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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran through several 
pertinent case studies, throughout the timeframe between 1977 and 1997. The 
researcher draws upon the arguments and assumptions of the neo-realist international 
relations school to explain the two countries' foreign policy behaviour towards each 
other. 
The thesis sets out to understand how certain factors (oil, religion, Iraq, regional 
conflicts, and the superpowers' involvement) shaped their relations. Although, each 
factor has played a significant role in determining the foreign policy behaviour of both 
states thus dictating the course of their relationship, each factor has assumed different 
degrees of importance, at different periods of time. The changing importance of each 
factor was influenced by three key events (the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, and 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait). In addition each factor is also shown to be inextricably 
interlinked to the other. The two countries have manipulated these factors to attempt 
to influence the balance of power in the region to their advantage. 
The researcher demonstrates that the abovementioned factors are likely to remain the 
key issues in affecting their relations in the foreseeable future. Based on neo-realist 
thinking, which perceives the international system to be characterized by anarchy where 
states compete for 'security, markets, and influence', both Saudi Arabia and Iran will 
remain competitive in regional affairs. However, both countries are also interested in 
maintaining a degree of co-operation to keep a balance of power in the region, as the 
ultimate goal for both countries is to protect their own national interests. 
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Chronology of Events in the Relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia 
1902 Abd-al-Aziz Bin-Abd-al-Rahman Bin-Faisal Bin-Turki Bin-Abdallah 
Bin Muhammad Al Sa'ud (often known as Ibn Sa'ud) takes control of 
Riyadh bringing the Al Saud family back into Saudi Arabia. 
1908 Discovery of oil in Iran, foundation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
(APOC). 
1912 The Ikhwan (Brotherhood) is founded based on Wahhabism; it grows 
quickly and provides key support for Abd-al-Aziz. 
1925 12 Dec. The Persian Parliament (Majlis) deposes the Qajar dynasty; elects Reza 
Shah as first king of new Pahlavi dynasty. 
1926 Abd-al-Aziz is proclaimed King of the Hijaz in the Grand Mosque of 
Mecca. 
1926 Jan. Britain recognises the independence of the Kingdom of the Hijaz and 
the Sultanate of Najd (together with their dependencies of Asir and 
Ahsa) in 27 May. 
1932 18 Sept. 'Abd al-'Aziz unifies the territories under his control and proclaims 
them as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
1935 Iran becomes the official name of the country that was known as 
Persia. 
1937 04 July Iraq-Iran Frontier Treaty is concluded under strong British pressure due 
to need for safe oil facilities. Iraq concedes navigation rights to all 
countries in the Shatt al-Arab waterway. 
1938 Oil is discovered in Saudi Arabia and production begins under the US 
controlled ARAMCO (Arabian American Oil Company). 
194125 Aug. Iran is occupied by Russia and British troops, and the Shah is deposed 
in favour of his son, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi (installed on 16 Sept). 
1945 23 Mar. Arab League formed. 
1947 12 Mar. Anti-communist Truman Doctrine proclaimed. 
1950 25 May. Britain, France, and US adopt Tripartite Declaration on regulating the 
supply of arms to the Middle East. 
195130 Apr. Dr. Musaddiq becomes Prime Minister of Iran, and Oil Nationalisation 
is ratified. 
1953 16-19 Aug. Coup '28th Mordad': Dr. Musaddiq deposed by UK/US-backed the 
Shah. 
1953 Nov. 'Abd al-Aziz Al Sa'ud dies; his eldest son, Sa'ud ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz 
takes over as king of Saudi Arabia, with his brother, Faisal, as Crown 
Prince. 
1955 24 Feb. Iraq Turkey, Britain and Iran sign the Baghdad Pact. 
ix 
1956 29 Oct. -7 Nov. The Suez War. 
1957 05 Jan. Anti-communist Eisenhower Doctrine is proclaimed. 
1958 05 Mar. Sa'ud's alleged attempts to bribe Syrian leaders to assassinate Nasser 
are revealed by Nasser & serve to discredit Sa'ud; Crown Prince Faisal 
takes over effective authority in Saudi Arabia, and implies rejection of 
the Eisenhower Doctrine (Aug). 
1959 Mar. Iraq withdraws from the Baghdad Pact, leaving the way open for Iran 
to sign a military cooperation agreement with the US, providing for 
American defence of Iran (which in turn leads Iran to reassert its claim 
that the Shatt al-Arab thalweg constitutes the international boundary). 
1960 10-14 Sept. Saudi Arabia and Iran are among the founding members of OPEC 
(Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries). 
1963 26 Jan. Shah of Iran begins westernising 'White Revolution', for economic 
modernization & land reform. 
1964 Revolt in Dhofar against rule of Omani government. Revolt continues 
until 1976. 
1964 Nov. King Sa'6d is deposed by his brother, the Crown Prince, Faisal 
Bin-Abd-al-Aziz Al Sa'ud. 
1967 5-10 June The Six-Day War. 
1968 09 Jan. The establishment of OAPEC (Organisation of Arab Petroleum 
Exporting Countries). 
1969 25 Sept. The OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) is founded in 
Jiddah, Saudi Arabia. 
1969 19 Apr. Iran unilaterally abrogates the 1937 Frontier Treaty with Iraq, claiming 
that the thalweg principle applies for the whole Shatt al-Arab 
waterway. 
1970 May. Iran renounces its claim to Bahrain, after UN report shows inhabitants 
want an independent State. 
19711 Dec. British withdraws from the Gulf territories. UAE (out of 6(from Feb 
72, with Ra's al-Khaymah joining, 7) emirates) formed as a federation 
on 2 Dec. 
1972 For the first time, Saudi Arabia gains control of a proportion (20 
percent) of ARAMCO, lessening the control of the Americans over 
Saudi's oil. 
1972 July Sadat expels Soviet military advisers. 
1973 06-26 Oct. The Yom Kippur War. 
1973 Saudi Arabia leads an oil boycott against the Western countries that 
supported Israel in the October War against Egypt and Syria leading to 
the quadrupling of oil prices. 
x 
1975 Jan. Iran sends 2 regiments into KDP-controlled areas of Iraq; war averted 
through Turkish, then Algerian mediation. 
1975 06 Mar. Under Algerian mediation during the OPEC sumn-dt, the Algiers 
Accord agrees to delimit territorial boundaries, according to the 
thalweg principle for the Shatt al-Arab in line with long-standing 
Iranian demands, and to end backing of subversive opposition groups. 
The Algiers Accord is incorporated into the Baghdad Treaty of 
International Boundaries and Good Neighborliness (signed 13 Jun; 
ratified 17 Sept) which creates a joint commission to demarcate the 
new boundaries. 
1975 25 Mar. King Faisal is assassinated; he is succeeded by his brother, Khalid 
Bin-Abd-al-Aziz Al Saud. 
1975 26 Aug. Emir of Bahrain dissolves the National Assembly & rules by decree 
(until 200 1). 
1978 Sept Iranian forces massacre around 1,500 people marching against the 
Shah on Jaleh square in Tehran. 
1979 15 Jan. Shah leaves Iran. 
1979 01 Feb. Ayatollah Khomeini returns; The Islamic Revolution in Iran. 
1979 Aug. Shiite revolt in Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. 
1979 04 Nov. US Embassy in Tehran is occupied and US diplomats taken hostage; 
released on 20 Jan 198 1, after 444 days. ' 
1979 20 Nov. 250 Saudi Sunni dissidents seize Mecca's Grand Mosque. 
1979 25 Dec. The Soviet army invades Afghanistan. 
1980 Saudi Arabia takes full control of ARAMCO from the US. 
1980 Jan. Carter doctrine proclaimed: protection of Gulf by force, blocking 
Soviet influence. 
1980 25 Jan. Abolhasan Bani-Sadr is elected Ist President of Iran, after new 
constitution is approved (IDec79). 
1980 22 Sept. Outbreak of war between Iraq and Iran. 
198125 May Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) formed by Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi & UAE to counter 'threats' of Iran and the Soviet Union. 
198122 June Bani-Sadr is dismissed as President of Iran. 
198107 Aug. Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia releases 8 point peace plan. 
198127-29 Sept. Iran retakes Abadan; the first sign of the reversal of the advantage in 
the war. 
1981 13 Dec. Bahrain blames Iran for failed coup by the Islamic Front for the 
Liberation of Bahrain; 73 people arrested. 
1982 12 Apr. Under strong Iranian counterattack, Saddam , Hussein offers to 
withdraw from Iran in order to end the conflict. Iran makes peace 
xi 
conditional on payment of reparations. 
1982 13 June Saudi King Khalid dies of a heart attack in Ta'if; his half-brother Fahd 
takes over, with Abdullah as Crown Prince. 
1983 04 May Iran dissolves pro-Soviet Tudeh party and expels 18 Soviet diplomats, 
as Soviet Union turns more strongly pro-Iraqi. 
1984 May Iran captures Iraq's oil-rich Majnoon islands. Iraq turns to attacking 
Kharg Island oil terminal & Iranian ships in the Gulf. Iran retaliates 
with strikes on Saudi & Kuwaiti ships (13 May). UN condemns the 
shipping war. 
1984 05 June Saudi shoots down an Iranian jet fighter, allegedly in its airspace. 
1985 July Iraq peace overtures ignored by Iran. 
1985 13 Sept. Iran receives 508 US-made Tow missiles, as part of secret 
arms-for-hostages deal with US. 4000 more missiles authorised by 
Reagan on 17 Jan 86, supplied through Israel. The sales are finally 
revealed by al-Shira'a magazine (Beirut) on 3 Nov 86, creating the 
international "Irangate" scandal. 
1986 Feb. Iran captures Fao Peninsula, in Southern Iraq. 
1986 Nov. King Fahd adds the title "Custodian of the Two Holy Cities" to his 
name. 
1987 17-25 Jan. Iraq resumes the 'War of the Cities'; Moscow pressures Iraq to end war 
(18 Feb) 
1987 Aug. Mecca riot causes more than 400 deaths. 
1988 Feb. The Soviet Union announces its intention to withdraw from 
Afghanistan. 
1988 16-18 Apr. Iraq recaptures Fao Peninsula. 
1988 18 Apr. US blows up 2 Iranian oilrigs, destroys an Iranian frigate and 
immobilises another. 
19 88 26 Apr. Saudi Arabia severs its diplomatic relations with Iran. 
1988 03 July USS Vincennes shoots down an Iranian Airbus passenger aircraft, 
killing 290. 
1988 18 July End of Iran-Iraq War. 
1988 20 July Iran accepts ceasefire after UN-brokered agreement in Geneva. 
1988 20 Aug. Formal ceasefire in Iraq-Iran war. 
1989 Feb. Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. 
1989 03 June Khomeini dies. Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafanjani becomes the new 
president (17 Aug. ). 
1990 02 Aug. Iraqi forces invade Kuwait. 
1990 12 Aug. Iraq offers to withdraw if Syria withdraws from Lebanon & Israel from 
1967 territories. Another offer to withdraw (23 Aug. ) if given 
xii 
guaranteed access to Gulf & full control of Rumailah oil field. SCR678 
(29 Nov. ) authorises military action to liberate Kuwait, & imposes 
deadline of 15 Jan for Iraqi withdrawal. 
1991 16 Jan. -28 Feb. The Second Gulf War. 
199106 Mar. 'Damascus Declaration': Syria and Egypt agree to protect GCC 
militarily for economic aid. 
1991 19 Mar. Saudi Arabia re-establishes its diplomatic relations with Iran. 
199125 Dec. Dissolution of the USSR. 
1992 20 Apr. Abu Musa issue re-emerges. 
1993 Apr. GCC Foreign Ministers claim UAE sovereignty over 3 Gulf Islands. 
1993 18 May Martin Indyk, Special Assistant to the US President on Near Eastern & 
South Asian affairs, announces a policy of 'Dual Containment' of Iran 
and Iraq. 
1993 11 June Rafsanjani re-elected as President in Iran. 
1994 05 Dec. Bahrain arrests Shi'ite leaders, and widespread Shi'ite protests follow, 
with attendant government crackdown. 
1994 08 May Clinton signs executive order banning US companies from trading with 
Iran; had been announced at meeting of the World of Jewish Congress 
in New York on 30 Apr. 
1996 09 Mar. Iranian Parliamentary election: pro-Rafsanjani faction gains. 
1996 03 June Bahrain's Interior Ministry accuses Iran of organising uprisings against 
the government through "Hizbullah-Bahrain7 group; recalls 
ambassador to Iran. 
1996 25 June Huge bomb explodes at al-Khobar, residential complex for US 
personnel stationed at Dhahran airbase in Saudi Arabia. 
1997 23 May Election of Seyyid Muhammad Khatami to the Presidency of Iran. 
1997 09 Dec. Organisation of the Islamic Conference meets in Tehran, adopting the 
Tehran Declaration which considers D'Amato bill void. 
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Introduction 
INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Objectives 
This study focuses on the relations between two of the most important and influential 
states in the Gulf regional system, Saudi Arabia and Iran; it attempts to assess the 
development of their relations through a number of case studies. The thesis identifies 
and explores different factors and variables which have impacted on their relations from 
1977 to 1997. This particular timeframe is chosen because it spans a period of 
momentous change in Iran; it encompasses the last two years of the Shah's reign, prior 
to the revolution, until the beginning of a new Iranian era under President Khatami. 
The Iranian Revolution marks a watershed for the Saudi-Iranian relations and, therefore, 
is critical for comprehending the fluctuations of their relations from the late 1970s to the 
beginning of the new era in the mid-1990s. The study attempts to establish and 
develop a comprehensive understanding of Saudi-Iranian relations and how they have 
been affected by various issues. Such an understanding is crucial to predict the factors 
that are likely to influence the future course of Saudi-Iranian relations. 
The research question the study aims to answer is: how certain factors, namely oil, 
religion, Iraq, regional disputes (Bahrain, Abu Musa, the Greater and Lesser Tunbs), and 
superpowers (the US, and the Soviet Union/Russia) have affected the relations between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran during the timeframe under study? 
2.0 Methodology 
The research has been conducted on a number of levels. The thesis is grounded in 
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international relations; the main theories of international relations, namely realism, 
neo-realism, pluralism, and globalism, are outlined in order to distil the theory that best 
explains the behaviour of Saudi Arabia & Iran towards each other. As will be 
illustrated, it is believed that neo-realism offers the most useful theoretical framework 
because it allows us to consider the state as a unitary actor. Since this thesis does not 
attempt to deal with all aspects that impact on Iranian and Saudi foreign policy-making 
(domestic or external), it is more useful to consider the end-product of policy in terms 
of the holistic actions of the state itself. Thus, the state needs to be dealt with as a 
unitary actor. 
Neo-realism also offers a context for a relationship between two states - the 
international and regional systems - which have been fundamental to the relationship 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Within that context, the concept of balance of power 
presents an understanding of how states align themselves in their relations with others, 
whether this is through competition or co-operation. Finally, neo-realism offers the 
notion that regime survival is the ultimate goal of states in the international system, and 
that - while other interests such as economic considerations are relevant - they are 
ultimately subordinate to this primary objective. 
The researcher highlights the different factors impacting on relations between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran. The researcher has chosen the most important issues, namely oil, 
religion, Iraq, Bahrain, Abu Musa and the superpowers, as the main themes for the 
chapters, in tracing developments in Saudi-Iranian relations. The researcher has relied 
mainly on published secondary sources, including books, articles and journals. 
Although some primary sources have also been used, assessing the nature of the 
political systems in the two countries has meant that access to official information has 
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often been unavailable. Where necessary, sources such as Mideast Mirror and SWB, 
which replicate primary commentaries, have been utilised. Moreover, while the 
researcher conducted some fieldwork in Iran in 1998, being Taiwanese, the researcher 
found it impossible to personally visit Saudi Arabia to conduct fieldwork there. 
3.0 Significance of the study 
A few systematic studies of Saudi-Iranian relations have been undertaken by 
Amirahmadi, Badeeb, Chubin, Furtig, Haass and Tripp. But none have dealt 
comprehensively with such important issues such as oil, religion, regional disputes, and 
the superpowers and their impact on relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The fact 
that oil intensified the competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran has so far been 
neglected. Also, the religious factor has played a prominent role since the Iranian 
revolution, and regional factors such as Iraq, Bahrain and the Abu Musa issues have all 
been critical in the Saudi-Iranian quest for dominance in the region. Thus, the major 
contribution of this study is that it is the first comprehensive attempt at exploring 
Saudi-Iranian relations concerning the above mentioned key factors from 1977 and 
through the revolutionary period in Iran. 
4.0 Outline of thesis 
This thesis is divided into three main parts. Part one comprises of the theoretical 
framework and the history of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran since the early 
twentieth century. The first chapter introduces the international relations theories and 
concepts used throughout the study. The researcher uses the main paradigms of 
international relations of realism, neo-realism, pluralism, and globalism, highlighting 
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each theory's strengths and weakness when applied to the study of relations between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran. One could argue that none of the paradigms could properly 
explain the impact of the forces which affected the relations between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran. However, one should bear in mind that theories are put forward after events 
happen and theorists attempt to find the most suitable theory to describe the 
phenomenon between the relations among states. The neo-realist theory of 
international relations, as developed by Waltz, has been chosen to be the principle 
JU 
guideline for the research, as the researcher argues that domestic factors play less 
significant part in determining states', in the case of this research Saudi Arabia and 
Iran's, foreign policy than external determinants. 
The second chapter traces the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran from the early 
twentieth century to 1977, and assesses the changing nature of their relations by looking 
at their geographical significance in world politics. Superpower competition in 
regional affairs has raised the importance of both countries in the international political 
system. Further, the discovery of oil in the region altered the form of competition in 
the region from simple ideological competition, after WWII, giving it an economic 
dimension in the late 1950s onwards. In particular, the rise of oil, which led to the 
establishment of Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and 
Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) in the 1960s, has 
influenced their relations in later periods. Regional conflicts emerged as a prelude to 
their competition for domination in regional affairs. Thus, studying the history of the 
relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran prior to 1977 is essential for producing a strong 
understanding of how the external factor has affected Saudi-Iranian relations. 
The foundations laid in Chapter Two are built on in the second section. This part is 
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divided into five chapters and assesses factors (oil, religion, Iraq, regional conflicts, and 
the superpowers' involvement) affecting Saudi-Iranian relations. Although, each 
factor has played a significant role in determining the course of relations, at a certain 
stage, one should not be tempted to overemphasise the influence of any one factor over 
the others. The researcher emphasises that each factor has intertwined with other 
factors in different stages; and any attempt to attribute the improvement or worsening of 
relations during a particular stage to one factor or another is an oversimplification of the 
relationship and will probably be inaccurate. 
Chapter Three focuses on oil. Despite having a common commodity base, oil, both 
states have adopted different approaches in utilising oil revenues to meet their 
development needs. By looking at how oil producing countries emerged as a cartel in 
the world market and competition for domination within OPEC, we are able to perceive 
how their confrontation has intensified. 
Chapter Four examines religion's contribution to the reinforcement of competition 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran soon after the Iranian Revolution. Investigating the 
division between Sunni and ShVite in the Muslim world will help us understand the 
natural difference of both regimes regarding religion. This difference was sharpened 
by the change of regime in Iran in 1979. The Iranian regime attempted to export its 
ideology into the region. This aroused the fear of the Saudi regime of an attempt to 
impose the Iranian style revolution in Saudi Arabia. Confrontation was intensified as 
the Iranian regime challenged the Saudi regime for its leading position in the Muslim 
world. The Saudi regime, ever since the establishment of the Kingdom, has based the 
legitimacy of Saudi leadership in the Muslim world on the location of the two Holy 
Cities, Mecca and Medina, within its territory. Saudi Arabia has, therefore, always 
5 
Introduction 
considered itself as the centre of the Muslim world. This was questioned by the 
Iranian clergy, especially Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who described the Saudi ruling 
family's behaviour as being 'un-Islamic'. Consequently, religion has had an adverse 
impact on the Saudi-Iranian relations after the revolution in 1979. Religion has been 
considered in this thesis, not as a literal or domestic identity-related input into 
foreign-policy making, but as a political tool of the regimes. 
Chapter Five discusses the influence of the Iraqi factor over Saudi-Iranian relations 
during the periods of the Iran-Iraq War between 1980-88 and the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990. During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq acted as one main reason behind the 
deterioration of Saudi-Iranian relations, as Saudi Arabia had supported Iraqi war efforts 
against Iran. This support was inspired by Saudi fear of Iran emerging as the dominant 
state in the region. This would have threatened Saudi's own security. However, the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait reversed the trend of their frosted relations, as Tehran took a 
neutral stance in the conflict. 
Chapter Six also accesses the impact of regional issues on Saudi-Iranian relations by 
discussing the Bahraini factor, Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs disputes. 
The reaction of both Saudi Arabia and Iran towards these two issues is highlighted in 
the chapter. Each issue elicited a different response from both countries. The Saudi 
regime closely monitored events in Bahrain to guard its own security interests. In 
contrast, the Saudi response to UAE's request for a confrontation with Iran regarding 
Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs disputes was lukewarm. Evidently, Saudi 
Arabia was unwilling to fight with Iran over these territorial disputes. 
The penultimate chapter assesses the effect of superpower involvement in regional 
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affairs on Saudi-Iranian relations. After WWII, both superpowers sought to extend 
their influence and promote their interests in the region. Due to ideological reasons, as 
will be highlighted in the chapter, the US has been more successful than the Soviet 
Union in cultivating relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran at different stages, thereby 
exerting more influence on the course of their relationship. Soviet influence in the 
region further declined with the dissolution of the Soviet Union into the Russian 
Federation, plus its economic collapse, and the loss of its Central Asian Republics, and 
the eventual recession of its territorial boundary moving further away from the Middle 
East region. Hence, since the early 1990s, the US has become the unipower in 
regional affairs, and its impact on Saudi-Iranian relations has been amplified. 
In the concluding chapter, the researcher presents a brief review of the arguments 
examined throughout the thesis. The contribution of each factor towards the 
improvement or worsening of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran will be assessed. 
The contribution which neo-realism can make in understanding the Saudi-Iranian 
relationship will be assessed, as well as the limitations of this specific approach. 
Finally, the researcher evaluates the kind of role each of the key factors might play in 
the future of Saudi-Iranian relations. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The strong do what they have the power to do, 
and the weak accept what they have to accept. 
-Thucydides 
1.0 Introduction 
The change in the international political environment from 1977 to 1997, caused by the 
Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88), the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 
1990, the Second Gulf war in 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the 
emerging unipolar distribution of power, had significant implications for the relations 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
Saudi Arabia and Iran are the most important players in the Gulf region due* to their 
strategic location, their resources of petroleum and natural gas, and their religious 
significance in the Islamic world. For their own benefit, external powers have been 
eager to play a role in their relations. Therefore, Saudi Arabia and Iran's relations have 
always been affected by international players. 
Yet, there is still no single coherent theory in international relations which could 
precisely explain and predict both Saudi Arabia and Iran's foreign policy behaviour. 
Although many theoretical frameworks have been applied to explain and predict their 
foreign policy regarding specific issues, they do not explain everything. The author, 
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therefore, attempts to highlight different theories, to explain their strengths and 
weaknesses in order to demonstrate which theory is most able to clarify their foreign 
policy towards each other. 
There are a variety of theories distinguishable within international relations literature. 
This chapter will elaborate on four main theories: realism; neo-realism; pluralism; and 
globalism. The researcher will present the main concepts, strengths and critique of 
each of the four theories. This will be then utilised as a tool to enable the author to 
analyse relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia from 1977 to 1997 within the 
intemational political system. 
2.0 The paradigms of international relations 
As already mentioned, in order to build up a theoretical and conceptual framework for 
this study, the author will highlight four theories: realism; neo-realism; pluralism; and 
globalism. The author highlights the main concept of each theory and at the same time 
identifying the theory's strengths and weaknesses. After a summary of the paradigms 
has been presented, the author will explain the reason for choosing neo-realism as a 
model to discuss relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
2.1 Realism 
Realism is widely regarded as the most influential theoretical tradition in international 
relations. Realism's main foci are the state, power and the balance of power. It sees 
nation states as constituents of an international system which determines their 
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behaviour. It argues that the state of war is the regular condition of life within this 
international system. 
Relations among states take place in the absence of a world government, and for 
realists, this means that the international system is anarchical. International relations 
are best understood by focusing on the distribution of power among states, and the 
uneven distribution of power means that the arena of international relations is a form of 
power politics (Griffiths, 1999: 1). 
The core elements of realism are: 
1. The state is the principal or most important actor; 
2. The state is a unitary actor; 
3. The state is a rational actor; 
4. National security is the most important issue for a state's survival. Military and 
political issues dominate the agenda and are referred to as high politics (Viotti and 
Kauppi, 1993: 5-7); 
5. Balance of power plays an important role in the anarchical world system. 
The essential features of realism are statism, survival, and self-help. For realists, the 
meaning of the sovereign state is inextricably linked with the use of force which has two 
dimensions: internal and external. State in the internal sense is 'the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. For the external dimension, a 
sovereign state coexists with other states in an anarchic system. The definition of 
anarchy does not imply chaos, but the absence of political authority. In anarchy, states 
compete with other states for security, markets, and influence' (Baylis and Smith, 
1997: 114-15). For realists, states are the only actors which really count, and the state's 
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first move is to organise power domestically, and secondly is to accumulate power 
internationally. 
The second principle of realism is the state's paramount goal of survival, this being a 
precondition for attaining all other goals, whether these involve conquest or merely 
independence. Realists argue that international politics is a constant of the regularity 
of war and conflict. The key difference between domestic and international orders lies 
in their structure. In the domestic polity, citizens do not have to defend themselves, 
yet in the international system, there is no higher authority to prevent and counter the 
use of force. Waltz argues that states use external as well as internal means to achieve 
their goals - an important one of which is security, and self-help is necessarily the 
principle of action in an anarchic order. Security can only be realised through 
self-help, the third pillar of realist theory (Baylis and Smith, 1997: 117), and through the 
operation of the balance of power, which refers to an equilibrium between states 
(Dunne, 1997: 122). However, the balance of power is not natural or inevitable, it must 
be constructed (Baylis and Smith, 1997: 118). 
Realists believe that states, existing in an anarchic world, rely heavily on the concept of 
power, rationality, and the balance of power. International politics is, therefore, a 
struggle for power and ultimately state survival. Realists regard power as the 
fundamental concept in social sciences, and power is central to their understanding of 
how nation-states deal and interact with each other (Bin Huwaidin, 2001: 60). 
Morgenthau states that international politics is a struggle for power; he perceives power 
not only as an instrument for the attainment of other ends in a competitive international 
system, but also as an end in itself (Morgenthau, 1967: 5). Whatever the ultimate aims 
of international politics, power is always the immediate aim. 
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States then compete with each other within the anarchic international system. The 
nature of the international system, therefore, determines the basic foreign policy 
orientations of any particular state, whether this be a policy of status quo, or 
imperialism, depending on its location in the international power structure. Due to its 
centrality to explaining state behaviour in realism thought, international anarchy 
deserves more attention. 
The concept of international anarchy: 
There is no body above the state; states are the only bodies in international society with 
sovereignty. There is no central government, and the units operating within the 
international system are sovereign and autonomous states, responsible for their own fate 
even though they may not control it. Thus, international politics is said to be 
anarchical because no single state or coalition of states has absolute control or authority 
over the entire system. (Griffiths and. O'Callaghan, 2002: 3). They claim a right to be 
independent or autonomous from other states, and they claim a right to exercise 
complete authority over their own territories, but can not claim the right to dominate 
another sovereign state. Some states are clearly more powerful than others, but there is 
no recognised authority higher than that of any state. 
The location of a state within a situation of anarchy imposes a security risk. There is 
no prospect of completely enforceable international law, or of a universal moral code to 
guide the actions of leaders. Might may not always be right, but unless it is met with 
equal might it may well prevail. Anarchy, therefore, can only be mitigated, not 
transcended. As long as the structure of the system remains anarchical, states must 
continue to ensure their own defences, and forces, or threats to it, will continue to be a 
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possible outcome of any international interactions. 
Realists believe that governments act rationally, have consistent, ordered preferences, 
and calculate the costs and benefits of all available policies in order to maximise their 
utility in light of both those preferences and their perceptions of the nature of reality. 
Furthermore, they assume that decision-makers will try to achieve the best possible 
decision (Viotti and Kauppi, 1993: 35-36). 
In such an anarchic international system, balance of power is central for ensuring 
stability of the system. 
Balance of power 
The term balance of power indicates the relative distribution of power among states into 
equal or unequal shares, and realists believe that a balance of power is the best 
guarantee of security of states and peace of the world. However, great powers play the 
leading roles in influencing the balance of power in the international system, as well as 
sub-systems, because of their military force and their control of key technologies. In 
the end a great power reaps a disproportionate share of the benefits of the system, but 
they also bear a greater responsibility as its regulators (Griffiths and O'Callaghan, 
2002: 12-13). 
As states in the anarchic system aim for survival, the balance of power plays a very 
important role within the realist framework. 
Viotti and Kauppi state that balance of power is: 
1. A policy aimed at a certain state of affairs; 
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2. An objective or actual state of affairs; 
3. An approximately equal distribution of power; as when a balance of power existed 
between the US and the Soviet Union; and 
4. Any distribution of power including a preponderance of power, as when the balance 
of power shifts in favour of either superpower (Viotti and Kauppi, 1993: 64). 
Balance of power theory is a theory about the results produced by the unco-ordinated 
actions of states. Coexistence is achieved through maintaining a balance of power; and 
limited co-operation is possible in interactions where the realist state stands to gain 
more than other states. 
Criticisms 
The key critique of realism's three principles are: statism is flawed both on empirical 
and normative grounds. There are no limits on the actions a state can take necessary to 
secure their survival. Nor is self-help an inevitable consequence of the absence of a 
world government; self-help is a game which states have chosen to play (Baylis and 
Smith, 1997: 119). 
In addition, realists saw power politics as a necessary and endemic feature of all 
relationships between sovereign states. Realists drew attention to the reality of conflict 
in international relations, and the lessons to be learrit from its recurrent patterns. 
However, realism is criticised for its failure to recognise how its contribution to 
international stability preserves social and economic inequalities within and between 
societies (Burchill, 2001: 83-85). Furthermore, Waltz's theory of the balance of power 
encounters some difficulties. He does not identify precisely the conditions under 
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which coalitions will change; he only predicts that balances of power will periodically 
recur. He relies explicitly on the rationality principle to show that bipolar balances 
must be stable (Keohane, 1993: 197). 
Realism is regarded as providing a basic understanding of human nature. However, 
realism has been criticised by a number of theorists. Globalists, such as Wallerstein, 
argue that the theory does not account for the role of classes, societies, and non-state 
actors within the world capitalist system, and fails to address economic factors which 
play a very important role within the state. Holsti, writing from a pluralist perspective 
further adds that realism could not explain the role of multinational corporations, 
terrorist groups, transactional and international organisations within the state power 
struggle. Furthermore, realism fails to deal with the particular motives and values of 
individual decision-makers. Keohane criticised realism for leaving little room for the 
individual decision-makers to act, and for ignoring that economics had several related 
effects (Keohane, 1993: 261). 
Furthermore, Keohane argues that realism does not provide a satisfactory theory of 
world politics, and could not provide a set of plausible and testable answers to questions 
about state behaviour under specified conditions. Realism is particularly weak in 
accounting for change, especially where the sources of that change lie in the world 
political economy or in the domestic structures of states (Keohane, 1986: 159). 
Furthennore, the balance of power does not explain the particular policies of states, and 
has two problems: 
1. The theory offers some predictions, but these are indeterminate. Because only a 
loosely defined and inconstant condition of balance is predicted, it is difficult to say 
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that any given distribution of power falsifies the theory. 
2. Though states may be disposed to react to international constraints and incentives in 
accordance with the theory's expectations, the policies and actions of states are also 
shaped by their internal conditions. 
2.2 Neo-realism 
The essence of neo-realism is a more theoretically refined systemic or structural account 
of international relations which answers some of the criticisms of realism. Although, 
neo-realism accepts all the assumptions made by realists including the concept of power, 
here the concept of power is not defined only in terms of military might. Instead, 
neo-realism defines power according to a wide range of capabilities. Neo-realism has 
two main areas of concern: the first is an attempt to rectify realism's inability to deal 
with economic issues; and the second is the development of a more thorough and 
rigorous structural account of international relations. 
Neo-realism accepts the basic assumptions of realism about the state being the main 
international actor in world politics and that states are mainly concerned with their own 
survival. However, co-operation is not impossible to achieve in the anarchical 
international system. States co-operate with each other in order to increase their own 
capabilities (Bin Huwaidin, 2001: 64-65), and the measurement of a state's power in the 
international system is not just restricted to its military capability, but also to its 
performance in several different capabilities, like economy, religion and politics. 
However, rather than locating human nature as the source of state behaviour, 
neo-realism emphasises the structure of the international political system. Neo-realism 
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identifies the natural state of anarchy, within which states exist, as the main determinant 
of state behaviour. Survival is the primordial reason for the state, where behaviour is 
governed by self-help in a system of states. However, the differentiation among states 
in terms of territorial size, their population, and the geopolitics factors, affects the 
power-ratio of relations (Quilliam, 1999: 9). 
Both realists and neo-realists agree that the internal dynamics of states, such as their 
domestic political systems, domestic economic development policies and religious 
legitimacy of regimes are relevant to the formulation of foreign policy, but when these 
clash with the objective of regime survival, the state puts the balance of power above 
economic and religious considerations. It can be argued that foreign policy should be 
based upon a rational set of objectives if the state is to survive in the anarchic arena. 
Therefore, to protect their sovereignty, states try to achieve a balance of power 
(Quilliam, 1999: 9). 
Neo-realists believe that states' national interests in the international system can be 
defined as securing their survival by increasing their economic, military and political 
capabilities in order to produce a balance of power. Therefore, balance of power 
becomes an important principle in guiding relations among states (Bin Huwaidin, 
2001: 69). 
Therefore, the core elements of neo-realism can be surnmarised as follows: 
1. Neo-realists recognise that states and non-state actors are both important in world 
politics, but recognise the role of non-state actors within the state decision-making 
procedure; 
2. Neo-realism belongs firmly to the realist tradition, where the state is a rational actor; 
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3. Neo-realism believes that both economy and power are important factors for state 
survival, but when both of them clash, the state puts power above economic 
considerations (Keohane, 1993: 110); 
4. The political significance of interdependence varies depending on whether a realm 
is organised, with relations of authority specified and established, or remains 
formally unorganised; 
5. Balance of power still plays an important part in the anarchical world. 
Neo-realists see states as able to control international economic transactions in a way 
that restores explanatory power to realist assumptions about the role of those states that 
attempt to maximise the power. Within neo-realism international, economic regimes 
are incarnations of structural power in the international system, and their existence 
allows states to control one area of the international agenda that better explain the 
international system than realism. If an economic power can sufficiently dominate the 
international economy, it can provide a hegemonic stability which enables other states 
to co-operate with it and with one another. 
Criticisms 
Criticisms of neo-realism arose because it leaves little or no room for systemic change 
induced by the units themselves. Waltz is convinced that states are virtually powerless 
to alter the system in which they find themselves trapped, although he concedes that 
under certain conditions they can resist the constraints of structure. Waltz argues that 
the values, ethics and moral aspirations of states are frustrated by the systemic 
constraint of anarchy. Waltz denies that greater levels of economic interdependency 
amongst states pose a threat to the condition of anarchy (Burchill, 2001: 92). 
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Neo-realism, due to its emphasis on recurrence and repetition in the international system, 
can not envisage a form of statecraft which transcends the calculus of power and control 
(Burchill, 2001: 93). Furthermore, neo-realism is criticised as a problem-solving 
theory which accepts the prevailing social and political relations between states and the 
institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action. It also 
reduces international relations to power management by legitimating the very political 
order it is describing - one which favours the powerful and is hostile to change 
(Burchill, 2001: 93-94). 
2.3 Pluralism 
The pluralist image of international relations is another approach to the study of 
domestic sources in determining foreign policy. Unlike realists who argue that balance 
of power and the international system are the most important factors in formulating 
foreign policy, pluralists emphasise the significance of internal factors in determining 
states' foreign policy. Pluralists believe power is not the most important factor in 
conducting states' foreign policy, but the role of different internal factors, mainly 
economic, shape states' foreign policy. Pluralism is more concerned with the notions 
of co-operation, coexistence, and interdependence. 
The main assumptions of pluralism are: 
1. State and non-state actors are important. Pluralists regard non-state actors as 
important entities in international relations that cannot be ignored, and play as 
important a role as states in international relations; 
2. The state is not a unitary actor; it is composed of different actors that attempt to 
influence the fonnulation of foreign policy; 
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3. The state is not a rational actor, and the foreign policy decision-making is a 
complicated process which is the result of clashes, bargaining, and compromise 
between and among different actors; 
4. Multiple agendas with socio-economic or welfare issues are as, or even more, 
important as national security questions. Pluralists argue that economic and social 
issues are important elements of foreign policy besides national security (Viotti and 
Kauppi, 1993: 7-10). 
The pluralist image is based on a different set of assumptions. First, non-state actors 
are significant entities in international relations. International organisations can be 
important independent actors in their own right. The organisation's own decision 
makers, bureaucrats, and other associated groups have considerable influence in areas 
such as agenda-setting, determining which issuesý are most important politically. 
Non-governmental actors such as multinational corporations (MNCs) can not be 
dismissed as being of merely marginal importance, as can be seen in the Third World 
countries, where Western companies may influence a country's policy. In pluralism, 
therefore, the transnational dimension of state and non-state actors operate across 
national borders (Viotti and Kauppi, 1993: 7-8). 
Second, for pluralists, the state is not a unitary actor. The state is composed of 
individual bureaucracies, interest groups, and individuals that attempt to formulate or 
influence foreign policy. Competition, coalition building, conflict, and compromise 
among these actors are the stuff of politics (Viotti and Kauppi, 1993: 7-8). 
Third, pluralists challenge the utility of the realist assumption of the state as a rational 
actor. This follows from the pluralist image of the disaggregated state in which the 
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foreign policy decision-making process is the result of clashes, bargaining, and 
compromise between and among different actors. However, misperception on the part 
of decision makers, as a result of incomplete information, bias, stress, and uncertainty 
about cause and effect, may result in an inability to produce the best or optimal decision 
(Viotti and Kauppi, 1993: 7-8). 
Finally, for pluralists, military or national security is not always on the top of a state's 
agenda. Foreign affairs issues may be influenced by economic and social causes that 
affect a state's decision making process (Viotti and Kauppi, 1993: 7-8). 
In relations between states, pluralists stress the possibilities for co-operation. Pluralists 
do not think that sovereignty is as important in practice as realists think it is in theory. 
The strengths of pluralism in explaining international politics are: 
1. Pluralists emphasise decision-making, transnationalism, and co-operation. 
2. Pluralists approach to international relations is grounded in political economy. 
3. Pluralists focus on a greater variety of actors. 
4. The transnationalist tradition emphasises socio-econornic or welfare issues. 
Criticisms 
Pluralism has been criticised by different schools, which conclude that pluralism can not 
explain conflict and compromise among different actors (i. e. interest groups, and 
individuals) influencing the decision making process. Furthermore, pluralists tend to 
downplay the role of anarchy and the security dilemma in explaining international 
relations. It has been argued by realists that no analysis of world politics is complete 
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unless the anarchical structure of the system is taken into account (Viotti and Kauppi, 
1993: 248-49). 
At the same time, realists criticise pluralism because, by emphasising misperception and 
the role of bureaucratic politics, there is a danger in thinking that all conflicts result 
from essentially non-rational forces and that somehow better communication would 
reduce the amount of conflict in the international system. By contrast, realists argue 
that states often have fundamentally different interests than conflict, and the notions of 
'slipping into war' and 'the war nobody wanted' are overused and misleading. Realists 
believe that pluralists are in danger of remaining in the realm of merely describing 
things as opposed to explaining why things happen the way they do (Viotti and Kauppi, 
1993: 248). 
2.4 Globalism 
Globalism shares some features with both realism and pluralism, but is distinguished in 
its perception of the world capitalist system. The essence of globalism can be found in 
its study of dependency. Dependency theories are about asymmetries in power 
relations, in particular in economic capability, which account for structural inequalities 
in global wealth and power. Dependency stems from the simple yet crucial factor of 
reliance, and can be identified in military, economic and technological terms (Evans, 
1998: 121). It refers to imposed conditions whereby the exposure of Third World 
states to foreign direct investment, unequal trade agreements, interest payments on debt, 
and the exchange of raw materials for high priced manufactured goods creates 
structurally unequal relations between the core and the periphery (Griffiths and 
O'Callaghan, 2002: 71-72). 
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Foreign direct investment creates an out flow of wealth from Third World states, and 
the wealth is systematically transferred from the periphery to the core. The result is 
chronic underdevelopment, which in turn manifests itself in two ways. The first is 
uneven development. The second is the introduction of a Western class system into 
. the Third World (Griffiths and O'Callaghan, 2002: 72). 
Wallerstein regards the world economy as coexisting with a multiplicity of political 
jurisdictions and was characterised by a new international division of labour between 
core and periphery. The core refers to most of Europe and the US, and is where capital 
is always concentrated in its most sophisticated forms. In contrast, the periphery, 
mainly Latin America, Africa, most Asian countries, and Eastern Europe, refers to 
regions lacking strong central governments, dependent on coercive rather than 
wage-labour, and whose economies depend upon the export of raw materials to the core 
(Griffiths, 1999: 252). 
Wallerstein also refers to semi-peripheries as well as extemal areas. Semi-peripheries 
are either regions that could be geographically located in the core but are undergoing a 
process of relative decline or rising economies in the periphery, such as Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, South Korea, and the Soviet Union. They are exploited by the core, but in 
turn take advantage of the periphery. Wallerstein argues that the semi-periphery is a 
crucial buffer between core and periphery (Griffiths, 1999: 253). 
Globalists believe that the structure of the world capitalist system is responsible for an 
inequitable relationship between the North and the South, i. e. the transnational. class 
coalitions linking elites in industrially developed countries (the North) with their 
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counterparts (the South). Wallerstein divides the organisation of the global economy 
into the core and the periphery; and in his theory, the periphery serves the interests of 
the core and the inequitable level of exchange ensures that the core remains the 
dominant partner in their relations Quilliam, 1999: 10). 
The main assumptions of globalism are: 
1. The global context within which states and other entities interact, as well as classes, 
states, societies, and non-state actors, operate as part of the world capitalist system. 
2. Views international relations from a historical perspective. 
3. Focuses on patterns of dominance within and among societies. 
4. Economic factors are the most important issues for states (Viotti and Kauppi, 
1993: 8-10). 
Globalists use systems analysis as their mode of enquiry. They perceive economic 
relations between the North and the South as dependent, and typically assume that the 
starting point of analysis for international relations is the global context within which 
states and other entities interact. Second, globalists stress that historical analysis is not 
only useful but also imperative to view international relations. Third, globalists 
believe that mechanisms of economic domination keep Third World states from 
developing, and that contributes to uneven development worldwide. Globalists 
recognise the importance of states, international organisations, and transnational actors 
and coalitions as actors in international relations, the particular focus being on how 
these and other factors act as mechanisms of domination by which some states, classes, 
or elites manage to benefit from the capitalist system at the expense of others. More 
specifically, globalists are typically concerned with the development and maintenance 
of dependency relations among northern industrialised states and poor, underdeveloped, 
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or industrially backward Third World or less developed countries (LDCs) of Latin 
America, Africa, and Asia. As part of the world capitalist system, LDCs can not 
choose their own path toward economic, and political development; autonomous 
development in these circumstances is not possible. Finally, globalists emphasise the 
critical importance of economic factors when it comes to explaining the dynamics of the 
international system. Globalists start with the assumption that economics is the key to 
understanding the creation, evolution, and functioning of the contemporary world 
system (Viotti and Kauppi, 1993: 449-50). 
The strengths of globalism are: 
1. The concept of dependency in a world capitalist context; 
2. Approach to international relations grounded in political economy which could 
explain the situation in the world economy; and 
3. Transnationalist tradition emphasises socio-economic or welfare issues. 
Globalism requires a significant capability, particularly in the military and economic 
dimensions and the willingness to use such a capability to secure goals of the state, 
often at considerable cost. Globalists see the global actor as uniquely qualified to 
pursue interventionist behaviour. 
Criticisms 
Critics have argued that some globalists have reduced the operation of the international 
system to the process of capital accumulation and related dynamics. They argue that 
globalists have placed too much importance on the economic variable (Viotti and 
Kauppi, 1993: 465). The economic criticism of globalism is that individual cases are 
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examined solely in terms of general theoretical constructs, such as dependency or the 
capitalist world-system. Furthermore, globalists use case studies only when they 
appear to provide evidence to support their line of argument (Viotti and Kauppi, 
1993: 465). Critics comment that globalists simply group all irregularity under the 
concept of the semi-periphery, which is a theoretically and empirically poorly defined 
concept. Critics also charge that much of the work is less about explaining 
underdevelopment than about uniting Third World nationalists and socialists against the 
West by providing a politically attractive doctrine packaged in social science terms that 
blames all LDC problems on outside powers (Viotti and Kauppi, 1993: 466). 
The essential problem for globalism is that from a purely systemic point of view, 
situations of strategic interdependence do not have determinate solutions. No matter 
how carefully power resources are defined, no power model will be able accurately to 
predict outcomes under such conditions. 
In line with the approach of this study, the researcher draws on the neo-realist school of 
thought, and highlights that state, power, and national security are critical variables in 
international relations theory, and will form the basis of analysis for this study. 
However, these are working definitions for the purposes of this research and, as such, 
are not intended to be comprehensive definitions. In order to establish a theoretical 
framework for this study, it is first of all necessary to have an understanding of the 
definitions of state, power and security, and also to recognise that the these factors play 
an important role in shaping the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the case 
studies discussed throughout the thesis. 
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The State 
According to Dunne's definition, the state is a legal territorial entity composed of a 
stable population and a government; it possesses a monopoly over the legitimate use of 
force; its sovereignty is recognised by other states in the international system (Dunne, 
1997: 122). Griffiths and O'Callaghan define states as that which: govern people in a 
territory with boundaries. They have laws, taxes, officials, currencies, postal services, 
police and armies. They wage war, negotiate treaties, put people in prison, and 
regulate life in thousands of ways. The most important fact is that they claim 
sovereignty within their territory (Griffiths and O'Callaghan, 2002: 209). 
Power 
Power is a key concept in understanding the behaviour of states. Power could be 
defined as a state's ability to control, or at least influence, other states or the outcome of 
events. For example, state A is able to get statý B to act in a way which maximises the 
interests of A (Dunne, 1997: 122). Furthermore, power could be defined within 
interstate relations as a state's ability to control, or at least influence, other states or the 
outcome of events. Two dimensions are important for examining power: internal and 
external. The internal dimension could be defined as a capacity for action. Generally 
speaking, the method determining whether a state is powerful or not is by measuring 
whether it is insulated from outside influence or coercion in the formulation and 
implementation of policy. The external dimension refers to a capacity to control the 
behaviour of others to force compliance (Griffiths and O'Callaghan, 2002: 253). Such 
influence need not be actively exercised; it need only be acknowledged by others, 
implicitly or explicitly, to be effective. 
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Power has both military and non-military components, and realist theorists have 
developed frameworks for classifying the elements of national power. Such 
capabilities include not only military forces, but also levels of technology, population, 
natural resources, geographical factors, from of government, political leadership, and 
ideology. Power is instrumental, used primarily for achieving or defending other 
goals, which could include prestige, territory, or security. To achieve these goals, 
states can use various techniques of influence, ranging from persuasion or offering 
rewards to threats or the actual use of force (Griffiths and O'Callaghan, 2002: 253). 
Security 
To be secure is to be safe from harm, and security issues in international relations deal 
with the survival, welfare and protection of a state. In broader international terms, 
security includes political, economic, societal, environmental as well as military aspects 
(Baylis, 1997: 194). States use whatever means necessary to protect their integrity 
from the threats of instability. States' primary motive is to protect their sovereignty. 
Because states are worried about the prospect of going to war, security is a primary 
concern (Griffiths and O'Callaghan, 2002: 290). 
According to realists, security is a primary concern, because of the significance of the 
concept of power. Realists believe that threats to the security of state are usually posed 
by other states. Given the lack of an international authority with the power to curb 
others' aggressive ambitions, states must rely on their own capabilities for preserving 
their security (Linklater, 1995: 176). From a realist perspective, security of the state is 
achieved defending itself against external dangers, which is to be realised by increasing 
28 
Chapter One: Theoretical framework 
its military capabilities. Thus, states are endemically insecure, and this leads them to 
place a premium on military power. If states are to survive, they have to maintain 
large standing armies, they must be vigilant about their defence, never trust other states, 
and always act in the national interest (Griffiths and O'Callaghan, 2002: 290). 
3.0 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the researcher highlighted the core of each theory by describing the most 
important factors which could properly be attributed to each theory. When comparing 
the different international relations paradigms to the nature of the interstate relations 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran, we can see that neo-realism is the most convincing 
theory. In examining Saudi-Iranian relations, one could identify the state as the 
principal actor; and economic, religious factors and power are important elements for 
states' survival. However, when all other factors clashed, both Saudi Arabia and Iran 
still put power above economic and religious considerations. Although non-state 
actors can influence the outcome of state foreign policy, due to the nature of Saudi 
Arabia and Iran, the actions of these non-state actors have been of minor importance. 
Therefore, the author has not considered domestic non-state actors or the structure of the 
world capitalist system in the analysis. 
The most appropriate paradigm for this thesis is neo-realism because realism cannot 
explain the roles of economic and religious factors in the relations between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran. Pluralism is rejected here since the thesis is trying to analyse the 
relationship between two nation-states while pluralism as a model rejects the idea of the 
state as a unitary actor. This thesis will demonstrate that both Saudi Arabia's and Iran's 
foreign policy conduct is mainly based on the decisions taken by national governmental 
29 
Chapter One: Theoretical framework 
(state) institutions; other actors are marginalised in the decision-making process. 
Additionally, the economic factor, which is emphasised by pluralists, has never played 
the major role in determining Saudi-Iranian relations: when economic interest clashes 
with state survival the latter has always taken precedence in their relations. Globalism 
also emphasises economic factors and regards these as the most important elements in 
international relations, again making it of limited utility in analysing Saudi-Iranian 
relations which are clearly shaped by political/strategic considerations. 
The researcher argues that neo-realist theory is the most useful framework for the 
purpose of this study, as it best explains both Saudi Arabia and Iran's foreign policy 
behaviour towards each other. The relationship clearly takes place within the context 
of the international and regional systems. As subsequent chapters will show, the 
relationship has been profoundly affected by superpower engagement in the region, by 
the independent interactions of the range of regional states and by the inter-dependent 
interactions between those states. Within this framework, regime survival has been the 
ultimate objective of both states in their dealings with one another, and that this 
objective has superceded other interests such as domestic economic development or 
internal ideological (religious) consolidation. The thesis highlights a number of 
factors - oil, religion, Iraq, the regional environment and superpower involvement in the 
region - which have determined the behaviour of the states towards one another. 
These factors have been considered in terms of how the states have related to them 
within the international and systemic contexts (thus they are ten-ned "external"), not in 
terms of how they contribute to policy-making at the domestic ("internal") level. 
Therefore oil and religion, which obviously play a major role in shaping the state itself, 
are not considered for this function so much as in terms of how they contribute to the 
states' efforts to relate to the regional and international systems, and their relations with 
30 
Chapter One: Theoretical framework 
one another within those systems. In line with a Neo-realist perspective, the thesis 
examines the relationship between the two states as a relationship between unitary 
actors. 
However, each empirical chapter will also demonstrate that there are nuances of 
behaviour which neo-realist assumptions cannot account for. It would be too 
simplistic, for example, to entirely ignore the domestic composition of political elites 
which, at times, can lead one to question the unitary nature of the state. Ultimately a 
more nuanced definition of the state - with less rigid understandings of it the boundaries 
between officialdom and ulema, for example, might be useful. Equally, issues of 
identity within the domestic arena are not wholly irTelevant when it comes to 
determining how states seek to legitimize their regional behaviour in territorial disputes. 
The thesis, while asserting the usefulness of neo-realist assumptions, does not seek to be 
wholly bound by neo-realism but, instead, to acknowledge its limitations. Neo-realism 
is in this case a framework for interpreting the relationship, but not a complete 
explanatory theory. This is because the focus of the thesis is the role of the factors 
discussed in shaping the relationship, rather than proving a neo-realist explanation for 
the relationship. 
However, in order to contextualise the analysis of Saudi-Iranian relations and 
understand the trends of their relations between 1977 and 1997, one should look at the 
historical background which highlights the factors shaping their relations prior to the 
time-frame of this study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
HISTORY OF THE SAUDI-IRANIAN RELATIONS 
PRIOR TO 1977 
1.0 Introduction 
In order to understand contemporary Saudi-Iranian relations one should look at the 
trends in both countries' foreign policy during the twentieth century. The purpose of 
this chapter is to show the evolution of both countries' foreign policy prior to 1977. 
This serves as the foundation for the more in-depth study regarding the impact of oil, 
religion, Iraq, Bahrain, the UAE and the superpowers on the relations between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran, and shows how regional and international events have influenced each 
country's policy towards the other. In particular, the chapter highlights how different 
phases of their foreign policy have been shaped by internal events and external powers. 
For the purpose of this analysis the foreign policies of Iran and Saudi Arabia prior to 
1977 is divided into three main eras. The first period, from the early twentieth century 
to the beginning of WWII, is distinguished by the establishment of both countries, and 
the change of both countries' position within the international arena. The second period 
begins from the end of WWII to 1967. During this period, three issues determined the 
balance of power between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The first issue was the Cold War, 
which extended into the region. Second, was the extension of the Cold War and the 
Nasser's emerging pan-Arabism, which threatened both Saudi Arabia and Iran, resulting 
in both countries co-operating with each other to withstand the Nasser threat. Third, oil 
emerged as an important factor, in the 1960s, due to the establishment of OPEC in 1960 
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and OAPEC in 1968. The third period from 1968 to 1977, began from when the British 
government announced its withdrawal from the region and consequently saw Saudi 
Arabia and Iran emerging as the most influential players in the regional political scene. 
In this period, three issues dominate the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. First, 
the Iraqi regime expelled the Shi'ite leaders into Iran which transferred the Arab Shi'ite 
centre from Iraq into Iran. Second, regional disputes played an important role in 
affecting Saudi-Iranian relations. The independence of Bahrain and the emergence of 
disputes regarding three islands in the Gulf water marked the beginning of regional 
territorial disputes that influenced Saudi-Iranian relations for the following four decades. 
Third, the rise of oil as a source of friction. 
The rest of the chapter will be devoted to examining these three periods in order to 
understand Saudi and Iranian foreign policies towards each other during the period 
under investigation. 
2.0 The period prior to the establishment of both countries until WWII 
As a regional system, the Middle East has been highly penetrated by international actors 
and in consequence, remains, to date, vulnerable to external factors. Three main actors, 
the Soviet Union, Britain and the US, played an important role in shaping the Middle 
East region, and ultimately contributed to the formation of Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
The Soviet Union has had a number of traditional interests in the Middle East, which 
even predate the Soviet era. Soviet interests had been shaped by the basic geopolitical 
factors that affected Russian policies since the days of the Tsars. Middle Eastern 
countries near or adjacent to Soviet borders formed a buffer zone to protect Russia's 
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southern border; by the same token, they constituted an obstacle to Russian expansion 
southwards (Joshua, 1970: 1). For this reason, Soviet interests in the region, mainly 
Turkey and Persia, were in direct conflict with those of the British Empire. By the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, Britain was the only obstacle to Russia's access to 
the Mediterranean. Britain wanted to protect its empire on the Indian subcontinent, and 
was, therefore, determined to prevent Russia from controlling the straits or dominating 
land routes between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. Thus, Britain assumed the 
role of ultimate guarantor of the Ottoman Empire's survival (Rubinstein, 2001: 77). 
At that time, the rivalry between the expanding Russian and British Empires had been 
played out in an arena that stretched from the Balkans to British India. The Middle East 
region was regarded as a so-called buffer zone and within this area, both countries 
mainly attempted to control Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. For the Soviet Union, 
security and access to warm water were primary concerns; for the British, it was 
defence of its commercial route to India (the 'Jewel in the Crown'). 
From the beginning of the nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, the US paid 
little attention to the Middle East as it is geographically distant. Also the region was 
regarded as part of the British sphere or influence. The US did not wish to become 
involved in the competition between the Soviet Union, Britain, France, Germany and 
Italy. 
US involvements in the Middle East region began from the early twentieth century. The 
British Empire and French governments control on the region was weakened by WWI 
which strained the resources of all countries. Furthermore, the defection of the Ottoman 
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Empire during this war created the opportunity for the US to penetrate the economic and 
political life of the region and share in the benefits with Britain and France. 
With the rise of the Russian revolution, in 1917, and the overthrow of the monarchy, 
communism was embraced by the new Russian regime, which attempted to export its 
ideology into the Third World. Accordingly, the predominant concern of the US in the 
Middle East became the potential Soviet threat to the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of its southern neighbours, and Soviet expansion into Eastern European 
countries consequently threatened Western interests in the region. To prevent the 
encroachment of the Soviet Union into the Middle East region, the US supported the 
Sa'adabad Pact of 1937, which was signed by Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan in the 
Sa'adabad Palace in Tehran, and was directed against Soviet interference in these 
countries' affairs (Kuniholm, 1987: 10). 
2.1 The establishment of Saudi Arabia and Iran 
Modem Iran was established in 1925 when the Persian Parliament voted to vest the 
crown on Reza Shah, displacing the Qajar dynasty. Saudi Arabia declared its 
independence in 1932. However neither country was a significant power in world 
politics at that stage. Oil, which allowed both countries to play an important role in 
world politics from the mid-twentieth century, was not found until 1908 in Iran and in 
1938 in Saudi Arabia. At the same time, because of the dominant British influence in 
the region, the US and the rest of the world (with the exception of the Soviet Union in 
Iran) did not attempt to establish strong links with either country. 
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As Murdcn notes 'the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia has been fundamentally shaped by 
the conservative nature of the monarchy and the unbalanced portfolio of Saudi 
capabilities' (Murdcn, 1995: 173-74). According to the US Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson, Saudi Arabia's main foreign policy is driven by the desire 'to survive, 
perchance to prosper ... under the al Saud dynasty' (Eilts, 2001: 219). The most basic 
interest for the regime is the successful management of the status quo of the 
monarchical system in order to guarantee the continuity of the al Saud dynasty. 
In order to analyse Saudi foreign policy towards the region and the world, one should 
understand the Saudi worldview, which profoundly affects the regime's decision- 
marking process. Because of the location and nature of Saudi Arabia, Long argues, 
Saudis have developed the so-called 'encirclement syndrome', the belief held by Saudis 
that they are encircled by enemies. Since WWII, most of the Kingdom's neighbours 
have been at one time or another considered enemies, namely, Hashemite Jordan and 
Iraq, and later radical republican Iraq; Zionist Israel; the monarchical Iran and later 
republican Iran, the PLO; Nasserist Egypt; the once pro-Communist and now Islamist 
Sudan; Communist Ethiopia under Mengistu; leftist Somalia under Siad Barre; 
Communist South Yemen; Oman (the Dhofari rebellion); the UAE (border disputes), 
and Qatar (border disputes) (Long, 1997b: 110). Following the establishment of Saudi 
Arabia, the state was perceived to be faced by number of external threats. This 
dencirclement syndrome' had a significant impact on promoting security as the primary 
driver of Saudi foreign policy. The growth of oil revenues enhanced Saudi's ability to 
purchase the guarantee of security from the West, in particular from the US. This view 
conforms to neo-realist thinking, where security concerns play a significant role in 
shaping states' foreign policy. 
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On the other hand, although Iran's foreign policy has been dictated by different factors, 
it also has been conducted within a neo-realist framework, where issues of security and 
survival were dominant. As early as the 19th century, Iran became entangled in the 
ambitions of the Russian and British powers due to its strategic location between Russia 
and the British colony in India. Russia regarded Iran as vital to its security, and the 
shortest route to both warm water ports and India. Britain found Iran increasingly 
important in the defence of its colonial (commercial) interests in India (the Jewel of 
Crown). The broad objective of the two powers was to consolidate the position of Iran 
as a buffer zone, so that neither would be able to threaten the other's security and 
interests directly. Therefore, Iran was infonnally divided into three spheres: the 
northern provinces around the Caspian Sea were under Russian (later Soviet) influence; 
the south was subject to British influence; and the central part, including the capital 
Tehran, was controlled by the QqJar dynasty and the Reza Shah (Saikal, 1991: 427). 
Iranian foreign policy had largely been manipulated by both powers during the 
nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries and this affected the thinking behind later 
Iranian foreign policy. The policy was based on distrust of the imperial powers. 
In spite of its defencelessness against Anglo-Russian rivalry, Iran remained a distinct 
political entity mainly because of the balance of power between Britain and Russia. 
However, the relationship between the Soviet Union and Britain with respect to Iran 
changed in the first two decades of the twentieth century due to two major 
developments. The first was the discovery of oil in southern Iran in 1908, which added 
a new economic dimension to the strategic significance of Iran, and consequently to 
Anglo-Russian rivalry. Secondly, the overthrow of the Tsarist regime in Russia in 1917 
and the subsequent seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, together with the civil war, 
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provided Britain with an opportunity to strengthen its position and encroach upon the 
Russian zone of influence in Iran. 
Nonetheless both Russia and Britain favoured a relatively stable Iran under an effective 
leadership in order to protect their interests. Therefore, they preferred a weak central 
Iranian government, which would remain neutral and could not challenge their interests. 
Their wishes were fulfilled when Reza Shah, trained in the Soviet Union, became Shah 
in December 1925. 
Soon after Reza Shah had become leader of Iran, he faced inter-related internal and 
external challenges. Internally, he had no military means to control the different ethnic 
groups and tribes. External powers exacerbated this by supporting the tribes against 
Reza Shah, in order to keep his power base de-centralised and, therefore, very weak. A 
weakened central Iranian government enabled both Britain and the Soviet Union to 
influence developments within the country. Reza Shah was walking a tight rope and 
was constantly worried about a possible invasion from either or both Britain and the 
Soviet Union. 
In contrast, Saudi Arabia was created in 1926 when Abdul al-Aziz bin Abdel-Rahman 
(Ibn Saud) (1880-1953) united the conquered Arabian Kingdoms, although 
independence was not declared until 1932. Saudi Arabia was first recognised by the 
Soviet Union in February 1926; however, due to its ideological differences, and the 
close relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia, Riyadh's response towards 
Moscow was lukewarm. Indeed, 1937 saw the cessation of all diplomatic relations 
between the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia, when the Soviet ambassador K. A. 
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Hakimov was recalled to Moscow and executed. Following this, there had been no 
official links between the two countries (Vassiliev, 1993: 334). 
When Saudi Arabia declared its independence in 1932, it was still weak and financially 
not significant enough to draw Reza Shah's attention. There was, therefore, little 
interaction between Iran and Saudi Arabia during this period. The first formal 
diplomatic intercourse between Persia and what was then the Sultanate of Najd (formely 
an independent sultanate until 1932 when it united with Hijaz to form the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia) occurred in 1925. At that time, 'Persia unsuccessfully tried to mediate 
between Ibn Saud and King Ali of the Hijaz, when the Saudi conquest of the Hijaz 
brought the Islamic holy places in Mecca and Medina under Wahhabi control' 
(Wrampelmerier, 1999: 203). 
Saudi-Persian relations suffered the first setback on 20 May 1927, when Ibn Saud 
signed a bilateral treaty with the British in Jeddah in which he recognised the 
governments of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman and their special treaties with Britain 
(Badeeb, 1993: 22). Persia regarded the British-Saudi treaty as a direct challenge to its 
sovereignty over Bahrain. In response, Reza Shah ordered his envoy in Cairo to submit 
a 'memorandum of objection' to the Saudi government; furthermore, he submitted a 
petition to the League of Nations demanding the restoration of Persian sovereignty over 
the island (Badeeb, 1993: 30). 
However, because both Saudi Arabia and Persia were politically weak in the 
international arena, both countries recognised the need to form better relations to 
counterbalance the threats from the external powers. The high point in Saudi-Persian 
political relations in the 1920s was the Friendship Treaty, signed in Tehran on 24 
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August 1929. This treaty set out the basic principles for developing political, 
diplomatic and commercial relations between the two countries (Badeeb, 1993: 35). 
Until 1932, relations between Persia and Saudi Arabia were limited mainly to 
commercial dealings surrounding the Hajj. However, the Great Depression of the 
1930s, followed by the gradual expansion of hostilities leading to WWII, greatly slowed 
down commercial relations between the two countries. As the number of Iranian 
pilgrims decreased, trade between the two countries fell to its lowest level. However, at 
the end of the 1930s, both countries had very little interchange, either on the political or 
economic scene. Yet, changes in the international environment, due to WWII, brought 
fundamental changes in their relations. 
3.0 From the end of WWII to 1967 
3.1 The Cold War extended into the region 
The position of Saudi Arabia and Iran in world politics changed when WWII broke out. 
The world was now divided into two spheres, and for the first time the US got involved 
in the region's affairs. The outbreak of the war disrupted oil production, which led to 
financial difficulty in Saudi Arabia. At the time, Saudi's annual income from the hajj, 
and oil concessions dried up due to the Great Depression and the war. The Saudi 
government sought emergency assistance from Britain in the form of foodstuffs and 
silver riyals to buy off the loyalty of tribes, but without a positive response from 
London (Eilts, 2001: 221). Nevertheless, the US responded to Ibn Saud's needs with the 
$40 million Lend-Lease Aid package to save the Kingdom (Anthony, 1984: 79), and 
from that time the US and Saudi Arabia began to consolidate their relations. 
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Across the Gulf, Reza Shah attempted to establish relations with a third party to counter 
the power of Britain and the Soviet Union. He made continual efforts to foster close 
ties with the US, by trying to persuade Washington of the value of Iran in the Middle 
East region. However, he quickly discovered that the US was not interested in 
developing such a relationship, as it considered Iran to be under British influence. He, 
therefore, approached Germany to establish the 'third power' to counterbalance the 
British and Soviet's influence. At this time Germany attempted to expand its sphere of 
influence through economic ties, facilitated by the establishment of trade links between 
the two countries during the German Weimar period; these links were extended 
throughout the Nazi period (Fatemi, 1980: 15). 
However, the situation changed when Germany attacked the Soviet Union in 1941. 
Although Reza Shah declared Iran's neutrality, he was not willing to sever relations 
with Germany, as Iran benefited from this economic link and Germany acted as a 
counter-balance against Britain and the Soviet Union. Hence, the Soviet Union 
collaborated with Britain to invade Iran in the same year. Subsequently, under pressure 
from Britain and the Soviet Union Reza Shah was forced to abdicate in favour of his 
son Mohammed Reza (Saikal, 1991: 434). 
In both political and military terms, WWII was a crucial test for the Saudi and Iranian 
regimes. The Saudi monarchy came out of the war stronger and more politically 
confident, and enjoyed a high degree of political stability in the post-war era. The 
Iranian monarchy had a more difficult time. As a result of the Allied occupation, by the 
Russians in the north and the British in the south, Iran emerged from the war with a 
damaged economy, a fragmented military force and the potential for domestic political 
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instability (Badeeb, 1993: 41-49). Soon after the war, the superpowers supported Saudi 
Arabia; hence, the balance of power between Saudi Arabia and Iran changed, and Saudi 
Arabia became more influential in regional affairs. 
Saudi-Iranian political relations remained cool but stable until December 1943, when 
the Saudi police arrested and executed an Iranian pilgrim for throwing excrement at the 
Ka'bah in protest at the discrimination against the Shiites. As a consequence, the two 
nations' recalled their representatives and broke off diplomatic relations in March 1944 
(Badeeb, 1993: 50-51). This 'estrangement' continued until 15 October 1946, when 
King Abd al-Aziz wrote a personal letter to the Shah, urging the renewal of Saudi- 
Iranian relations based on old and faithful ties, and following this, their relations were 
resumed in early 1947 (Badeeb, 1993: 5 1). 
Between 1947 and 1950, Saudi-Iranian relations strengthened, as the interests of both 
countries coincided in two important areas. First, Iran decisively aligned itself with 
Western, particularly US, interests; and second, as the two countries developed their oil 
industries, they often dealt with common issues. With rapidly expanding oil revenues in 
the 1950s, both countries experienced economic prosperity, and trade relations once 
again expanded as both countries pursued laissez faire commercial policies (Badeeb, 
1993: 105). 
3.2 The common threats from Egypt's Pan-Arabism 
Between 1950 and 1967, Saudi-Iranian political relations evolved around four major 
issues: regional politics, oil, religion and international security. The two countries had 
common interests in many of the region's political developments, such as the British 
42 
Chapter Two: History of the Saudi-Iranian relations prior to 1977 
role in the Persian Gulf, the Nasserist movement in Egypt, the situation in Turkey and 
the political situation in the states of the Fertile Crescent. Moreover, they were bound 
by their common economic stakes in the oil industry, and at the international level, both 
countries strengthened their relations with the West in the period following WWII 
(Badeeb, 1993: 51-52). Iran emerged as an important partner of the West in general, and 
the US in particular. The West forged very close relations with Iran; and, in 
consequence, Iran's importance was far greater than that of Saudi Arabia. 
Prior to 1977, religion in Saudi Arabia and Iran played very different roles and served 
different functions. In Saudi Arabia, religion was the main pillar of its foundation, and 
every policy, including foreign policy, was formed by paying lip-service to the religious 
doctrines. In contrast, under the Shah, religion was based purely on personal belief and 
did not play an important role in the formation of Iran's internal and external policies. 
However, in the 1950s during the 'Cold War' period when the Soviet Union extended 
its influence in the Middle East region, specifically with Egypt and Iraq, one of the main 
challenges of that period for the two monarchies, especially Saudi Arabia, came from 
Egypt. The collapse of the Egyptian monarchy, 'the largest Arab monarchy', disturbed 
the Saudi regime. Nonetheless, soon after the 1952 coup in Egypt, the Saudis preferred 
to maintain an appearance of friendship with the new military regime. Therefore, King 
Saud signed a mutual defence treaty with Nasser in 1955 (Eilts, 2001: 226). Al-Rasheed 
argues that this move was aimed against Hashemite Iraq, which had joined the Baghdad 
Pact in 1955 (al-Rasheed, 2002: 115), and signified an expression of Saudi displeasure at 
its exclusion from the pact. I 
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Nasser embraced a reformist approach to Islam. Nasser identified reformist Islam with 
Arabism and the liberation of oppressed nations from the forces of imperialism and 
reactionary Islamic rule, namely Saudi Arabia (Maclntyre, 1981: 20). Thus, "Nasser 
proclaimed himself as 'the voice of the Arabs"' (Piscatori, 1983: 39), and he began to 
challenge Saudi Arabia in regional affairs. 
As King Saud quickly discovered that Nasserism threatened his regime, he tried to use a 
counterbalancing doctrine proclaiming Islam and the Shari'a to be the only basis of the 
Kingdom's policy. The regime issued decrees prohibiting support of any ideology, such 
as socialism or communism (Safran, 1988: 92-93). Therefore, it can be deduced that 
religion in Saudi Arabia acts as a tool to fulfil the needs of the Saudi regime. 
At the same time, Saudi Arabia manipulated religion, and Pan-Islamism, as an anti- 
radical ideology to counter Nasser's Pan-Arabism during the so called 'Arab Cold War' 
(1956-67) (MacIntyre, 1981: 19). King Faisal emphasised his commitment to Pan- 
Islamic co-operation. This initiative was launched exactly at a time when Saudi Arabia 
was under severe ideological attack from Nasser. In other words, Saudi Arabia's 
foreign policy of Islamic co-operation was induced for 'pragmatic considerations' in 
order to protect its internal and external security interests (Olsen, 1994: 139, and 
MacIntyre, 1981: 20). 
To counterbalance Nasser's Pan-Arabist threat, Saudi Arabia allied itself with Iran, and 
there was the suggestion of a defence pact between the two countries to prevent threats 
from Egypt, even though hostility between the two countries was escalating. At the 
beginning of the Pan-Arab movement Saudi Arabia attempted to appease Nasser by 
accusing Iran of imperialist designs in the Gulf. This campaign aroused the anger of 
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Tehran because it was directed against its 'historical interests' in the region (Fuller, 
1991: 109). At the same time, Iran became aware of the significance of Saudi Arabia as 
a major player in the 'Arab equation' (Fuller, 1991: 109). 
Ties between the two countries were strengthened by the Shah's invitation to King Saud 
to visit Tehran in 1955. According to the neo-realist school, balance of power and 
regime survival play a very important role to conduct a state's foreign policy. The 
threat posed by the Nasser's Pan-Arabism, and forming a defence pact against the 
Soviet Union, drew Saudi Arabia and Iran closer to each other. The visit was the first of 
its kind between the two countries since their creation as fully independent sovereign 
states. However, the discussion of the Baghdad Pact caused some disagreement 
between them. Saudi Arabia was not included in the pact because King Saud believed, 
at that time, that the Pact included secret clauses in favour of Israel (Badeeb, 1993: 52- 
53). 
Despite the petty antagonisms that grew out of King Saud's visit, the two countries 
maintained co-operation in matters of mutual concern. Nevertheless, the differences 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia were never far from the surface, as was shown by the 
Suez crisis of 1956. Enraged by Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal, France and 
Britain, joined by Israel, launched a military attack against Egypt. The Shah decided to 
remain on the sidelines even as the Arab world and many Islamic countries, condemned 
the invasion of Egypt. The Shah's decision was quite possibly motivated by the fact 
that he had only been restored to power in 1952, with British and American help. 
Iranian military power was only in the early stages of increasing its influence, and was 
reliant upon help from the US. Thus Iran was, as yet, insufficiently powerful enough on 
its own to risk standing in opposition to its Western allies. According to neo-realism, 
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the balance of power played an important role, since Nasser's influence grew in the 
region, beginning to threaten the Shah's own ambitions connected with the domination 
of regional affairs. This additional factor meant that the Shah was highly unlikely to 
have been opposed to the invasion of the Suez in any case. Thus, the Suez crisis 
resulted in a strain in the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. This strain was 
eased by the Shah's visit to Saudi Arabia in 1958 (Badeeb, 1993: 53). During the visit, 
the issue of the Baghdad Pact was raised again. King Saud and the Shah also discussed 
the Shah's suggestion of a Saudi-Iranian Defence Pact, 'aimed particularly at detaching 
Saudi Arabia from Egypt and Syria and at improving the standing of the Baghdad Pact 
in the Arab World'; but in the end, this pact was never signed (Badeeb, 1993: 54). 
After the Shah's visit, Saudi-Iranian relations indeed witnessed a remarkable 
improvement. Both monarchs resisted Soviet attempts to infiltrate the Middle East and 
united their efforts to stand against Nasser's revolutionary slogans, as both regimes held 
him responsible for bringing the Soviet Union into the region. Moreover, the two 
monarchs were concerned about the situation in Iraq after the coup of 1958, which 
established a revolutionary republican regime (Badeeb, 1993: 54-55). In sum, the 
Nasser's Pan-Arabism acted as a factor for the cooperation between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran, however, at the same time, it was a fore taste of the importance of religion in the 
relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the later period. However, the Iraqi factor 
became relevant to Saudi-Iranian relations only after the Iranian revolution in 1979 and 
the subsequent Iran-Iraq war in 1980 to 1988. 
Iran's role in the Baghdad Pact gave it a more important regional role, which led to the 
rising resentment of Saudi Arabia. Another factor was the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1956 
when the Saudis imposed an oil embargo without co-operation from Iran. At that time 
46 
Chapter Two: History of the Saudi-Iranian relations prior to 1977 
Iran was one of the most important oil exporting countries, and without its co-operation 
the embargo hardly had any impact in the world oil market, and, was therefore, doomed 
to fail. 
Thus, during the period, one could conclude that despite their differences over the 
Baghdad Pact and Arab-Israel conflict, Saudi Arabia and Iran maintained cordial 
relations due to common threats from Egypt, Iraq and communism. In the 1960s, the 
increasing importance of oil, which influenced and dominated the region, changed the 
course of their relations. 
3.3 Oil emerged as an important factor 
In the 1960s, signs of co-operation and competition deepened. This was first witnessed 
with the establishment of Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 
1960. OPEC was created at the Baghdad Conference in September 1960 by Iran, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, to co-ordinate and unify petroleum policies 
among member countries, in order to secure fair and stable prices for petroleum 
producers; an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consuming nations; 
and a fair return on capital to those investing in the industry (www. OPEC. org). 
Two factors have affected OPEC's behaviour: first, the global market needs the cartel as 
much as the cartel needs the global market. Second, the OPEC members' power stems 
from collective bargaining and maintaining a united front. These two fundamental 
factors are the catalyst behind OPEC's vitality (Dorraj, 1993: 19), and at the same time 
are the cause of friction between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
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Saudi Arabia strengthened its power by leading the formation of Organisation of Arab 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) in 1968, which transformed Saudi Arabia into 
a dominant player. This organisation played a crucial role in enhancing the Saudi's 
bargaining position vis-a-vis Iran. Created by Libya, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, OAPEC 
acts as a regional Arab intergovernmental organisation; currently, it has ten Arab 
petroleum countries as members. The organisation's main concern is the development 
of the petroleum industry by fostering co-operation among its members 
(www. oapecorg. org). OAPEC serves as a collective force to unify the Arab petroleum 
exporting countries' support in its fight with Iran over oil prices. 
In the 1960s, OPEC began to emerge as the leading cartel in the world oil market. The 
early 1960s were considered as being a buyer's market, characterised by an 
overabundance of oil and thus depressed prices; the OPEC nations saw no future change 
without some action on their part. In a market flooded with oil, the producing countries 
had to live with low prices. However, two events changed the face of OPEC forever. 
First, there was a shift towards a seller's market, which was triggered by the Arab- 
Israeli war in 1967 (Dorraj, 1993: 19), and second, the amount of oil exports were 
reduced in 1970, due to leakage of the Saudi oil pipelines. 
In June 1967, the Arab-Israeli war affected the transportation of oil from the region to 
the West and Asia. The closure of the Suez Canal during this time eliminated the 
shorter route to western oil markets and resulted in several side effects, the most 
important of which was the coming to power of the 'price hawks. ' The price hawks, 
represented by such countries as Iran, Libya and Algeria, pushed for higher oil prices 
(Dorraj, 1993: 20). This fall in supply to the West was exacerbated in 1970 by the 
accidental crack of the Saudi pipeline, closing it and cutting off a substantial amount of 
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the Saudi oil supply (Dorraj, 1993: 20), further pushing up oil prices and increasing the 
importance of OPEC. 
However the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict did allow the oil producing countries to re- 
negotiate their contract with the foreign-controlled oil companies. The result was Saudi 
Arabia and Iran gaining control over their own oil companies, and emerging as leading 
players in the world oil market. This resulted in the inevitable frictions between both 
countries in later eras. 
The rising importance of oil in world politics turned Saudi Arabia from a marginalised 
regional player in the 1950s, to an important international player. Furthermore, King 
Faisal managed to forge a cohesive foreign policy, utilising the Kingdom's resources, 
namely, its geo-strategic position, oil and petrodollars to achieve his goals. This is best 
illustrated by the Kingdom's oil policy at the time, which was tailored to meet the 
growing requirements of the US. During the 1960s, Saudi relations with the US 
continued to improve, especially in light of Nasser's threat to their common interests, 
and their desire to contain expanding Soviet influence in the region. Faisal's task of 
regional consensus building was made easier by the 'inflow of petrodollars that flooded 
the Saudi treasury in the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war', enabling the Kingdom 
to buy friends (Wilson, 1994: 98-99). Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia still needed an external 
power to guarantee its security and survival. 
In the mean time, Iran was gaining stature in regional politics as the Shah managed to 
play the superpowers against each other. Within Iran, the Soviet inspired communist 
Tudeh party, which was strongly opposed to the Shah, was very influential among the 
poor peasants and lower middle classes. However, the Shah sought to reduce the 
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potential Soviet influence in his country by normalising relations with Moscow at the 
government level, while still opposing the ideology of communism. In January 1966, 
both countries signed an economic agreement, under which Iran was to supply the 
Soviet Union with more than $600 million worth of natural gas. In return the Soviet 
Union was to help Iran build a large steel complex in Esfahan and a machine-tool plant 
in Shiraz (Saikal, 1991: 449). 
Improved ties with the Soviet Union provided the Shah not only with a new source of 
technical assistance but also a bargaining chip with the West, especially the US, in the 
bipolar Cold War environment, to acquire more advanced weaponry. It also 
strengthened his position vis-a-vis Cairo and Arab radical forces in the region, improved 
his image with Afghanistan and India (which had devel oped close ties with the Soviet 
Union), and reduced the chances of co-operation between his domestic opposition and 
hostile regional forces. Thus, by the end of the 1960s, the Shah was in a stronger 
position to conduct Iran's external affairs with greater independence. 
In regional affairs, the threats from the coup in South Yemen supported by Nasser and 
the communist-inspired Omani rebellion contributed to the competition and co- 
operation between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The competition between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran began because both countries wished to dominate all regional affairs. Riyadh 
regarded the Gulf region as being under its sphere of influence, and at the same time, 
the Shah considered that it was under Iran's dominance. Therefore both states paid very 
close attention to control regional affairs. Conflict and competition between Saud and 
Nasser moved to Yemen when the military coup there of 1962, supported by Nasser, 
overthrew the Zaidi Imamate and established a Yemeni republican regime. The Saudi 
regime was concerned about a similar Nasser-backed coup could occur in Saudi Arabia. 
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Thus, King Saud resisted Nasser and asked for US support to prevent a possible direct 
attack on Yemen by Egypt (Safran, 1988: 92-96), and at the same time sought co- 
operation with Iran to prevent the threat spreading throughout the region. Neither Saudi 
Arabia nor Iran was willing to see Egypt emerging as a leading power in the region. 
The Dhofari rebellion in Oman was another event which aroused Saudi resentment 
towards Tehran. Moscow supported the Dhofari rebellion in Oman, in conjunction with 
South Yemen. Initially this was a secessionist rebellion which began in 1965 under the 
Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF) (founded in 1962). However, Riyadh could not help the 
Omanis to crush the DLF, even though the Saudi regime was concerned that the 
communist movement in Oman would encourage its own Shi'ite minority to demand 
better treatment. The Saudi regime was aware of the limitation of its own military 
power; it mainly feared that if its military failed to quell the Omani rebellion it would 
spread to its own territory. Instead, the Iranian military moved in to crush the 
movement; Riyadh was helpless in the face of Iranian domination in the region. (Golan, 
1990: 32). However, the threat of Egyptian influence spreading into the Gulf region 
awakened both Saudi Arabia and Iran to the necessity of increased co-operation 
between them. Despite their competition for regional dominance, both states realised 
the need for containing the threat posed by Egypt. 
4.0 1968 to 1977, Saudi Arabia and Iran emerge as regional powers 
4.1 The Iraqi religious factor and its affect on Saudi-Iranian balance of power 
The threats from Egypt subsided after the Six-Day war which started on 5 June 1967, as 
Egypt was weakened, and this afforded Saudi Arabia the opportunity to extend its 
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regional influence in the Arab world. However, the Iraqi revolution in 1958 brought the 
monarchical reign in Iraq to an end, and more importantly for the region the new regime 
embraced radical Arab nationalism (Fuller, 1991: 109). Until the mid-twentieth century 
the Arab ShPite centre was located in Iraq because of its holy sites, Najaf and Karbala. 
After the Baathist party took over in 1968, under the leadership of al-Bahr, it 
encroached upon religious institutions. ShPites were persecuted, the freedom of inquiry 
was closed, and finally key ShPite clerics were forced to leave the country fleeing to 
Iran (Fuller, 1999: 72). Thus, since the 1970s, Iran, and especially the city of Qom, 
became a major learning centre in the Muslim world for ShVite scholars. 
However, the Saudis were particularly concerned about the gradual decline of the Iraqi 
holy ShVite cities, as this would eventually lead to the rise of the Iranian shrine cities, 
and ultimately a shift of the ShVite centre into Iran. One could argue that Saudi concern 
stemmed from the fact that any changes in the region to the ShPite balance of power 
could impact on Saudi's own ShVite minority. In addition, Saudi was naturally 
interested in any matters concerning Islam as its own foundation took its basis and 
legitimacy from the religion. However, as religion was marginalized in Iran, and 
because at that time the Shah was the most dominant power in the region, the Saudi 
regime did not confront the Shah over the religious domination in the regional scene. 
4.2 The regional territorial disputes 
A new regional environment was created in 1968 when the British announced the 
withdrawal of their military forces from East of the Suez Canal in 1971, creating a 
serious power vacuum in the region. Saudi Arabia and Iran had different reactions 
towards the British decision. For Saudi Arabia, the British withdrawal from the Gulf 
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put Riyadh in a dilemma. In public, they welcomed it, but in private, according to 
Safran, King Faisal requested the British to stay. Faisal was even willing to pay the 
British military expenses 'in the hope that Britain might relent or that the United States 
might take its place, and then to avoid involvement in a dispute between the British and 
the Shah over the future of Bahrain' (Safran, 1988: 125-6). In addition, 'Saudi Arabia 
worried about potential instability of the Marxist or Arab Socialist variety spreading to 
the Gulf' (al-Alkim, 1989: 113). In contrast, the Shah was delighted by the British 
withdrawal. Since the Shah had regained his power in 1953 with help from the US and 
Britain, Iran's military power increased through the sale of oil, which enabled Iran to 
build up its influence in the region. This decision represented a golden opportunity to 
the Shah to achieve his ambition of turning Iran into the dominant power in the region. 
4.2.1 The 'Twin Pillar' policy 
The emerging Persian Gulf Arab states were worried about their survival as none of 
them had the military or human resources necessary to perform Britain's traditional 
security role in the region. And, as the US was entangled in the Vietnam conflict, it was 
neither willing nor able to replace Britain directly. Therefore, in 1969, President Nixon 
announced his doctrine which resulted in the so-called Nixon Doctrine, by which the 
US relied on regional states to assume the primary responsibility for their own defence. 
With Nixon's 'Twin-Pillar' policy, the US sought to ensure stability in the Gulf through 
co-operation with Iran and Saudi Arabia (Kuniholm, 1987: 16). 
Therefore, Washington adopted Iran and Saudi Arabia as its proxies in the so-called 
'Twin Pillar' policy, to fulfil the West's security policy in the Persian Gulf (Hunter, 
1990a: 163). The framework for this policy was announced in the Nixon Doctrine in 
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June 1969. The Doctrine was a declaration of American retrenchment in global affairs, 
redefining the means whereby regional commitments and stability were to be 
maintained. Essentially the US was to keep its treaty commitments, furnish a nuclear 
shield for those states deemed vital to American interests, and be prepared to provide 
military and economic assistance to states suffering from aggression, though those 
states had to furnish the manpower for their defense. This policy further underscored 
the importance of military sales and assistance programs to regimes friendly to 
American interests, therefore the American administration chose Iran and Saudi Arabia 
as the regional policemen. The perception of Iran as the main protector of Gulf security 
was reinforced by the American reluctance to fill the power vacuum left by Britain as a 
result of its historic decision to withdraw forces in 1971 from the area 'east of Suez', 
including the Persian Gulf. 
In the case of Iran, it was not only able to pay for its weapons, but it was also willing to 
assume responsibility for its own defense and that of the Persian Gulf. However, 
although Saudi Arabia was an important player among the Arab Gulf states, it lacked 
the population and military power necessary for playing a major security role in the 
Gulf region, which reduced its importance in its position as the policeman in the region. 
By endorsing Saudi Arabia and Iran as regional powers, the US supplied the two 
countries with arms in an open commitment, (the only exception being nuclear 
weapons). It allowed Saudi Arabia and Iran to buy nearly unlimited weapons with their 
newfound wealth from oil, and for the US this was the best way to recycle their petrol- 
dollars. 
The 'Twin Pillar' policy allowed the Shah to safeguard three vital interests, mainly: to 
ensure the maintenance of free navigation in the Gulf (as the Gulf is the main transport 
route for Iranian oil exports); to protect vulnerable and costly oil installations from 
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damage and sabotage; and to guard against the entrenchment of unfriendly regimes in 
the nearby Gulf states (Chubin, and Zabih, 1974: 200). Thus, the Shah struck a number 
of agreements with the Gulf Arab states to resolve territorial disputes. The long time 
dispute between Saudi Arabia and Iran, regarding the continental shelf boundary in the 
Gulf, was delimited (October 1968). He also made agreements with Qatar (September 
1969); Bahrain (June 1971); Oman (July 1974); and with the UAE (August 1974) 
(Calabrese, 1994: 46). 
Although there was no major competition between the two countries during the 1960s, 
the balance of power certainly favoured Iran because Tehran possessed more manpower 
which enhanced its military muscle (see table 2.1-2.4). Only when Saudi Arabia 
emerged as a world financial power after the 1973 oil crisis, did it seem for a time to be 
regarded as the key player of American policy in the Persian Gulf. The Carter 
Administration in particular, seemed to have some preference for the financial power of 
Saudi Arabia as contrasted with the military power of Iran. 
Table 2.1 Land/Air Forces of Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia 
Country Total armed 
forces(after 
mobilization) 
Number of 
tanker in 
service 
Total of 
strike 
aircraft 
Total of 
interceptor 
aircraft 
Defence 
budgets 
million) 
Iran 180,000 400 - 75 197 
Iraq 82,000 320 12 75 142 
Saudi Arabia 55,000 - 6 12 106 
Source: Arms in the Persian Gulf, 1974, p. 23. 
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Table 2.2 Combat Aircraft Inventories in the Persian Gulf 
Country 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70 1970-71 1971-72 1972-73 1973-74 
Iran 166 202 188 158 151 160 159 
Iraq 170 213 213 229 220 189 
1 
224 
Saudi Arabia 20 39 43 75 55 71 710 
Source: Arms in the Persian Gulf, 1974, pp. 4-5. 
Table 2.3 Naval Vessels in the Persian Gulf 
Country 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70 1970-71 1971-72 1972-73 1973-74 
Iran 37 39 39 45 30 51 41 
Iraq - - - 25 25 19 30 
Saudi Arabia 7 14 31 20 
Source: Arms in the Persian Gulf, 1974, pp. 16-17. 
Table 2.4 Military Statistical Summary of Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia in 1977-78 
Country Population Total Percentage Defence Gross Defence 
(1000) armed of armed budget National budget as 
forces forces to (billion $) Product % of GNP 
population (billion $) 
Iran 34,756 342,000 0.98 7.9 56.8 13.9 
Iraq 
- 
11,800 188,000 1.59 1.66 14.2 11.7 
diArabia rau 7,500 61.500 0.81 7.53 37.2 20.2 
Source: The Military Balance, 1977, pp. 35,36,40. 
One could argue that the 'Twin Pillar' policy was the main cause of competition 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran because both countries attempted to play the role of 
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dominant partner, despite being tied to a common US allY. The ultimate failure of the 
Twin Pillar policy could have derived from the tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran 
and their inability to co-operate with each other in the regional issues. 
However, the announcement of the British withdrawal from the region had a side-effect 
on the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran with the emerging issue of Bahrain's 
independence, and the Abu Musa, and Greater and Lesser Tunbs dispute between the 
UAE and Iran. 
4.2.2 The independence of Bahrain 
The 1968 British decision to withdraw their forces from East of the Suez Canal in 1971, 
created two serious problems between Saudi Arabia and Iran. One was the issue of 
Bahrain's independence, and the other was the Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser 
Tunbs dispute between the UAE and Iran. 
Saudi Arabia and Iran were not the only contributors to the early history of the Gulf 
states' fon-nations. As Schofield notes, political and territorial control in the Lower 
Gulf region before the British arrival was marked by its fluidity (Schofield, 1997: 144). 
14 
The history of the Gulf is a history of rivalry among powers for control of the region. 
Bahrain and the Omani Coast Emirates had been part of the Islamic empire between the 
7th and 11'h centuries and had been thereafter ruled by various local Muslim dynasties 
until they were occupied by the Portuguese, in 1522, for eighty years (Allocock et al, 
1992: 363). Following the Persian occupation of 1602 to 1783, the Dutch, French and 
British and lately the US and the Soviet Union have all shown an interest in the area. 
However, Persian claims to Bahrain continue to arise from time to time, but usually 
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only on those occasions when an opportunity presents itself. Examples of these 
opportunities are whenever Bahrain signed treaties with other powers, or other countries 
signed treaties regarding the Bahraini status, such as when the Saudi regime signed a 
treaty with the British government in 1927, or when internal pressures arose in Persia 
itself as the regime wished to distract attention from these events. Occasionally, claims 
have been made when there has been unrest in the internal politics of Bahrain itself 
(Rumaihi, 1978: 7). Therefore, in February 1968, when the British announced their 
withdrawal from the region by the end of 1971, Iran's claim over Bahrain was rekindled. 
Although, since the end of the eighteenth century, Persia had never been able to control 
Bahrain as its own territory, Persians never abandoned their claim over Bahrain but 
without any physical occupation of Bahrain. From the early nineteenth century the 
British government controlled the Omani coast, which included Bahrain. Although Iran 
was not willing to relinquish its claim on Bahrain, it was not able to challenge the 
British government until 1968, when the British government announced its intension to 
withdraw from the region. This rekindled Iran's ambition to control Bahrain. 
From the sixteenth century to the mid twentieth century, Iran consistently claimed their 
sovereignty over Bahrain, but because of its weak political position in the international 
arena (until the 1960s) this claim was never realized. However, after the Shah had 
emerged as the winner during the 1950s power struggle between him and the Iranian 
Prime Minister, Dr. Musaddiq, the Iranian oil income rapidly increased. This was 
because the Shah was selling Iranian oil to the American market, and this increase in the 
Iranian income allowed the Shah to pursue social and economic changes and permitted 
increased spending on the Iranian military, which increased its power in the region. 
From the 1960s, the Shah built up his influence in the regional affairs, and he was 
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involved in the crushing of the Omani rebellious movement. Therefore, with the 
announcement of the British withdrawal from the region and that Iran had been chosen 
by the US and Britain to be the 'policeman' of the region, the Iranian position in world 
politics was significantly enhanced. 
Prior to the British withdrawal from the Gulf region, the British government attempted 
to settle the Bahraini and the Omani Coast Emirates problems by encouraging Bahrain, 
Qatar, and the seven Omani Coast Emirates to sign an agreement establishing a 
federation to take effect in March 1968. The signing of the federation agreement 
aroused strong Iranian opposition on two accounts. One was Iran's claim to sovereignty 
over Bahrain, going back to the eighteenth century; the other was the Shah's ambition to 
succeed Britain as the leader of the Gulf states and become the guarantor of peace in the 
region, to the exclusion of any outside power (Safran, 1988: 134-5). However, the 
Shah's announcement of his claim to Bahrain had a significant impact on the progress 
of the federation negotiations (al-Alkim, 1989: 10). 
In the case of the independence of Bahrain, one can notice that Bahrain was the first 
case to affect the relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In 1927, when Saudi 
Arabia and the British government signed the 'Jeddah Treaty' related to the Bahraini 
status, the Persian government protested that the British government had violated its 
rights regarding its sovereignty. However, the Persian government was weak at that 
time and the protest did not bring about any significant change. 
Later, Saudi Arabia made a very broad move to antagonise the Shah by supporting the 
'recognition' of Bahrain as an Arab country in 1954 and 1957 during Arab League 
meetings (Rumaihi, 1978: 8). To counter-balance Riyadh's move, the Iranian MajUs 
59 
Chapter Two: Histoty of the Saudi-Iranian relations prior to 1977 
(Parliament) passed a law including Bahrain as its 14 th province of Iran, and kept two 
seats of congress for the Bahraini representatives. 
The close relations between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain were demonstrated by the 
signing of the Saudi-Bahraini continental shelf boundary delimitation agreement in 
1958. This agreement gave the Abu Safa oilfields, (long disputed by Saudi Arabia and 
Bahrain), to Saudi Arabia, although the income from them would be divided equally 
between the two countries (Zahlan, 1998: 143-44). 
After the British government had announced its withdrawal from the Gulf region at the 
end of 1971, King Faisal was caught in a dilemma as mentioned above. On the one 
hand, this was an opportunity for Saudi Arabia to become the dominant power in the 
region, and on the other hand, they did not wish to get involved in the dispute regarding 
Bahrain. Therefore, King Faisal kept a very low profile on this matter, and this cautious 
approach proved justified in two respects. First, by the end of 1969 the British 
succeeded in inducing the Shah to renounce his claim to Bahrain, and second, by that 
time, it had become apparent that the US, (paralysed by its Vietnam burden, ) was not 
prepared to take over the British role and was willing to rely on the Shah to be guardian 
of the Gulf and of Western interests there (Safran, 1988: 135). 
Safran claims that, from 1970, King Faisal reached an understanding with the Shah on a 
tacit division of spheres of influence in the Gulf which left the Gulf Emirates in the 
Saudi sphere but allowed Iran to seize the Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs 
belonging to Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah respectively (Safran, 1988: 126). In return, 
Saudi Arabia acknowledged Iran's primary role as guardian of the Gulf waters. This 
understanding was underscored by a declaration issued by Saudi Arabia, Iran and 
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Kuwait in July 1970 (Safran, 1988: 135), which is confirmed by Holden (Holden and 
Johns, 1981: 275). However, this understanding between the Shah and King Faisal has 
never been ratified in any documents. 
Both the British government and Riyadh were in favour of forming a federation 
consisting of nine Emirates, including Bahrain and Qatar. Because Iran at that time was 
militarily stronger than Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia avoided a direct confrontation with 
Iran by keeping a low-key profile and waited for the British and the Shah to settle the 
issue of Bahraini independence. Saudi patience paid off as Bahrain gained 
independence in 1970, and Saudi Arabia and Iran were chosen by the US as regional 
policemen under the Nixon's 'Twin Pillar' policy, which enhanced Saudis importance 
in the region. 
In 1968, the British government launched its own highly sensitive and secret diplomatic 
initiative to solve the issue of Bahrain. Led by Sir Geoffrey Arthur and Sir Denis 
Wright, the task was to find a face-saving formula for the Shah and persuade him to 
accept it (Holden and Johns, 1981: 275). 
The Shah accepted their suggestion of a UN fact-finding mission in Bahrain but warned 
that the talks would be broken off if any information was leaked out. Any publicity 
would make it impossible for him to recognise Bahrain's independence after British 
withdrawal from the Gulf. This secret deal was maintained until after the deposition 
and later, the death of the Shah. The compromise, involving the Shah's acquiescence to 
Bahrain's independence, was reached just before the end of 1969 (Holden and Johns, 
1981: 275). In exchange for this, King Faisal turned a blind eye when the Shah occupied 
Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs in 1971, which belonged to Sharjah and 
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Ras al-Khaimah respectively. According to Safran, Holden and Jones, King Faisal was 
informed of the whole plan in 1969 (Safran, 1988: 135, Holden and Johns, 1981: 275). 
Considering the British passive reaction to the Shah's invasion of Abu Musa, and the 
Greater and Lesser Tunbs, one could argue that Iran and Britain struck a deal whereby 
the Shah would willingly relinquish his claim over Bahrain, in exchange for the British 
government to turn a blind eye on the issue of these islands. 
This secret negotiation between the Shah and the British government regarding the 
status of Bahrain never existed on paper. The researcher of this study interviewed with 
the former British diplomat, Chris Randal, who was based in Tehran for a few years, 
who confirmed that he was never aware of the existence of such documents. However, 
according to the former Harvard University professor, Nadav Safran, who accepted the 
CIA and the Israeli government funding to conduct a research on the history of Saudi 
Arabia, in his book 'Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security', he concluded that 
the written contract did exist. Furthermore, Holden, the assassinated journalist, in his 
book, 'The House of Saud', indicated that various contracts between the Shah and the 
British government did exist prior to Bahrain gaining independence. For the nature of 
such a sensitive subject, although both authors failed to provide concrete evidence then 
surely, the Shah's willingness to abandon his claim to Bahrain would have caused such 
a cloud over the whole issue. 
The UN fact-finding report published on II May 1970 was ratified by Iran's Senate on 
18 May 1970, thereby relinquishing its claim on Bahrain and enabling Bahrain to 
declare its independence in that same year (Mojtahed-Zadeh, 1994: 51-52). 
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In Riyadh, King Faisal had initially favoured a comprehensive federation of nine Gulf 
Emirates as a means of filling the vacuum that would be created by the British 
withdrawal. However, when the Shah insisted on his claim over Bahrain and rejected 
any American or British security role in the Gulf, he decided to keep a low profile until 
the situation became clearer. The King was keen to ensure that Iran would not gain 
control over Bahrain, due to its strategic location just a few miles from the Saudi coast 
and the oil region. However, he did not overtly challenge Iran and he left the Bahraini 
issue for the British to settle. He also tried to manipulate the general Arab public 
opinion by portraying the Shah's ambition over the Gulf region with his aim to 
dominate the regional affairs (Safran, 1988: 135). 
in the end King Faisal's policy seemed to pay off, as Britain and Iran negotiated a 
settlement, and Riyadh emerged as a leading power in the Arab Gulf subsystem. At the 
same time, cordial relations were preserved between Saudi and with Iran; and in July 
1970, the two countries issued a joint statement opposing a continued British military 
presence in the Gulf (al-Alkim, 1989: 113). 
4.2.3 The Abu Musa dispute and the formation of the UAE 
The Abu Musa issue coincided with the Bahrain issue in 1968, as the British had just 
announced their withdrawal from the region. Both the British government and Riyadh 
were in favour of forming a federation consisting of nine Emirates, including Bahrain 
and Qatar. However, the Shah's announcement of his claim to Bahrain had a significant 
impact on the progress of the federation negotiations (al-Alkim, 1989: 10). The Omani 
Coast Emirates, aware of their vulnerability to Iranian pressure, were extremely 
concerned about Bahrain's participation in the federation while its status was still 
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unresolved (al-Alkim, 1989: 10-11). In the end, this caused disputes among the 
signatories of the federation agreement and only seven Emirates, (Abu Dhabi, Ajman, 
Dubai, Fujairah, Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah, and Umm al-Qaiwain), fonned the 
federation. 
The Bahraini problem was solved through an understanding between the two regional 
powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia, based on their conviction that the future security of the 
region depended on the maintenance of the status quo (al-Alkim, 1989: 11). In 
exchange King Faisal turned a blind eye when the Shah occupied Abu Musa and the 
Greater and Lesser Tunbs in 1971, which belonged to Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah 
respectively. According to Safran, Holden and Jones, King Faisal was informed of the 
whole plan in 1969 (Safran, 1988: 135, Holden and Johns, 1981: 275). Safran claims that, 
starting in 1970, King Faisal reached an understanding with the Shah on a tacit division 
of spheres of influence in the Gulf which left the Gulf Emirates in the Saudi sphere but 
allowed Iran to seize the Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs (Safran, 
1988: 126). In return, Saudi Arabia acknowledged Iran's primary role as a guardian of 
the Gulf waters. The Shah insisted that he absolutely needed the control of these islands 
in order to secure Gulf navigation, and the Saudis unreservedly gave in to his demand. 
Iranian claims to the islands 
Iranian claims to these three islands have traditionally been based upon its boast to have 
controlled and administered them before Britain intervened in the Lower Gulf during 
the first half of the nineteenth century, in order to impose its own maritime order. 
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According to Schofield, in the minds of most Iranians, these islands were taken by 
Britain in the nineteenth century and rightfully returned to Iran on Britain's departure 
from the Gulf waters in 1971. Therefore, the islands question has become inextricably 
linked to the mind of most Iranians so the regime could not easily abandon its claim 
over these islands, for fear that the Iranian population would then regard their 
government as relinquished Iran's historical rights, threatening the Iranian regime's 
legitimacy (Schofield, 1997: 155). 
Iran first claimed the ownership of these islands in the mid-1840s when the Persian 
Prime Minister, Mirza Aghassi, claimed all of the waters and islands of the Gulf region 
as being Persian. However, it was not until 1877 that Persia formally declared 
sovereignty over the Greater and Lesser Tunbs and in 1888 Tehran made claims for Abu 
Musa (Schofield, 1997: 144). According to Schofield, until 1873, the British Residency 
at Bushehr had generally believed that the Tunbs belonged to Persia, because of their 
geographical proximity to Persia (Schofield, 1997: 144). 
Iran laid great stress on a British War Office map produced in 1886 in which Abu Musa 
and the Tunbs are shown clearly in Persian colours. This was presented to the Qajar 
Shah as a gift by the British Minister during the summer of 1888 on the instructions of 
Lord Salisbury, the British Foreign Secretary at that time (Schofield, 1997: 145). 
The UAE's evidence of ownership of these islands 
Sharjah's claims to Abu Musa are based upon the uninterrupted possession of the island 
over a long and continuous period. It claimed that sovereignty was gained by a process 
of historical consolidation. Pearlers and fishennen visiting Abu Musa paid annual dues 
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to the ruler of Sharjah from 1863 onwards and Britain has actively defended the claims 
of Sharjah to the islands since the 1870s (Schofield, 1997: 145). 
Various territorial trade-offs were debated during the period of the unsuccessful Anglo- 
Persian Treaty negotiations. On several occasions during the 1920s and 1930s, the 
Iranian Foreign Ministry offered to drop its claim to Bahrain if Britain would recognise 
its sovereignty over Abu Musa and the Tunbs. On other occasions Britain played with 
the idea of leasing Abu Musa and the Tunbs to Iran in a bid to move along the hindered 
treaty negotiations. Sharjah resisted any suggestions that Abu Musa should from part of 
these plans (Schofield, 1997: 146). 
Britain's attitude towards the islands question was not consistent with its earlier policy. 
In the early twentieth century, the British had resisted Iran's claim to the islands; but as 
a result of the British decision to withdraw, Tehran's public claims ensured that 
maximum attention was focused on these islands. 
When the British announced their withdrawal from the Gulf region in 1968, the Shah 
sought to trade off London's acquiescence to his take-over of Abu Musa and the Tunbs 
for his abandonment of Iran's historical claim to Bahrain (MEI, I May 1992: 9). 
Nonetheless, the Abu Musa and the Tunbs disputes brought a lot of problems to the 
British government. They appointed Sir William Luce, the British Resident in the Gulf 
during the mid-1960s, and 1970-71, as a special envoy to the Gulf to reconcile the 
differences. In his shuttle diplomacy, Sir Luce proposed that Shadah and Ras a]- 
Khaimah lease the disputed islands to Iran (al-Alkim, 1989: 141). However, neither Iran, 
Sharjah nor Ras al-Khaimah were willing to abandon their sovereignty over these 
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islands. However, once it became clear that they were unable to work out a settlement 
acceptable to any party, and soon after the trade-off the issue of these islands for the 
settlement of Bahrain between the Shah and the British government, changed the British 
attitude towards them to become favourable with Iran (al-Alkim, 1989: 141). 
The Shah then reached an understanding with the British that he would occupy the 
islands after the termination of their treaty commitment to the Sheikhdoms. The British 
were in a hurry to get out of the region, and were therefore, unwilling to have a conflict 
with Iran. At the same time, Iran had already been chosen as a policeman in the region 
to safeguard the West's interests. Therefore, the British government changed its attitude 
towards the islands issue. 
Under both pressure from the British government and the threat from the Shah, who 
publicly announced he would use military force to enforce Iranian historical rights on 
these disputed islands, the ruler of Sharjah, Sheikh Khalid al-Qasimi, finally gave in. 
On 2 November 1971, the Sheikh announced a final settlement of the longstanding 
dispute between Sharjah and Iran over the island of Abu Musa (al-Alkim, 1989: 139). 
On 29 November 1971 both countries signed the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) as follow: 
-- Sharjah agrees to the stationing of Iranian troops in certain areas of Abu Musa, Iran 
having full jurisdiction over them. The Iranian flag will fly there. 
-- Sharjah will maintain jurisdiction over the rest of the island, with the Shadah flag 
flying there. 
-- Revenue derived from oil exploration, on and offshore, will be divided equally 
between Sharjah and Iran. 
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-- Iran will pay Sharjah 1.5 million pounds a year, until the emirate's annual receipts 
from oil total 3 million pounds a year. 
-- Both Iran and Sharjah recognise a 12-mile limit of territorial waters around the island 
(Arab Record and Report, 1971: 599, and al-Alkim, 1989: 142). 
The Abu Musa and the Tunbs dispute burst onto the international spotlight on 30 
November 1971, when Iranian troops stationed on Abu Musa, and took the Greater and 
Lesser Tunbs by force as British troops withdrew from the Gulf region. Although an 
agreement had already been reached between the ruler of Sharjah, and Iran, no similar 
understanding was ever reached with Ras al-Khaimah over the Tunbs (al-Alkim, 
1989: 142-3). On the same day that Ras al-Khaimah requested the British to defend the 
islands, the British government declared that the majority of their forces had already 
been withdrawn, and therefore could not get involved (at-Alkim, 1989: 143). 
Iran took this action on the day before Britain terminated its treaty relations with the 
rulers of the Turcial states on 1 December 1971. Safran argues that the Shah chose this 
date in order to demonstrate that he took the islands from Britain rather than from the 
weak Sheikhdoms (Safran, 1988: 136). This action spared Riyadh from the 
embarrassment of not being able to protect its Arab Neighbours, and in doing so Saudi 
Arabia only received minimum blame. At the same time, King Faisal merely expressed 
his opposition towards the Shah's occupation of these islands because this did not 
threaten its own regime survival, although to a certain degree, it did affect the balance 
of power in the region. On 2 Decernýer 197 1, the federation of the United Arab 
Emirates was officially proclaimed (Schofield, 1997: 147). Soon after the establishment 
of the UAE, the issue of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs receded for nearly 
a decade, until the Iranian Revolution began in 1979. 
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Al-Alkirn believes that the Shah was determined to seize the islands in 1971 for four 
main reasons: 
1. Freedom of navigation in this waterway at all times was essential for Iran as the 
Gulf is the only outlet for its oil exports. 
2. Iran needed to exploit its offshore oil resources and to protect not only its extensive 
oil installations at Kharq Island and elsewhere but also its oil cargoes for the entire 
length of the waterway. 
3. The preservation of the status quo in the Gulf was necessary to counterbalance 
communism, which was perceived as threatening the survival of the Gulf regimes, 
and the Shah himself. 
4. The Shah's insistence on the annexation of the islands by any means emanated not 
so much from their strategic value or Iran's historical rights, but more, perhaps, 
from the Shah's desire to save face at home after he had relinquished his claim to 
Bahrain. This made it difficult for him to sacrifice the islands for better relations 
with the Arabs in general, and with the Arab rulers of the Gulf in particular (al- 
Alkim, 1989: 140-41). 
However, after the formation the UAE, the UAE did not file a formal complaint to any 
international body, because it needed to maintain good relations with Tehran to 
encourage the Shah to recognise the UAE as a state rather than as a number of 
individual Emirates. Second, the UAE rulers' decision to freeze their claim to regain 
sovereignty was because of the Shah's military superiority. The Shah believed that he 
could offer them protection against any outside invasion or threat from within (al-Alkim, 
1989: 60-61). Third, at that time Abu Dhabi still had a territorial dispute with Saudi 
Arabia. Riyadh withheld its recognition of the UAE until 1974 when Abu Dhabi finally 
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gave in to Saudi demands (interview with Bin Huwaidin, 5 March 2000). Therefore, 
when the 1971 Abu Musa and the Tunbs dispute erupted Riyadh merely expressed 
regret over the incident, but did not take any action. Without the support of Saudi 
Arabia, the UAE could not afford to challenge the other dominant regional player. Only 
after the settlement of the islands dispute was the UAE able to declare its independence, 
on 2 December 197 1. 
In summary, the Bahraini and Abu Musa issues happened simultaneously soon after the 
British government announced its intention to withdraw from the region. The Shah 
claimed sovereignty over Bahrain, and occupied Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser 
Tunbs, complicating the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Yet, one can easily 
identify that the Saudi reaction towards the two events was different. Because of 
religious and strategic factors, Riyadh paid more attention to Bahrain compared to Abu 
Musa. However, because the Shah was militarily and politically dominant in the region, 
Saudi Arabia did not confront Iran on either issue. 
4.3 The rise of oil as a source of friction 
In the 1970s, oil dominated relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran due to its growing 
importance in world politics. The 1970s witnessed the change from being co-founders 
of OPEC to confrontation due to different opinions on how to utilise their oil resource. 
In this era, three developments dominated relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The 
first one was Saudi Arabia and Iran's emergence as the principal oil export countries 
after gaining control of their own oil resources in 1971. Second, the oil embargo of 
1973 divided the oil exporting countries into the so-called hawks, led by Iran, and doves, 
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led by Saudi Arabia. This forced both countries into competition for control of OPEC 
and the world oil market. Third, the recession in 1975 led Saudi Arabia and Iran to 
fight over their market share. 
4.3.1 Rise of Saudi Arabia and Iran as major oil exporters 
Soon after the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict, Libya was the first country to negotiate terms 
and conditions in favour of the government controlling its oil company. Both Saudi 
Arabia and Iran soon followed. At a meeting in Tehran in February 1971, Western oil 
companies operating in the Gulf signed an agreement with their host governments 
agreeing to terms similar to those obtained by Libya. This agreement marked the 
transfer of control over oil prices and production rate from oil companies to oil 
producing countries in OPEC. At the same time, oil producing countries were acquiring 
ownership of their oil resources from the companies through concession agreements. 
Most countries like Saudi Arabia accomplished this through nationalisation (Long, 
1997b: 67). Prior to the nationalisation of its oil companies, Saudi oil policy was almost 
entirely controlled by ARAMCO, a consortium owned by four American multinationals 
- Socal, Texaco, Exxon, and Mobil (Golub, 1985: 2-3). 
At that time, Saudi Arabia played a crucial role in a number of negotiations that were 
significant for the emergence of OPEC as the price-setting cartel (Ahrari, 1989: 72). For 
both Iran and Saudi Arabia, the Tehran negotiations of January 1971 served as an 
important landmark, enabling them to control oil prices within OPEC, therefore 
enhancing their position in world politics. Resolution XXI. 120, which was passed by 
the Twenty First Conference of OPEC, became the basis for a unified pricing strategy, 
the framework of the strategy being 'regionalisation' or a regional co-operation 
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approach. The principle was to treat the price problems of each region within OPEC 
jurisdiction separately. The negotiated increases in the price of oil in one region would 
serve as the basis for ensuing negotiations aimed at incorporating these increases in the 
other regions (Ahrari, 1989: 72). Three regional committees were established to deal 
with the price issues: the Gulf states committee, made up of Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia; 
the Mediterranean committee, including Saudi Arabia, Libya, Algeria, and Iraq; and a 
third committee comprising Venezuela and Indonesia (Ahrari, 1989: 72). Both Iran and 
Saudi Arabia wanted to lead the Gulf committee and thereby attain a greater influence, 
and this was the main cause of friction between the two countries. 
During the early 1970s, within OPEC, Saudi Arabia was the force behind those 
countries that wanted to ensure moderate price rises and stable prices. Iran was one of 
the price hawks that wanted to boost the price as high as it would go. As Badeeb argues, 
for the Shah, leadership of OPEC was in great part a reflection of his imperial ambitions 
(The neo-realist framework rejects the significance of individuals and focuses on 
systematic variables. One might argue, therefore, that neo-realism has a rather limited 
use in explaining this situation). Moreover, Iran had been the world's leading oil- 
exporting country until it nationalised its oil in 1951. Although it never again became 
the dominant supplier, it continued as a leading exporter and the Shah's aspirations 
dominated OPEC policy as the swing producer in the 1970s. In the meantime, Saudi 
Arabia had risen to be the leading exporter from only minimal production at the end of 
WWII. With smaller domestic oil needs and far more reserves than Iran, it had more 
productive capacity and could afford to export a greater percentage of its production. 
Thus, Saudi Arabia and not Iran became the swing producer in OPEC in the 1970s 
(Badeeb, 1993: 109). 
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Short-term political disruptions had a profound effect on the oil market. The 1973 
Arab-Israeli war for example, led to the Arab oil embargo, which was more successful 
than that attempted during the 1967 war. 
4.3.2 The 1973 oil embargo 
In September 1973, OPEC's demand for higher oil prices in response to an increasingly 
tight market had little success. However, the whole situation changed within one night 
due to the eruption of the Arab-Israeli war on 6 October. Following this, the majority of 
Arab countries thought that Riyadh should use its huge oil resources to force the West 
in general, and the US in particular, to abandon its aid to Israel. Prior to King Faisal's 
granting his approval to use oil as a political weapon, Saudi Arabia succeeded in 
securing an agreement with the states bordering Israel to help end the long-standing 
impasse in the Arab-Israeli conflict by attacking Israel. Only after gaining this 
assurance did he agree to use oil as a political weapon (Ahrari, 1989: 82). At the same 
time, King Faisal felt personally betrayed by the US that had failed to fulfil its promise 
to give Egypt aid if he could persuade Cairo to expel its Soviet military personnel. Thus, 
King Faisal instituted an oil embargo on 20 October 1973, which lasted until March 
1974. The embargo had two parts: an absolute embargo on the US and the Netherlands, 
considered especially friendly to Israel; and a cutback in production to ensure that 
embargoed countries would not simply shift purchasing patterns for a replaceable 
worldwide product (Long, 1997b: 68-69). However, Iran, whose interests were 
elsewhere, used the oil shortage to raise its oil output and accordingly to increase its 
financial gain. At the same time, the Shah sought to reduce the initial impact of the 
embargo; hence, an open confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran emerged soon 
after. 
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During this period, Saudi-Iranian relations were dominated by oil and influenced by 
differences of opinion over OPEC production policies and its pricing system. The price 
increases demanded by Iran within OPEC, and the reluctance expressed by the Saudis to 
accept this, defined the parameter of conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the 
1970s (Ahrari, 1989: 70-71). 
The shortage of oil supplies worldwide and the growing importance of OPEC best 
suited Saudi objectives (Ahrari, 1989: 81), and at the same time allowed Iran to 
accumulate huge oil wealth. The Saudi success in implementing the Arab oil embargo 
was the ultimate transformation of economic power into political prestige. In addition, 
from 1974, Saudi Arabia emerged as the leading force for price moderation within 
OPEC. The decision to adopt this role stemmed from the fact that Saudi Arabia had the 
largest quantities of proven oil reserves, and in this capacity its economic prosperity 
was linked to the economic stability and a healthy growth of the Western industrial 
economies (Ahrari, 1989: 74). 
Although the 1973 oil embargo made Saudi Arabia the most important oil producing 
country in the world, it also effectively caused the friction between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran within OPEC. Saudi Arabia was inclined to adopt a strategy of a prolonged, steady 
supply of oil to the market. This would most benefit Saudi Arabia as it has the largest 
oil reserve, a smaller population within which to divide the oil wealth, and no other 
sustainable human or natural resource to develop its own industries other than those 
related to oil. In contrast, although Iran enjoyed a huge oil resource, the population 
growth, and its desire to establish stronger industrial bases, forced Tehran to decide it 
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needed a quick return from the oil resource to invest into industry. Therefore, Saudi 
Arabia and Iran were on a collision course regarding oil policy. 
Rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia became significant in the 1970s as oil emerged 
as a potent weapon along with the growing effectiveness of OPEC to impose increases 
in oil prices (Ahrari, 1989: 70). Since the beginning of 1974, OPEC meetings were 
marked by in-fighting between the price hawks (led by Iran, Libya, and Algeria, which 
were frequently joined by Iraq and Nigeria), and the price doves (led by Saudi Arabia 
and often joined by the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar). The OPEC price hawks exploited the 
artificial shortage the embargo created to maximise their fortunes (Long, 1997b: 68-69). 
However, soon after the oil embargo in 1973, the world recession hit. The cartel began 
to introduce unilateral price escalations, which resulted in accelerating inflation around 
the world. This situation eroded the buying power of the oil-producing states; and 
consequently, OPEC introduced further increases to counterbalance the erosion of its 
purchasing power. This in turn led to a higher rate of inflation, thus creating a vicious 
circle in price setting policies (Dorraj, 1993: 20). 
4.3.3 World recession intensified the competition 
The OPEC countries finally faced the consequences of their subjective price escalations. 
Since petroleum is a politicised commodity and pricing is as much determined by the 
law of supply and demand as it is by political factors that remain outside the world oil 
market, it is not surprising that political decisions can have a direct bearing on the price 
(Dorraj, 1993: 20). 
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In 1975 the Saudis, as the major leader of OPEC, attempted to unify the price of all 
OPEC states, although two major factors frustrated these attempts. First, the price 
hawks continued to be disobedient, selling their oil for a higher price. Second, major oil 
companies disliked the Saudi lower prices, and continued to sell their own oil for $2 to 
$3 more per barrel, rendering the Saudi's strategy self-defeating (Dorraj, 1993: 20-2 1). 
The world recession of the mid-1970s, was a consequence of the huge oil deficits 
incurred by the consuming countries, and the sluggish oil market. Ironically this 
threatened to undermine the new higher oil prices, as it led to a reduction in demand for 
oil. The more populous oil-producing countries, particularly Iran, Venezuela and 
Nigeria, were reluctant to cut back on supply as they did not want to sacrifice the 
revenue which was needed for development projects. Saudi Arabia took action to 
conserve supplies to keep the world price steady. This action was inspired by political 
as well as economic motives (Wilson, 1979: 50). 
Towards the end of 1976, however, the magnitude of disagreement on the amount of 
price increase between these two groups of countries was quite divergent (Ahrari, 
1989: 75), and confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran increased rapidly. From 
1976 to 1977, the oil exporting states continued to try to cope with the erosion of their 
purchasing power, but the dwindling of oil surpluses and the continued downward 
pressure on the price of crude oil put them in a difficult position (Dorraj, 1993: 20). 
As a tactical manoeuvre aimed at applying pressure on the price hawks, Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE announced the removal of their self-imposed production ceiling, thereby 
raising their combined production from the prevailing rate of 11.1 mbd to 12.5 mbd or 
about 42 per cent of the total OPEC production, which remained at 32-33 mbd (Ahrari, 
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1989: 75). The Saudis hoped that the surplus thus created would produce downward 
pressure on the price scales adopted by the eleven other oil states and that the latter 
would be forced to realign their prices with those of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The 
OPEC majority was equally determined to back their higher price tier, with coordinated 
production cutbacks if necessary, rather than succumb to the Saudi pressure (Ahrari, 
1989: 75-76). 
By July 1977, Saudi Arabia decided to unify prices by rising its own by a maximum of 
5 per cent, which divided the oil price within OPEC between two tiers. The two-tier 
price system caused little damage to OPEC price hawks. Iran learned to defy Saudi 
Arabia despite its role as a swing producer, and the Saudis had to choose another 
occasion to demonstrate the potential power of their enormous oil reserves as a modifier 
of the pricing behaviour of other OPEC members (Ahrari, 1989: 76). 
The Shah, in the wake of the Saudi estimate that the production of the eleven OPEC 
price hawks might drop by more than 25 per cent because of lower Saudi prices and 
increased production, stated that any attempt by the Saudis to use escalated production 
as a pressure tactic would be equivalent to an act of aggression (Ahrafi, 1989: 76). The 
in-fighting raged on in 1977 and relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran deteriorated. 
In sum, in the 1970s the oil issue changed the balance of power between Saudi Arabia 
and Iran. The natural differences regarding oil policy, and the 1973 oil embargo were 
the main factors causing their relationship to become fractious. Prior to 1973, Iran was 
the most dominant power in the region, but the embargo made Saudi Arabia the most 
important oil producing country in the world, and gave it confidence to challenge Iran's 
position in the Gulf region. 
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The most dramatic change during the 1970s was the role of Saudi Arabia in regional 
and international affairs. Saudi Arabia evolved from a country whose interests lay 
almost exclusively in preserving its domestic political stability and territorial integrity, 
into a powerful regional actor whose influence extended well beyond the Persian Gulf 
into the entire Middle East, as well as into Africa and Asia (Dawisha, 1998: 129). 
However, the oil issue became the perennial problem which caused frictions between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran and was a prelude to their confrontation during the 1980s and 
1990S. 
5.0 Conclusion 
This chapter highlights the evolution of the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran 
from the early twentieth century prior to 1977, and presents an understanding of the 
factors that affected their relations throughout the period of this study. It demonstrates 
that the factors of oil, religion, Iraq, Bahrain, the UAE and the superpowers gradually 
became important issues and this chapter acted as a sign-post to understand the trends in 
their relations. It also discussed how each individual factor played a different role in 
affecting the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. In subsequent chapters, all of the 
above mentioned factors will be assessed as being deep rooted issues since the early 
stage of their relationship. However, it is clear that only the Iraq factor was a 'new 
issue' post-1977. 
The early period of Saudi-Iranian relations was mainly shaped by the superpowers' 
geopolitical ambitions, both Saudi Arabia and Iran emerging as independent countries 
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lacking prominence in world politics. Both countries' main goal in this period was 
regime survival. 
The position of Saudi Arabia and Iran in world politics changed when WWII broke out. 
In both political and military terms, WWII signified a crucial test for the Saudi and 
Iranian regimes. The Saudi monarchy came out of the war stronger with western 
backing, more politically confident, and enjoyed a high degree of political stability in 
the post-war era. The Iranian monarchy had a more difficult time, as a result of the 
Allied occupation. In the period prior to WWII both Saudi Arabia and Iran fell under 
the influence of the Soviet Union, Britain and the US, and neither developed a foreign 
policy towards each other; they only reacted to events. 
In the aftermath of WWII, because the Shah decisively aligned himself with the West, 
particularly US interests, and both Saudi Arabia and Iran dealt with common oil issues; 
the end of the 1940s witnessed cordial relations between the two countries. 
During the 1950s, Saudi-Iranian relations began to evolve around three major issues: 
regional politics, oil and international security. Saudi Arabia and Iran were bound by 
their common threat from the Nasser's pan-Arabism. At the same time, oil began to 
gain prominence in the world; and economic stakes in the oil industry began to enhance 
their significance to the West. At the international level, both countries strengthened 
their relations with the West in the period following WWII, and during the 'Cold War'. 
Although, Iran managed to cultivate closer links with the West. The Baghdad Pact 
excluded Saudi Arabia and aroused its resentment. Nonetheless, the increasing 
importance of oil, which dominated the region in the 1960s, changed the balance of 
their relations. 
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In the 1960s, signs of co-operation and competition deepened. The rising importance of 
oil turned Saudi Arabia from a marginal regional player, in the 1950s, into an effective 
international player from the 1960s onwards. At the same time, oil became a central 
factor in shaping Saudi-Iranian relations in the years to come. 
In regional affairs, threats from communism dictated co-operation between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran. Although, the Dhofari rebellion demonstrated Tehran's dominance in 
regional affairs. Saudi Arabia sought to accumulate the means and power to compete 
with Iran from the 1970s onwards in order to contain Iranian influence in the region. 
The 1968 British announcement to withdraw their military forces from East of the Suez 
Canal in 1971, enhanced the position of both Saudi Arabia and Iran as regional 
policemen. Nonetheless, it also led to the rise of the issue of Bahraini independence and 
Abu Musa disputes between the UAE and Iran. Indeed, this was a prelude for the 
confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the 1990s when both issues re-emerged. 
The Nixon's 'Twin Pillar" policy allowed Saudi Arabia and Iran to become the most 
powerful states in the region. Yet because of the differences in their natural and human 
resources, this policy created an unequal partnership between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
The 1970s witnessed a dramatic change in world politics because oil emerged as 
decisive factor by transforming economic power into political power. The implication 
of this was a change in the balance of power between Saudi Arabia and Iran. In this era, 
Saudi Arabia and Iran emerged as the principle oil exporting countries, and, accordingly, 
increased their importance within OPEC. Saudi Arabia, with its huge oil reserves, 
emerged as the most dominant power within OPEC, and gained the confidence to 
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confront Iran. The oil embargo of 1973 allowed Gulf Arab states to manipulate their 
economic power, represented in oil, to influence political decision-making, but also 
divided the oil exporting countries own pricing policy. This led to both countries 
competing for domination of OPEC and the world oil market. The late 1970s witnessed 
an intensified confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran over the oil issue. 
Thus, this chapter shows the background of the evolution of relations between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran. From the early twentieth century both countries struggled for 
surviving in a volatile international system. But through time, the importance of oil in 
the world transferred both countries from minor players into dominant regional powers. 
However, the superpowers and regional events affected their relations in different ways. 
In the 1950s, Western interests mainly amounted to preventing the spread of 
communism, which resulted in the West and the US supporting Iran more than Saudi 
Arabia. This enabled the Shah to build up his power base and become the dominant 
regional power. In the following decade, both Saudi Arabia and Iran utilised their oil 
wealth to consolidate their influence in the region. However, the Saudi regime was 
unable to challenge the Shah. Until after the 1973 oil embargo, imposed by Saudi 
Arabia, which totally changed the position of Saudi Arabia in the world and 
consequently brought confrontation with Iran. 
The regional system demonstrated clear signs of significant penetration by international 
superpowers, to which both Iran and Saudi Arabia had to respond and which shaped 
their relations with one another. Equally the regional system was shaped by an 
emerging local balance of power which saw Iranian military and resource might 
combined with external support balanced by Arab solidarity in the early post- 
independence era. As time progressed, oil became a major determinant of regional 
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balance of power, assisting Saudi Arabia's rise to regional prominence and causing a 
regional competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia. However, this competition was 
counter-balanced by a number of common interests -a shared alliance with the West, 
common fears of radical anti-monarchical forces (Nasserism/Communism) and the 
economic and strategic rise of an Iraqi regional player. 
This chapter demonstrates that each of the factors identified in the Introduction plays a 
contributing role in shaping relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, although some 
were significantly more important during these early years than others. During this 
period the religious factor did not play a particularly significant role but signs were 
certainly there of the confrontations that were to come later. Likewise, Iraq and 
regional conflicts only served as a minor cause of direct friction but the potential for a 
greater impact was clearly evolving. Within this period one could argue that the 
involvement of superpowers (the penetrated nature of the regional system) was the 
single most important factor which shaped the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran 
and affected the balance of power between them. 
From 1977 onwards, oil, religion, Iraq, and regional disputes (Bahrain, Abu Musa, the 
Greater and Lesser Tunbs) became as significant as the intervention of superpowers (the 
US, and the Soviet Union/Russia) in shaping the course of Saudi-Iranian relations. 
Each of these factors will be discussed individually in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE OIL FACTOR 
1.0 Introduction 
This chapter analysis how oil - and the struggle for the leadership of OPEC - has 
affected Saudi-Iranian relations. In particular, we will illustrate how both countries 
have utilised their oil in order to maximise their own fortunes in the world oil market, 
and the impact of this on their relationship. Oil has been an important dimension of 
the Saudi-Iranian relationship mainly because 60% of world oil comes from the Middle 
East region; and around 25% comes from Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia and Iran have 
also adopted different views on how to utilise their oil resources which has affected 
their short and long term policy on oil. This has resulted in a conflict of interest that 
dictates their relations. Furthermore, this chapter shows how the quest for dominance 
in the Gulf region between both countries was transferred into dominance for OPEC 
leadership. 
The key to understanding Iranian and Saudi economies is in examining the 
opportunities and constraints of their main source of revenue, oil. This is because all 
modem sectors of the Iranian and Saudi economies are dependent on earnings from oil 
(Amirahmadi, 1990: 70). Thus, the most appropriate economic theory that could 
explain Saudi and Iranian economic activity is the rentier state theory, which first 
appeared in 1970 when Mahdavy used the concept of rentierism in the context of the 
Middle East. 
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Adam Smith defined rent as a component of price of commodities different from wages 
and profit. 'High or low wages and profit are the cause of high or low price; high or 
low rent is the effect of it' (Smith, 1960: 412). When applied to an economy, rent is 
generally a reward for ownership of all natural resources. A rentier economy is 
characterised by the following features: 
1. One where rent situations predominate. 
2. An economy, which relies on substantial external rent (Mahdavy, 1970: 428). 
3. The government is the principal recipient of the external rent in the economy 
(Bablawi, 1987: 52). 
In a rentier state only a few people are engaged in the generation of this rent (wealth), 
the majority being only involved in the distribution or utilisation of it. In the case of 
the oil-producing countries, the role of oil revenues is so overwhelmingly obvious that it 
can be approximated to be the cause of other activities. Saudi Arabia and Iran are the 
best examples of explaining the rentier theory, because, according to their statistical 
yearbooks, both countries are heavily depended on the oil revenue, which counts to 
more than 91% of Saudi's total income in the early 1960s. This income increased to 
99.9% by exporting crude oil in the 1980s. In the case of Iran, the income increased 
from 85% in the early 1960s to more than 95% in the 1980s (see table 3.1). However, 
both countries' oil industry has only employed a very Small part of their entire labour 
force. In the case of Saudi Arabia the oil industry only employed no more than 15,800 
Saudis in 1979 which only stood for 0.539% of the Saudi population (see table 3.2). 
Also in the case of Iran, in 1974 only 15,000 Iranians were employed, which comprised 
0.00047% of the total Iranian population (see table 3.3). 
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Table 3.1 Oil Exports As A Percentage of Total Exports of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Total 
OPEC States, 1961-1980 
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
I. R. Iran 84.8 85.8 86.9 88.6 87.2 87.7 90.6 
Saudi Arabia 91.7 90.8 91.3 91.9 90.8 90.5 
' 
89.7 
Total OPEC 75.3 1 77.3 1 77.8 79.0 1 80.8 1 82.0 [ 83.1 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
I. R. Iran 89.7 88.4 89.9 91.3 90.0 90.8 96.9 
Saudi Arabia 99.8 99.7 99.6 99.7 99.7 99.6 99.7 
Total OPEC 85.3 85.1 85.2 88.1 87.9 88.1 95.0 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
I. R. Iran 97.1 97.5 97.2 98.1 96.0 94.5 
Saudi Arabia 99.6 99.7 99.8 99.6 99.8 99.9 
Total OPEC 95.2 1 94.7 94.1 93.1 93.2 1 94.3 
Sources: OPEC Annual Statistical Yearbook, 1980, p. XX 
Table 3.2 Saudi Employees by Economic Activity 
Economic activity Total 
Mining and quarrying 15,825 
Manufacturing 15,385 
Electricity, gas and water 4,740 
Construction 11,489 
Wholesale and retail trades, restaurants and hotels 54,703 
Financing, insurance, real estates and business services 6,882 
Community, social and personal services 8,714 
Total workforce 117,738 
ITotal. population 8,930,0001 
Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Statistical Yearbook, 1979, p. 481, and OPEC Annual Statistical Yearbook, 1997, 
p. 2. 
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Table 3.3 Iranian Employees by Economic Activity 
Major industry group Total 
Male Female 
Agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing 3,616,000 83,000 
Mining and Quarrying 15,000 -- 
Manufacturing 931,000 489,000 
Construction 533,000 2,000 
Electricity, gas, water and sanitary services 45,000 2,000 
Commerce, banking and insurance 707,000 10,000 
Transportation, storage and communications 293,000 3,000 
Services 720,000 165,000 
Activities not adequately described 21,000 1,000 
Total workforce 6,881,000 755,000 
Total population 31,64 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Iran, 1973-1974, and OPEC Annual Statistical Yearbook, 1973, p. 2. 
Being a depletable source, oil is a double-edged sword for oil producing countries like 
Iran and Saudi Arabia when they plan their annual expenditures. Sharp declines in oil 
output and oil revenues play havoc with development plans of individual countries and 
put the weakest countries under considerable strain, whilst sharp increases in oil output 
can cause problems of a different nature. They encourage governments to make 
spending commitments that may not be sustainable when market conditions turn round. 
More seriously, they prevent the adoption of any consistent depletion policy that may be 
designed to preserve the long-term economic interest of the countries (Jaidah, 1983: 1-4). 
Although Iran and Saudi Arabia depend on oil resources as their primary source of 
revenue, the difference in quantity of their respective resources affect their decision 
making process regarding their financial needs. 
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2.0 Saudi oil-based economy 
By any standards, Saudi Arabia is the most important oil-producing state in the world 
today. It has more than one-fourth of the world's oil reserves and with the break up of 
the Soviet Union and sharp decline in former Soviet production, it has become the 
world's largest oil producer. Saudi Arabia has proven oil reserves of 66 billion barrels, 
which amounts to 25% of the world oil reserves (Ahrari, 1989: 70). With the Saudi 
population reaching 20 million in 2000 (OPEC's figure) and oil revenues making up 
around 90-95% of total Saudi export earnings, 70-80%of state revenues, and around 
40% of the country's gross domestic product, Saudi Arabia's economy remains heavily 
dependent on oil despite attempts at diversification (Energy Information Administration, 
www. eia. doe. gov). 
Most of Saudi Arabia's income has been Of a rentier nature, accumulating from the 
possession of one scarce resource, namely petroleum (Wilson, 1979: 40). Saudi Arabia 
is a state with high consumption but little production, large incomes but no necessity to 
work for these earnings. The oil sector employs only a small fraction of the country's 
active labour force, while the majority are engaged in agricultural activities and services 
(see table 3.2). With an essentially oil-based economy, Saudi industrial diversification 
is based mainly on petrochemicals, or on the use of oil and gas to operate industrial 
processes. Saudi development policies have always attempted to move the country 
forward at a measured pace so that society could adjust to the changes taking place. 
The Saudi strategy has aimed at maximising oil revenues by maintaining production at a 
high level. At the same time, it is unwilling to press for dramatic rises in the price of 
oil. This is partly because of Saudi's concern about the effect this would have on the 
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West's industrialised economies, the consequences for future oil demand (and Saudi 
revenues), and the US-Saudi relationship (Chubin and Tripp, 1996: 66). Riyadh is 
unwilling to see dramatic rises in the oil price because it is afraid that this would 
encourage the industrial countries to develop alternative energy resources such as wind 
and solar, or unclear power which would come from stream, therefore, alternative 
energy sources would become profitable and therefore, diminish the power of Saudi oil. 
The best example was soon after the 1973 oil crisis in the world market, when the 
previously higher oil rent states such as Britain, Mexico and Norway, began to produce 
their own oil and, once they had passed the benchmark on the production line their 
product could easily compete in price with the Saudi oil, in the long run. Saudi Arabia 
also needs the West, especially the US, for protection from the threats of its neighbours, 
i. e. Iran, and Iraq, and is therefore, very keen to forge interdependent relations with the 
us. 
Saudi Arabia's favourable situation bears little resemblance to that prevailing in other 
Third World countries. The astronomical growth in the value of Saudi Arabian oil 
exports account for over 90-99% of the country's export earnings. The rentier income 
has grown enormously, especially since the oil price increases of January 1974 (see 
table 3.4), which was brought about by the collective action of the OPEC cartel. Saudi 
Arabia has lacked both resources and the means to use its earnings to increase real 
wealth through the development of the domestic economy (Wilson, 1979: 40-44). 
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Table 3.4 Crude Oil Production (Thousand Barrels) and Revenues (Million US Dollar) 
in Iran and Saudi Arabia since Commencement 
Year I. R. Iran Iran's Revenues Saudi Arabia 
from Oil* 
Saudi's 
Revenues from 
OiJA 
1913 1,825 N/A 
1914 2,920 N/A 
1915 3,650 N/A 
1916 4,392 N/A 
1917 6,935 N/A 
1918 8,623 N/A 
1919 10,139 0.5 
1920 12,230 0.6 
1921 16,637 0.6 
1922 22,247 0.5 
1923 25,230 0.4 
1924 32,373 0.8 
1925 35,038 1.1 
1926 35,842 1.4 
1927 39,688 0.5 
1928 43,461 0.5 
1929 42,145 1.4 
1930 45,833 1.3 
1931 44,376 1.3 
1932 49,471 1.5 
1933 54,392 1.8 
1934 57,851 2.2 
1935 57,273 2.2 
1936 62,718 2.9 
1937 77,804 3.4 
1938 78,372 3.3 495 0.1 
1939 78,151 4.3 3,934 3.2 
1940 66,317 4.0 5,075 1.2 
1941 50,777 4.0 4,310 1.0 
1942 72,256 4.0 4,530 1.1 
11943 74,612 4.0 
4,868 1.1 
11944 102,04J5 4.5 7,794 1.7 
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1945 130,526 5.6 21,311 4.3 
1946 146,819 7.1 59,944 10.4 
1947 154,998 7.1 89,852 18.0 
1948 190,384 9.2 142,853 52.5 
1949 204,712 13.5 174,009 39.1 
1950 242,475 16.0 199,547 56.7 
1951 127,600 7.0 277,962 110.0 
1952 10,100 N/A 301,861 212.2 
1953 9,800 0.3 308,294 169.8 
1954 22,400 20.7 351,044 236.3 
1955 120,035 90.2 356,449 340.8 
1956 198,289 150.9 367,037 290.2 
1957 262,742 212.8 376,254 296.3 
1958 301,526 247.2 386,343 297.6 
1959 338,810 262.4 420,733 313.1 
1960 390,766 285.0 480,734 333.7 
1961 438,804 291.2 540,237 377.6 
1962 487,084 342.4 599,666 409.7 
1963 544,325 380.0 651,890 607.7 
1964 
---- 
626,107 482.2 694,129 523.2 
1965 696,520 514.1 804,936 664.1 
1966 778,109 608.2 949,660 789.9 
1967 950,180 751.6 1,023,840 903.6 
1968 1,039,367 853.4 1,113,717 926.4 
1969 1,232,155 922.8 1,173,896 949.2 
1970 1,397,585 1,109.3 1,386,659 1,214.0 
1971 1,656,918 1,851.1 1,740,633 1,884.9 
1972 1,838,455 2,396.0 2,201,962 2,744.6 
1973 2,139,229 4,399.2 2,772,605 4,340.0 
1974 2,197,901 21,443.4 3,095,088 22,573.5 
1975 1,952,787 18,870.0 2,582,533 25,676.2 
1976 2,153,141 21,837.0 3,139,255 30,747.5 
1977 2,066,922 20,735.0 3,358,000 42,384.0 
1978 N/A 19,300.0 N/A 32,233.8 
1979 N/A 20,500.0 N/A 57,522.0 
1980 N/A 13,500.0 N/A 102,212.0 
1981 N/A 9,300.0 N/A 113,200.0 
1982 N/A l 17,600.0 N/A 76,000.0 
90 
Chapter Three: The oil factor 
1983 N/A 20,000.01 N/A 42,600.0 
1984 N/A 16,700.01 N/A 16,700.0 
Note: *Iran's revenues from oil until 1951 indicated by million pound, and since 1953 indicated by million US dollar. 
ASaudi's revenues from oil indicated by million US dollar only. N/A: Not available. 
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical yearbook, 1977, pp. 20,21,27,157, and 162. OPEC Annual Statistical Yearbook, 
1980, pp. XLIX, and OPEC Annual Statistical Yearbook, 1984, p-34- 
The Saudi policy on moderate prices also conformed to its domestic economic interests. 
With huge oil reserves, but few human and natural resources other than oil, the 
Kingdom needed to be able to maintain a long-term oil market. It feared that if prices 
were too high, consumers would be encouraged to develop non-oil energy sources and 
deprive all OPEC members of their major export (Badeeb, 1993: 111). 
The dilemma between long-term Saudi maximisation of oil revenues, through moderate 
prices and secure supply, and meeting the Kingdom's short-term revenue needs, through 
higher prices, would probably always constitute a challenge to Saudi Arabia (Long, 
1997: 74). 
3.0 Iranian oil dominated economy 
On the other side of the Gulf, Iran has the largest human and mineral resource, the most 
advanced industrial bases among the Gulf states, in addition to proven oil reserves of 51 
billon barrels (Ahrari, 1989: 70). Iran's population reached 63 million in 2000 
(OPEC's figure) and its economy relies heavily on oil export revenues which amount to 
about 80% of total export earnings, 40-50% of the government budget, and 10-20%of 
GDP (Energy Information Administration, www. eia. doe-gov). Although like Saudi 
Arabia, Iran depends on oil, unlike Saudi Arabia, it has the necessary complementary 
resources, both in terms of manpower, land, and natural resources in addition to oil, to 
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ensure that the financial boom resulting from oil exports is translated into real domestic 
economic growth (Wilson, 1979: 1). 
Nonetheless, despite relatively high oil export revenues, Iran continues to face 
budgetary pressures; a rapidly growing, young population with limited job prospects 
and high levels of unemployment; heavy dependence on oil revenues; significant 
external debt; high levels of poverty; expensive state subsidies on many basic goods; a 
large, inefficient public sector and state monopolies; international isolation and 
sanctions (Energy Information Administration, www. eia. doe. gov). 
In Iran, some 90% of the state's foreign exchange earnings come from crude oil exports 
that pay for various kinds of Iran's ever-increasing industrial and food imports. The 
modem industries of Iran, for example are dependent on the world economy for more 
than 65% of their input. Oil is the economy's real lifeline. Yet, Iran has only limited 
control over the production, export and price of its oil, for these are largely determined 
by changes in the world economy and within OPEC. Dependency on oil has 
constrained Iran's budget and therefore its socio-economic development policies 
(Amirahmadi, 1990: 70). In addition, oil is vital for the economy, as over 95% of Iran's 
foreign currency earnings come from this huge industry -a degree of dependence which 
the Iranian government admits is unhealthy, but has so far been able to do nothing about 
(MBI, 27 September 1985: 14). 
Evidently, both Saudi Arabia and Iran's economies are oil-driven; however, Iran has 
been more successful in diversifying its economic activities. This could be explained 
by its more skilled human resource as well as its possession of other natural resources. 
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Prior to the Iranian revolution, the Shah's policy was to transfer the oil base economy 
into an industrial orientated economy by exerting the oil money as soon as possible and 
investing in industries. One could notice that during the 1973 oil crisis, the Shah was 
forceful in advocating higher oil prices which inevitably contradicted Riyadh's views, 
and resulted in the conflicts with Saudi Arabia in every OPEC meeting for different 
price tagging. Interestingly, soon after the revolution, the Iranian clerical regime 
sought to prolong the life of the country's oil reserves and gradually reduce its 
dependency on oil exports, as well as increasing its investments in downstream projects 
and raise the export of products at the expense of the export of crude oil. However, the 
outbreak of the eight-year Iran-Iraq war in 1980 forced the Iranian regime to abandon its 
oil policy and intensified the competition with Saudi Arabia within OPEC. 
As oil has been a significant resource for both countries, it constituted another sphere of 
co-operation and competition in their relationship. Two oil related organizations 
(OPEC and OAPEC) play very important roles in relations between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran. The competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran for leadership within the oil 
organizations has been manifest in OPEC, and transformed OPEC into the most 
important forum for Saudi-Iranian competition. At the same time, Saudi Arabia 
utilised OAPEC as a collective force to mobilise support from Arab petroleum 
exporting countries in its battle with Iran over oil prices. 
4.0 The history of OPEC and OAPEC 
4.1 The establishment of OPEC 
The Organisation of the Petroleum Countries (OPEC) is a permanent, intergovernmental 
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organisation, and is the most important venue for Saudi Arabia and Iran in competing 
for influence in the world oil market. OPEC was created at the Baghdad Conference 
on 10-14 September 1960 by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, and were 
later joined by another eight members. According to the OPEC official website: 
www. OPEC. org 'the OPEC's objective is to co-ordinate and unify petroleum policies 
among member countries, in order to secure fair and stable prices for petroleum 
producers; an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consuming nations; 
and a fair return on capital to those investing in the industry'. 
Saudi Arabia and Iran use OPEC to influence oil policy within the organisation for their 
own benefit and financial advantage. At the same time, Saudi Arabia uses the 
Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), as a collective force to 
unify the Arab petroleum exporting countries' support in its fight with Iran on the oil 
price issue. 
4.2 The establishment of OAPEC 
As well as OPEC there is another organisation, the Organisation of Arab Petroleum 
Exporting countries (OAPEC), formed by Arab countries with Saudi Arabia as the 
dominant player. This organisation plays a very crucial role in enhancing the Saudi's 
bargaining position with Iran. OAPEC is a regional Arab intergovernmental 
organisation created on 9 January 1968 by Libya, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and 
currently has ten Arab petroleum countries as members. The organisations' main 
concern is the development of the petroleum industry by fostering cooperation among 
its members (www. oapecorg. org). 
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In the 1970s, within the framework of OPEC, Saudi Arabia remained the leading force 
behind moderate price increases and made sure that the rest of the OPEC membership 
followed the line. However, within OAPEC, Saudi Arabia was the chief architect of 
the oil embargo of 1973 punishing the US for aiding Israel in the conflict between Israel 
and the Arab states. As leader, this embargo made Saudi Arabia the most dominant 
power within the Arab states. The complexity of Saudi policies within OPEC and 
OAPEC gave that country a legitimate claim to the leadership of OPEC (Ahrari, 
1989: 70). 
The rest of the chapter will be devoted to examining how Saudi-Iranian relations were 
influenced by the oil factor during the period 1977-1997. This will be demonstrated 
by analysing how Saudi Arabia and Iran have tried to use oil in their contest for 
extending their influence regionally and worldwide through the struggle to dominate 
OPEC's policy making. For the purpose of this analysis, the timeframe will be divided 
into three periods. The first, prior to the Iranian revolution, saw both Saudi Arabia and 
Iran attempt to stabilise the oil market. The second period in the 1980s, witnessed 
Saudi Arabia emerging as the dominant player within OPEC. The third, the 1990s, 
observed the politics overcome the difficulty of economics between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran for a better working relationship. 
5.0 1977 to the Iranian Revolution: the prelude of the volatile oil market 
As was pointed out in chapter two, the oil market of the 1960s could be described as a 
buyer's market, where prices were controlled by oil companies. It was only after the 
1967 Arab-Israeli war that the shortage of tankers allowed Libya to negotiate the terms 
and conditions with the oil companies. Later most of the Arab oil producing states 
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nationalised their oil companies, and this changed the future of the oil industry. Saudi 
Arabia and Iran were put in the front line, due to their huge oil reserves. Inevitably, 
both countries transferred their struggle for leadership to OPEC when the market 
became a seller's market during the 1970s, and the oil exporting states replaced the oil 
companies as oil price regulators. 
Although this infighting raged on during 1977 and 1978, internal unrests within Iran 
occupied the Shah's attention. However, during the duration of the Iranian revolution 
between October 1978 and January 1979, the Saudis tried to maintain a stable oil price. 
They boosted production to capacity (well over 10 mbd) in an effort to compensate as 
much as possible for the lost Iranian production. By that time, with Iranian production 
at a precarious 1.2mb, one quarter of its former level, increased Saudi output had failed 
to prevent the market from becoming tight (Golub, 1985: 28). The Iranian Revolution 
created a highly uncertain situation concerning the supply of oil in the oil market. 
The fall of the Shah had a psychological impact on the market similar to that of the Arab 
embargo in 1973, and sent spot oil prices soaring. Fears that Iranian oil would stay off 
the market due to political upheavals were largely unfounded; but panic buying 
continued, further encouraged by strategic stockpiling (Long, 1997b: 71). 
After the Shah's downfall in 1979 at the hands of the Shi'ite clergy, the new Islamic 
government changed its economic policy. It sought to prolong the life of the country's 
oil reserves and gradually reduce its dependency on oil exports, as well as increasing its 
investments in downstream projects and raise the export of products at the expense of 
export of crude oil. Within OPEC, Iran was to defend a policy of limited production 
and increasing prices (Amirahmadi, 1990: 72-73). Outside of OPEC, Tehran sustained 
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a policy of imposing surcharges and rerouting its contract crude into spot sale (Ahrari, 
1989: 78). 
Saudi Arabia unsuccessfully continued its advocacy of a unified price structure. In the 
end, Riyadh allowed the spot market to set the prices of crude oil, and OPEC was 
indeed abandoning its role as a price-fixing cartel (Ahrari, 1989: 77). However, in 
order to reunify the multi-tier price structure and also to restructure the chaotic 
supply-related market conditions, Saudi Arabia opted for raising its production levels. 
In spite of this measure, prices of crude oil in spot markets continued to escalate. 
Riyadh also found that in spite of its efforts to stabilise oil prices, the American oil 
companies were buying the Saudi oil at a cheaper rate whilst selling at premium prices. 
So by the end of 1979 Riyadh was forced to introduce two more upward adjustments in 
its futile endeavours, to reunify prices and bring about order to the market (Ahrari, 
1989: 77). 
Thus, the Iranian Revolution in 1979 brought Saudi Arabia and Iran into open 
confrontation over the oil quota and prices, and both countries used the oil as a weapon 
I 
in the 1980s to forge their own political agenda. 
This period witnessed the growing importance of both Saudi Arabia and Iran within 
OPEC and the oil issue became the dominant reason for the frictions between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran. Saudi Arabia attempted to stabilise the oil price (see table 3.5) during 
both crises in 1973 and 1979, however, Iran had a different strategy, as it wanted to 
maximise its oil income by opposing Saudi oil policy. Since, Iran was superior in 
terms of military power, Saudi Arabia tried to avoid any direct confrontation with Iran 
on the oil issue within OPEC. However, the 1980s witnessed the change in the balance 
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of power between Saudi Arabia and Iran due to the Iran-Iraq war which depleted Iranian 
military power and its economic might; and Saudi Arabia began to utilise oil as a 
weapon to challenge Iran. 
Table 3.5 Each December Oil Price Indication, 1970-1997 
(US Dollar/Per Barrel) 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
US Dollar/Barrel 1.8 2.18 2.48 5.18 12.82 14.81 13.71 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1 1981 
__1982 
1983 
US Dollar/Baffel 14.76 14.94 28.91 35. 51 32.85 29.3 
1984 1 1985 1986 1 1987 1988 1989 1990 
US Dollar/Barrel 28. 6.21 14.17] 17.2 14.11 20.05 25.56 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
US Dollar/Barrel 17.17 16.94 12.46 15.78 17.58 23.22 16.16 
Source: www. eia. doe. gov/emeulcabs/chron. html. 
6.0 The 1980s: Saudi Arabia became the unassailable power within OPEC 
During the 1980s Saudi and Iran's relations went from bad to worse. Although, 
politics and economics intertwined with each other, as predicted by the neo-realist 
theory, politics gained the upper hand and relations were dictated by political 
considerations rather than economic ones. The main issue during this period was the 
Iran-Iraq War. Fearing that Iran would come out victorious from this war, which 
would have probably meant the export of Iranian ideology into the Arabian Peninsula, 
the Saudi regime favoured Iraq and supported them both politically and financially. 
98 
Chapter Three: The oil factor 
Table 3.6 World Oil Exports, 1977-1997 
(Thousand Barrels per Day) 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
I. R. Iran 4,867.4 4,447.1 2,407.0 796.7 714.6 1,623.2 1,718.7 
Iranian percentage 
within OPEC 
17.8 17.2 9.1 3.5 3.9 11.5 14.1 
Saudi Arabia 8,608.4 7,706.0 8,817.7 9,223.2 9,017.9 5,639.4 3,920.8 
Saudi's percentage 
within OPEC 
31.5 29.8 33.3 40.8 49.2 40.1 32.1 
Total OPEC 27,322.7 25792.5 26,477.5 22,605.3 18,319.5 14,049.4 12,210.7 
Total World 32,990.0 31,848.0 33,433.4 29,876.2 25,849.5 122,399.1 21,168.3 
OPEC percentage 82.8 81.0 79.2 75.7 70.9 1 62.7 57.7 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
I. R. Iran 1,521.8 1,568.3 1,454.0 1,710.0 1,696.0 2,120.0 2,220.0 
Iranian percentage 
within OPEC 
12.9 14.8 11.5 14.5 13.0 14.2 13.8 
Saudi Arabia 
_ 
3,186.9 2,150.7 3,265.8 2,416.5 3,030.1 3,335.5 4,499.8 
Saudi's percentage 
within OPEC 
27.1 20.3 25.9 20.5 23.2 22.4 28.0 
Total OPEC 11,737.1 10,569.5 12,594.0 11,797.6 13,032.9 14,875.9 16,050.9 
Total World 21,506.6 20,632.5 23,001.4 22,639.9 24,314.8 25,884.4 27,262.5 
JOPEC percentage 54.6 51.2 54.8 52.1 53.6 57.5 58.9 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
I. R. Iran 2,420.0 2,528.0 2,600.0 2,650.0 2,621.0 2,630.0 2,587.0 
Iranian percentage 
within OPEC 
14.2 14.5 14.5 14.7 14.5 14.4 13.5 
Saudi Arabia 6,526.3 6,581.9 6,292.9 6,233.6 1 6,290.8 6,109.3 6,184.5 
Saudi's percentage 
within OPEC 
38.5 37.8 35.1 34.6 34.8 33.5 32.2 
Total OPEC 16,956.7 17,413.9 17,899.6 18,017.9 18,084.3 18,253.8 19,182.7 
Total World 27,870.2 29,078.1 30,396.2 31,412.6 32,254.1 33,220.5 34,605.9 
OPEC percentage 60.8 59.9 58.9 57.4 56.1 54.9 55.4 
Sources: OPEC Annual Statistical Yearbook, 1997, pp. 24,27. 
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Additionally, Riyadh manipulated oil as a weapon to damage Iran's ability to continue 
the war, and confrontation between both countries became inevitable. (For a detailed 
discussion of the Iran-Iraq War, refer to Chapter Five). Non-OPEC countries were also 
inspired to challenge OPEC simply by virtue of its existence. As the world economy 
went into recession, non-OPEC oil producing countries competed with OPEC members 
for their share of the oil market, the emerging of non-OPEC oil production threatened 
the share of OPEC member states in the world oil market from 82.8% in 1977 into an 
average 55% in the 1980s, and this further intensified the frictions between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran (see table 3.6) for the already dwindling oil share. Eventually, Saudi 
Arabia emerged as the ultimate power within OPEC, and Iran's influence subsided even 
after several attempts to challenge the Saudi's domination 
Although the Iranian revolution in 1979 brought panic buying in the oil market, which 
resulted in the price of oil jumped from $15.5 to $30 per barrel (www. eia. doe. gov), 
when the first shockwave subsided world recession prevailed and the oil price soon 
plummeted. In the first quarter of 1980, the oil market began to create a condition of 
oversupply due to a build-up of oil and due to the slowing down of economic activities 
in industrial countries (Ahrari, 1989: 77). 
Riyadh took advantage of the Iranian revolution, and increased Saudi oil production to 
8.8 mbd in 1979,9.2 mbd in 1980, and 9.0 mbd in 1981(OPEC annual statistical 
yearbook, 1997: 24,27). Iran interpreted the Saudi policy of overproduction as an 
unfriendly move towards the Islamic regime (Amirahmadi, 1990: 78). 
Throughout the 1980s, the oil market was characterised by oversupplies, a situation that 
warranted production cutbacks and a price freeze, or even price reduction. As the 
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organisation was gearing up to tackle new issues, the struggle between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran over the leadership of OPEC was to focus, aside from the pricing issue, on 
production programming (Ahrari, 1989: 78-79). Competition within the oil market 
intensified, not only amongst OPEC states but also with non-OPEC oil exporters, such 
as Britain, Mexico, Russia, and Norway. The world recession of 1981 and the 
subsequent decline in oil demand affected the income of both Saudi and Iran and put a 
strain on their relations. 
By the beginning of 1981 oil demand declined and predictions of the emergence of a 
soft market abounded. Saudi Arabia acted as a swing producer, using its two-pronged 
strategy of production and pricing to bring about stability of prices (Ahrari, 1989: 77). 
Saudi Arabia always sought an OPEC-wide price unification as a precondition for its 
consideration of the long-term strategy plan which best suited the Saudi economic and 
political goals (Ahrari, 1989: 78). 
Saudi insistence on price reunification grew almost in direct proportion to the increasing 
softness of the world oil market. Saudi Arabia became the absolute 'swing producer' 
of OPEC, a position that contributed to its growing power within the organisation in the 
subsequent years. The Kingdom used its new found power to make economic and 
political gains and friends. Amirahmadi argues that Saudi Arabia used its power 
within OPEC to regulate oil prices according to its economic needs and the 
requirements of its Westem friends, the US in particular (Amirahmadi, 1990: 77). 
Beginning from 1981, Iran showed its displeasure with Saudi policies. Disagreeing 
with the Saudi position, Iran and the other hawks adopted OPEC wide cutbacks to finn 
up prices. The Saudis promptly dissociated themselves from this decision. As 
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Ahrari argues, the price and production-related aggressiveness of Iran under Khomeini 
has been one of the reasons underlying the inability of OPEC to successfully implement 
its production quotas in the 1980s. Towards the end of October 1981, Saudi Arabia 
attained its long-cherished goal of subjugating the OPEC majority through its leverage 
as a swing producer (Ahrari, 1989: 78-86). 
Naturally, the war itself became one of the chief reasons underlying the heightening of 
hostility among the oil states of the Gulf. Both Iran and Iraq wanted to be given a 
production quota (see table 3.7), which was at least as high as that of the other (Ahrari, 
1989: 86). What made Iran bitter during the debate over the assigning of production 
quotas is that it found virtually no sympathy among other Gulf states about the fact that 
its production had dropped considerably, from about 4.4 mbd in 1978 to a little over 2.4 
mbd in 1979. Even after the revolution, the oil output was still in turmoil and could 
not reach the pre-revolution level. The most devastated effects on the Iranian oil 
output came from the Iraqi invasion of Iran in September 1980 which destroyed the 
Iranian oil terminals and reduced the Iranian oil output to 0.79 mbd (OPEC Annual 
Statistical Yearbook, 1997: 24,27). 
The war between Iran and Iraq was the main factor for Saudi Arabia and Iran's strife 
over the quota issue within OPEC. As Ahrari argues OPEC had never seriously tried 
to adopt a production programme before, but in 1982 it had to bite the bullet and adopt 
this measure. Saudi Arabia, as the largest owner of oil reserves, had to agree to play 
the role of a swing producer. The Saudi willingness to perform this role only solved a 
minor part of the problem related to the production programme (Ahrari, 1989: 79). 
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Table 3.7 OPEC Crude Oil Production Ceiling Allocations 
(1000 barrels per day) 
Apr 82- 
Mar 83 
Apr 83- 
Oct 84 
Nov 84- 
Oct 86 
Nov 86 Dec 86 Dec11.20 
1986 
Jun 87 
I. R. Iran 1,200 2,400 2,300 2,317 2,317 2,255 2,369 
Iraq 1,200 1,200 1,200 0 0 1,466 1,540 
Saudi Arabia 7,150 5,000 4,353 4,353 4,353 4,133 4,343 
Total OPEC 17,150 1 17,150 15,680 14,580 14,658 15,438 16,220 
1988 Nov 88 Jul 89- 
Sep 89 
Oct 89- 
Dec89 
Jan 90- 
Jul 90 
Aug 90- 
Mar9l. 
Apr 91- 
Sep 91 
I. R. Iran 2,369 2,640 2,783 2,926 3,140 3,140 3,217 
. 
Iraq 0 2,640 2,783 2,926 1 3,140 3,140 0 
Saudi Arabia 4,343 4,524 4,769 5,014 5,380 5,380 8,034 
Total OPEC 14,680 18,104 19,083 20,062 21,616 22,021 1 21,740 
Oct 91- 
Jan 92 
Feb 92- 
Sep 92 
Oct 92- 
Dec92 
Jan 93- 
Feb 93 
Mar 93- 
Sep 93 
Oct 93- 
Jun 96 
Jul 96- 
Dec 97 
I. R. Iran N/A 3,184 N/A 3,490 3,340 3,600 3,600 
Iraq N/A 505 N/A 500 400 400 0 
Saudi Arabia N/A 
- - 
7,887 N/A 8,395 8,000 8,000 8,000 
ITotal OPEC_ 23,6 5 01 22,436 24,200 24,289 23,301 24,233 1 25,033 
Note: N/A Not available. 
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Yearbook, 200 1, pp. XIV, XV. 
In early 1982, the oil glut and a related price slump in the world oil market were causing 
concern for both Saudi Arabia and Iran. When Iran was accused of violating its 1982 
quota of 1.2 mbd and undercutting other OPEC members by selling its crude oil at a 
lower price, the Iranian Oil Minister, Mohammed Gharazi, argued that Iran had already 
drastically lowered the 4.8 mbd production level from the days of the Shah to about 1.6 
mbd (OPEC Annual Statistical Yearbook, 1997: 24,27). Iran accused Sa6di Arabia of 
unfairly expanding its own share at Iran's expense at a time when the latter was fighting 
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a war with Iraq. He argued that Iran, under such circumstances, was left with no 
alternative but to exploit whatever opportunities presented themselves; and Iran 
remained the leading violator of OPEC-allocated quotas in 1982 (Ahrari, 1989: 79-80). 
The confrontation between both countries reached its culmination during the OPEC 
meeting in 1982 when Iran suggested a quota allocation to members by population and 
the need for oil income, which would be disadvantageous to Saudi Arabia. In response, 
Saudi Arabia strongly disagreed with this proposal. 
Therefore, in 1982 Iran challenged Saudi's leadership within OPEC. Tehran was 
trying to create a united front with the 'radical states' within OPEC (Algeria and Libya) 
against the Saudi government. Iran's government was successful in applying an 
aggressive pricing strategy in spot markets and in marking extensive barter deals with 
Eastern European nations. During that year, Iran announced three successive price 
cuts in less than three weeks, and its oil price was $4 to $5 lower than the price for 
comparable Saudi oil. It seemed as if Iran was trying to deliberately paralyse the 
'Saudi OPEC' (Amirahmadi, 1990: 81). In response, the Saudis surprised every one in 
the oil market when they offered to cut their production in order to boost prices. But, 
Iran did not give in, and as a result, the country's oil revenue increased to its 
post-revolutionary peaks in 1982 and 1983 ($17.6 billion and $20 billion) which more 
than double of its 1981 oil revenue (OPEC Annual Statistical Yearbook, 1980: XLIX). 
The issue of allocating quotas emerged as an immediate problem when OPEC 
considered the adoption of a production programme in 1982. This was the first serious 
confrontation between Riyadh and Tehran over the issue of oil quotas and made Riyadh 
change its policy towards Tehran from covert confrontation to overt fighting for 
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domination within OPEC. In the December 1982 OPEC ministerial meeting, Iran 
proposed that the production quota be determined by a member country's need for 
foreign exchange, its population size, the capacity of its oil reserves, financial needs, 
and the quantity of its petroleum exports in the preceding decade. Such a formula 
clearly put Iran, Nigeria, Indonesia, and even Iraq ahead of Saudi Arabia, since all 
populous states, as 'high absorbers' of capital, were also in acute need of capital. All 
of these factors would have helped Iran to receive a higher production and export quota 
while placing Saudi Arabia in a disadvantageous position (Amirahmadi and Entessar, 
1993: 9). 
Nevertheless acceptance of the Iranian position by Saudi Arabia would clearly enable 
Iran to regain the role of leader of OPEC that it had enjoyed under the Shah. Moreover, 
the political implications of this role might further escalate the already threatening 
posture of the Khomeini regime in the Gulf, a horrifying scenario not only for Saudi 
Arabia but also for other oil monarchies in the Gulf region (Ahrari, 1989: 79). The 
Saudis led the opposition to the Iranian proposal and engineered a move to bypass the 
election of a new OPEC Secretary-General when it was Iran's turn to fill the position. 
Thus, confrontation between both countries became inevitable (Amirahmadi and 
Entessar, 1993: 9). 
Despite agreement to cut production proportionately, the overwhelming temptation was 
to maintain revenue levels by pumping as much as oil as possible. Tehran was never 
able to abide by its OPEC quota because it needed the revenues to continue its war with 
Iraq. The Saudis, as swing producer, were forced to cut production to maintain price 
stability. But maintaining this position was untenable. By 1983, Saudi Arabia had 
begun to borrow money from local banks to offset its deficit, and in mid-1985 their 
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revenue was less than half of their budgetary expenditures. Towards the end of 1985, 
Saudi Arabia temporarily abandoned the production programme and opted for the 
so-called 'fair share policy', which for a brief duration was essentially a price war with 
non-OPEC producers, but at the same time hurt Iran's oil income. As a result, Saudi 
Arabia, help by Kuwait and the UAE, again increased production, causing prices to 
drop briefly to $10.91 per barrel in July 1986 (www. eia. doe. org) but ultimately forcing 
other OPEC producers to share the burden of production cuts to stabilise prices and 
regain lost market share (Long, 1997b: 72-73). 
What made Iran bitter during the debate over assigning production quotas is that it 
found virtually no sympathy among other oil states in the Gulf in general, Saudi Arabia 
in particular, about the fact that its production has gone down considerably from about 
4.7 mbd to a little over 2 mbd, as a result of the deliberate policy of the Khomeini 
regime. Iran found itself squabbling over a production quota of about 3 mbd (Ahrari, 
1989: 86). - 
Frustrated by Iran's extensive cheating on oil production quotas, the threats from Iran to 
the Gulf states, and Tehran's persistence in refusing a ceasefire with Iraq, Saudi Arabia 
decided to increase its share of production, in 1986, and flood the oil market in defiance 
of Iran. The Saudis believed this would constrain Iran's financial resources and curtail 
its ability to continue the war with Iraq (Amirahmadi, 1990: 79). At the same time, 
Riyadh also hoped that the lower prices would reduce the non-OPEC share of the 
market and discourage research and development in alternative sources of energy, thus 
ensuring long-term Western dependence on OPEC oil (Dorraj, 1993: 21). The result 
was an oil glut and the collapse of prices to as low as $10.91 per barrel in July 1986 
(www. eia. doe. org). 
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The Saudi action resulted in a dramatic drop in Iranian oil revenue from a projected $15 
billion to an actual $5.8 billion in 1986. The government was so unprepared that it had 
to introduce an emergency economic plan to cope with the disastrous consequences 
(Amirahmadi, 1990: 74). Tehran also regarded Riyadh's action as unfriendly. 
To combat Riyadh's attempt to damage the Iranian economy and abort the war affairs, 
Iran reduced its output by 300,000 barrels per day in order to reduce the oil glut and 
raise prices. Although Libya and Algeria followed suit, without co-operation from Saudi 
Arabia, the attempt to raise prices was doomed (Dorraj, 1993: 28). 
The reduction in the share of oil balances and the fall in the world price of oil in 1986 
caused a fundamental rethink about the future role of oil and the importance of OPEC 
supplies within the global oil scene (Stem, 1989: 112). In 1986, one could argue that 
Saudi oil policy was determined to maintain the world price of oil, for a prolonged 
period of time, at a level which was sufficiently low to stimulate world oil demand and 
hinder investments in non-OPEC oil and other energy sources (Stem, 1989: 117). 
All OPEC members have suffered from the declining oil market and Saudi policies, 
though Iran felt the greatest impact. Iran was involved in a war for which it had no 
international support and had inherited an economy that was in deep crisis and highly 
dependent on oil revenues. Amirahmadi argues that to achieve the maximum 
destructive effect, the Saudi policy was to fundamentally challenge Iran over the oil 
issue (Amirahmadi, 1990: 79-80), and utilise oil as a weapon to incur as much harm as 
possible on the Iranian economy to force it into aborting its war against Iraq. In the 
end the Iranian regime could not continue to fund the war with Iraq, and a crippling 
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economic situation threatened the very survival of the Islamic regime. Under these 
economic pressures Tehran agreed a ceasefire with Iraq in 1988. 
Saudi Arabia stepped up its oil production almost immediately after the cease-fire on 20 
August 1988, and by early October, Saudi production had reached 5.7 mbd 
(Amirahmadi, 1990: 80), well above its OPEC quota of 4.3 mbd (OPEC Annual 
Statistical Yearbook, 2001, pp. XIV, XV). The Saudis claimed they were protecting 
their market share against a possible incursion from Iran, a protest that soon became 
untenable. Iran continued to produce less than its OPEC quota of 2.37 mbd throughout 
1988. In the meantime, the Saudi government and its allies, other members of Arab 
OPEC, raised the question of production parity between Iran and Iraq as a condition for 
a new OPEC accord on price and production (Amirahmadi, 1990: 80). 
While in the 1970s the OPEC states appeared to be major, powerful and independent 
actors on the international scene, the 1980s revealed the limits of their autonomy. 
Compared with the 1970s, the 1980s witnessed significant differences between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran regarding oil policy, which affected their relations. Being a swing 
producer in the 1980s did not bring the Saudis any of the benefits of the 1970s, but 
instead the confrontation with Iran. The oil glut, 'competition from non-OPEC oil 
exporters such as Britain, Mexico and Norway, conservation and alternative-energy 
measures in the West, Japan and the US, and short-term trading on the spot and highly 
speculative future markets have all contributed to a decline in oil prices - and the 
decline of OPEC. The fall in oil price meant a redistribution of income from 
petroleum producers to consumers. 
The fighting for leadership within OPEC amplified the frictions between Saudi Arabia 
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and Iran during this period and the 1980s witnessed the worst relations between the two 
countries. Iran, with large fiscal needs, little sympathy for the West, an expensive war 
with Iraq, insufficient reserves to take a long-term view of market and production at 
maximum capacity, saw the Saudi oil policy as an extension of its alliance with the US. 
As Chubin argues, there are some grounds for this interpretation, there being an implicit 
understanding that Saudi Arabia would keep oil prices low in exchange for US 
protection (Chubin and Tripp, 1996: 68), which was the best example to highlight the 
neo-realist assumption, that the regime survival strategy and the balance of power plays 
a very important role in conducting Saudi policy towards Iran. By keeping the oil 
price low, which favoured the Western industrial countries, Riyadh gained the supports 
from the West in general, and the US in particular, therefore, during the 'Tanker War' 
Riyadh requested the American navy to protect its tankers through the Strait of Hormuz. 
Riyadh used its oil as a tool to buy protection, and the balance of power was in favour 
of Saudi Arabia, which witnessed that Iran lost its battle with Saudi Arabia on two 
fronts; one was the oil quota within OPEC. and the other was their gradual isolation 
from the West and the Arab states. For Iran, this represented a serious problem. Iran 
could not match Saudi's influence within OPEC and, therefore, needed Saudi 
cooperation (Chubin and Tripp, 1996: 68). 
At the same time, the slump in the oil market throughout the 1980s forced OPEC to 
scramble for survival strategies. Iran remained a leading price hawk and manifested its 
aspirations for the leadership of OPEC (Ahrari, 1989: 70-71), but failed to gain any 
footing. One could argue that Iran's military and political influence subsided in the 
region as Saudi's influence rose. With the backing of the US, Saudi Arabia was able to 
use oil as an important weapon in order to damage Iran's economy and, therefore, force 
Iran to terminate its war effort against Iraq and also to accept the humiliation of a 
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ceasefire. Soon after the ceasefire, Riyadh still tried to hinder Iran from regaining its 
pre-war era's oil quota by overproducing, and this limited Iran's influence within OPEC. 
Only after August 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, did Saudi Arabia realise that it 
needed to accommodate Iran into regional affairs. Thus, it sought to change relations 
with Iran, and tried to cultivate co-operation, economic as well as political, and 
understanding between the two countries. 
7.0 The 1990s: the politics overcame the difficulty of economics between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran 
During the 1990s, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran could be highlighted 
in four stages: First, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Second, in 1993 
politics still dominated their relations and the OPEC witnessed short-lived co-operation 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran which resulted in higher oil prices benefiting both Saudi 
Arabia and Iran. Third, the election of the former Nigerian oil minister Rilwanu 
Lukman as Secretary-General of OPEC in 1994 which again weathered their relations. 
Fourth, despite exchange of high ranking personnel official visits in 1995, both 
countries wished to maximise their oil revenue, because of economic difficulties. This, 
inevitably, prolonged the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran to the end of 1997. 
7.1 1990: The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
In this decade the first major political disruption to the oil market occurred when Iraqi 
troops invaded Kuwait in August 1990. oil prices soared briefly, from about $18 to 
almost $40 per barrel, but stabilised in the range of $20 per barrel, as Saudi Arabia 
increased its production from 5 mbd to 8 mbd (EIU Saudi Arabia No3 1996: 17) in order 
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to ease world supply. Nonetheless, after the end of the Second Gulf War, Saudi Arabia 
expressed no intention to reduce its output to its pre-war quota. Although both Iraq 
and Kuwait re-entered the oil market in 1992 and 1996 respectively, Riyadh ignored 
Iran's calls to reduce its oil production. 
Whilst the war was raging with Iraq in early 1991, the Saudis refused to discuss the 
quota situation with fellow OPEC members. For Tehran, high oil prices helped it to 
achieve rapid growth, and so wished the situation to continue. However, because 
Saudi flooded the market with oil to stabilise the price, and bring it down to its pre-war 
level, the price target set in July 1990 was heavily criticised by Iran (EIU Saudi Arabia 
Report, No 1 1991: 4). 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a double-edge sword for Saudi Arabia. Riyadh had 
to pay $55 billion, during the 1990-91 Gulf crisis, to the US-led military campaign to 
force Iraqi troops out of Kuwait (Long, 1997b: 73). Consequently, Saudi expenditure, 
which amounted to $127 billion, far outstripped its earnings of $84.4 billion (MEM, 7 
October 1993: 16). Thus, the Saudi government was forced to borrow money from 
commercial sources, and payment delays started to reappear. The Saudi government 
could only cover its budget deficit by borrowing; it no longer had the option of drawing 
on reserves which had accumulated in the 1970s and 1980s (EIU Saudi Arabia Report, 
No 2 1991: 4). In May 1991, the Saudi government not only signed up a $4.5 billion 
loan with international banks, but also borrowed a further $2.5 billion in foreign 
currency from domestic banks on a significantly less voluntary basis (EIU Saudi Arabia 
Report, No 3 1991: 14). 
When revenues declined drastically during the 1980s, Saudi Arabia resorted to a few 
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fiscal restraints but avoided really painful austerity measures, gambling that the glut 
would end before the Kingdom exhausted the huge reserves it had amassed in the 1970s. 
By the end of the Kuwait conflict, the Kingdom was no longer a cash-rich country. 
Since then, its short - and medium-term needs for revenues again began to affect its oil 
policies (Long, 1997b: 74). 
Since 1991, Saudi Arabia has assumed a dominant role in oil politics. Iran's attempts 
to match this, by increasing its productive capacity in order to recapture its 
pre-revolutionary role as an OPEC leader, were futile. Chubin and Tripp argue that 
without Saudi's co-operation within OPEC for increasing its quota level, Iran has been 
unable to achieve its economic and political goals, which have not been necessarily 
compatible with those of Saudi Arabia (Chubin and Tripp, 1996: 68). What has 
become clear is that, most certainly, the balance of power has favoured Saudi Arabia. 
From Iran's perspective, only the Saudis have reaped the benefit from increasing their 
output, and so the mistrust between both countries has deepened. 
Although after the Second Gulf War, Saudi Arabia realised that it needed to 
accommodate Iran into regional affairs, although mistrust between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran still continued, and their differences in oil policy came back to the forefront. The 
February 1992 meeting of OPEC in Geneva, which reached a production cutback 
agreement, proved to be a great disappointment to Iran. In fact, neither Iran nor Saudi 
Arabia appeared to be satisfied with the arrangement. Iranian representatives argued 
in favour of maintaining a ceiling on OPEC output below 22.5 mbd for a higher oil 
price. The Iranian press renewed its attack on Saudi oil policy in its desire to serve the 
interests of Western industrial countries by keeping oil prices low (EIU Saudi Arabia 
Report, No 4 1992: 7). The allegation reflected the deteriorating relations between the 
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two countries and suggested that the future management of OPEC's oil supply would 
involve tough political negotiations (EIU Iran Report No2 1992: 19). 
For Iran, a low oil price would not help clear its outstanding foreign debt, which was 
calculated at being more than $17.6 billion in March 1992 (EIU Iran Report No3 
1992: 15). Since Saudi Arabia was the dominant player within OPEC and Tehran could 
not compete for its quota, the Iranian Oil Minister, Aqazadeh, announced on 24 
September 1992 that Iran would raise its oil production from a reported output of 3.21 
mbd to 3.6 mbd, without gaining an approval of OPEC. Aqazadeh publicly rejected 
the OPEC decision to maintain a constant quota. Tehran had wanted OPEC to curb the 
output to be no more than 24 mbd and to achieve a $21 barrel price. In October 1992, 
Saudi Arabia totally abandoned its role as being the swing producer, because Riyadh 
believed that due to previous experience, members of the OPEC states had agreed on 
the quota but the temptation of cheating with over-production was far too great. 
Therefore, although setting and agreeing on the quota, none of the members were 
willing to abide to their given quota. At the same time since the Second Gulf War, 
Saudi Arabia's own financial burden was too big to bear, and being a swing producer 
did not bring along the benefits for Saudi Arabia as it did in the 1980s. Therefore, 
although Iran overproduced, Saudi Arabia did not react very strongly, as it believed that 
Iran had already produced over its quota and had already reached the 3.5-3.6 mbd level 
(EIU Iran Report No4 1992: 18). Therefore, because Saudi Arabia needed Iran to deter 
any threats from Iraq, Riyadh were willing to tolerate Tehran's overproduction. At the 
same time, however, Riyadh totally abandoned its desire to be the swing producer, 
stating that if the oil glut persisted they would not reduce production to stabilise the 
price. They claimed that the market should determine prices, not artificial shifts in 
production rates (Long, 1997b: 74). 
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Overproduction did not benefit Iran's economy, but simply lowered oil price. Since 
the ceasefire with Iraq, Iran had been fighting for a higher OPEC quota to meet growing 
imports, an ambitious economic plan and development projects. Tehran faced hard 
currency shortages, as it owed about $10 billion in deferred payments in 1993. Some 
foreign contractors refused to continue work unless some of the overdue funds were 
paid (MEM, 7 October 1993: 16). Iran was struggling with a $27 million foreign debt, 
including $7 billion in amount overdue, and drew more than 80 percent of its foreign 
exchange earnings from crude sales. Iran was in need of oil revenues, but the weak oil 
prices deepened Tehran's foreign debt crisis and the Iranian riyal dropped in value by 10 
per cent against the dollar and other major currencies within three weeks (MEM, 22 
November 1993: 17). Rafsanjani understood that regime survival depended on 
co-operation with Riyadh to reach the higher oil price and boost its revenue. 
7.2 1993: The short-lived cooperation 
In February 1993, OPEC agreed to impose quota cuts to help boost prices. However, 
due to Kuwait's unwillingness to accept a production cut, and the fact that other OPEC 
members cheated on their quota, oil prices slid to a five-year low and Iran's 
much-needed oil revenues melted away. Tehran sought to pressurise Saudi Arabia into 
cutting production in order to accommodate Kuwait. However, Saudi Arabia was no 
longer willing to play the 'swing producer, ' defended its role as the dominant player 
within OPEC and did not give in to the Iranian request. Iran accused Saudi Arabia of 
over-production; Saudi Arabia in turn accused Iran of 'chronic large-scale cheating on 
quotas' (Chubin, 1996: 68). 
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The exchange of harsh words between Saudi Arabia and Iran continued until the 
beginning of March 1993. The Tehran Times said that Iran was not prepared to suffer 
the economic cost of 'short-sighted' Saudi oil policies. It accused the Saudis of 
producing more than their OPEC quota, and facilitating a US presence in the 'Persian 
Gulf' which Tehran believed had affected its chance for regaining its influence in the 
region and had meant that the balance of power still favoured Riyadh (MEM, 17 March 
1993: 17). Eventually, low oil prices and falling oil revenues forced Iran to cut some 
development projects (MEM, 17 March 1994: 17). 
The consequence of lower oil prices had a huge impact on Iranian domestic politics and 
forced the Iranian regime to rethink its policy towards Riyadh. The Iranian Foreign 
Minister, Ali Velayati, said in mid-March 1993, that the relations with Saudi Arabia 
were going through a 'confidence-building stage' and that he hoped that a summit 
between the leaders of the two nations would take place (EIU Iran No2 1993: 13). 
Hopes were raised in May when the Iranian Foreign Minister visited Riyadh, but the 
Hajj quota dispute affected their rapprochement (see Chapter Four). In June during the 
OPEC meeting, Kuwait refused to reaffirm its quota sending the price of oil tumbling 
(EIU Saudi Arabia, No2 1993: 4), and the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran 
reached a new low, and both countries accused each other for the failing oil prices. 
In 1993, Tehran continued to deny reports of overproduction and maintained it was 
producing within its official 3.34 mbd quota. The Iranian Ministry of Oil, in July 1993, 
admitted that Iranian overproduction was only due to a misinterpretation of domestic 
consumption (EIU Iran No3 1993: 19). This could be regarded as an expression of 
Iran's willingness to adjust its policy towards Saudi Arabia, and a prelude for the 
rapprochement towards Saudi Arabia in September 1993. 
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By autumn 1993, Iran sought to avoid further quarrels which would continue to weaken 
the market. The slide in oil prices, due to OPEC overproduction and a weak world 
demand, generated sufficient pressure on OPEC to reach an agreement in September 
1993 to curb production levels. Rafsanjani understood the need for an all-out 
co-operation among member countries with a view to achieving a just price for oil and 
for adopting a co-ordinated method to prevent output fluctuations. He discussed the 
oil price with King Fahd in September 1993, and the possibility of cutting oil exports to 
boost the price (MEM, 22 November 1993: 17). Saudi Arabia agreed to freeze their 
output at 8 mbd while Iran's quota was increased from 3.34 mbd to 3.6 mbd and, with 
this the oil prices picked up to reach $16.9o a barrel (MEM, 7 October 1993: 16). This 
represented a great victory for Iran. It was reportedly achieved because Saudi Arabia 
had agreed to give up some of its market share to Iran, although it refused any 
suggestion that its production should fall below 8 mbd. The Iranian decision to seek 
accommodation with the Saudis bore the hallmark of Rafsanjani's pragmatism, and the 
compromise and agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran proved that the neo-realist 
assumption cannot account for the whole spectrum of every event that can take place. 
This also shows the limitations of neo-realism theory that can be used to apply to their 
relations. The September 1993 OPEC meeting demonstrated that cooperation could be 
beneficial to all (Chubin and Tripp, 1996: 68-69); and the Iranian Foreign Minister 
Velayati and his Saudi counterpart, Prince Saud al-Faisal, 'expressed satisfaction at the 
recent positive trend in relations' between Tehran and Riyadh (MEM, 14 October 
1993: 20). 
Saudi Arabia's willingness to cut its own production enough to both placate Iran and to 
increase prices did not appear to harm it economically, since the small rise in prices 
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tended to cover the small cut in Saudi's production (Chubin and Tripp, 1996: 69). 
However, the 'honeymoon period' did not last long, as the OPEC summit in November 
showed that the discord among the member states was the main reason behind the fall of 
oil price from $18 to $12 per barrel again in that month. Tehran accused Saudi Arabia 
of failing to settle its differences with Iran over regional security so they could 
co-operate and have more control over setting world prices (MEM, 23 February 
1994: 16). 
Tehran stated that with 'the kingdom's refusal to cooperate with other members of 
OPEC to stabilise the overall production level, it would be unrealistic to expect a fair 
price for oil anytime soon' (MEM, 23 February 1994: 16). The Tehran Times, which is 
considered close to the Iranian Foreign Ministry, claimed that high oil production by 
Saudi Arabia was to blame for weak oil prices which were undermining the Gulf 
economies. Iran has in the past been critical of the fact that Saudi Arabia boosted its 
production by about three million barrels daily after the 1991 Gulf war to evict Iraq 
from Kuwait, but the Saudis said they were simply restoring their former output levels 
(MEM, 23 February 1994: 16). 
The slump in oil prices in the last quarter of 1993 hurt both Iran and Saudi Arabia's 
economy. Both countries were in need of oil revenue more than ever. The leading 
Saudi daily Asharq al-Awsat, estimated that Saudi Arabia was in debt to an amount of 
around $61 billion (MEM, 4 January 1994: 22). However, Iran was in no better 
economic shape. In 1994, Iran owed $40 billion to 30 different countries, such as 
South Korea, Japan, and Germany, imported over half its food and three quarters of its 
medical supplies, and relied on oil exports for more than 90% of its revenue (MEM, 15 
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August 1994: 17). 
At the beginning of 1994, Riyadh announced belt-tightening plans, with a hefty 20 per 
cent cut of its budget due to the world economic recession and low oil demands (MEM, 
4 January 1994: 22). With a huge debt mounting, Rafsanjani's pragmatist party 
understood Iran's need to cooperate with Saudi Arabia for the higher oil revenues. 
However, at the OPEC meeting in Geneva on 25 March 1994, OPEC oil Ministers 
extended the existing OPEC production ceiling of 24-52 mbd for the whole year. The 
decision represented a victory for the Saudi position, and was bitterly attacked by Iran 
(ElU Saudi Arabia, No2 1994: 16). The Saudi view that a production cutback would be 
ineffective stemmed from the kingdom's experience with recent attempts by OPEC at 
production cutbacks. Even if OPEC were successful in cutting back production, the 
Saudis believed that non-OPEC producers would increase their own production to fill 
the gap, resulting in an output and a price loss for Saudi Arabia. As a consequence, 
Saudi Arabia maintained its current strategy of preserving market share, a view it was 
able to impose on the rest of OPEC even though most members would have preferred a 
reduction in quotas. 
Iran was extremely disappointed with the outcome of this meeting and the failure to 
agree on production cutbacks. Iran was stumbling from lower oil prices and high 
debt-servicing payments, as well as producing at its sustainable production capacity, 
thereby making any attempt at unilateral production increases difficult. From an 
Iranian perspective, higher prices were more important than concerns about market 
share (EIU Saudi Arabia, No2 1994: 17). The Tehran 771mes yet again accused Saudi 
Arabia of fostering lower prices in order to further the interests of the US. Saudi 
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Arabia reiterated its position that its oil policy was based solely on considerations 
pertaining directly to oil, and was not a foreign policy tool to be used to benefit the US 
or to harm Iran (EIU Saudi Arabia, No2 1994: 17). 
7.3 1994: Fighting for influence within OPEC 
The issue of the election of Secretary-General of OPEC, which erupted in June 1994, 
caused a dispute between Saudi Arabia and Iran. When the term of office of 
Secretary-General, Dr Subroto of Indonesia, expired at the end of June, the most widely 
favoured candidate to replace him was Alirio Parra, of Venezuela, who was supported by 
Saudi Arabia and all other OPEC members except for Iran. Iran preferred its own 
candidate, Kazempour Ardebili. As the choice for the OPEC Secretary-General has to 
be unanimous, Iran's unwillingness to withdraw Ardebili's candidacy caused a stalemate, 
leading to the president assuming the responsibilities of the secretary-general for six 
months. This problem last occurred in 1983 and took five years to resolve (EIU Saudi 
Arabia, No3 1994: 17). Iran held to Article 28 of the OPEC constitution, which states 
that in the absence of a unanimous decision on a candidate on the basis of merit, the 
selection of a new secretary-general should be decided by rotation (EIU Iran, No3 
1994: 19). The saga demonstrates the competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia over 
the control over OPEC. 9 
During the OPEC meeting in November 1994, Iran insisted that it would agree to the 
former Nigerian Oil Minister, Rilwanu Lukman's appointment as new 
Secretary-General on the condition that at the end of his three-year term Iran would be 
allowed to nominate his successor. This would put an Iranian candidate in line for the 
next secretary-general, and not surprisingly this condition was rejected by Saudi Arabia 
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and other OPEC members. Iran finally conceded to Lukman's appointment 
unconditionally (EIU Saudi Arabia, No4 1994: 17), showing the Saudi's unassailable 
position within OPEC. 
Although the Secretary-General issue was resolved the oil price fell to $13.51 per barrel. 
The immediate cause of the price drop was the failure of OPEC members to agree on 
production cuts at its November 1993 meeting in Vienna. Iran was widely believed to 
have produced more than its quota in the first half of 1994 (EIU Iran Nol 1994: 21). 
Iran's income in 1994 was at $13.5 billion against an annual budget of $17 billion. 
Therefore, in 1994 Iran faced a foreign debt amounting to $28 billion which the low oil 
price did not help to relieve (EIU Iran Nol 1994: 22). Production shortfalls coupled 
with the low international oil prices deterred Iran's projected development of its 
hydrocarbon industry. Saudi-Iranian relations came under intense strain. Tehran 
blamed Riyadh for failing to stabilise falling oil prices, which according to the Iranian 
Oil Minister, Aqazadeh, had cost Iran at least $3.5 billion from September 1993 to June 
1994 (EIU Iran No2 1994: 9). 
7.4 1995: The political situation dominated Saudi-Iranian relations again 
The economic embargo imposed on Iran by the United States in 1995 forced Iran to find 
alternative markets for its crude oil. Iran thus faced a five-year period of austerity 
which could become a major economic crisis with political repercussions. 
However, the situation for Saudi Arabia was no better. In 1995, Saudi Arabia cut its 
annual budget by another 20% and King Fahd issued a decree introducing fees on 
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electricity, water consumption and locally consumed refined oil products except fuel oil. 
Local telephone calls were no longer free, and the price of air travel was increased by 
10%, 15% and 20% for economy, business and first class respectively (EIU Saudi 
Arabia Nol 1995: 12-13). 
The 1995 budget reduced spending by 10 billion riyals ($2.7 billion) to 150 billion 
riyals ($40 billion) and raised revenues by 15 billion riyals ($4 billion) to 135 billion 
riyals ($36 billion). King Fahd blamed the price increases on serious cash flow 
problems caused by low oil prices, heavy spending on infrastructure and more than $50 
billion spent on the Gulf war and asked his people for patience, claiming the price hikes 
and new fee would be temporary (MEM, 9 January 1995: 12). 
Nevertheless, King Fahd still denied reports that the Saudi economy was 'shaky', 
declaring that 'the currency is covered 100 per cent and the reserves are there 100 per 
cent. ' Riyadh was facing a cash crunch brought on by weak oil prices and some $55 
billion in payments towards financing the 1990-91 Gulf war over Kuwait. To get its 
finances into better shape, Saudi Arabia reduced 1994 public spending by 20 per cent - 
down from the SR 196.95 billion ($52.52 billion) budgeted in 1993 to SR 160 billion 
($42.67 billion). Furthermore, the king expressed his intention for reconciliation with 
Iran (MEM, 9 December 1994: 19). 
With the beginning of rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran in 1995, the oil quota 
issue became insignificant, and both countries refrained from accusing each other on the 
overproduction and quota. One could argue therefore that the oil issue serves only as 
an excuse when Tehran and Riyadh are under pressure to get the most possible revenue 
from oil. There is no doubt, however, that it sometimes serves as a political tool with 
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which to outdo each other. 
Although 1995 witnessed the warming of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran with 
the exchange of high-ranking officials, both countries' domestic economic pressure did 
not allow them to cede in the fights for maximising their oil revenue. Inevitably, this 
co-operation faced another test in 1996. 
In 1996, the overproduction, in conjunction with the UN oil-for-food programme 
allowed Iraq to enter back into the oil market and posed a pressing dilemma for OPEC. 
Iraq's return and the predicament of overproduction placed Saudi Arabia in the spotlight. 
First, Saudi Arabia had been a main beneficiary of Iraq's absence, allowing it to increase 
its quota from 5.5 mbd to over 8 mbd. Now the Tehran Times called for Saudi Arabia 
to return to its pre-Iraqi sanctions production level. Riyadh refused and only increased 
the total OPEC output to accommodate the return of Iraqi oil into the market (EIU Saudi 
Arabia No 3 1996: 19). 
However, both Saudi Arabia and Iran believed that OPEC had to establish 'quota 
discipline' before it could convincingly tackle reallocating production to Iraq and 
reducing it from other members. Saudi Arabia and Iran's Oil Minisiers led the drive to 
re-establish discipline within the organisation. The result was the announcement that 
OPEC would reconstitute the Ministerial Monitoring Subcommittee under the 
chairmanship of the Iranian Oil Minister. However, OPEC's powers to enforce any 
discipline are weak. 
Eventually, 1996 witnessed the first sustained rise in oil prices since their sharp drop in 
1986. The price of Saudi Arabia's benchmark crude, Arab Light, increased to an 
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average of almost $20 per barrel in 1996, from $16.73 per barrel in 1995 and $15-39 per 
barrel in 1994 (ElU Saudi Arabia No 1 1997: 7). However, the oil price could not 
sustain the higher price mark because of the world economic situation. 
The oil price slipped in the first four months of 1997 as the spot price for the OPEC 
basket of seven crudes averaged only $19.8 per barrel compared with a $23.06 per 
barrel in 1996, a decline of 14.1%. The major factor behind the significant fall in oil 
prices was oversupply. The incremental oil production brought about by the new 
North Sea Fields and the Iraqi oil for food programme, failed to be accommodated by 
any of the OPEC producers (EIU Saudi Arabia No2 1997: 18). 
8.0 Conclusion 
This chapter answers the question of why and how oil affects the relationship between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran with both countries being heavily dependant on this single 
resource for their revenues. It highlights the importance of oil for Iran's and Saudi 
Arabia's economies and shows how both countries have sought to dominate OPEC to 
control oil price and production. Events such as the Iran-Iraq War and the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait affected Saudi Arabian and Iranian policy towards oil pricing and 
policy making and consequently had an impact upon their relations with one another. 
The oil issue is of great political importance to both Iran and Saudi Arabia. Although 
both countries depend on oil, the difference in quantity of their respective oil resources 
affects their financial and decision making process. 
The Saudi strategy has been to maximise oil revenues by maintaining production at a 
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high level. At the same time it has been unwilling to press for dramatic rises in the 
price of oil. This is partly because of Saudi concern about the effect of this on the 
West's industrialised economies, and the consequences for future oil demand. 
In contrast, because of circumstances with the Iran-Iraq war, Iran was forced into taking 
the short-term view in utilising its oil resources, seeking to maximise revenue through 
larger quotas in the early 1980s. This led to intensified competition with Saudi Arabia 
over oil policy within OPEC (Saudi Arabia and Iran having become the leading players 
within OPEC in the 1970s). 
Ultimately, because Saudi Arabia processes the largest reserves of oil and coordinates 
with other Gulf Arab oil producers, it has been able to occupy the dominant position in 
the oil market and within OPEC. However, Saudi Arabia could only dominate in 
economic terms, lacking both manpower and military might. Iran's military 
superiority in the region enabled it to resist Saudi pressure and Saudi Arabia proved 
reluctant to translate its economic strength into overt confrontation with Iran. This 
competition within OPEC was thus constrained during the 1970s. 
The Iranian Revolution in 1979 changed the balance of influence within OPEC between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran. For Iran, the competition with Saudi Arabia intensified in 
September 1980 as a result of the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran War, which had a negative 
impact on every sector of the economy. Although oil exports were maintained, 
domestic oil supplies were disrupted and many factories and industries were closed 
down. In short, the eight-year war (1980-88) devastated Iran's economy. 
Because Saudi Arabia overtly supported the Iraqi war efforts, their tankers became the 
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target of Iranian attacks and Tehran threatened to bomb Saudi ports, oil pipelines and 
installations and facilities. By the middle of 1985, the Saudi regime simply because of 
its own weakening economy, increased its diplomatic efforts to reconcile Iran and Iraq, 
and proposed a cease-fire. 
In 1986 Riyadh decided to use oil as a weapon and flooded the market, which resulted 
in the collapse of oil prices and reduced the Iranian revenue. One could argue that this 
action was partly to blame for the rioting of the Iranian pilgrims making the Hajj in 
1987 and the subsequent severance of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 
1988. 
Thus, the 1980s witnessed open confrontation between the two countries over the issue 
of oil quotas within OPEC and beyond. Because of the war, Iran lost its political, 
economic and military superiority in the region and Saudi Arabia seized this chance to 
suppress Iran's influence within OPEC, and dared to use oil to force Iran to accept its 
terms and conditions. Only after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 did Riyadh 
change its foreign policy towards Iran because it needed Iran's co-operation in regional 
affairs, to counterbalance the threat from Iraq. In this latter period one could argue that, 
although both countries still fought for domination within OPEC, they nonetheless 
attempted to keep good relations. This complex relationship can be accounted for 
within the neo-realist framework. Both states recognised the benefits to be gained 
from maintaining a balance of power within the Gulf region, thus co-operating when 
necessary but equally competing when necessary to preserve their own regime survival 
in the face of regional threats. OPEC became one for among others for the playing out 
of this delicate game. 
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We can see, then, that the role played by oil in relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran 
was far greater than simply its contribution to the domestic economics of each party. 
Its utility as a political/strategic tool carried more weight in foreign policy making that 
its functional economic contribution. Under the pressure from its weak economy, Iran 
did seeks to avoid further quarrels with Saudi Arabia, which would have continued to 
weaken the market and co-operation over oil between Saudi Arabia and Iran did 
eventually result in higher oil prices which benefited both countries. Nevertheless, the 
need to dominate OPEC and consolidate their regional positions was ultimately 
paramount, and made co-operation between both countries short lived. The balance of 
power shifted in favour of Saudi Arabia following the 1973 oil crisis until the 1980s. 
In the 1990s, due to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Iran was able to regain its position 
within OPEC. 
This chapter has shown the importance of oil for both countries. However, oil acts as a 
double-edged sword for their relations, because both countries' economies are based on 
oil-derived rent. Both states utilize oil as a tool to fulfill their national needs - as 
neo-realists point out, both power and economics are important factors for state survival. 
But this chapter has shown that ultimately the search for power is a greater imperative 
of international relations than domestic economic considerations. 
Furthermore, this chapter shows how important the external aspects of oil (i. e. the 
market role and oil prices) are, when compared to internal aspects (i. e. development 
policy). This situation is more complex for an oil-dependent economy, like Saudi 
Arabia, than for a partially oil-dependent economy like Iran, and the differences will be 
reflected in the foreign policy of each country towards each other. 
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This chapter suggests that neo-realist theory can explain the two countries' relationship. 
However, the researcher also acknowledges that neo-realist assumptions are insufficient 
to explain every aspect of their relationship; for example the nature of rentierism. and its 
role in determining the foreign-policy of states, cannot be properly explained by the 
neo-realist school of thought alone. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR 
1.0 Introduction 
This chapter analyses how religious division between Saudi Sunnis and Iranian ShVites 
played an important role in the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. This chapter 
first highlights the significant difference between Sunnis and ShVites since the 
establishment of Islam in the seventh century, and how these sects shaped the foreign 
policy of each country in the twentieth century. It will illuminate how regimes in both 
countries utilise religion as a tool to fulfil their political needs. Furthermore, it shows 
how religion shapes their relations through the Hajj and the competition within Islamic 
organisations. 
In order to understand how religion affects the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, 
one should look at the fundamental division between Saudi Sunnis and-Iran's ShPites, 
and how the division evolved and affected their decision-making processes. Also one 
needs to trace the important developments within the region that affected religious 
developments in both countries. Finally, case studies, namely, the Hajj issue and the 
competition within Islamic organisations will be used to highlight how religion plays an 
important role in shaping their relations. 
However, as discussed in the Introduction, the researcher is not intending to discuss 
religion as an identity that contributes per se to foreign policy. The researcher's 
intention is to examine how regimes have utilised that identity for their own purposes, 
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notably for state survival and greater influence in the regional balance of power. 
Regarding the neo-realist school, it is assumed that states act rationally and therefore 
religion can only be considered as a tool of rational action and not as a non-rational 
input into policy-making. 
2.0 The division of Sunni and Shia in the Islamic world 
Islam comprises two main sects, Sunni and Shi'a. In the Islamic world the majority of 
Muslims are Sunnis, the Shi'ites forming the minority. Shi'ite Muslims have always 
been excluded by the Sunni society except in Iran which is predominantly Shi'ite- 
Both sects always argue that they are the rightful leader in the Muslim world. 
2.1 Sunna and Sunni 
Sunna can be applied to usages and customs of nations; the predominant meaning of 
Sunna however, is that of the spoken and acted example of the Prophet. It includes 
what he approved of, allowed, or condoned when under prevailing circumstances he 
might well have taken issue with others' actions, decisions or practices; and what he 
himself refrained from and disproved of (Glasse, 1989: 381). 
In other words, Sunna is the generally approved standard or practice introduced by the 
Prophet as well as the pious Muslims of olden days, and at the instigation of al-ShafN 
(d. 204 AH, one of the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence), the Sunna of the Prophet 
was awarded the position of the second root of Islamic law, the Sharia, after the Qur'an. 
In classical Islam, the concept of Sunna originally stood for a way or manner of acting, 
whether good or bad, hence (dis)approved custom or norm of previous generations, 
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al-awwalun (Bosworth et al, 1997: 878). 
After the death of Muhammed, the Muslim community was ruled first by the Khulafa' 
rashidun and then the Umayyads; at the time, the term Sunna was used in debates on 
legal and ritual issues to indicate any good precedent set by people of the past, including 
the Prophet. During Muhammed's lifetime and immediately after that, when faced 
with a problem to solve, people reminded each other of how the Prophet and his first 
faithful followers had acted under particular circumstances, so-called Sunnas (Bosworth 
et al, 1997: 878). 
The largest group of Muslims are the Sunnis, often known as 'the orthodox', who 
recognise the first four Khalifas, attribute no special religious or political function to the 
descendants of the Prophet's son-in-law Ali, and adhere to one of the four Sunni School 
of Law. The full name of the Sunnis is 'the people of the Sunna [the custom of the 
Prophet] and the Consensus (Glasse, 1989: 382). Sunni recognise Prophet Muhammad, 
the Qur'an, the Sharia, and the Khalifahs preceding Ali (Bosworth et al, 1997: 878); 
they belong to one of the four schools of jurisprudence founded by Imam Abu Hanifah, 
Imam ash-ýhafi'i, Imam Malik, or ImamAhmad ibn Hambal (Hughes, 1895: 572). 
2.2 ShPism and Shia 
ShVism in the broad sense refers to the movement upholding a privileged position of the 
Family of the Prophet in the political and religious leadership of the Muslim 
Community (Bosworth et al, 1997: 420). The name ShPite means 'a partisan' and 
come from Shi'at Ali (the party of Ali) (Glasse, 1989: 365). Followers of Ali, first 
cousin of the Prophet Muhammad and the husband of his daughter Fatimah, recognise 
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Ali as the first legitimate Imam or Khalifah, successor, to the Prophet, and therefore 
reject Abu Bakr, Omar, and Othman, the first three Khalifiahs of Sunni Muslims, as 
usurpers (Hughes, 1895: 572). The spirit of division, which appeared among the 
followers of Mohamed, even before his death, broke out with greater violence after it. 
ShVism signifies not only a religious faith but also a way of life based on that faith. As 
Fuller notes: 'ShPism as an identity is inseparable from adherence to the religious faith, 
and it is the active practice of ShVism that expresses identity'. Thus, AN= entails 'a 
compound of religious, cultural, historical and social attributes, usually acquired by the 
circumstance of birth' (Fuller, 1999: 17). 
ShVite Muslims constitute 10 percent or less of total Muslims all over the world. 
ShVites themselves are divided into three principal groups. The Twelve-Imam ShVism, 
also called 'Welvers', has been the official religion of Persia/Iran since the Safavid 
dynasty came to power in 1501. Twelve-Imam ShVites make up 60 percent of the 
population in Iraq, and in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, al Hasa and Qatif. 
The second group, the Zaydis, also called 'Five-Imam ShPites' or 'Fivers', are found in 
North Yemen, where they make up about 40 percent of the population. The third 
group, the Isma'dis, who are 'Seven-Imam ShPites' are concentrated in India (Glasse, 
1989: 364-65). 
However, ShVites have always been rejected by mainstream Sunnis; since the ninth 
century they were labelled Rafidha, or 'rejecters', as they rejected the line of succession 
established after the death of Prophet Muhammad, and they considered the successive 
Muslim dynasties illegitimate. Consequently, they have been persecuted by Sunnis. 
This on the ShVite community influenced the formation of the ShVite identity (Fuller, 
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1999: 18). 
Shi'ism remains geographically on the peripheries of the Arab world. Nonetheless, it 
lies in the heart of the Persian Gulf; the majority of ShPite communities concentrated 
around the oil-rich areas of eastern Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, southern Iraq, Kuwait, and to 
a lesser extent the UAE, Qatar, and Oman (Fuller, 1999: 17-18). Being socially and 
politically excluded, these communities have emerged as the second major 
religio-political opposition movement in these states (Ayubi, 1991: 4). 
For understanding the fundamental difference between Iranian ShVites and Saudi 
Sunnis, the following section will highlight how Sunnis and ShVites in Saudi Arabia and 
ShVites in Iran play a defining role in both countries' foreign policies. 
3.0 The development of Sunni and Shila in both countries 
3.1 Sunni in Saudi Arabia 
As Saudi Arabia was the cradle of Islam, and the first Islamic state in Medina in the 
seventh century, Islam has traditionally played a more significant role in the political 
and social life of its people than in any other country in the Arab world. During the 
latter half of the eighteenth century, the dynasty of Saud embraced Wahhabism, as a 
religious doctrine, and manipulated it to transcend tribal tensions and divisions in order 
to unify the country. Saudi kings have realised, since the establishment of the 
Kingdom in 1932, that the attachment to the house of Saud was not enough to guarantee 
the loyalty of the tribally diverse and divided population of the Kingdom. They 
needed a stronger force to bind them to the state; this was embracing Wahhabism as an 
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official religion of the state. By engaging the ulama in policy making, the Saudi 
regime utilises religion as a tool to reach its political goal within society (Sankari, 
1982: 185). Although, neo-realists recognise that states and non-state actors are both 
important in world politics, they recognise the role of non-state actors is important 
within the state decision-making procedure. Therefore, the ulama can be seen to act as 
a tool for the regime to achieve its goal by reinforcing the regime's legitimacy. The 
alliance between Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1691-1787) and Muhammad 
Ibn Saud fonned the basis of the rule of the new theocratic state founded in Dariya, near 
Riyadh in 1925 (Sankari, 1982: 179). 
Wahhabism is a steadfast literalist interpretation of Islam in the tradition of Ibn Hanbal, 
founder of the Hanbali madhhab (school of law) as expounded by the thirteenth century 
Hanbalite Ibn Taymiyyah. Wahhabism is noted for its policy of compelling its own 
followers and other Muslims strictly to observe the religious duties of Islam, such as the 
five prayers, and for the enforcement of public morals to a degree not found elsewhere 
(Glasse, 1989: 414-15). 
Abd al-Wahhab considered the Islamic practices of his time unpure, as they did not 
conform to the teachings of the Prophet. According to the teachings of Abd al-Wahhab, 
the Qur'an and Sunna are the only authentic sources; later theological and mystical 
developments and interpretations are, therefore, rejected. Abd al-Wahhab branded all 
who disagreed with him as heretics and apostates, thereby justifying the use of force in 
imposing his doctrine, and political suzerainty with it, on neighbouring tribes. It 
allowed him to declare 'holy war', otherwise legally impossible, against other Muslims 
(Glasse, 1989: 415). As Wahhabism has a narrow interpretation of Islam, the gap 
between Iranian ShVite and the Saudi Sunnis is very difficult to cross. 
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Thus, the Saudi regime has used Islam as an effective tool to unify the peninsula, 
structure the Saudi polity, and legitimise their rule and policies (Sankari, 1982: 193). 
The regime has managed to achieve these objectives by making the Qur'an the Saudi 
constitution, and claiming the role of the 'guardian of the holy places, patron of the 
pilgrimage, and promoter of Islamic causes throughout the world' (Piscatori, 1983: 59). 
3.2 ShPites in Saudi Arabia 
Although Saudi Arabia state religion is Wahhabism, it has a significant ShVite 
community in its Eastern Province. According to government estimates, they 
represent 2-3 percent of the population, or 200,000 to 400,000. However, this figure is 
probably underestimated because ShVites often conceal their identity because of 
discriminatory practices employed against them. For example, in the Eastern province 
of al-Hasa, Fuller believes that the ShVite population constitute around 33 percent of the 
overall population (Fuller, 1999: 180). But al-Hasa province has not shared in the 
general level of prosperity that characterises the rest of the country. The ShVites have 
been systematically excluded from employment, especially from ARAMCO, although 
they have consistently been barred from the high-ranking professional and technical 
jobs. 
As in some other Arab 'Sunni states, ShPites in Saudi Arabia have been marginalised, 
and they have suffered from social and economic discrimination; they have also been 
denied access to the political system. Their religious freedom has been restrained; and 
their religious institutions, have been deprived of autonomy and financial independence 
(Fuller, 1999: 27-28). 
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In Saudi Arabia, the strictly literalistic interpretation of Islam partly accounts for the 
discrimination of the Saudi ulama and regime against Saudi ShPites, as they do not 
consider them to be legitimate Muslims. Therefore, Saudi ulamas issued 'fatwas' in 
1927 and 1991 describing ShVites as non-believers; the implication being it was not 
'juridically illegal' to kill them. Furthermore, Saudi ShVites suffer not only from de 
facto, but also from de jure discrimination, as they are not allowed to freely express 
their own religious traditions or identity (Fuller, 1999: 179). According to Fuller, the 
Saudi ShVites are the 'truly forgotten Muslims'. Thus, Saudi ShVites came to view the 
Wahhabis as the greatest calamity that had befallen their community (Fuller, 
1999: 179-183). 
Furthermore, the ShVite have been underrepresented in the Saudi government, where 
they seldom rise above mid-level posts in ministries. There has been only an 
occasional ShPite cabinet minister in a technical area. Such positions are granted for 
6exceptional loyalty and service' and sometimes they are conferred as 'a concession to 
deflect possible criticism' (Fuller, 1999: 36). ShPites are particularly denied access to 
senior governmental positions and 'sensitive' areas of the state (Fuller, 1999: 36), such 
as the judiciary, the military officer corps, the security forces, and the National Guard, 
the Hajj Ministry, and the Ministry of Islamic Affairs (Fuller, 1999: 184). 
Not only are the ShPites politically and socially excluded, but they are also isolated 
among the opposition, as they are not comfortable with Sunni Islamist movements. 
They perceive that these movements would not accommodate ShPites and therefore, 
think they 'would be better off in a secular regime than a Sunni Islamist one' (Fuller, 
1999: 195). 
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As Saudi Wahhabi doctrine always discriminate against the Saudi ShPites and caused 
resentment within the Saudi society, whenever the opportunity ever presents itself, the 
Saudi ShPites seize the chance to request better treatment from the regime. Hence, the 
vicious circle repeats itself creating further mistrust of the ShVites from the regime, and 
Saudi ShPites are always regarded as second class citizens. 
3.3 Shia in Iran 
Although the Arabs succeeded in conquering 'extensive' territories in and around Persia, 
from the seventh century onwards, and the majority of its population embraced the 
Islamic faith, these areas have not been Arabised. Although Iranians have embraced 
Islam since the seventh century, they maintained their Persian identity and prided 
themselves on their cultural heritage and their own language and adopted a different 
brand of Islam, Shia (Fuller, 1999: 17-18). 
According to Afrachteh, Shi'a Islam acted as 'a national identifiable alternative to the 
monarchy and an ideology ingrained among Iran's practising and non-practising 
Muslims alike'. The ShVite leadership was more respected than its secular peers, and 
was less vulnerable to the control of the state (Afrachteh, 1991: 104) because the ShVite 
leadership was closer to the common people than its secular peers. 
In 1501 the Safavid dynasty established a new Iranian state and declared this form of 
ShPism, the Ithna 'Ashara (TWelver ShVite), as the official religion of the state (Savory, 
1990: 35). The Ithna 'Ashara gained this name because they believe that there were 
twelve Imams, 'the last of whom is still mysteriously alive since his occultation in the 
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ninth century, and will return as the Mahdi' (Glasse, 1989: 202). Since then, the 
Twelvers have been the dominant religious faction in Iran. They also constitute the 
majority in Iraq, and there are scattered communities in Syria, Lebanon, Pakistan, some 
of the Gulf states, and in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia - al-Hasa and Qatif 
(Glasse, 1989: 202). 
However, since the sixteenth century, because of Iran's geo-strategic location between 
the East and the West, it was constantly under the control of foreign powers namely the 
Russian and British empires. As this time the Iranian regime concentrated on their 
own survival rather than paying much attention to the religious grassroots movements. 
Since the reign of the Reza Shah prior to the Iranian Revolution, religion was marginal 
in determining Iranian, domestic and foreign, policies because the monarchies of 
Persia/Iran were secular and did not allow religion to influence politics. This limited 
religious activities. The ShVite clergy, who, in line with ShVite doctrine, regard 
temporal rulers as illegitimate, acted as 'the most vocal opponents of unpopular 
monarchs' (Rezun, 1990: 15). The apogee of clerical political rule occurred in Iran 
after the revolution of 1979. 
Since then, Iran, being the main ShPite country in the world, has been interested in the 
welfare of ShPite communities abroad. It sent representatives to them in order to assist 
and influence them. Arab ShPite communities, particularly, were viewed by Tehran as 
4natural instrumentalities' for extending Iranian influence in the Arab world (Fuller, 
1999: 42). One could argue that since the Iranian Islamic Revolution, the Iranian 
regime attempted to use religion as a tool to expand its influence in the Gulf states, and 
especially in those which have the ShPite minority. 
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Because of adopting an Islamic ideology, soon after the revolution, Iran tried to export 
its ShVite brand of Islam into the Gulf region; this threatened the Gulf monarchies, and 
following that religion became the main source of friction between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia. 
4.0 Struggling for religious leadership 
4.1 The Iranian Revolution in 1979 
The Islamic revolution of Iran is significant not only because it brought the ShVite 
clergy to power for the first time, but also because Iran became the first Islamic state in 
the world (Fuller, 1999: 84). 
The first official Saudi reaction to the Islamic uprising in Iran was to express full 
support for the Shah, in spite of the exposure of the Shah's connections with Israel. 
The Saudis justified their position by claiming that 'Saudi Arabia supported any 
legitimate government as long as it was in power' (MEI, 16 February 1979: 6). 
Furthermore, the Saudis voiced their criticisms and mistrust of the revolution (MEI, 18 
July 1980: 8). The Saudi regime was afraid that any change in the region might affect 
their own security and further threatened its regime survival which in 1958 witnessed 
King Saud's alleged attempts to bribe Syrian leaders to assassinate Nasser, and in 1964 
when the revolt in Dhofar against rule of Omani government, the Saudi regime paid 
huge attention to the development in its neighbours. Therefore, Riyadh was concerned 
that the change of regime would introduce uncertainty into the region, and lead to 
revolution fever in the Gulf states. 
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Subsequently, the Iranian Revolution resulted in the deterioration of Tehran's relations 
with its Arab neighbours in the Gulf. The Gulf monarchies and in particular Saudi 
Arabia, perceived the revolution as a threat to the 'validity' of their rule (Piscatori, 
1983: 70). This threat emanated from two sources. First, the revolutionary Iranian 
regime declared its intentions to export the Islamic Revolution to other countries, 
especially those in the Gulf states with a ShVite population (SWB, 25 October 
1980: ME/6558/A/6). Furthermore, the Arab Gulf regimes were concerned about a 
possible Islamic uprising inside their own territories 'inspired' by the Iranian Revolution 
because Arab ShPites in the Gulf states had already been socially, politically and 
economically disenfranchised by their regimes (Mojtahed-Zadeh, 1994a: 53). Second, 
Iran offered an Islamic alternative to monarchical rule, and as all the Gulf regimes are 
monarchical, this became a fundamental threat to the Gulf regimes. 
After the revolution, Iran began to promote itself as the 'Guardian of Islam', 
considering itself 'the centre of true Islam in the Muslim world' a direct confrontation to 
Saudis claim as guardian of the holy places (Fuller, 1999: 81-82). Khomeini's speech 
on the first anniversary of the Islamic Revolution highlights this vision, as he 
proclaimed: '0 Muslim nations of the world who are oppressed, arise! ' Hence, 
according to Savory, any attempts at exporting the ideology of the Iranian revolution 
were manifest in clergies' visits, and establishment of clandestine Ithna 'Ashara cells in 
several Gulf countries. Between 1979 and 1981 emissaries from Iran visited several 
Arab Gulf states in order to incite their compliant societies to rise against their 
governments (Savory, 1990: 52). Furthermore, Khomeini explicitly condemned the 
Saudi government, which he described as an 'un-Islamic' monarchy, and its military and 
economic ties with the US referring to the relation as 'American Islam' (SWB, 7 
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October 1980: ME/5542/A/3). Khomeini conducted an aggressive campaign against 
the Saudi regime; he proclaimed: 'The ruling regime in Saudi Arabia wears Muslim 
clothing, but it actually represents a luxurious, playful, shameless way of life, robbing 
funds from the people and squandering them, and engaging in gambling, drinking 
parties, and orgies' (Esposito, 1997: 54-55). Furthermore, the Tehran regime accused 
the al Saud regime as 'the ones trying to fight Islam in the robe of Islam', and 'the 
subservient nature of the ruling [al Saud] family supplies a high percentage of the fuel 
for the murderous West' (SWB, 7 October 1980: ME/5542/A/3). The Iranian clergy 
also challenged the lawfulness of the Saudi regime as the guardian of Holy Cities of 
Islam (Fuller, 1991: 105-6). 
Thus, the revolution marked the beginning of rising antagonism and rivalry between 
Iran and Saudi Arabia for leadership of the Muslim world (Piscatori, 1991: 8). 
According to Esposito, the Arab Gulf regimes, especially Saudi Arabia, were concerned 
that their ShVite communities might rise against their rulers following the example of 
the Iranian revolution. These security concerns grew as several demonstrations in Iraq 
(1979), Bahrain (1980,1981) Saudi Arabia (1979), and Kuwait (1980) followed the 
revolution. However, these ShVite uprisings were mainly induced by indigenous 
factors, notably political and economic grievances of ShVite minorities in these 
countries; thus, Iran served only as a 'catalyst. '(Esposito, 1997: 53). 
This was manifest in the case of the oppressed ShPites of the Eastern Province in Saudi 
Arabia. Not only were they denied access to government employment, but they also 
shared 'minimally' in the wealth of the country (until the mid- 1980s). Thismadethern 
$receptive to Iranian propaganda'. Therefore, as Fuller concludes, the Iranian 
Revolution did not revive ShPism, but helped in 'providing a focal point for a ShPite 
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political identity that was already in formation' (Fuller, 1999: 3 1). 
Thus, the Iranian revolution marked the beginning of confrontation between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran along religious lines. Iran 'questioned the very legitimacy of the 
Saudi regime and its right to protect Islam's holy shrines' (Abir, 1994: 125), and accused 
the Saudi regime 'who do not believe in religion', as being 'against the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran' (SWB, 7 October 1980: ME/5542/A/3). Saudi Arabia responded to 
the Iranian challenge by asserting its interest in the welfare of the Muslims of the world. 
Thus, during the Eid al-Fitr in 1980, the then Crown Prince Fahd, proclaimed in his 
speech that the Arabs should return to jihad in order to liberate Jerusalem. He 
maintained that 'the guardians of the haramein of Mecca and Medina still consider 
themselves responsible to the Muslim world for Jerusalem'. To this end, he promised to 
restore the shrines of East Jerusalem to Muslim control making this a high priority for 
the Kingdom. The fact that this speech was made in Eid al-Fitr, which 'marks the end 
of the suffering and sacrifice of the Ramadan fast' (MEI, 12 September 1980: 6), 
indicates that it was an attempt by Saudi Arabia to regain its moral authority and 
religious leadership over Iran in the Muslim world. 
The ideological struggle 'in the context of cultural differences' soon turned into a 
political confrontation between the Iranian and Saudi regimes. During the early 1980s, 
the ruling Ayatollahs made aggressive statements against regimes in Muslim countries, 
calling upon religious leaders to turn their mosques into 'prayer, cultural and military 
bases [to] ... prepare the ground for the creation of Islamic governments in all countries' 
(Esposito, 1997: 55). In order to counter the Iranian threat, the Saudis offered 
assistance to Iraq in its war against Iran; additionally, they imposed restrictions on 
Iranians pilgrims (Amirahmadi, 1993: 147). 
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Furthermore, the Saudis attacked the Iranian Islamic regime for its inability to offer any 
valuable service to Muslims. Riyadh announced that 'Ever since the Iranian and 
Islamic peoples were afflicted by the Khomeini regime, this regime has failed to render 
any noteworthy service to Islam, and the Muslims ... 
This regime has tried to create 
schism among Muslims, not only in their politics but also in their mosques. The 
Khomeini regime sends its agents everywhere to foment discord' (Esposito, 1997: 55). 
Hence, the turning point for the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran came after 
the revolution. 
4.2 The Mecca riot and the Saudi ShPite demonstration 
The Iranian revolution served as an inspiration to Islamic movements in the Gulf region; 
several riots or demonstrations were staged in several Gulf states, which worried the 
Gulf monarchies. On 20 November 1979, the Islamic threat reached the doorstep of 
Saudi Arabia. To the surprise of the Saudis, the Grand Mosque of Mecca was seized 
and occupied for two weeks by a group of around 100 Sunni militants who denounced 
the Saudi regime (Esposito, 1997: 55). Suspicions were first directed at ShVites 
connected with outside groups - mainly Iranians. However, it was soon revealed that 
the attack was led by a Saudi Sunni (Sankari, 1982: 190-91). 
According to Ayubi, this incident demonstrated that even the "Islamic Saudi Arabia was 
not completely immune to the forces of 'Islamic' resurgence" (Ayubi, 1991: 99). 
Sankari argues that until this incident, the regime believed that it could contain any 
domestic threat to its position. This belief was grounded in the regime's claims to 
legitimacy based upon four interrelated factors. First, the regime has manipulated 
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Islam, supported by the ulama, in consolidating a modem state in the Kingdom. 
Second, as a traditional Bedouin society regards 'the wealthiest, most prolific, and 
militarily most effective families in its midst' as prestigious, the royal family is revered 
because it enjoys political, economic, and military control over the resources of society. 
Third, the ruling dynasty was successful in unifying the divided tribes of the peninsula; 
thus, these tribes owed their allegiance to the House of Saud. Finally, the ruling elite 
assumed a patriarchal role by distributing 'material rewards' to the Saudi population 
(Sankari, 1982: 190). 
Despite the above-mentioned factors, opposition was growing in Saudi Arabia, as 
demonstrated by the Mecca riot, which shattered the regime's confidence. The Mecca 
riot could be attributed to the following reasons. There was a growing dissatisfied 
secular middle class in the Kingdom created by the sudden and considerable wealth that 
brought about modemisation and rapid technological change. Corruption was 
widespread among some members of the royal family. The education system was 
producing more frustrated qualified personnel who were unable to enter the high-level 
bureaucracies and whose innovative ideas [are] overruled or ignored by their less 
sophisticated superiors'. Members of the royal family dominated key positions, such 
as foreign affairs, defence, interior, public works, and housing and the system was 
marked by regional discrimination where the most sensitive government posts were 
granted to Najdi natives, the dynasty's ancestral power base, which is rivalled by the 
more educated I-Iijazis. The Saudi regime also used oil wealth and no taxation to buy 
off the vote and at the same time did not allow the opposition voice to surface Saudi 
society. The close links that had developed between Saudi Arabia and the US, roused 
the conservative Saudis against the regime, as the US supported Israel in Arab-Israeli 
conflicts. There was an emerging small but dedicated opposition group such as 'the 
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Organisation of the Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula' (Hiro, 1987: 337) in 
the Kingdom which was inspired by the success of the Iranian Islamic revolution to 
rebel against the ruling regime (Sankari, 1982: 190). 
The occupation of the Grand Mosque by Sunni militants signified a challenge to the 
Saudi ruling family as the guardian of Muslim holy places. It exposed the failure of 
the regime to foster consensus within society, based on the doctrine of Wahhabism. 
This was revealed in the demands of the militants, among other things, for 'a strict 
adherence to the Sharia, a ban on television, football, movies and a prohibition against 
women working in public places'. Moreover, they accused the ruling regime of 
corruption and incompetence (Olsen, 1994: 139-140). 
The Saudi regime used religion to counterbalance its opponents. King Khaled and 
Crown Prince Fahd seized the opportunity to secure a fatwa to legitimise their actions in 
dealing with the rioters. Oslen argues that Khaled and Fahd could certainly have acted 
without a fatwa; however, securing one promoted the image of the Sauds as the 
protectors of the holy places and thus of their claim to rulership (Olsen, 1994: 139). 
The Mecca riots changed the Saudi regime's 'perception of the sources of threats to the 
country's stability'. Before the incident, the Saudi regime was mainly concerned about 
external threats, namely, from Iraq, South Yemen, and Iran - especially after the success 
of the Iranian revolution. The seizure of the Grand Mosque alerted the royal family to 
the possibility of a threat arising internally from dissident native Saudis (Sankari, 
1982: 191). 
Another event broke out when regime was still trying to resolve the Mecca crisis. 
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Riots broke out on 27 November among 250,000 ShPite Muslims in the oil-rich Eastern 
Province (al-Hasa). After the success of the revolution and the triumphant return of 
Khomeini, ShPites rose against the regime demanding a 'fairer distribution of oil wealth 
and services' (Esposito, 1997: 55). One could argue that the Iranian revolution offered 
an example to the oppressed Saudi ShPites. However, the riots were soon crushed by 
Saudi forces, but the Saudi regime began to pay more attention to the Saudi ShPites 
connection with Iranian ShPites. Thus, relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran began 
to turn from covert competition into overt confrontation which is illustrated by the 
annual clashes between Iranian pilgrims making the Hajj and Saudi forces which 
contributed to the worsening of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
5.0 Clashes between Saudi Arabia and Iran 
The religious factor has acted as a catalyst for the confrontation between Saudi Arabia 
and Iran on two fronts, one is the annual Haj, and the other is competition for 
leadership of Islamic organisations. 
5.1 The Hay 
The Hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca during the twelfth month of the Muslim year, is one 
of the five pillars of Islam that Muslims are obliged to fulfil at least once in their 
lifetime, if they are well enough and can afford to make the journey. Islamic tradition 
traces the Hajj origins back to the Prophet Ibrahim. According to the Quran, Ibrahim 
together with Isma'il built the Ka'bah, 'the House of God, ' the focal point towards 
which Muslims turn in their worship five times a day. It was Ibrahim who established 
the rituals of the Hajj, which recall events or practices in his life and that of Hagar and 
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their son Isma'il (http: //islamicity. com). By the time the Prophet Muhammad received 
the divine call, however, pagan practices had become linked into some of the original 
observances of the Islamic Hajj, but Muhammad reinterpreted them in monotheistic 
terms. These rites include circling the Ka'bah, kissing the Black Stone set in one of its 
walls, running between the nearby hills of Safa and Marwa, stoning a pillar near Mina 
which symbolically represents the devil, sacrificing sheep there, and assembling in large 
groups on the plain of Arafat (Goldschmidt, 1999: 41). 
.y 
for the Saudi regime 5.1.1 The importance of the Ha 
The significance of the Hajj has placed Saudi Arabia in an extremely important position 
in the Muslim world. The Saudi ruling family has capitalised on this and utilised 
domestic and foreign policies to assert its political and religious authority, and hence 
bolster its legitimacy, both domestically and internationally. The annual IIajj has been 
one of the effective tools available to the House of Saud to achieve this aim. By 
sponsoring the Hajj, the Saudi regime has reinforced its position, in the Muslim world, 
as the upholder and defender of 'Islamic values and the holy places of Mecca and 
Medina' (MacIntyre, 1981: 27). 
Although the Hajj has traditionally been considered a privilege for Saudi Arabia, due to 
the stature it has given the Kingdom in the Islamic world, it has recently become a 
liability for the regime (Murden, 1995: 180). This is particularly because, since the 
Iranian revolution, Iranians have attempted to turn it into a religious-political event and 
to politicise the Hajj pilgrimage (SWB, 21 October 1980: ME/6554/A/7). Since the 
outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, Tehran felt it had been isolated by the Gulf states 
and the West in the international arena, as they had sided with Iraq (SWB, 2 October 
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1980: ME/6538/A/3). Therefore, Iran has tried to use the Hajj as an occasion for 
demonstrating its frustrations against the Gulf states and the West, particularly the US. 
Since the Hajj attracts a large number of Muslims from all over the world (SWB, 1 
August 1987, ME/8635/A/16), it has been regarded by the Iranian regime as a good 
opportunity to propagate its vision and channel its frustrations. 
5.1.2 Conflicting interpretations of Islam and Hqu 
The belief in the legitimacy of demonstrations at the Hajj was grounded in Khomeini's 
conviction that Islam is not only limited to the private relationship between man and 
God, but also encompasses the character of the state and the historic obligation of the 
ruler to extend the force of Islamic law into the life of his people. This led Khomeini 
to believe that the obligation of Iranian pilgrims was to demonstrate against those forces 
that oppress Islam, and against the unlawful and profane character of the Saudi regime 
itself. Therefore, to Khomeini, political expression at the Holy Cities was more 
religiously significant than fulfilling the ritual obligation of the Hajj itself by the 
individual pilgrim (SWB, 1 August 1987, ME/8635/A/16). However, the Saudi regime 
disputed this interpretation of Islam, which conflicted with its own interests. 
Saudi Arabia was aware of the constraints of its resources in its struggle with Iran. 
Though an oil rich state, Saudi Arabia had limited human resources, and a weak military 
power, which could not guarantee regime survival. Seeking its own survival, which 
according to the theory of neo-realism is the predominated reason for the state, Riyadh 
utilised the location of the two Holy Cities, Mecca and Medina, to strengthen its 
position in the Muslim world, by proclaim its guardianship of these two Holy Cities, 
and at the same time used its wealth from the oil to buy its friendships among the 
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Muslim states. By doing this Saudi Arabia strengthen its bargaining power towards 
Iran, and this is why, as Fuller notes, the Saudi ruling family reacted primitively and 
more sharply to Khomeini's challenge to its religious legitimacy than it ever has to 
Iranian acts of military aggression or sabotage (Fuller, 199 1: 105-6). 
5.2 The annual HqU, the yearly clash 
In essence, the HaJ brings a large number of Muslims to Mecca every year in order to 
show solidarity and common purpose. However after the 1987 Mecca riot, Khomeini, 
and other senior clerics, rejected the Saudi claim to be 'the keepers of the Holy Cities, 
Mecca and Medina', and even requested the two Holy Cities should be placed under a 
special committee's control, which in effect would have stripped Saudi of its privileged 
position in the Muslim world (SWB, 7 August 1987, ME/8640/i). 
This first started after the Hajj season in 1981, when Iranian pilgrims held 
anti-American and anti-imperialist political demonstrations in the name of liberation of 
Mecca from infidels. In October 1981, King Khaled accused Khomeini of inciting 
Iranian pilgrims to undertake activities that not only did not serve Iranian interests, but 
were also against the 'aims of pilgrimage and the honour of the holy places. These 
pilgrims shouted slogans and demonstrated in the holy precincts; actions which 
disturbed and disgusted other pilgrims to the holy house of God' (Ramazani, 
1986b: 26-27). Khomeini replied that the purpose of pilgrimage was not religious 
worship alone and Islam should be completely linked to politics (Ramazani, 1986b: 27). 
During the Hajj in 1982, Iranian pilgrims guided and inspired by their leader, Hojatollah 
Eslam Muhammad Musavi Khoeiniha, clashed with Saudi authorities as they held 
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posters of Khomeini and chanted slogans against the US, the Soviet Union, Israel and 
Saudi (Esposito, 1997: 55-56). Every year more than 100,000 Iranian pilgrims 
promoted the Iranian brand of Islam among other pilgrims (MEI, 31 May 1985: 9). In 
1986, Iranian pilgrims who were thought to be importing an-ns were arrested and 
prevented from undertaking the Hajj. 
Thus, clashes with Khomeini's supporters in the pilgrimages of the 1980s tarnished the 
Saudis' image as 'an [in]effective guardian of peace in the holy land' (Piscatori, 
1983: 44). Political agitation by Iranian pilgrims during the yearly HaJ ceremonies in 
the holy city of Mecca became a major headache for Saudi authorities, and 
Iranian-Saudi relations deteriorated sharply (MEI, 31 May 1985: 9). 
5.2.1 The 1987 riot in Mecca 
Saudi-Iranian relations reached their lowest point on 31 July 1987, when Iranian 
pilgrims demonstrated in Mecca shouting slogans against the US, Israel and Saudi 
Arabia (MEI, 8 August 1987: 3). The riot, anticipated by the authorities, was brutally 
crushed by Saudi police (Amirahmadi, 1993: 139). Therefore, when Iranian pilgrims 
clashed with Saudi security police outside the Grand Mosque, in Mecca, reporters and 
cameramen were ready to report the incident and take pictures. Films of the riot were 
shown on its television network and also throughout the Muslim world, which led to 
'condemnation of the Iranian pilgrims' behaviour' (SWB, 7 August 1987, ME/8640/i). 
By the end of the riot, casualties amounted to approximately 400 dead, of whom 275 
were Iranians and 85 Saudis, and 650 people injured. However, Iranian official reports 
later maintained that 600 Iranians had been killed and 4500 injured. This incident 
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widened the gulf between Riyadh and Tehran, especially since 'it had a Sunni-ShVite 
character' (MEI, 29 May 1987: 4). 
Immediately after the suppression of the riot, Saudi Arabia and Iran blamed each other. 
Subsequently, Iran convened an international conference to discuss the future of the 
holy places. However, the conference was only successful in concentrating anti-Saudi 
rhetoric, which was already 'flowing from pro-Iranian circles in Muslim world' (FBIS, 
NES-87-228,27 November 1987: 53). 
After the killing of the rioting Iranian pilgrims in Mecca, Rafsanjani issued a strong 
protest: 'In their short history the Saudis have engaged in a great bloodshed... ' 
demonstrated by their statement that 'they would commit any kind of crime. The 
revenge for [the spilling of Iranians'] sacred blood [in Mecca rioting] will be to divest 
the control of the holy shrines and holy mosques from the contaminated existence of the 
Wahhabis, these hooligans, these malignant people' (SWB, 4 August 1987, ME18637/i). 
'The true revenge is to remove the colossal and precious wealth belonging to the Islamic 
world which lies under the soil of the Arabian Peninsula ... from the control of criminals, 
the agents of colonialism .......... (SWB, 4 August 1987, ME/8637/A/5). In Tehran, 
crowds surrounded the Saudi embassy and one Saudi diplomat was killed leading to 
long and bitter recrimination (SWB, 3 August 1987, ME/8636/i). 
Khomeini blamed the US for the incident because the main reason for holding the 
demonstration was to denounce the US for supporting Iraq in the war with Iran and for 
its long-term support of Israel. In the end, Khomeini proclaimed Saudi Arabia to be 
Iran's main enemy, even though Iran was still at war with Iraq. Once again, the Iranian 
Islamic clergy questioned the legitimacy of the House of Saud's rule and demanded the 
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removal of the custodianship of the two Holy Cities from Saudi hands (SWB, 4 August 
1987, ME/8637/i). King Fahd responded by dropping the non-Islamic, secular title of 
'king' and assumed the title of 'Custodian of the two Holy Cities', which asserted his 
legitimacy as a Sunni ruler (Fuller, 1991: 106). 
When King Fahd chaired the Council of Ministers on 1 August 1987, the Council 
expressed that it was an 'extreme displeasure at the action of a large numbers (sic) of 
Iranian pilgrims during the [Hajjl procession.... [and] actions that totally contradict the 
teachings of the noble religion' (SWB, 3 August 1987, ME/8636/A/4), and 'in the light 
of the photographed events it has viewed of the mob acts of some of the Iranian 
pilgrims at the courtyard of the Holy Mosque and in view of the security reports in its 
possession, the government of Saudi Arabia would like to clarify to all that the 
fabricated news and allegations carried by the Iranian media against the Saudi security 
authorities conflict with reality and have no link with the truth', and accused Iranian 
pilgrims in having 'violated the rules and security regulations in past years' (SWB, 4 
August 1987, ME/8636/A/4-5). Furthermore, on the occasion of Id al-Adha Saudi 
religious officials strongly condemned Iranian pilgrims in having 'spread unrest among 
pilgrims and created sedition and stir up trouble [which] was incompatible with the 
sanctity of the House [of God]' and they also stated that 'the rulers of Iran pushed 
innocent Iranians to commit this disgraceful act' and the Iranian regime should 'holds 
the responsible(sic) for the evils and the sedition resulting from their action' (SWB, 4 
August 1987, ME/8636/A/5). The bitter accusations from both countries sent their 
relations into nadir in the history of their diplomatic relations. 
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5.2.2 Introducing the quota system 
In an attempt to pre-empt trouble in the subsequent pilgrimages during the Islamic 
Conference of Foreign Ministers, in Jordan in March 1988, the Saudis announced, that 
due to major renovation work at Mecca, lasting for two to three years, the number of 
pilgrims would be restricted (www. oic-oci. org). Thus, a quota system was introduced; 
according to this system each Muslim country was entitled to a thousand pilgrims per 
million of the total population. Accordingly, Iran was allowed to send only 45,000 
pilgrims in 1988, compared to 150,000 the previous year. 
This whole quota system was aimed at controlling the Iranian population inflow into 
Saudi Arabia during the pilgrimage. In other words, Riyadh attempted to restrict the 
number of Iranian pilgrims in order to reduce the chances of confrontation in the 1988 
Hajj season. One could argue that this quota system mainly focused on the Iranian 
pilgrims, because the Saudi regime did not apply the same rule to the Kuwaitis and 
Qataris in the same quota system. Riyadh also declared that it would not tolerate any 
political demonstrations in the Holy Cities. Iran's attempts to make Saudi Arabia 
rescind its decision failed, and in the end Saudi Arabia formally cut diplomatic relations 
with Iran on 26 April 1988 (Murden, 1995: 180). 
Furthermore, the execution of pro-Iranian radicals in September 1988 and September 
1989 led to further antagonism between Saudi Arabia and Iran (Murden, 1995: 180). 
The Saudi authorities also accused Tehran of masterminding the Mecca bombing which 
led to the execution of 16 Kuwaiti ShVites (Abir, 1994: 142). The confrontation 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia now became more visible and heated. In October 1989, 
while Iran was hosting a conference on the Lebanese problem in Tehran, a similar 
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conference was taking place in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia (MEI, 22 June 1990: 17). 
As tension escalated between Saudi Arabia and Iran, negotiations in Riyadh over the 
Hajj quota allocated to Iran in May 1990 proved to be futile (Murden, 1995: 181-82). 
Since the Mecca incident, every year when the Hajj approached, Tehran attempted to 
send more pilgrims back to Saudi Arabia, but Riyadh would not yield to Iranian 
t, ' demands. Eventually, the Tehran regime banned its own people from going to the Haii 
for more than three years (1988-1990) (MEI, 20 July 1990: 6). 
Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran deteriorated further after the worst catastrophe 
in the history of the Hajj took place on 2 July 1990. In Mina, about 10 kilometres 
from Mecca, 1426 pilgrims, mostly Asians, suffocated to death when the ventilation 
system of the Mina tunnel broke down. Tehran used this disaster as ammunition in its 
long-standing campaign against Saudi control of the pilgrimage and holy cities and 
referred darkly to a 'criminal conspiracy' (Piscatori, 1991: 8). This erupted into verbal 
warfare between Saudi Arabia and Iran (MEI, 20 July 1990: 6). Furthermore, Iran 
demanded that control of the Hajj be handed to a pan-Islamic committee (MEI, 20 July 
1990: 6). 
5.2.3 The 1990s reconciliation over the IIa[y issue 
As will be explained in Chapter Five, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 made 
the Saudi regime recognise the fact that even possessing the most advanced weapons in 
the world still could not secure Saudi Arabia from the threat of invasion. The Saudi 
regime therefore realised that it must negotiate with Iran in regional affairs. Hence, 
Riyadh began to mend fences with Tehran. - 
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The first sign of the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran was a series of 
high-level contacts between the two countries in early 1991 (MBI, 11 January 1991). 
They reached an agreement on their most contentious bilateral issue, the participation of 
Iranians in the Hajj. The quota set by Riyadh on Iranians was 45,000 pilgrims in 
contrast with Tehran's demand of 150,000 pilgrims and in the end they compromised at 
115,000. The other point of contention concerned the demonstrations which Iranian 
pilgrims insisted on holding to express solidarity with the oppressed Muslims of 
Palestine. Riyadh agreed to allow Iranian pilgrims to hold demonstrations at one fixed 
place only without processions or marches (MEL 28 June 1991: 6-7). However, as the 
Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati, who was among the pilgrims, personally pledged to 
King Fahd that the demonstrators would be peaceful and they would not shout 
anti-Saudi slogans, Riyadh was tempted to test the limits of President Rafsanjani's 
authority. Thus, Riyadh allowed Iranians to hold a demonstration with pilgrims 
stretching over 3 kilometres, shouting only anti-American and anti-Israeli slogans (MEI, 
28 June 1991: 6) 
The warming of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran lasted only for two years. In 
1993, the Iranian demonstration held in Mecca without the permission of Saudi 
authorities threatened Saudi-Iranian relations. The Iranian pilgrims went on the 
offensive against the Saudis when they broke up an Iranian demonstration in Mecca. 
The next day Riyadh expelled the head of the Iranian pilgrims, Reyshahri, and as a 
result, Tehran attacked Riyadh bitterly (MEI, 11 June 1993: 11). 
Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which had been steadily improving since the 
end of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, were once again severely strained in 1994, due to the 
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1993 incident. In 1994, Saudi Arabia declared that it would again restrict the number 
of Iranian pilgrims to 55,000, claiming shortage of facilities and citing an agreement 
reached by the Arab foreign ministers in Amman in March 1988 for allocation of one 
pilgrim per 1,000 of population from each country. Of course Tehran regarded this 
quota system as a mere excuse, to restore the quota of only 45,000 Iranian pilgrims to 
Mecca annually (MEI, 15 April 1994: 18). 
Iran's spiritual leader, Khamenei accused Saudi officials of 'procrastination' and called 
on them to change their stance and admit more Iranian pilgrims or faced the wrath of the 
Iranian nation. He warned Saudi officials not to turn the lIajj into 'another tool in the 
hands of America and the big powers'. At the same time, Javad Larijani, deputy 
chairman of the foreign affairs committee of the Iranian Majlis, charged that it would be 
a disgrace for Saudi Arabia to refuse Muslims who want to visit Islam's holiest shrine' 
(MEI, 15 April 1994: 19). The Saudi government condemned the criticism and 
retaliated by accusing Iran's spiritual leader of making 'improper and irresponsible 
statements followed by a frenzied media campaign' (MEI, 15 April 1994: 19). 
Relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia were showing signs of improvement as Iranian 
media refrained from criticising the Saudi regime when 270 pilgrims died in a stampede 
in Mina, in 1994. This could have contributed to the rapprochement between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran soon after the Kuwaiti crisis. In the post-Kuwait war period, Iran 
became concerned about its possible isolation from the regional affairs. Therefore, 
Tehran attempted to mend its relations with Riyadh. Iran began to initiate the 
rapprochement with Riyadh by the Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Velayati, visit to 
Jeddah in April 1991. The Saudi Foreign Minister Saud reciprocated this visit in June 
1991. Therefore, because most of the Iranian media was under Tehran's tight control, 
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the Iranian media refrained from criticising the whole tragedy. Again other 
catastrophes occurred in 1995,1996 and in 1997 when a fire broke out in Mina trapping 
and killing more than 340 pilgrims and injuring more than 1,500 people (CNN, 5 March 
2001). The Iranian media remained silent. 
In 1997 Rafsanjani took several high-profile steps to ease relations with Riyadh. He 
emphasised the spiritual nature of the HaJ ceremony, which reduced the hardliner's 
harsh tone of intertwining religion and politics; and during the 1997 HaJ season, he 
personally took part (MEI, 4 April 1997: 14). The Saudi regime and press reacted 
towards Iran positively and in July 1997 a Saudi envoy visited Tehran (MEI, 25 July 
1997: 11) and in August the Saudi foreign minister crown prince Abdullah attended the 
OIC conference in Tehran. 
Evidently, the Hajj issue has been utilised by both countries to serve their own agendas 
in the religio-political scene. Nevertheless, it has not been the only reason for the 
fluctuations of their relationship; the competition for leadership in Islamic organisations 
has played a significant role as well. 
6.0 The competition within Islamic organisations 
Although the purpose of establishing two Islamic organisations in the 1960s, the 
Muslim World League, and the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), was to 
counterbalance threats from pan-Arabism, they were eventually became another 
battlefield for conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The rest of the chapter will be 
devoted to highlighting developments that led to this situation. 
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Saudi Arabia has been a major sponsor of Islamic organisations, such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Jamaat-i Islami, and supporter of Islamic institutions (mosques, 
schools, hospitals, and banks) and activities (from publishing to preaching) dedicated to 
the promotion of Islamic faith all over the world (Esposito, 1997: 53). The Saudi 
leadership claims that it has an obligation to promote Islam; therefore, it has invested 
huge sums of money in Islamic institutions inside and outside the Kingdom. Not only 
this, but Saudi Arabia has also utilised Islam to extend its influence and stature in the 
Muslim world, and legitimise its role as the custodian of the Islamic faith. 
Religion has been important in formulating Saudi foreign policy; and the Saudi regime 
has been willing to commit huge amounts of money to sponsoring Islamic institutions 
and promoting Islam in general. According to Piscatori this can be explained by four 
reasons: 
1. Most Saudis view their commitment to Islam as natural and unshakeable. They 
believe if Islam becomes the ideology of the population, it can impose 
constraints from below on the leaders. 
2. As few individuals have dominated decision-making in Saudi Arabia, their 
strongly-held religious views make a difference. Faisal and Khaled's devotion 
served to magnify Islam's relevance to the definition of the national interest. 
Therefore, their policy affected the Saudi's foreign policy. 
3. Because the Saudi regime is conservative and pro-Western, Arab nationalists and 
leftists have forced it on the defensive, especially after Nasser began to 
challenge the Saudi leadership in the Muslim world. Promotion of Islam as 
either superior or complementary to Arabism has been the saving retort of the 
Saudi regime (Piscatori, 1983: 49). 
4. Saudi Arabia has used religious organisations as its speaker channels. For 
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example, Saudi Arabia has used the Muslim World League (Rabitat al-Alam 
al-Islami), established in 1962 with the aim of combating 'the serious plots by 
which the enemies of Islam are trying to draw Muslims away from their religion 
and to destroy their unity and brotherhood', 'as a non-governmental Saudi 
spokesman' (Piscatori, 1983: 40). 
Unlike Saudi, religion has not always been a determinant factor in policy making in Iran. 
Prior to the Iranian Revolution, religion remained at the grassroots level within society 
because the Shah did not allow religion to play a role in Iranian foreign policy. 
However, at that time the Shah utilized religion as a tool to manipulate his influence in 
the religious organizations in the Muslim world. The clerical rebellion towards the 
Shah only intensified during the last few years of the Shah's regime. The Islamic 
revolution changed the position of religion in Iran. Religion now became the principal 
of the new regime and began to take control of Iranian domestic and external policy. 
Religion became the driving force behind foreign policy, and one could argue that 
because of this Iran's relations with most Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia, 
deteriorated sharply because both countries wanted to be the sole leader of the Islamic 
world. 
6.1 The Muslim World League 
The Muslim World League was founded in 1962 to promote Islamic unity. The 
League is an international, Islamic, non-governmental organisation, with the main 
objectives to disseminate Islamic Dawah, expound the teachings of Islam, and to defend 
Islamic causes in a manner that safeguards the interests and aspirations of all Muslims. 
It also aims to refute false allegations against Islam, and repel inimical trends and 
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dogma which the enemies of Islam seek to exploit, in order to destroy the unity of 
Muslims (www. arab. net/mwl/organization. htm). 
The headquarters of the Muslim World League is located in Mecca, and it comprises of 
five organisations. Saudi Arabia is the main financial supporter of the Muslim World 
League, but although Iran is a member it does not host one of the League's offices. 
One might argue that this is because one of the branches of the Muslim World League is 
dedicated to the commission on scientific signs in the Holy Qur'an and Sunna 
(www. Arab. net/mwl/organization. htm) but as Iran is a country that mainly follows Shi'a 
Islam then this could explain why Iran's attitude towards the Muslim World League has 
always been rather lukewann. 
6.2 The OIC 
The OIC, comprising both 56 Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries, was established in 
1969 by 25 founding states, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, and is based in Jeddah. 
The main goal of the organisation is for states to pool their resources, combine their 
efforts and speak with one voice to safeguard the interest and ensure the progress and 
well-being of their peoples and those of other Muslims in the world. 
The OIC consists of three main bodies. The conference of kings and heads of states 
and government is the supreme authority of the organisation which meets once every 
three years to lay down the organisation's policy. The second body is the conference 
of foreign ministers, which meets once a year to examine a progress report on the 
implementation of its decisions taken within the framework of the policy defined by the 
Islamic summit. Third, the general secretariat is the executive organ of the 
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organisation, which is entrusted with the implementation of the decisions of the two 
preceding bodies (www. oic-oci. org). 
Saudi Arabia has been the major benefactor of the organisation, contributing 10 percent 
of the budget of the General Secretariat (Piscatori, 1983: 46). This has allowed Saudi 
Arabia to use the OIC as a forum to express its views and enhance its position and 
image in the Islamic world in general and among the Arabs in particular (Piscatori, 
1983: 41). 
The criteria for joining the OIC have been unclear since its establishment in 1969. 
Jansen argues that in 1987 the organisation had 46 members, of which ten not being 
Muslim ma . ority states should not have been members at all. For instance, Gabon's j 
Muslim minority amounts to less than five per cent of the population, but according to 
the wildly inaccurate OIC figures it constitutes 40 per cent. Another example is Sierra 
Leone, whose Muslim population should be around 30 per cent instead of the 65 per 
cent stated (MEI, 6 February 1987: 6). 
Furthermore, Jansen suggests that the African countries sought to join the OIC during 
the oil boom to benefit from its financial support. Gulf states tried to buy them off. 
This also benefited Saudi because they could use their wealth to buy support from these 
states and therefore gain more influence within the OIC and the Muslim world. One 
could argue that the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, uses the OIC not only as a 
religious tool but also a political weapon, in order to gain the support from other 
Muslim countries. The formula for determining membership dues for the OIC is not 
clear, as it is not publicised. Saudi Arabia has been a major sponsor of the OIC, but 
with the drop in oil prices, the Saudi contribution consequently declined (MEI, 6 
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February 1987: 6). 
In contrast with the Muslim World League, the OIC has become a battlefield for 
political and ideological confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran. One could 
argue that the timing was critical in determining the reaction of Saudi Arabia and Iran 
towards both Islamic organisations. When the Muslim World League was established 
in 1962 religion did not play an important role and religious leaders were suppressed. 
However, when the OIC came into existence in 1969, at that time the British 
government had just announced its intensions to withdraw from the east of the Suez 
Canal in 1971. As stated earlier, Saudi Arabia and Iran became the effective 
policemen of the Gulf region under the Nixon's 'T\vin Pillar' policy which promoted the 
importance of Iran in the regional affairs and fuelled the Shah's ambitions. The Shah 
wished Iran to become the hegemonic power in the region, therefore, he began to build 
his military influence in the Gulf region and started to pay more attention to religious 
and political movements, as he wanted to show his influence in every aspect of the 
regional affairs. 
The function of the Muslim World League and the OIC has been to act as speakers for 
the Saudi regime in the 1960s and 1970s. The Muslim World League, however, never 
became the focus point for the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran due to the 
League's focus on the formation of a uniform Islamic interest, in the light of the holy 
Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet (www. arab. net/mwl). This could explain why 
although Iran, which has a ShPite majority, is a founding member of the League, it was 
not in a position to compete with Saudi Arabia within it. 
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6.2.1 Iran boycotts OIC summits 
Soon after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, the Saudi regime attempted to use the third 
OIC summit held in Mecca to reconcile the two warring countries in January 1981. 
However, the Iranian regime believed that the majority of the Sunni members of the 
OIC were biased in favour of the Sunni ruled Iraq, especially the Gulf states, such as 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia who began providing money to aid the Iraqi warfare. Prior 
to the OIC conference in 1981, a mass march against Saddam Hussein to attend the 
conference proceeded in front of the Saudi Embassy in Tehran (SWB, 26 January 198 1). 
They proclaimed that those who attended the conference would be 'Islamically and 
historically accountable to God and to the oppressed Iraqi people' unless Saddam 
Hussein was barred from the summit (SWB, 26 January 1981). Iran eventually refused 
to attend the OIC conference. 
Because Saudi Arabia was supporting Iraq in the war with Iran, Riyadh was not affected 
with Iran's request to withdraw, but merely expressed its regret that the Iranian delegate 
could not attend the conference. The Saudi Crown Prince Fahd speaking at the 
conference, advocated peace between Iran and Iraq and wished that Iran could have 
participated in order to resolve the conflict peacefully and 'restore unity and cohesion to 
the Muslim ranks' (SWB, 28 January 1981). However, the Iranian media bitterly 
announced that the summit was not 'competent to rise to the level of Islamic masses' 
desires and [was] unable to cope with their fateful causes, and the conference boycotted 
by Iran [was] doomed to failure and [could not] proceed one step towards the real Islam' 
(SWB, 28 January 1981). Furthermore, Khomeini accused the participating kings and 
heads of state of creating 'a division between the ShVites and Sunnis in Iran, describing 
the conference as 'a plot of the extremely corrupted leaders of some of these countries' 
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(SWB, 31 January 1981). 
Following the 1981 OIC summit, Tehran boycotted successive OIC summits and 
intensified its campaign against the Saudi regime because of the latter's support for Iraq. 
In 1984, again, Iran refused to attend OIC in Casablanca because it still believed that 
most member countries were biased in favour of Iraq, and Tehran wished to punish 
those countries supporting the Iraqi regime, in the war, notably Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia. During the fourth summit of OIC, the Iranian foreign minister condemned 'a 
draft resolution approved by the Foreign Ministers of the participating countries' 
supporting the Iraqi regime. He claimed that its sole aim was to serve as 'a 
propaganda tool on behalf of Saddam's regime, and offered no solution to the war ..., 
and such [a] resolution [made] [Iranian] more determined to obtain its just and 
legitimate rights' (SWB, 19 January 1984). At first, the Saudi regime looked for a 
peaceful means to bring about a ceasefire between Iran and Iraq. However, in 1984 
during the OIC summit, King Fahd stated that 'in spite of the Islamic and international 
efforts and mediation to end the war, this war is still continuing. Further, he praised 
Iraq's 'response' to all attempted 'peace moves' (SWB, 18 January 1984), and criticised 
Iran's rejection of a ceasefire, which brought dangers into the region. 
Iran did not attend the fifth summit of OIC at Kuwait, in January 1987. The Iranian 
President Khamenei made Iran's attendance conditional on convening the summit at 'a 
venue other than Kuwait' (SWB, 10 January 1987) who financially supported Iraqi war 
efforts against Iran. Iran's formal request for either postponing the summit or changing 
its venue failed. Therefore, Tehran boycotted the OIC summit again. 
To sum up, because of the war with Iraq in the 1980s, and the Iranian regime's belief 
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that most of the Sunni member states would support Iraq in the issue of ceasefire, it 
boycotted all three OIC summits. Although the Iranian regime thought that by 
boycotting the summits, it morally punished other member states, in reality Iran lost its 
influence within the organisation to Saudi Arabia; Riyadh therefore became the most 
dominant and influential player in the OIC. 
6.2.2 1990s Iran returned to OIC as an active member 
After the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, because of economic difficulties, the Iranian 
regime recognised the need to re-enter the international arena as essential for regime 
survival, Iran needed to forge better relations with the Gulf states in general, and Saudi 
Arabia in particular. The opportunity came with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 
and the subsequent Second Gulf war. This made Riyadh reassess its foreign policy and 
adopt a more co-operative policy towards Iran. The relationship between both 
countries, therefore, began to improve. 
Iran participated in the OIC summit in 1991. At a meeting in Dakar, Saudi Foreign 
Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal conveyed through Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati an 
invitation to President Rafsanjani to visit Saudi Arabia, and they also discussed a 
proposed visit by King Fahd to Tehran (SWB, 10 December 1991). On the same day, 
Iranian President Rafsanjani had a meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah 
regarding Palestinian rights and the price of oil and the quota within OPEC (SWB, 11 
December 1991). 
On his way back to Tehran, from the OIC conference in Dakar in 1991, Rafsanjani 
visited Saudi Arabia and met King Fahd, which paved the way for more co-operation 
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between both countries. Soon after the meeting Riyadh agreed to increase Iran's Haii 
pilgrim quota to 120,000 people in 1992 (SWB, 17 December 1991). 
Despite the Hajj incident in May 1993, and the subsequent quota restriction that Saudi 
Arabia imposed on Iran, and which saw Saudi-Iranian relations fall to a very low point, 
these events did not deter either of them to participate in the 1994 OIC summit in 
Morocco. During the 1994 OIC summit, Iran was elected as the host for the 1997 OIC 
summit which boosted Iranian religious credibility within the Muslim world. 
All 56 members of the OIC attended the 1997 summit. One could argue that the high 
Arab turnout in the OIC summit in 1997 was a sign of Arab protest against the US-led 
'The Fourth Middle East and North Africa Economic Conference' held in Qatar just one 
month before, which was attended by Israeli delegates. The heads of the Muslim 
states meeting with the Israeli Prime Minister in the same conference would have been 
regarded as utter betrayal towards Palestinians. Although the US tried to persuade 
the Gulf state leaders to participate in the conference, it was boycotted by Saudi Arabia, 
a significant ally of the US (Economist, 13 Dec 1997). The refusal for attending the 
conference by the heads of several Arab states forced the Qatari government to 
downgrade the level of the participants to a ministerial level. Because of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, while peace negotiations remained deadlocked and Tel Aviv 
consistently fails to fulfil its obligations under the Oslo accords, the majority of the 
Arab states were against the participation of Israeli delegates in the regional economic 
conference. However, the American administration attempted to persuade the Arab 
states to attend the conference, but without any success. The economic conference 
stimulated an Islamic unity between Saudi Arabia and Iran which had a positive impact 
on the relations between both countries. Furthermore, the warming up of relations 
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between Iran and the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, helped Iran to build a bridge 
with its Arab neighbours. 
Just one day (8 December 1997) prior to the eighth OIC summit in Tehran, Saudi Crown 
Prince Abdullah, in an interview with the Japanese newspaper, Mainichi, stated that 'if 
his country was asked to mediate between Iran and the USA, it would do whatever 
would contribute to the region's stability' (SWB, 10 December 1997). This statement 
highlighted Saudi's good intention towards Iran. In response, Iranian supreme leader 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei emphasised that Iran wanted to build 'stronger ties with Saudi 
Arabia, and stressed the need for a firrn resolve by both sides to expand cooperation' 
(SWB, 11 December 1997). 
Iranian supreme leader, Khamenei, made the opening address, and he asserted that 
'Islamic Iran poses no threat to any Islamic country' (Economist, 13 December 1997). 
This served as an attempt to reassure Iran's Gulf neighbours that Iran was no longer 
intent on exporting its revolution. His main theme was that Muslims had to unite 
against the West, and Israel (Economist, 13 December 1997). On the same day, 
Iranian President Khatami and Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah discussed a 'new phase' in 
their relations, and 'the need for adopting policies that would bring about concord 
between Tehran and Riyadh' (SWB, 11 December 1997). Saudi Crown Prince 
Abdullah stressed 'the need to expand relations and cooperation between the two 
Muslim and sisterly countries', emphasising that there are favourable grounds 'for 
starting a new phase in the relations between the two countries' looking to 'the future, 
not the past' (SWB, 11 December 1997). 
In conclusion, in contrast with the Muslim League which served as a spokesman of 
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Saudi Arabia, the OIC functioned as a battleground for both Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
The Muslim World League is a Sunna dominated organisation which promotes the 
formation of a uniformed Islamic interests based on the Qur'an and Sunna, which 
largely excluded Iran's involvement in the League. On the other hand, OIC was used 
by Saudi Arabia and Iran to enhance their position and mobilise support in the Muslim 
world. 
During the Iraq-Iran war, Saudi Arabia tried to use the OIC summits to court Iran into a 
peace agreement with Iraq; however, Iran refused to give in and accused the majority of 
OIC states of being biased towards Iraq. Tehran boycotted the three OIC summits and 
ended up being alienated from the organisation. Finally, with the end of the war, Iran 
sought to rejoin the OIC fold and was welcomed by other members that recognised the 
significance of Iran as a Muslim power and a regional player. 
In particular, Riyadh used the 1997 OIC summit to show its goodwill towards Tehran by 
offering the mediation between Iran and the US which resulted in the rapid warm up 
relations between both countries. For Iran, the summit marked the start of what its 
leaders hoped to be a new phase in Iranian foreign policy. Iran's President, 
Muhammad Khatami, was appointed chairman of the OIC; and thus was 'at the helm of 
the world's biggest Muslim body' (Economist, 13 Dec 1997). 
7.0 Conclusion 
Esposito argues that Islam has been an effective force in 'providing or reinforcing 
national identity and political legitimacy'. It has been manipulated by government and 
opposition movements throughout the Muslim world, in political discourse to serve as a 
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'source of mass mobilisation'. However, the use of religion as a legitimising force is a 
double-edged sword. Although it can provide the government and or opposition 
movements with needed legitimacy, 'it can also be used as a yardstick for judgment by 
opposition forces and de-legitimisation' (Esposito, 1997: 70). 
This has been highlighted in this chapter, which showed how both Iran and Saudi Arabia 
have manipulated religion to gain legitimacy. Islam was founded in the seventh 
century in the Arabian Peninsula as the legitimate religion, and the division between 
Sunnis and ShPites also derived from that time onwards. However, prior to the 
twentieth century, the religious factor has never been an issue that caused many frictions 
between Persia and Saudi Arabia. This could be attributed to the fact that in Persia 
religion was treated as a grassroots issue and never played an important role in the 
Persian internal or external policy-making until the Iranian Revolution in 1979. 
The Iranian Islamic revolution had fundamental change its policy orientation towards 
Saudi Arabia, and at the same time transferred the peaceful coexistence with Saudi 
Arabia into competition and confrontation. This chapter first discussed how the 
division of how Sunni and Shi'ite plays a role in their relations and how the Iranian 
Revolution had such a fundamental change in their relations. Iran, since soon after the 
Iranian revolution, has promoted itself as the model of true Islamic state with its Shi'ite 
doctrine that emphasises the link between religion and politics. Therefore, the Iranian 
clerical regime wanted to export their vision of Islam into the Muslim world, especially 
the Arab Gulf states, which caused immediate panic reactions from the Arab Gulf 
regimes. When the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War began in 1980, many of the Gulf 
states still tried to effectively sit on the fence, but only the threats of Tehran's intension 
to export its revolution ideology shifted the wind and they began to back Iraq against 
168 
Chapter Four. The religious factor 
Iran. From that time religion has become the tool of the political game between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran. The confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran played in two 
fronts, one was the annual Hajj and the other was the competition within the Islamic 
organizations, and both fronts intertwined with each other. 
Tensions between Sunni and Shi'ite Islam have escalated since the Iranian Revolution 
much more than it had in several centuries (Fuller, 1999: 1). Prior to the Iranian 
Revolution, Saudi Arabia and Iran had never had any confrontation regarding religion. 
One could note that prior to the Iranian Revolution both countries regarded and utilised 
religion in different ways. For Saudi Arabia, religion has been the fundamental base 
for the Saudi regime in building up their prestige in the Muslim world. For Iran, prior 
to the revolution, religion had a social and domestic political dimension in terms of 
opposition politics. Although the Shah was involved in the establishment of Islamic 
organisations in the 1960s, this was motivated by his desire to dominate in all regional 
affairs. He had no true intension of allowing religion to play an important part in 
Iranian politics. However, the Iranian Revolution changed this balance. 
The ideological struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran soon turned into a political 
confrontation, as the Iranian regime attempted to export its revolution to Saudi Arabia. 
Khomeini called upon Saudi ShVites to turn their mosques into prayer, cultural and 
military bases, and encouraged Iranian pilgrims to hold demonstrations and shout 
anti-American, anti-Israeli and anti-Saudi slogans during the annual Hajj. The Hajj 
became the forum for annual confrontation. 
The Hajj became the focus point for both countries, and confrontations became 
inevitable between both countries. The worst event came in 1987 when the Saudi 
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forces crushed the demonstrators in Mecca resulting in more than 400 deaths, and both 
countries exchanged harsh words and Khomeini even proclaimed that Saudi Arabia as 
the biggest enemy of Iran. In result, Riyadh terminated its diplomatic relations with 
Iran in 1988, which was the lowest point in Saudi-Iranian relations in the twentieth 
century. 
Soon after that, Riyadh began to use the OIC to stop the Iranian pilgrim inflow into 
Saudi Arabia. In 1988, during the foreign minister conference of the OIC, Saudi 
Arabia announced that it would limit each country's quota to send pilgrims to Mecca. 
This greatly reduced Iranian quota. Failing to negotiate with Riyadh for its quota, Iran 
refused to send pilgrims to Saudi Arabia for three years. The Hajj became the political 
arena for both countries. Only after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991, did 
Saudi-Iranian relations begin to show signs of improvement. 
From this chapter one could notice that both countries used religion as a tool to fulfill 
their political needs in the competition to be a leader in the Muslim world. At the 
same time, religion played a divisive factor in shaping Saudi-Iranian relations, through 
international Islamic organisations. Religion had been used as a tool in defining the 
legitimacy of both regimes which led to competition within the region between the two 
states but also impelled them to co-operate on some issues and in some organizations. 
Both Saudi Arabia and Iran used religious organisations, namely, the Muslim World 
League and the OIC, to transfer their political stance. Saudi Arabia used the OIC 
summits in the 1980s to court Iran into the negotiation of a ceasefire with Iraq, when 
Tehran refused all the summits which made Iran appear as the guilty party for failing to 
agree to a ceasefire during the Iran-Iraq War. This, in turn, reduced Iranian religious 
credibility among the Muslim world. The 1987 Hajj incident in Mecca, in particular, 
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made Iran isolated in the world and alienated it from the rest of the Islamic society. At 
the same time, Saudi Arabia and Iran used the 1997 OIC conference to forge 
cooperation between either other. 
Religious issues also shaped the role of external superpower forces towards both 
countries. Revolutionary Iran rejected the overtures of communist USSR because of 
religious ideology, which made Iran lose Soviet support during their confrontation with 
Saudi Arabia. At the same time Iran was alienated from the US because of the hostage 
crisis and this situation pushed the US to support secular Iraq against religious Iran. 
The US rejected its previous (secular) superpower ally during the Iran-Iraq War, and this 
also enhanced the American support towards Saudi Arabia in any front of confrontation 
with Iran. 
Since the Iranian Revolution, ideology/religion temporarily superceded regime survival 
as a contributor to Iranian policy towards Saudi Arabia. Also, the Iran-Iraq War 
complicated the whole religious issue between both countries, but was only to fall back 
to political over economic considerations under Rafsanjani. 
Acting according to the rational principles of neo-realism, both countries put their 
security concerns and national interests first. Due to practical reasons, Iran was forced 
to move away from considerations of religion and revolution and towards the demands 
of the state, internal reform, and international normalisation as dictated by its national 
and security interests. In other words, Iran was forced to ignore the needs of the 
persecuted ShPites in Arab countries with whom Iran has managed to build good 
bilateral relations. Nevertheless, Iran might still use the Arab ShVile card strategically 
to its own advantage if it can do so (Fuller, 1999: 85). 
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Neither will Riyadh jeopardise its own regime survival to give in to the Saudi ShVite 
demands, but it will still try to keep the difficult balance by improving its relations with 
Iran. This is because it cannot totally ignore Tehran's influence in the region 
especially in its Eastern Province, where the majority of the Saudi ShPite are located. 
Conforming to the neo-realist theory, regime survival is the outmost important factor in 
foreign policy formulation. This could be easily detected in examining Saudi-Iranian 
relations by looking at how Hajj and competition within Islamic organisations did not 
play a significant role before the 1980s, as both countries wished to keep friendly 
relations. Therefore, even when conflict of interests emerged from time to time, both 
Saudi Arabia and Iran still refrained from allowing these factors to affect their relations. 
One could argue that in the future, the religious factor will still play an important role in 
shaping the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran but only when both countries need 
to utilise religion as a pawn in the political game; otherwise both states will subside 
their differences regarding the religious factor. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE IRAQ FACTOR 
1.0 Introduction 
This chapter analyses Iraq as a factor in Iran-Saudi Arabia relations, through two of the 
most important events in the Middle East and the world - the Iran-Iraq War and the 
90/91 Kuwait crisis. Seeing the trend of the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran 
from the imbalance of the 1980s, which was in favour of Saudi Arabia, this, led towards 
a more equilibrium situation which developed soon after the Kuwaiti crisis in the 1990s. 
Iran was in a stronger position militarily and politically before the Iran-Iraq War than it 
was at the end. Saudi Arabia became more stable and stronger both politically and 
economically in the 1990s. One could argue that during the 1980s Riyadh was 
concerned about possible Iranian efforts to destabilise the Saudi monarchy and export 
the idea of Islamic Revolution into the Gulf Arab states. Riyadh therefore decided to 
support Iraq's war efforts by offering both financial and logistical means. However, 
this move only intensified the frictions between Saudi Arabia and Iran and thus the 
potential threat, proving counter-productive. That is to say, Saudi used oil as a weapon 
in order to hammer Iran's economic means so it restricted Iran's ability to continue its 
war with Iraq. Saudi Arabia allowed Iraqi fighter planes to land in its airports during 
their attacks on Iranian oil infrastructures. Ironically, during the 1990 Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait, Iraq was to become the factor which led to Riyadh and Tehran's 
rapprochement. 
Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia are the most influential and the most important players in 
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the Persian Gulf region, because of their considerable oil reserves (see table 5.1), size, 
and population (see table 5.2). However, Saudi Arabia's role has been overshadowed 
by its two major rivals in the Gulf region. 
Table 5.1 Proven Crude Oil Reserves, 1977-1997 
(Million Barrels) 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
I. R. Iran 62,000 60,088 58,833 58,296 57,020 56,148 55,257 
Iraq 34,500 32,100 31,000 30,000 32,000 59,000 65,000 
Saudi Arabia 164,070 168,940 166,480 168,030 167,850 165,484 168,848 
Total OPEC 447,876 443,134 435,556 434,614 438,312 467,371 475,295 
. 
Total World 636,164 
. 
626,764 
. 
635,594 
. 
656,187 670,017 697,931 706,779 
JOPEC percentage 70.4 1 70.7 1 68.5 1 66.2 
[ 65.4 1 67.0 1 67. 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
I. R. Iran 58,874 59,000 92,860 92,860 92,860 92,860 92,850 
Iraq 65,000 65,000 72,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 
Saudi Arabia 171,710 171,490 169,744 169,585 254,989 260,050 260,342 
Total OPEC 509,998 535,798 643,016 674,020 760,484 764,830 766,014 
Total World 742,082 767,898 870,062 899,346 990,801 997,613 998,210 
[OPEC percentage 1 68.7 1 69.8 1 73.9 1 74.9 76.8 1 76.7 1 76.77] 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
I. R. Iran 92,860 92,860 92,860 94,300 93,700 92,600 92,600 
Iraq 100,000 ; 100,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 112,000 ý 
112,500 
Saudi Arabia 260,936 261,203 261203 261,374 261,450 261,444 261,541 
Total OPEC 772,402 773,770 774,351 777,400 785211 801,998 804,922 
Total World 1,003,752 1,010,318 1,010,227 1,019,001 1,028,144 1,042,895 1,057,078 
OPEC 
percentage 
77.0 76.6 76.7 76.3 76.4 76.9 76.1 
Sources: OPEC Annual Statistical Yearbook, 1997, pp. 10- 11. 
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Table 5.2 Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia Estimated Mid-Year Population, 1973-1996 
(Thousands of Inhabitants) 
1973 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
I. R. Iran 31,645 34,690 36,110 37,200 39,300 40,850 42,313 
Iraq N/A 12,000 12,405 12,821 13,238 13,669 14,110 
Saudi Arabia 8,000 1 8,060 1 8,490 1 8,930 1 9,370_ 1 9,810 10,250_ 
Total OPEC N/A 1295,896 1303,894 311,787 ý 321,414 1330,476 1339,656 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
I. R. Iran 43,979 45,721 47,541 49,445 50,648 51,888 53,164 
Iraq 14,586 15,077 15,585 16,110 16,659 16,880 17,430 
Saudi Arabia 11,170 11,980 12,649 13,266 13,912 14,591 15,302 
ITotal OPEC 1349,707 1359,912 1369,942 1 380,37 ý390,383 1400,339 1410,466 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
I. R. Iran 54,484 55,837 57,231 58,668 60,148 60,557 61,130 
Iraq 
_18,080 . 
18,510 
. 
18,900 19,260 19,650 20,090 20,610 
Saudi Arabia 16,048 16,399 16,757 17,123 1 17,760 18,250 18,840 
Total OPEC 418,000 426,574 436,581 446,471 1456,698 465,257 475,140 
Sources: OPEC Annual Statistical Yearbook, 1973, p. 2. and OPEC Annual Statistical Yearbook, 1997, p-2. 
The Saudis have striven to be the leaders on the Arab side of the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula; this was partly achieved in the aftermath of their involvement in the 1962 
civil war in Yemen and its negotiated conclusion in 1968. This however, adversely 
affected Saudi's relations with the other Gulf states. Saudi Arabia manipulated its 
huge oil reserves in the 1970s to dominate regional politics. Nevertheless, it did not 
manage to become a major regional force like Iran, Iraq, Syria and Egypt (Amirahmadi, 
1993: 148-149). In spite of its economic power, Riyadh's vulnerability has persisted. 
This was manifest during the Iran-Iraq war when, in 1986, it had to ask for US 
assistance following Iran's invasion of the Fao Peninsula in Iraq; it feared that Iran 
would threaten Saudi oilfields in the Eastern Province. Their insecurity was further 
exposed in 1990 when Saddam Hussein's forces invaded Kuwait. 
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By contrast, Iran's claim to leadership in the Persian Gulf was largely justified during 
the Shah's rule. The Shah was determined to make Iran 'the dominant force in the 
Gulf, a principal Third World power and, indeed, a great power' (McLaurin, 1982: 218). 
This claim was justified due to several politico-military factors: Iran was the largest 
country in the region, in terms of population (which is almost eight times that of Saudi 
Arabia); it was a relatively advanced state industrially; and had large armed forces (see 
table 5.3-5.5). Moreover, as Iran has the longest coastline along the Persian Gulf 
compared to any other Gulf state, it was able to play the dominant maritime role in the 
Gulf. Finally, Iran owns many islands in the Gulf, including the largest one in the Gulf, 
Qeshm, and controls the most strategic point in the Persian Gulf, namely, the Strait of 
Hormuz, which is also the Saudis' major oil exports outlet (Amirahmadi, 1993: 148). 
Table 5.3 Land/Air Force of Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia 
Country Total armed 
forces(after 
mobilization) 
Number of 
tanker in 
service 
Total of 
strike 
aircraft 
Total of 
interceptor 
aircraft 
Defence 
budgets ($ 
million) 
Iran 180,000 400 - 75 197 
Iraq 82,000 320 12 75 142 
. 
S_audi Arabia 55,000 - 16 
12 106 
Source: Arms in the Persian Gulf, 1974, p. 23. 
Table 5.4 Combat Aircraft Inventories in the Persian Gulf 
Country 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70 1970-71 1971-72 1972-73 1973-74 
Iran 166 202 188 158 151 160 159 
Iraq 170 213 213 229 220 189 224 
Saudi Arabia 20 39 43 75 55 71 70 
Source: Arms in the Persian Gulf, 1974, pp. 4-5. 
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Table 5.5 Naval Vessels in the Persian Gulf 
Country 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70 1970-711 1971-72 1972-73 1973-74 
Iran 37 39 39 45 30 51 41 
Iraq - - - 25 25 19 
30 
Saudi Arabia 7 31 20 
Source: Arms in the Persian Gulf, 1974, pp-16-17. 
In the 1970s, President Nixon's 'Twin Pillar' policy enhanced Iran's role as a regional 
leader as the US encouraged it to act together with Saudi Arabia as the policemen in the 
region. Accordingly, they were both supplied with arms by the US as well as other 
Western countries. In particular, Iran used its newfound oil wealth, at the time, to 
acquire considerable advanced weaponry; and hence, it asserted itself as the guardian of 
the Persian Gulf. 
Iran's growing military strength (see table 2.4 and 5.6), and the Shah's ambitions, in 
addition to its declining oil-production capacity formed a threat to the Saudis. They 
perceived that Iran was 'covetous' towards Arab oil fields in the region (McLaurin, 
1982: 218). However, they did not challenge Iran's dominant position in the Gulf 
region. 
Thus, the Iranian-Saudi tension was a reflection of the two countries' rivalry over 
leadership of the Persian Gulf and its security (Amirahmadi, 1993: 148). However, the 
balance changed soon after the Iranian Revolution in 1979. 
2.0 The effects of the 1979 Iranian Revolution 
The 1979 Iranian Revolution was a milestone in the relationship between Iran and Saudi 
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Arabia. This event changed the balance of power in the region by weakening Iran's 
position in the Gulf. As a consequence, Saudi Arabia became a very important partner 
for the West and the US. Accordingly, relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran 
changed completely. The perceived Iranian threat became paramount as a result of the 
overthrow of the Shah. Several reasons contributed to this outcome, although during 
the Shah's period of reign Iran, in the military scene, dominated in the regional affairs. 
However, because Iran cooperated with the West, especially the US, this guaranteed that 
Iran would not threaten the Gulf regimes, but soon after the Iranian Revolution, the new 
Iranian clerical regime wished to export it ideology into the Gulf region and at the same 
time, the relationship between Iran and the US deteriorated soon after the American 
hostage saga which changed the whole concept of security in the region. 
Table 5.6 Military Statistical Summary of Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia in 1979-80 
Country Population Total Percentage Defence Gross Defence 
(1000) armed of armed budget National budget as 
forces forces to (billion $) Product % of GNP 
population (billion $) 
Iran 39,330 415,000 1.05 9.94 75.1 13.2 
Iraq 12,730 222,000 1.74 2.02 15.5 13.0 
Saudi Arabia 7,984 44,500 0.55 14.18 64.2 22.1 
Source: The Military Balance, 1979, pp. 39,40,44. 
First, the fall of the Shah was followed by the social upheaval and the chaotic situation 
within the military scene in Iran. As much as the Saudis feared the Shah, they feared 
the unknown even more. Anarchy was seen as inviting dismemberment and worse, 
some form of eventual Soviet presence across the Gulf. 
Secondly, the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran had made little secret of their 
178 
Chapter Five: The Iraq factor 
determination to export their revolution throughout the Islamic world. As Khomeini's 
speech on the first anniversary of the Islamic Revolution highlights this vision. Soon 
after the Iranian Revolution, the clerical regime attempted to export its ideology were 
manifest in clergies' visits, and the establishment of clandestine Ithna 'Ashara cells in 
several Gulf countries (Savory, 1990: 18). They specifically included Saudi Arabia as a 
prominent target of this objective. 
Third, the revolution awakened the consciousness and restlessness of ShVite 
communities in the Gulf, including the Saudi ShVite population (McLaurin, 1982: 
218-19). This potential problem was not one that Saudi leaders were anxious to 
address, particularly given the Saudi ShVites are under the discrimination of the Riyadh 
regime. 
Fourth, the Iranian clerical regime by its aggressive propaganda against the conservative 
regimes, called the Saudi regime un-Islamic, thus jeopardised the Saudi's legitimacy 
(Fuller, 1999: 90), caused the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran to deteriorate. 
Fifth, at the same time, the clergy encouraged the Shi'ite communities in Saudi Arabia 
to follow the Iranian example and to overthrow the Saudi governments (Fuller, 1999: 90), 
resulting in the August 1979 Saudi ShPites revolt in the Eastern Province of Saudi 
Arabia. 
Sixth, during the Iranians' uprising against the Shah, the indecision and inaction of the 
US seriously diminished the significance of the many commitments the US had made to 
Saudi Arabia over the years. Thus, Saudi leaders felt more vulnerable, and less 
protected, than ever before. 
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Seventh, the collapse of the Shah which created the power vacuum in the region caused 
a huge security problem because neither Iraq nor Saudi Arabia were strong enough to 
replace Iran as the guarantor of Gulf stability. Riyadh feared the Soviet's prot6gee in 
Oman and Yemen would utilise this instability to gain some footing in the region. 
The Iranian Revolution weakened Iranian military power because the clerical regime 
began to prosecute military leaders and to execute the pro-Shah generals and ministers. 
In the 1970s, when the Shah was in the dominant position in the region, he made an 
enemy of Saddam Hussein by supporting the suppressed Iraqi Kurds. From the 
beginning of Saddarn Hussein's regime, the Kurds rebelled against him. The Shah 
used this opportunity to support the Iraqi Kurds, and by doing this forced Saddam 
Hussein to sign the Algiers Agreement which favoured Iran in the long-term border 
dispute with Iraq. Saddam Hussein had long been looking for the chance to regain the 
territory. Therefore, soon after the Iranian revolution, Iraq took advantage of the 
chaotic situation in Iran and initiated the eight-year war with Iran in September 1980. 
3.0 The Iran-Iraq War 
3.1 The roots of conflict 
The Iran-Iraq War, which broke out on 22 September 1980, and lasted for eight years, 
was far from the first Iran-Iraq confrontation: for centuries there have been periods of 
conflict between Iran (Persia) and Iraq (Babylon, Mesopotamia). As previous 
confrontations between the two countries, this one too attracted outside powers that had 
interests in the outcome. In this war, powers such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the 
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United States, supported Saddam Hussein (Simons, 1998: 255-256). 
When Iraq declared its nominal independence from Britain in 1921, tensions started 
with Iran as the latter demanded that the new border be drawn along the thalweg (the 
line following the midpoint of the main navigations channel of a river), of the Shatt 
al-Arab; Iraq refused. The new Iraqi government of Hekmat Suleiman, however, 
agreed to adjust the border along the thalweg in the Frontier Treaty that was signed by 
the two countries on 4 July 1937. This issue was settled only temporarily and 
re-emerged in 1958 after the revolution in Iraq. Since then, it has been a bone of 
contention in the relations between the two neighbours and eventually, the Treaty was 
abrogated by Iran in 1969. Tensions arouse as Iran supported the Iraqi Kurdish 
separatist activities within Iraq. With Iran's occupation of the Persian Gulf islands of 
Abu Musa, and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs in 197 1, relations deteriorated further, and 
consequently, Iraq severed ý diplomatic relations with Iran. Border confrontations 
continued during the period from 1971-1974. Finally, Saddam Hussein wished the 
Shah ceased his support towards the Iraqi Kurds. In the end Saddam Hussein gave in to 
the Shah's demand and a border settlement was reached with the signing of the Algiers 
Agreement of 6 March 1975 (Gardner, 1988: viii), which favoured Iran. 
This agreement solved the dispute but to the disadvantage of Iraq. Iraq being allowed 
to use only half of the Shatt al-Arab, (Iraq's only navigable river to the Persian Gulf), 
was denied direct access to the Gulf. Furthermore it made Iraqi vessels vulnerable as 
Iran could easily control or disrupt Iraqi navigation. Although Iraq was forced to 
accept the humiliating 1975 Algiers Accord, it always looked for a way to renegotiate 
the Treaty, to gain full control of the Shatt al-Arab and to establish itself as an unrivalled 
power in the Gulf (MEI, 12 June 1987: 17). 
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Relations between Iran and Iraq were damaged further as a result of Saddam Hussein's 
attacks on the Iranian revolution. Although Baghdad recognised Iran's new regime 
soon after the revolution, by mid-June 1979 Iraq had begun its hostile propaganda 
against Iran, and the Iranian media retaliated by calling on the Iraqi people to 'topple the 
regime of tyrants'. Furthermore, Khomeini himself had been expelled from Iraq in 
October 1978 and even in the heights of the Iranian demonstrations against the Shah, 
Saddam. Hussein still gave royal hospitality to Empress Farah Pahlavi in November 
1978 (Menashri, 1990: 101-102). One could understand, therefore that Khomeini did 
not form cordial relations with the Iraqi regime. 
Saddarn Hussein saw the Iranian revolution, and consequently the rearrangement of the 
power in the Gulf region, as his opportunity to claim leadership of the Arab world and 
challenge other regional leaders, mainly, Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Hence, he 
challenged Iran on account of Iran's occupation of three Gulf islands belonging to the 
UAE, its involvement in Bahrain (see Chapter Six for further discussion), and the 
border dispute of the Shatt al-Arab. 
3.2 The beginning of the war 
The military clash between Iraqi and Iranian troops started on 2 September 1980 near 
Qasr el-Shirin; then Iranian artillery shelled the Iraqi towns of Khanaqin and Mandali. 
Saddarn Hussein's declaration of full control of the Shatt al-Arab, in a televised speech 
to the National Assembly (17 September), led to the breakout of heavy fighting along 
the waterway (Simons, 1998: 257). The Iraqi invasion of Iran on 22 September 1980 
and the subsequent eight-year war between the two countries, became a turning point in 
182 
Chapter Five: The Iraq factor 
the relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The tensions between them since the 
Iranian Revolution had revolved mostly around religious claims and counter-claims. 
The outbreak of war brought direct strategic and political challenges to the relationship, 
which now revolved around the two issues of oil and regional security. 
According to Hiro, Iraq had signed secret agreements with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait ten 
days before invading Iran, whereby Saudi Arabia agreed to increase its oil outputs by 
1,000,000 b/d, and to devote the revenues to Iraq's war effort against Iran (Hiro, 
1985: 337). 
In support of Hiro's arguments, Simons claims that Saddam Hussein believed that he 
could rely on financial backing from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and that Washington 
would welcome the military campaign against the Iranian regime, which described the 
US as 'the Great Satan'. Saddam Hussein thought that the war would be brief and the 
outcome would be to his advantage; thus, he would achieve his aim to become "the 
leader of the Arab world, the liberator of Arabs in Iranian territories and the friend also 
of the Iranian Kurds struggling for recognition" (Simons, 1998: 257). 
According to Hiro, Saudi Arabia supported Iraq's intention to invade Iran because of the 
following reasons: 
Saudi Arabia feared the spread of the Iranian revolution throughout the Gulf. This 
constituted a major threat to Saudi oil wells and refineries, which are mainly located 
in the Eastern province, where Saudi's Shi'ites - who have always resented being 
treated like second-class citizens - are the main work force. Hence, riots in this 
region would endanger the Saudi regime's own survival. 
2. Saudis Arabia was antagonistic towards the Iranian policy in the Gulf region due to 
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the competition between the two countries over the influence of regional politics 
and the oil prices. 
3. As the war would probably weaken both Iranian and Iraqi economic and military 
power, this would act to reduce Saudi security concerns (Hiro, 1985: 337). 
However, Saudi Arabia was nonetheless caught in a dilemma regarding the Iran-Iraq 
War. As Haeri argues, Riyadh and its Gulf Arab allies, like the superpowers, Western 
Europe and Israel, did not want either party in the conflict to attain a final victory, as 
they feared the Iraqis 'as much as they hated the Iranians' (MEI, 31 May 1985: 9). 
Thus, they wished the struggle to continue depleting the resources of both countries. 
One could argue that the Iran-Iraq War came at the right moment for Saudi Arabia. 
This is because although Saudi Arabia had invested heavily in defence since the late 
1960s, its armed forces continued to be weak and were 'incapable of protecting the 
Kingdom against Iranian or Iraqi aggression'. Moreover, even after the fall of the 
Shah, Riyadh was still sceptical of US commitment towards Saudi Arabia (Abir, 
1994: 126). On the other hand, Saudi Arabia feared the spread of the war into its own 
territory; which might lead to an uncontrollable situation. 
The war allowed the Saudi regime to improve its image both domestically and 
regionally in the Arab world. First, domestically, it enabled King Fahd to consolidate 
his power within the royal family due to the infighting among the Saudi princes, and to 
deal with the kingdom's most pressing problems - the external threat, and the war. At 
the regional level, it improved Saudi's image, which had been badly tarnished between 
1962 and 1968 by Saudi Arabia's involvement in the Yemeni civil war. King Fahd 
tried to develop an Arab consensus on the Iran-Iraq War by trying to bridge the 
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differences between Iraq and Syria and by rebuilding the power of the moderate Arab 
camp after Egypt's return to the Arab fold (Abir, 1994: 126-7). The Iran-Iraq War 
resulted in the erosion of the power of the radical Arab camp, forced Baghdad to court 
the conservative Arab countries and, eventually, to seek to improve its relations with 
Washington (Abir, 1994: 126). Furthen-nore, the war helped to gradually decrease the 
Soviet, Iranian and Iraqi threat to Saudi Arabia. For the Soviets, the Iran-Iraq War 
transferred its focus on regional affairs moving away from supporting the rebellious acts 
in Oman and Yemen and focusing on Iraq and Iran. The war diminished Iran and 
Iraq's military threats towards Saudi Arabia. 
When the war broke out between Iran and Iraq, Riyadh was caught in a dilemma. 
Although Riyadh had signed a secret agreement with Baghdad prior to the war, Riyadh 
did not wish to get involved into the war and was concerned that the frontline would 
spread into its own territory, which could explain Riyadh's attitude to hide its supports 
towards Iraq. At beginning of the war, Riyadh's main concern was Iran's military 
power, as well as Iraq's retaliation if Saudi Arabia did not help its war effort. Saudi 
Arabia was therefore trying to appease both Iran and Iraq, though they were secretly 
'happy to embrace Saddam Hussein as a defender of Arab interests in the Gulf' 
(Simons, 1998: 257). Instead, Saudi maintained adherence to the principle of Islamic 
solidarity. At that time, the Saudi foreign minister, HH Saud Al-Faisal, affirmed his 
government's neutral stance (Korany, 1993: 243). But beneath the surface, Saudi 
Arabia gave Iraq financial and logistical help. 
Saudi Arabia was keen not to show Iran that it was helping Iraq, as well as not to get 
involved in the war itself. For example, when during the early days of the war, Iraq 
wanted to bomb the islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs from the UAE or Oman, 
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Saudi Arabia exerted pressure on Iraq to drop the idea as this would have caused the 
conflict to spread to the rest of the region (Hiro, 1985: 336-337). At the same time, due 
to the American hostage crisis in Tehran from November 1979, the US requested Saudi 
Arabia not to react to the Iranian clergy's provocation in the early stages of the Iran-Iraq 
war, in order to prevent confrontation between the two countries. 
At the same time, King Fahd was cautious to avoid publicly promoting US' interests 
because of the strong anti-American sentiments in the Kingdom and the Arab world in 
general. Thus, 'immediately after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, he approached 
President Carter for help but indicated his apprehension lest Arab nationalists interpret 
such aid as an invitation to establish a US military presence in the Kingdom or in the 
Gulf. This was a significant departure from the Saudi traditional publicly-stated 
opposition to any American presence in the Gulf, based on apprehension about the 
reaction of Arab nationalists and its own conservatives and new elites' (Abir, 1994: 127). 
3.3 The war began to affect Saudi-Iranian relations in 1981 
Iranian-Saudi relations became strained particularly during 1981. This could partly be 
attributed to Khomeini's declared scom for the Saudi regime and his depiction of the 
Saudi government as 'un-Islamic' (Menashri, 1990: 252) and corrupt. He accused 
Saudi Arabia of being 'Washington's watchdog in the Gulf' and having turned into 'the 
devoted pig of the US' (Menashri, 1990: 252). 
Moreover, pro-Iranian demonstrations in Mecca and Medina, Islam's holy cities, during 
the Hajj season in 1981 antagonised the Saudi regime and population. As a result, 
Saudi Arabia offered more financial support to Iraq (Menashri, 1990: 209). Tehran, 
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which perceived this support as 'a direct threat' did not attend the summit of the OIC in 
Ta'if in January 1981. It regarded the Ta'if Conference as an effort by the Saudis to 
lead a Saudi-Sunni Arab front against the Iranian Revolution (refer to Chapter Four for 
in-depth discussion). This was compounded by closer US-Saudi relations under the 
Reagan administration in particular, Iran, for its part, feared the rise of Saudi as a major 
regional power (Menashri, 1990: 209). 
Iranian-Saudi relations further deteriorated as a result of the establishment the Gulf 
Co-operation Council (GCC) in May 1981, which included Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman. The GCC proclaimed itself as an economic and 
cultural co-operation organisation; although Riyadh attempted to make it a regional 
defence organisation to co-ordinate the internal security activities of its member states 
(Abir, 1994: 127). Tehran saw this as a direct challenge to its hegemony in the Gulf 
region, especially as Iran was the first state in the region to advocate regional 
cooperation in 1975 and 1976 respectively, and both times was turned down by Riyadh. 
As Iraq's position in the war deteriorated at the end of 198 1, they portrayed the war as a 
new 'Persian invasion of the Arab world' (Abir, 1994: 128), and accordingly, cried out 
for help from its Arab sister states. The GCC states, which were also concerned about 
Tehran's 'subversive activities among their ShVite subjects, responded by expanding 
financial and logistical assistance to Iraq (Abir, 1994: 128-130). Thus, by the end of 
1981, Riyadh, which became Iraq's primary financer, had already provided around $10 
billion worth of financial support to Saddam, while Kuwait contributed another $5 
billion. In total, Saudi and Kuwaiti support for Iraq during the war is estimated to 
have reached nearly $50 billion (Simons, 1998: 257-258; Amirahmadi, 1993: 103). 
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Meanwhile, the Saudi regime tried to use Islamic or Third World countries mediation 
with Iran, or United Nations intervention in an effort to end the war. These efforts 
were mainly motivated by the fear of an Iranian victory over Iraq and the costs the 
Saudis incurred during the war. At the same time, the Saudis realised that they were 
constrained by 'new economic and political dynamics', and military weakness. 
Furthermore, the Saudi economy, those of other GCC states, and ultimately the stability 
of the regime, depended mainly on oil revenues (Abir, 1994: 128-129), and the security 
of the oil industry. The war affected the oil price in the world market (see table 3.5 in 
Chapter Three) which in turn affected the Saudis' long-term oil strategy. 
3.4 The first attempt of ceasefire 
By July 1982, Iran had gained the upper hand in the war and succeeded n recovering all 
the territories it had lost to Iraq. Saudi Arabia was concerned about an Iranian advance 
into Iraqi territory, particularly as Iran threatened to block the Strait of Hormuz. The 
Saudis and Kuwaitis feared an Iranian victory and its 'adverse' implications on the 
stability of their regimes (Hiro, 1987: 339; Amirahmadi, 1993: 145). Therefore, Riyadh 
renewed its mediation attempts to put an end to the war. At an Arab summit in Morocco 
in September 1982, King Fahd presented a settlement proposal comprising Iraq's 
complete withdrawal from Iranian territory, and financial compensation for Iran 
provided by Gulf Arab states, and finally allowing the full co-operation of Iran in 
regional affairs. However, while the plan favoured Iran and was accepted by Iraq, 
Tehran turned it down because of its belief in its military superiority, and increasing oil 
revenues. It was determined to attain total victory and the overthrow of Saddam 
Hussein, whom it perceived as the 'aggressor' (Amirahmadi, 1993: 145). 
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When conciliatory efforts failed, Saudi Arabia tried a 'tougher' approach with Iran. 
Thus, in early October 1982, 'Riyadh warned Tehran that it would face a 'no holds 
barred' war with all Arab states if it continued to refuse mediation' (Hiro, 1987: 339), 
but Tehran refused to end the war until it had achieved its aforementioned objectives. 
Riyadh therefore continued to support Iraq; and in January 1983, it permitted Iraq to 
pump oil through a pipeline across Saudi territory. Furthermore, the Saudis, backed by 
Washington, agreed with France to supply five sophisticated Super-Etendard warplanes 
to Iraq in return for oil, which was to be paid by Saudi Arabia. However, the Kingdom 
was burdened by the war as a result of the falling oil prices and its reduced OPEC quota 
(Simons, 1998: 259). 
1983 saw increasing hostility between Iran and Saudi Arabia caused by Tehran's 
continuous propaganda attacks on the Gulf regimes. At the same time, Tehran also 
tried to smooth the situation by assuring them that Iran had no interest in expansionary 
interests in the Arab side of the Gulf (Menashri, 1990: 292). Furthermore, Khomeini 
promised the Gulf States that if they had good relations with Iran, the latter would help 
them 'to get rid of the superpowers' (Menashri, 1990: 252). And, later, Rafsanjani 
asserted that if the Gulf states did not intervene in the war, 'Iran would honour their 
territorial integrity and "defend their security... (Menashri, 1990: 252). 
However, these appeasing statements did not bring about the desired improvement in 
relations with the Gulf Arab states because Khomeini continued his 'harsh threats' 
against the Gulf rulers for their hostility towards Iran and support of Iraqi war efforts 
(Menashri, 1990: 252). Tehran's attacks against Riyadh centred around two main 
issues: the nature of the Saudi regime and its policies. Tehran accused Riyadh of 
turning itself into 'the servant of Imperialism', acting against Islam, suppressing its own 
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people, and promoting the interests of Zionism and Israel (Menashri, 1990: 293). In 
addition, Iran attacked Riyadh for its hostility towards Iran through its support of Iraq, 
its role in lowering oil prices in international markets, and its acceptance of an 
American military presence in the Gulf (Menashri, 1990: 293). Interestingly Riyadh 
did not respond to Tehran's provocation at this time for fear it might cause Tehran to 
attack Saudi Arabia. 
3.5 The second attempt at a ceasefire 
When the Iranian forces seized the Majnoon islands in Iraq in early spring 1984, Iraq 
again proposed a ceasefire with Iran which was refused by Tehran (Mostyn, 
1991: 210-211) because Khomeini wished to force Saddarn. Hussein to step down and at 
the same time punish the Gulf states, mainly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for supporting 
Iraqi war efforts. Thereupon, Iraq tried to reduce Iran's oil incomes by attacking 
Iranian oil tankers and the Iranian oil terminal on Kharg island in March 1984. Instead 
of being pressured to accept the ceasefire, Iran in turn attacked Iraqi oil fields and cities 
(Hiro, 1987: 342). At the same time, Tehran began to focus on Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait for their so-called unfriendly gesture towards Iran as Tehran believed that 
without their support, Iran could win this war. 
Iran's behaviour towards Saudi Arabia and Kuwait can be explained by three 
arguments. First, as Stauffer argues, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait became targets because 
of Iran's success in the first stage of the 'war of erosion', when Iraq was able to sustain 
the war only because of the support it received from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (MEI, 15 
June 1984: 14). Second, Tehran had already threatened that if its oil exports were 
harmed by the war, it would not allow any other Gulf state to ship crude oil through the 
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Strait of Hon-nuz. Third, Iran believed the Saudis and Kuwaitis had neither the will 
nor the military power to stand up to any escalation in the war- As such, before 
attacking Saudi and Kuwaiti tankers, Iran threatened to bomb Saudi ports, oil pipelines 
and installations and facilities. Saudi Arabia realised that its refineries, offshore wells, 
and its desalination plants in the Eastern Province were all close to the war zone, and 
hence they would be difficult to defend in case of an air strike. Therefore, Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait had until then tried to restrain Iraq from striking at the Iranian oil 
terminal on Kharg Island (MEI, 11 October 1985: 13). 
Not surprisingly, Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti shipping became the targets of Tehran's 
attacks (May and July 1984 and February 1985) (Mostyn, 1991: 211,214) because of 
their support for Iraq. Both countries allowed Iraq to use their territories and ports for 
shipping goods to Iraq, which had become effectively 'land-locked'. Saudi Arabia 
allowed Iraq to build an oil pipeline across its territory to pump oil to the Red Sea to 
maintain its oil exports (Simons, 1998: 258). 
In May 1984, Iraqi planes hit an Iranian tanker. Iran could not successfully retaliate 
directly against Iraq, instead Iran attacked a Kuwaiti ship carrying fuel oil between 
Kuwait and Bahrain, and subsequently damaged a Kuwaiti oil tanker and a Saudi tanker 
in Saudi territorial waters (Hiro, 1987: 342). 
In response, Kuwait lodged a complaint against Iran with the UN Security Council for 
attacking ships bound for Saudi and Kuwaiti ports, which lie outside the war zone 
(Hiro, 1987: 342-343). Saudi Arabia, however, feared fighting (MIEL 1 June 1984: 3), 
so it asked Syria to determine Iranian intentions regarding Saudi Arabia. Iran made it 
clear that it did not intend to fight Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, and it explained that its 
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offensive actions against both countries were a demonstration that 'any threat to Iranian 
shipping would equally threaten all other shipping in the Gulf' (Hiro, 1987: 342-343). 
Saudi Arabia was aware that it could not ask the US to protect its sea-lanes as this 
would provoke Iran and would invite internal dissent (Hiro, 1987: 343). Thus, Riyadh 
requested that the US maintain a strong presence 'over the horizon', meaning in the 
Arabian Sea and at their Diego Garcia base, in case of an emergency (Abir, 1994: 13 1). 
3.6 The first direct conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran 
The Saudi regime was afraid of the possibility of the war spreading into its own territory. 
Since Riyadh could not directly invite US forces to protect its territory, they requested 
the US to provide the most advantageous AWACs system, at that time perhaps the best 
surveillance system in the world, to prevent to a possible attack from Iranian air forces. 
Despite its reassurances, Iran continued to violate Kuwaiti and Saudi territorial waters 
and airspace (Abir, 1994: 130). On 5 June 1984, the Saudi air force shot down an 
Iranian F-4 Phantom, which the Saudis claimed was in their airspace (SWB, 6 June 
1984). Iran, on the other hand, alleged that the plane was in international airspace 
when it was shot at. Eventually Iran delivered 'a strongly worded memorandum to 
Riyadh protesting vigorously against the Saudi attack on aircraft'. According to Saudi 
Prince Khaled, at that time, the Saudi regime thought Iran may initiate an attack on 
Saudi soil (Khalcd, 1995: 144). Three days after the incident, however, President Ali 
Khamenei declared that they did not intend to fight Saudi Arabia or other Arab Gulf 
states if they refrained from intervening in the war (Simons, 1998: 260). Although, the 
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Iranian intention behind this incident was not very clear, both Saudi Arabia and Iran 
subsequently ignored it in order to avoid escalating the conflict and maintain a dialogue. 
Although, the Iranians and Saudis did not wish to engage in a conflict, such a conflict 
seemed inevitable, as Iraq maintained its attacks on shipping using the Iranian terminal 
at Kharg and the Iranians were onlY able to retaliate against Kuwaiti or Saudi vessels 
(MEI, 15 June 1984: 3; and MEI, 13 July 1984: 8). 
3.7 The third attempt at a ceasefire 
Although the war between Iran and Iraq had reached a stalemate by 1985, Saudi 
Arabia's foreign policy towards the war changed because of two factors: 
1. Saudi Arabia began to feel the financial burden of the war. Until 1985, Saudi 
Arabia had supported Iraqi military operations through loans. In 1985, Saudi's 
national debt had reached a peak of $20,000 million (Mostyn, 1991: 217). 
2. Saudi Arabia feared the extension of the war into its own territory. 
Therefore, in 1985, Riyadh again increased its diplomatic efforts to reconcile with Iran 
and bring the war to an end. Thus, on 18 May 1985, King Fahd sent the Saudi Foreign 
Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, to Iran to propose a cease-fire during the forthcoming 
month of Ramadan. This was a remarkable visit as it was the first one made by a 
senior Saudi minister since 1979. Therefore, it was regarded as being 'a very 
significant breakthrough for the political climate of the Gulf region' (Menashri, 
1990: 367). 
While this visit was considered by Riyadh as a first step towards a negotiated cease-fire 
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agreement, Tehran saw it 'as a first step towards isolating Iraq from its Arab allies' 
(Menashri, 1990: 367), and also as a diplomatic victory over Saudi Arabia and other 
Arab Gulf states. Therefore, both countries had a different interpretation of this visit. 
The Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Velayati, reciprocated the Saudi official visit on 
7 December 1985. This was the first such visit to Saudi Arabia since Khomeini had 
come to power. However, these visits failed to build any understanding between 
Riyadh and Tehran due to a huge gap between the views held by the two countries (MEI, 
20 December 1985: 6). Given the discrepancy between the views of the countries, the 
Saudi initiative failed to achieve its objectives. 
3.8 The Iran-Contra event 
Between 1985 and 1986, Saudi Arabia continued its attempts to improve its relations 
with Tehran while co-ordinating its activities with Washington to free the American 
hostages through a limited supply of arms to Iran, which led to its involvement in the 
Iran-Contra fiasco. Relations between the two countries improved slightly with Saudi 
facilitating the flying of American weapons to Iran and selling Iran badly needed 
refined oil products. King Fahd was personally involved in the so-called 'weapons for 
hostages' saga at the request of the American administrations. Tehran showed its 
goodwill by replacing its pilgrimage director, who had enraged the Saudis, and 
intervening with the Lebanese Hizbullah to free a Saudi diplomat abducted in Beirut 
(Abir, 1994: 131). However, the revelations of the so-called 'Iran-Contra' secret in 
1986 set back the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran (a more detailed 
discussion of whole 'Iran-Contra' Affair appears in Chapter Seven). 
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3.9 The invasion of the Fao Peninsula 
Another event in early 1986 affected the Saudi regime's attitude towards Iran, the 
Iranian invasion of the Fao peninsula in February 1986. This peninsula is situated on the 
Iraqi Kuwait borders and the Iranian threat became obvious as soldiers were 'positioned 
on Kuwait's border, a short distance from Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province and its oil 
fields' (see Iran-Iraq map on Fao peninsula). As far as Riyadh was concerned, the 
conquest of the Fao peninsula meant the Iranian threat had reached its doorsteps and the 
possibility of an Iranian victory over Iraq horrified the Saudi regime. This event 
represented a turning point in the course of the Saudi policy towards Iran. 
At the beginning of the Fao offensive, Iran sent an envoy to Kuwait demanding that 
Iraqi troops should not be allowed to make use of the strategic Bubiyan Island to push 
back the advancing Iranians. Iran threatened that if Kuwait did not meet this demand, 
Iran would use its forces against it (MEI, 21 February 1986: 4). Kuwait and Riyadh 
were enraged by the Iranian threat and on 16 March 1986, Riyadh announced that it 
would not tolerate any Iranian attack on Kuwait and moved a brigade from Saudi Arabia 
nearer the Kuwaiti border. This action demonstrated that the Kingdom was willing 
and ready 'to confront Iran' (MEL 21 March 1986: 10). 
At the same time, Riyadh requested Syrian President Assad to 'use his influence with 
Iran to put a check on Iran's aggressive ambitions' (MEL 21 February 1986: 4). 
However, Assad's attempts to persuade Iran to guarantee it would not attack other Arab 
states failed. Iran remained firm in its demands, namely to punish Iraq the aggressor, 
remove Hussein's regime, and receive compensation for war damage (Mostyn, 
1991: 225); at the same time, Tehran wished to punish the Gulf states, mainly Saudi 
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Arabia and Kuwait, for supporting Iraq. 
Soon after the Iran-Contra revelations and the invasion of the Fao Peninsula in 1986, 
Saudi Arabia changed its tactics to put an end to the war. It perceived that the only 
way to make Iran accept a ceasefire was to damage the Iranian military capability 
through weakening its financial means by draining the Iranian oil income. Thus, Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait tried to keep oil output high in order to force oil prices down (MEI, 
2 May 1986: 9). The result of this move was a decline in Iran's annual revenue from 
oil, not least as, with the on-going tanker war, Iran was forced to offer huge discounts 
on its oil exports to attract buyers. 
Moreover, before the Fao offensive, Saudi Arabia had never permitted Iraqi combat 
aircraft to make use of its territory, but as Riyadh was trying to force Iran to end the 
war, it allowed Iraqi Mirages which were returning from bombing Larak, (the Iranian 
island which served as Iranian oil terminal), to refuel at Dhahran airfield. However, it 
was reported that the Saudis were reluctant to allow the Iraqi aircraft to land and the 
Saudi regime claimed that they only 'granted permission when the pilots claimed that 
they would have to crash land' (MEI, 12 December 1986: 13). 
As Iran attacked 14 ships, bound to and from Kuwait, and also seized some Kuwaiti 
cargoes in 1986-1987, Kuwait sought protection from both superpowers and this 
embittered Iran further (MEI, 29 May 1987: 3). 
Thus, Iran retaliated by increasing its attacks on ships bound to and from Kuwait or 
Saudi ports. Whereas, Kuwait reported these attacks to the UN Security Council, 
Saudi Arabia did not. Saudi Arabia was keen on improving its relations with Iran. 
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This it sought through actions such as 'freezing arrangements to sell "war relief' crude 
oil on Iraq's account from the Neutral Zone' (MEI, 29 May 1987: 4). However, the 
Mecca riot changed this attitude towards Iran. 
3.10 The Mecca riot 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Saudi-Iranian relations reached their lowest point 
on 31 July 1987, when Iranian pilgrims demonstrated in Mecca shouting slogans against 
the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia (MEI, 8 August 1987: 3). The riot was brutally 
crushed by the Saudi police (Amirahmadi, 1993: 139). The Saudi authorities anticipated 
the demonstrations, which were common place during Hajj seasons, therefore, when 
Iranian pilgrims clashed with Saudi security police outside the Grand Mosque, in Mecca, 
reporters and cameramen were ready to report the incident and take pictures during the 
riot. Films of the riot were shown on Saudi television network and also throughout the 
Muslim world, which led to the 'condemnation of the Iranian pilgrims' behaviour' (Hiro, 
1991: 157). 
By the end of the riot, casualties amounted to approximately 400 dead, of whom 275 
were Iranians and 85 Saudis, and 650 people injured. However, Iranian official reports 
later maintained that 600 Iranians had been killed and 4500 injured. This incident 
widened the gulf between Riyadh and Tehran, especially since 'it had a Sunni-Shi'ite 
character' (MEI, 29 May 1987: 4). 
As a result, Iran banned all foreign ships from its waters, on 4 August 1987, during two 
days of naval manoeuvres, which it code-named 'Operation Martyrdom' (MEI, 12 
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September 1987: 6). It also prevented all tankers from calling through the Strait of 
Hormuz, thus escalating the tension. 
Furthermore, Khomeini intensified his acrimonious campaign against the Saudi regime. 
To him, Saudi Arabia was the main enemy of Iran serving US interests in the region. 
He also 'questioned the legitimacy of the House of Saud and predicted its downfall 
within a year or so' (SWB, 4 August 1987). 
King Fahd responded to the challenge to his regime's legitimacy by adding the title of 
'the custodian of the two Holy places' - Mecca and Medina to his status. Moreover, 
on 25 August 1987, Prince Naif declared Saudi's wish to 'remove the authorities in 
Iran', and Saudi Arabia gave Iraq an immediate grant of $2 billion (Mostyn, 1991: 232). 
The following month, on 8 September 1987, the Saudi official radio station began 
broadcasting to Iran. It called on Iranians to overthrow the 'renegade' government in 
Tehran, accused Khomeini of 'fostering terrorism, and suggesting that priests should 
keep out of politics' (MEI, 12 September 1987: 5). As Jansen observes, for the Saudis, 
who had always been inclined to make compromises with Iran, 'the use of force had 
now become an option' (ME1,12 September 1987: 6). 
On 3 October 1987, Saudi aircraft chased Iranian speedboats away from the neutral 
zone between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Saudi Arabia even asked the US, Britain and 
France to offer protection to its tankers, as they did with Kuwaiti tankers, and sought to 
mount an arms embargo against Iran with the US and UN Security Council. However, 
these efforts were unsuccessful (Abir, 1995: 139) because the Soviets were displeased 
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with the Saudi's support for the Pax Americana in the Gulf. Therefore, the USSR 
blocked the UN Security Council, concerning the act of arms embargo against Iran. 
Seeing that the war was escalating, and Iran was building up its arms, Saudi Arabia 
sought, through discussions with French and some other West European arms 
manufacturers, for ways to strengthen its forces to stand up against Iranian aggression 
(MEI, 19 December 1987: 10). 
At the same time, Saudi Arabia did not give up on quiet diplomacy with Iran. On 
27-30 December 1987, during the GCC summit in Riyadh, King Fahd described 'both 
Iran and Iraq as shuquq (sic)(sisterly) countries', he did not refer to the riots in Mecca, 
or to Iranian Silkworm missile attacks on Kuwaiti or other Gulf shipping. 
Nevertheless, in an interview given on the following day, he mentioned Iran's 'hostile 
activities and unreasonable behaviour' (MEL 9 January 1988: 13). 
The Mecca riot helped the Saudi regime to gain support, both internally and from the 
Arab world, for its policies (Abir, 1994: 145). The riot, in fact, weakened the position 
of Tehran, and enabled Saudi Arabia to take a 'firm and decisive line in opposition to 
Iran' and co-operate more directly militarily with the US (Simons, 1998: 260-261). 
3.11 The 1988 ceasefire 
The war took a new turn after the Mecca riot, which led to Iran's isolation, and the US 
naval presence in the Persian Gulf which further weakened its position. Moreover, 
Iran suffered a humiliating defeat when Iraq recaptured the strategic Fao peninsula, on 
18-20 April 1988, and Iran's naval vessels and oil platforms were attacked by the US 
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navy in retaliation to the Iranian 'Tanker War'. Finally, Saudi Arabia announced it was 
to break off diplomatic relations with Iran, on 26 April 1988. Saudi Arabia offered 
four reasons for its decision: 
1. Iran had attacked Saudi-bound tankers. 
2. Iran refused to end the war with Iraq unconditionally. 
3. Iran's behaviour at the annual pilgrimage to Mecca caused a riot. 
4. Iran had pillaged the Saudi Embassy in Tehran (MEI, 14 May, 1988: 13). 
Another blow to the Iranian regime came in July 1988 when the Saudis announced at 
the OIC meeting that the new quota system for the Hajj allowing only one thousand per 
million Muslims from each Muslim country (MEI, 24 June 1988: 12). Tehran saw this 
as a deliberate policy against Iran. Tehran tried to persuade Riyadh to reconsider its 
decision unsuccessfully. At the end of the OIC meeting, the Iranian delegation walked 
out, and Tehran decided not to send any pilgrims to Mecca in 1988. 
Repeated Iraqi victories in May, June and July, after Iran's military and logistical 
infrastructure had collapsed, resulted in Iran unconditionally accepting UN Security 
Council resolution 598 calling for an immediate cease-fire, and the cease-fire started on 
20 August 1988 (Abir, 1994: 141). Rafsanjani declared: 
'The Islamic Republic of Iran, because of the importance it attaches to the 
lives of human beings and the establishment of justice and regional and 
international peace and security, accepts Security Council Resolution 598' 
(MEI, 22 July 1988: 3). 
Several reasons determined Iran's acceptance of a cease-fire: 
1. From April 1988, Iraq had been using chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers. 
But on the Iranian side, Khomeini still refused to allow Iranians to use chemical 
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weapons against Iraq in the name of Jihad (holy struggle). Iranian Soldiers could 
not wear the protection mask in near 50-degree temperature to fight Iraqi soldiers, so 
gradually they lost their advantages and Iraq recaptured its territory and attacked 
Iran again. This action deeply affected the Iranian psyche. 
2. Iran was also gradually becoming more isolated in the international arena. In 1988, 
Iran lost its only Middle East ally, Syria, which from 1986 had begun to support 
Saudi Arabia in return for Saudi financial incentives; France had broken off its 
diplomatic relations with Iran because of the assassination of an Iranian opposition 
politician in Paris and the bombings of the Air France office in Tehran. Iran's 
relationship with the USSR had also deteriorated in the face of Soviet arms supplies 
to Iraq. Moreover, Iran had become increasingly isolated from the Muslim world 
as a result of the Mecca accident. 
3. The US warship 'Vincennes' mistakenly shot down an Iranian civilian airline over 
the Persian Gulf, killing all 290 people on board, on 3 July 1988. This accident 
devastated the Iranian psyche, as Iranians thought that even the US was at war with 
them. 
4. This view was not surprising given the naval exchanges between Iran and the US 
navies which had increased since the 'Tanker War'. Although Iran refrained from 
attacking the United States naval force directly in Gulf waters, it did use various 
forms of harassment, including mines, hit-and-run attacks by small patrol boats, and 
periodic stop-and-search operations. However, when Iranian forces hit the Kuwaiti 
re-flagged tanker 'Sea Isle City' in October 1987, Washington retaliated by 
destroying an Iranian oil platform in the Rostarn field and by using the United States 
Navy's Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) commandos to blow up a second one nearby, 
demonstrating that the Iranian naval forces could not compete with the American 
forces (www. fas. org). 
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5. A decade of revolution and eight years of war had left Iran in a weak and exhausted 
position. The economy was weakened as eight years of war with Iraq, other Gulf 
Arab states and the superpowers had depleted much of its military and financial 
resources. The revolutionary fervour was fading, and a 'struggle for leadership 
was under way between conservatives led by Khamenei and pragmatist Rafsanjani' 
Quandt, 1991: 13). This domestic struggle was translated into foreign policy -a 
struggle eventually won by the pragmatic faction. (Since regime survival could be 
said to have been at stake at this point, a neo-realist interpretation can include 
consideration of what was essentially a domestic political struggle). 
By the time of the cease-fire in August 1988, the cost of the war for Iran, in terms of its 
image, isolation, economic and social costs, had become significant. Iran needed to 
re-integrate quickly into the Western economic system in order to recover and rebuild its 
economy (Amirahmadi, 1993: 106). Therefore, as soon as the war ended, Iran - under 
pragmatist Rafsanjani - tried to mend its damaged relations with the Gulf Arab states. 
Saudi Arabia welcomed this move and, in turn, the Saudi media stopped its attacks on 
Iran in October 1988 and hence, relations between the two countries slowly improved. 
Evidently, Saudi Arabia played a vital role in the Iran-Iraq War. In fact, it has been 
argued that Iraq could not have sustained the war without Saudi financial and political 
support (Simons, 1998: 258). By all means, Saudi Arabia was the behind-the-scenes 
force trying to bring Iran to its knees. 
Prior to the Iran-Iraq War, Iran was one of the dominant powers in the Persian Gulf 
region but, after eight years of war with Iraq, Iran emerged in a weaker position. In 
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contrast, Saudi Arabia had developed into becoming a stable and confident regional 
power. 
4.0 After the ceasefire 
After the ceasefire, Iran went through a major transformation in its foreign policy 
orientation due to several domestic and international reasons. Domestic reasons can be 
summarised as follows: 
1. The death of Khomeini contributed to the gain of power by the pragmatists. 
2. After eight years of war with Iraq, Iran faced economic hardship. The Islamic 
regime realised that in order to survive, it must perform well economically so that it 
could cope with post-war reconstruction (Amirahmadi, 1993: 106). 
3. After the cease-fire, the Iranian population began to question the Islamic regime 
about its policy towards the Iran-Iraq War. They questioned that, since Iran had 
accepted the cease-fire, then why had it not done so back in 1982, when Iran was 
winning the war? 
External reasons can be surnmarised as following: 
1. During the war, Iran became quite isolated from the world, and it realised that after 
the cease-fire it needed to reintegrate into the international system, and in particular, 
the capitalist world market. 
2. Traditionally, Iran used the USSR to counter-balance US influence in the Gulf 
region, but gradually the USSR lost its influence in the region, and the regime 
realised that it must look elsewhere for support. 
Hence, after the cease-fire with Iraq in August 1988 and the death of Ayatollah 
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Khomeini in 1989, the Islamic republic began to modify its foreign policy from the 
earlier confrontational approach towards a more moderate and co-operative one with the 
other states in the region (Amirahmadi, 1993: 139). In redefining its policy, Iran was 
mainly concerned with: 
1. Preserving Persian Gulf security. 
2. Regaining Iran's dominant role in the Gulf. 
3. Sccuring the foreign investments needed for post-war reconstruction, and the 
urgency for reintegration into the capitalist world market. 
4. Iranian awareness that the status of USSR was declining in the Middle East, along 
with its potential to sustain the economic relationship which had developed since the 
mid-1980s. Tehran understood that it needed to find alternative sources of support in 
order to rebuild the country. 
5. Reducing Iranian-Saudi tensions. 
6. Correcting Iran's fractured image in the West (Amirahmadi, 1993: 95-139). 
Rafsanjani's statement, on 2 July 1988, reflected clearly the change in Iranian foreign 
policy: 
'One of the wrong things we did in the revolutionary atmosphere was to 
constantly make enemies. We pushed those who could be neutral into 
hostility and did not do anything to attract those who could become friends. 
It is part of the new plan that in foreign policy we should behave in a way 
not to needlessly leave ground to the enemy' (Daneshkhu, 1994: 295). 
Furthermore, Iran redefined the export of revolution to mean building Iran into a model 
Islamic country for others to emulate. 
Thus, by summer 1990, Tehran was communicating with Cairo, Rabat, Riyadh, and 
even Baghdad. And by time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, it had managed to 
204 
Chapter Five: The Iraq factor 
re-establish relations with several Gulf states, including Kuwait and Jordan (EMI, 8 
March 1991: 23). 
The Iran-Iraq War decreased the ability of Iran to shape the regional arena, and the 
balance of power in Iranian-Saudi relations shifted in favour of Saudi Arabia. The war 
forced Iran to rethink its policy towards its Gulf neighbours. During the eight-year 
war economic considerations - other than oil - had been suppressed in favour of 
strategic considerations and a growing competition in Islamic "propoganda". Soon 
after the ceasefire economic considerations re-emerged as a priority as the Iranian 
regime was forced to consider its own survival by satisfying the economic needs of 
Iranians. This forced Tehran to transform its foreign policy orientation, supporting the 
neo-realist assumption that regime survival is of utmost importance in determining state 
foreign policy. Saudi Arabian policy through out the war had been determined by the 
perception of threat from Islamic Revolutionary Iran and the desire to see Iraq playing a 
role in balancing Iranian influence in the Gulf, utilising oil and the religious factor as 
strategic tools for these purposes. 
5.0 The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 came as a surprise to the whole world, 
especially since Saddam Hussein's delegates had just begun negotiations with the 
Kuwaitis in Jeddah on the previous day (Abir, 1994: 173). 
The most remarkable and 'enduring' consequence of this invasion was the redefinition 
of the Middle East. Furthermore, Gulf regimes were forced to recognise that procuring 
the most advanced military technology does not secure their countries from invasion nor 
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does it make them technologically advanced (Lewis, 1993: 102-103). 
Saddam Hussein's seizure of Kuwait constituted 'an immediate threat' to Saudi Arabia. 
At the regional level, Saddam's bid for hegemonic leadership posed a direct challenge to 
other regional players in the Middle East, namely, Egypt, Syria, Israel, Turkey and Iran. 
It also threatened oil and the strategic interests of the US in the region (Khaled, 
1995: 168). 
Several reasons could explain Iraq's motivations to invade Kuwait: 
1.11istorical and the territorial claims; 
2. Domestic social factors; 
3. Economic incentives; and 
4. Geo-strategic factors. 
Iraq's intention and strategic aims had a direct influence on Iranian-Saudi relations. 
5.1 Historical and territorial claims 
The borders of present day Iraq and Kuwait were designated by colonial powers, mainly 
Britain and France. Sheikh Mubarak of Kuwait 'was brought into treaýy relations' with 
Britain, under the direction of Lord Curzon, on 23 January 1899. Despite Mubarak's 
repeated request for British protection, Kuwait remained a part of Iraq under the 
sovereignty of the Turkish sultan (Simons, 1998: 263). 
In 1899 Germany was granted a concession to build a railway from Constantinople to 
Baghdad. As Kuwait possesses the finest natural harbour in the upper Gulf, Germany 
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thought about extending the railway to Kuwait, which would then serve as a tenninal 
for the project. This alarmed the British authorities (Simons, 1998: 263). According 
to the San Remo conference in 1920, most of the territories of the Middle East, which 
formed part of the Ottoman Empire prior to World War I, were divided between Britain 
and France, 'which received mandates from the League of Nations to establish and 
supervise national governments in the territories'. In 1921, Britain established the 
Kingdom of Iraq comprising the three former provinces of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra 
(Bahbah, 1992: 50); and Kuwait was under the Basra governor's control. 
In 1922, Sir Percy Cox attempted to hinder the extension of German influence into 
Kuwait by calling for the Ujair Conference with the aim of reaching a final boundary 
settlement for Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia (Simons, 1998: 263-264). The resulting 
settlement delineated the modem borders of Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and 
confirmed the separation of Kuwait from Iraq. This settlement served Britains' 
purpose by detaching Kuwait from the Ottoman vilayet of Basra (Simons, 1998: 264). 
According to the settlement Kuwait received a coastline of 310 miles, while Iraq had 36 
miles only (Bahbah, 1992: 50). 
Thus, since independence in 1932, Iraq has claimed that Kuwait constituted, historically, 
part of its territory. Accordingly, Iraq attempted to invade Kuwait twice since its 
independence in 1961. According to Bahbah, after Kuwait had gained its 
independence in 1961, Baghdad threatened to annex it by force. The Kuwaiti Emir 
requested help from Britain which sent its troops to Kuwait to stop an Iraqi invasion 
(Bahbah, 1992: 51). Thus, on 4 October 1963, Iraq recognised Kuwait's sovereignty 
(Mostyn, 1991: 87) in return for an interest-free loan of $80 million, provided by Kuwait, 
to be paid over 25 years (Bishku, 1991: 86). 
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Nonetheless, Baghdad did not cease to question the issue of its borders with Kuwait; 
and in 1973, Iraqi troops 'briefly occupied a Kuwaiti border post' (Bahbah, 1992: 51) 
within one mile of the Kuwaiti territory. This area was occupied until the out break of 
the Iran-Iraq War in 1980. Furthermore, the two governments could not reach a 
settlement regarding the disputed ownership of the Rumaila oil field, which lies beneath 
the Iraq-Kuwait border. Iraq estimated that the oil field in question contained 30 
billion barrels of oil located on the Iraqi side, and thus Baghdad claimed that it was 
entitled to the $10 billion worth of oil pumped from the oil field during the Iran-Iraq 
war (Bahbah, 1992: 51-52). 
5.2 Domestic social factors 
The end of the Iran-Iraq War marked the beginning of Saddarn Hussein's difficult task 
to rebuild his country. According to Dannreuther, as Saddam, Hussein promised to 
achieve a great victory, his population expected 'a renewed prosperity after eight years 
of suffering, fighting and struggle' (Dannreuther, 1992: 11). 
Saddarn Hussein enjoyed the support of his population for his policies during the 
Iran-Iraq War by 'spending generously on goods and services'. After the end of the 
war with Iran, the Iraqis expected a better standard of living. Saddam Hussein realised 
that meeting the demands of his people was critical for his regime's survival. Thus, 
the regime strove to have Iraq's debt forgiven and to increase its oil revenues (Bahbah, 
1992: 52). In particular, the Iraqi government found it difficult to demobilise its troops 
after the war with Iran and create jobs for nearly one million disarmed personnel to 
enable them to support their families (Mazarr, 1993: 25, and Dannreuther, 1992: 11). 
208 
Chapter Five: The Iraq factor 
Saddam Hussein initiated reconstruction projects and privatisation reforms, and 
promised a degree of political liberalisation (Dannreuther, 1992: 11). These ambitious 
programmes, however, required considerable funds that Iraq did not have, as its debt 
was estimated at between $65-80 billion (Dannreuther, 1992: 11). 
Iraq had an oil-based economy and agriculture had made the country self-sufficient, but 
after the war, and in the absence of investors, Iraq was totally dependent on revenues 
from oil, which represented 97% of her exports (see table 5.7). The declining price of 
crude oil, due to the worldwide economic recession, made it more difficult for Iraq to 
pay its considerable debts and to purchase essential imports. For example, in 1989, 
Iraq's oil revenues were estimated at about $15 billion, whereas its needs amounted to 
$20 billion (Alaolmolki, 1991: 163). Consequently, Baghdad suffered from a 50% 
inflation rate, a shortage of food, and a high unemployment rate (Alaolmolki, 1991: 163). 
Saddam Hussein believed that by invading Kuwait, which possessed a huge oil resource 
and no defence ability, would be the easiest way to solve the Iraqi domestic problem. 
Table 5.7 Values of Petroleum Exports of Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Total OPEC, 
1961-1997 (Millions of US Dollars) 
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
I. R. Iran 722 706 799 1,109 1,138 1,149 1,748 
Iraq 499 500 579 634 660 
1 
698 610 
Saudi Arabia 876 91 1,022 1,089 1,267 1,493 1,596 
Total OPEC 5,642 5,961 6,936 7,934 8,697 9,411 10,380 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
I. R. Iran 1,688 1,857 2,358 3,494 3,637 5,614 20,906 
Iraq 755 761 784 1,062 953 1,836 6,505 
Saudi Arabia 1,776 1,869 2,349 3,472 4,545 7,657 31,163 
. 
Total OPEC 11,603 12,806 14,846 19,511 22,101 34,641 113,494 
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1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
I. R. Iran 19,634 22,917 23,599 21,684 19,186 11,693 11,491 
Iraq 8,177 9,114 9,560 10,913 21,382 26,096 10,039 
Saudi Arabia 27,885_ 36,314 1 43,308 1 40,332 2,855 108,175 118,9981 
Total OPEC 1104,879 1126,501 1141,623 1134,823 200,086 282,625 26 
=1,073 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
I. R. Iran 20,168 21,150 16,726 13,710 
_6,255 
10,755 9,673 
Iraq 9,933 7,816 8,863 10,097 6,905 9,416 9,312 
Saudi Arabia 78,119 44,830 36,285 25,937 18,061 20,427 20,205 
Total OPEC 205,304 159,225 148,876 129,567 76,995 92,933 86,629 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
I. R. Iran 12,031 17,906 15,767 16,802 14,251 14,801 14,944 
Iraq 11,876 9,594 351 482 425 421 461 
Saudi Arabia 24,095 40130 3,701 44,754 38,621 38,139 42,502 
Total OPEC 107,525 147,058 127,360 132,063 120,107 120,172 132,164 
1996 1997 
I. R. Iran 17,960 17,662 
Iraq 680 17,662 
Saudi Arabia 50,046 48,218 
Total OPEC 161,560 161,593 
Sources: OPEC Annual Statistical Yearbook, 1980, pp. XVIII, XIX, and OPEC Annual Statistical Yearbook, 1997, p. 
6. 
5.3 Economic incentives 
Although before the war Iraq was one of the richest countries in the Middle East, with 
hard currency reserves between $25 billion and $38 billion (Alaolmolki, 1991: 163), at 
the end of the war, it was the nation most in debt in the Arab world, with a debt 
amounting to nearly $65-80 billion, of which at least $25 billion were owed to Western 
governments and firms (Dannreuther, 1992: 11). After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 
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King Fahd declared that Saudi assistance to Iraq throughout the war had reached $25.7 
billion (Munro, 1996: 198). In total Iraq owed Kuwait and Saudi Arabia $35-7 billion. 
However, soon after the Iran-Iraq War, Kuwait began to request Baghdad to repay its 
debts, and ask Saddarn Hussein to repay $2 billion of its debts by the end of 31 July 
1990. Moreover the Kuwait regime made its demand (for $12 billion to Kuwait alone) 
towards Iraq publicly through the media which greatly humiliated Saddarn Hussein 
(Simons, 1998: 265). 
After the war, Iraq needed to rebuild its infrastructure, but could not afford this 
investment given its diminishing oil revenues. This decline in oil revenues was partly 
the result of overproduction of oil and other manifestations of lack of discipline among 
the producers of oil within the OPEC cartel (for more details on this issue refer to 
chapter three). 
Saddarn Hussein claimed that Iraq had fought Iran on behaif of all Arabs to protect them 
from the Iranian Islamic revolution (Bahbah, 1992: 52). In other words, 'Iraq had 
assumed the burden of defending the Gulf states from Iranian expansion, to the 
advantage of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia as much as to Iraq"s benefit' (Simons, 
1998: 265). Thus, Saddam Hussein thought Kuwait's attitude was ungrateful as, at the 
time when Saddarn Hussein was in a difficult situation, Kuwait had changed its attitude 
towards Iraq. Once the war was over, with the immediate danger from Iran dwindling, 
Kuwait 'distanced itself from Iraq and reverted to its traditional policy of having 
balanced relations with both Iran and Iraq' (Dannreuther, 1992: 17). The Kuwaiti 
government quickly re-established diplomatic relations with Iran andq unlike Riyadh 
who gave this issue a very low profile, made a public announcement of Baghdad's debt. 
It requested Iraq to repay part of its debt, making it clear that it would not write them 
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off, nor would it offer Iraq the same kind of financial support it had done during the 
Iran-Iraq War (Dannreuther, 1992: 17). 
Thus, an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait seemed so tempting since Iraq could not pay back its 
debts and Kuwait had a limited military force to defend itself. Moreover, Kuwait's 
economy was flourishing with public sector reserves reaching $95 billion (MEI, 14 
September 1990: 19). By annexing Kuwait, as its 19th province, Iraq would double its 
oil reserves to roughly 200 billion barrels, and it would be second only to Saudi Arabia 
with reserves estimated at 258 billion barrels (MEEI, 14 September 1990: 19). 
Additionally, as Iraq would command the whole oil production, from refinement to sale 
of oil, it would become not only a regional power but also a global one. It would be 
able to 'dictate the terms of oil contracts in no uncertain terms to Iran, other regional 
producers and OPEC members' (MEI, 14 September 1990: 20). 
5.4 Geostrategic factor 
The annexation of Kuwait would allow Iraq to expand its coastline, Iraq could gain 
access to the Persian Gulf easily, and it would extend its sphere of influence in the Gulf 
region. The fact that one of the main reasons for the Iran-Iraq War was the issue of 
who controls the Shatt al-Arab waterway, which provides Iraq with the only access to 
the Gulf, sh9uld not be overlooked. Also, it should be recalled that the 1920 San 
Remo conference left Iraq with only a 36 miles coastline, of which the Fao Peninsula is 
too close to Iran. In addition, the river is not navigable for oil tankers. 
In its quest for a deep sea port in the Gulf, Iraq asked Kuwait three times to allow it to 
exercise control over the two strategic islands of Warbah. and Bubiyan. These islands 
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overlook the approaches to Umm Qasr (a dry port), one of Iraq's two ports on the Gulf. 
The first request was made in 1975, when it proposed to lease half of Bubiyan island for 
99 years. The second request came shortly after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 
1980. Finally, Iraq made its third request in 1989, after the end of the Iran-Iraq War. 
Kuwait refused all three requests (Bahbah, 1992: 51). Iraq viewed Kuwait's refusal as 
an unfriendly move. 
All these factors contributed to Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait and at the 
end of unsuccessful negotiations on I August 1990, Saddam. Hussein moved his forces 
into Kuwaiti territory the next day. 
Thus, when Iraq occupied Kuwait it was willing to meet Iran's peace terms, in other 
words to set the border between Iran-Iraq in the middle of the Shatt al-Arab back to the 
1975 Algiers Agreement. This is partly because the occupation of Kuwait enabled Iraq 
to control more than 360 miles of coastline and the finest harbour in the upper Gulf; 
thus, it enjoyed easy access to the Gulf. Another reason for concluding peace with 
Iran was that Iraq did not wish to have enemies on both sides, especially since Iraq still 
had a 500,000 army posted on the Iran-Iraq border. 
Of course, there were omens that appeared from the very beginning of 1990 but people 
still failed to notice Saddam Hussein's intention, and none of the world leaders could 
believe that Saddarn Hussein would mount another war in such a short period of time 
after the devastating eight-year war with Iran. However, Iraqs annexation of Kuwait 
shattered whatever remaining illusions there might have been about common Arab 
interests. Most of the Arab regimes disapproved of the invasion, but only a slight 
majority of the Arab League was prepared to condemn it outright and support the idea 
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of sending troops to defend Saudi Arabia. Others were more concerned with the 
American and European military build-up (Quandt, 1991: 64), as an 'infidel' force in the 
Islamic Holy land. 
In order to solve Iraq's economic problems, Saddam Hussein had asked King Hussein 
of Jordan and President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, at the Arab Co-operation Council 
(ACC) meeting in Amman in February 1990, to put pressure on the Gulf states to 
suspend all wartime debts to Iraq, and, moreover, to make an immediate additional grant 
of $30 billion. He argued that Iraq had fought for eight years against Iranian Islamic 
fundamentalism on behalf of the Arab Gulf states, so they owed him reimbursements. 
He threatened the Gulf states that if they did not meet his financial demands, he would 
'know how to get it' (Pimlott, 1992: 36), thus, hinting that he would use force against 
them. 
Subsequently, as Iraq's economic problems increased, due to the decline in oil prices 
caused by over-production, Saddarn Hussein pointed out, at an Arab Summit on 27 May 
1990 in Baghdad, 'for every single dollar drop in the price of a barrel of oil, our loss 
mounts to $1 billion a year' (Pimlott, 1992: 37). He, therefore, demanded 'an end to 
quota violations, a permitted increase to Iraqi production and a price rise to at least $25 
a barrel' (Pimlott, 1992: 37). During this summit, in a private meeting with the heads 
of the Gulf states, Saddam Hussein again demanded an extra $30 billion from Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait (Dannreuther, 1992: 15). He declared that "in Iraq's present 
economic state of affairs, this overproduction amounted to 'an act of war"' (Bahbah, 
1992: 52). But still at this stage Saddarn Hussein did not mention countries by name, 
perhaps still trying to hide his military intentions towards Kuwait. 
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However, the world economy was moving into recession, and the declining oil prices 
compounded Iraq's economic problems, as the oil price dropped from $18 in May to 
$14- in July 1990. Iraq held Kuwait and the UAE responsible for this drop because 
they substantially exceeded their quotas (Dannreuther, 1992: 15). On the very day after 
the Iran-Iraq War ended in August 1988, Kuwait began to violate its OPEC production 
quotas in order to make up for the lost revenues from the Iran-Iraq War (Mazarr, 
1993: 25). For the UAE, on the other hand, the reason was political rivalry between 
Abu Dhabi and Dubai, where neither Emirate was willing to reduce its oil production 
(Interview with Bin Huweidin, M., 5 March 2000). 
Since Saddarn Hussein had been denied more financial aid ($30 billion) from the Gulf 
states during the Arab summit in May 1990, he stopped requesting aid from the Gulf 
states and started demanding it. This indicates that Saddarn Hussein had already made 
up his mind towards Kuwait. The first public threat from Iraq towards Kuwait came 
on 17 July 1990, when Saddam. Hussein, on Iraqi radio, described low oil prices as a 
'poisoned dagger' pointed at Iraq. He accused Kuwait and the UAE of robbing Iraq of 
its 'economic lifeblood', and he claimed that they would have to pay for it. 
Furthen-nore, Saddarn Hussein threatened clearly to take some retaliatory action as he 
asserted that 'if words fail to protect us, we will have no choice other than go into action 
to re-establish the correct state of affairs and restore our rights' (Mazarr, 1993: 35). 
On the same day, Baghdad sent a memorandum to the Arab League (Dannreuther, 
1992: 15), accusing Kuwait of 'theft tantamount to military aggressive and deliberate 
border violations'. In addition, Baghdad called on Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to cancel 
Iraq's war debts, and to 'organise an Arab Marshall Plan to compensate Iraq for what it 
had lost in the war' with Iran (Mostyn, 1991: 261). 
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Saddam Hussein specifically accused Kuwait of 'stealing Iraqi oil by slant drilling 
beneath the border in the Rumaila oilfield, and demanded compensation of $2.4 billion' 
(Pimlott, 1992: 37). In response, Kuwait denied the accusation and refused to write off 
the Iraqi debt; moreover, it maintained its oil production levels. Obviously, Kuwait 
did not take the threat seriously, as it did not place any troops at the Iraqi border and 
even took its sentries off alert status in late July 1990 (Mazarr, 1993: 3 1). 
On 31 July 1990, negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait were held in Jeddah. Iraq 
demanded $10 billion in cash, either as aid or as a loan, and Kuwait made an offer of $9 
billion; Iraq, nonetheless, refused the offer. Later, the Saudis offered to pay the 
difference. The Kuwaiti Crown Prince, however, insisted on resolving the border 
dispute between Iraq and Kuwait before discussing the issue of aid or a loan. Iraq, in 
turn, refused the Kuwaiti demand and warned Kuwait against 'what might happen to 
Kuwait if the various issues were not settled to Iraq's satisfaction'. Thus, the meeting 
ended on 1 August 1990 after failing to achieve anything (Mazarr, 1993: 44). 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait came as a surprise to the whole world which highlighted 
Arab and US' grave miscalculations of Saddam Hussein's intention towards the Gulf 
region in general, and Kuwait in particular. Prior to the invasion, Saddarn Hussein met 
with the American Ambassador in Baghdad and, hinting that the dispute between Iraq 
and Kuwait over the oil and border issues might result in military confrontation, the 
American Ambassador perhaps misread Saddam Hussein's line as she informed him that 
the US did not wish to get involved in any Arab neighbours' dispute. For the Arab 
states, they did not believe that any military invasion would occur because just merely 
two years ago Kuwait was still the lifeline of Iraqi war efforts, having supplied huge 
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financial means. Since the ceasefire, Iraq had constantly accused Kuwait of stealing 
its oil from the oil well located within their borderline, and also of Kuwaiti 
over-production of oil which had caused the oil price to drop. Therefore, several 
negotiations occurred between Iraq and Kuwait, and at the end of these unsuccessful 
negotiations on I August 1990, Saddam Hussein moved his forces into Kuwaiti territory 
on the very next day. 
Saddam Hussein had miscalculated the reaction from the world in general, and Arab 
states in particular. He believed that the Arab states would not react strongly towards 
the invasion, since Kuwait did not gain the support from the majority of OPEC states 
for its quota violations, and at the same time the Iraqi military power still ranked as 
being among the top of the Gulf states, even after the devastating eight-year war with 
Iran. Therefore, Saddam Hussein believed that although most countries would raise 
their disapproval for his action, soon after that, any opposition to the invasion would die 
out. 
6.0 The reaction of Saudi Arabia 
Until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait Saudi Arabia had adopted a foreign policy of 
$conciliation' rather than 'confrontation' (Munro, 1996: ix). As Munro noted: 'Prior to 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia had over the years made an art of financial 
diplomacy, whereby Riyadh had sought to avoid confrontation by buying off through 
judicious subvention those who might disturb its prosperous existence' (Munro, 
1996: xix). Saudi Arabia perceived Iran to be the real threat to its prosperity, thus, the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait came as a shock. The Saudi regime was enraged and felt 
betrayed by the Iraqi aggression against its Arab neighbour (Munro, 1996: xx). 
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The Saudis 'were noticeably silent' when Iraq threatened Kuwait because of its 
over-production of oil. Gause attributes this silence to the fact that Saudi Arabia 
wanted Kuwait to abide by its OPEC production quota (Gause, 1993: 208). Saudi 
Arabia had pressured Kuwait before the invasion to maintain its oil production quota, in 
accordance with Saddarn Hussein's demands. Kuwait complied with this demand, and 
at the OPEC meeting of 25-27 July 1990, it agreed to cut its production to the quota 
level. 
The Iraqi invasion caused a great deal of financial uncertainty world-wide, in particular 
in the oil markets. The fate of Saudi Arabia became uncertain as the Iraqi army was 
just over the Kuwaiti and Saudi's borders. The Saudis were so shocked by the 
invasion that for the first three days, the Saudi media did not report it. The Iraqi troops 
were concentrated on the border, and Saudi oil-fields in the Eastern Province were 
vulnerable to Iraqi invasion, especially since Saudi land forces lacked the necessary 
military equipment to defend Saudi territory (Munro, 1996: 57). 
Although Saddarn Hussein promised King Fahd he would not invade Saudi Arabia, the 
latter did not trust him. Many military analysts pointed out that Iraq could easily 
capture the eastern oilfields in Saudi Arabia and the Arabian peninsula, and all its oil 
reserves, with no obstruction which would have led to Iraqi dominance of the region 
(Dannreuther, 1992: 23). 
On 2 August 1990, the US offered Saudi Arabia aid if Iraqi troops did not stop at the 
border, C-141 transport aircraft were ordered to European airbases in case an airlift of 
forces to the Gulf was needed. On 4 August 1990, the CIA received spy-satellite 
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photographs that showed Iraqi troops already in the Neutral Zone between Kuwdit and 
Saudi Arabia. President Bush contacted King Fahd to inform him that the Kingdom 
was endangered by an Iraqi attack. He, therefore, sent Secretary of Defence Richard 
Cheney to Riyadh to discuss protection plans, and on 6 August 1990, Cheney met King 
Fahd in Jeddah and persuaded him to accept US forces' protection (Pimlott, 1992: 43). 
Riyadh accepted the US offer of protection after the US had promised to abide by the 
following three conditions: 
1. The US would indicate, in writing, that it would leave Saudi Arabia once the Iraqi 
threat was over, and if the Saudi government asks America to leave (MEI, 14 
September, 1990: 10); 
2. The US would not launch an offensive attack against Iraq from Saudi territory (MEI, 
14 September 1990: 10); 
3. Washington should keep quiet about the agreement until US forces began to arrive 
on Saudi territory (Simons, 1998: 268-269) to buy time for Riyadh to persuade its 
domestic opposition. 
Prior to Bush's suggestion to dispatch US troops to Saudi Arabia, King Fahd explained 
to his people that they needed to call on Arab and friendly forces to help them defend 
their territory, preserve their vital interests and enhance their forces. He stressed that 
the presence of these forces in Saudi Arabia would be temporary and that they would 
depart 'immediately when requested to do so' (Khaled, 1995: 180). But he repeated 
that the moves to invite foreign forces into Saudi Arabia were primarily defensive not 
directed against anyone. Evidently, King Fahd tried to avoid irritating Saddarn 
Hussein. 
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King Fahd finally accepted President Bush's plan, and on 6 August 1990, Saudi troops 
moved into the frontier area. Saudi television began to show defensive positions in the 
desert. Hence, 'Riyadh began to put itself on to a war footing, a situation without 
precedent in its nearly 60 years of existence' (Munro, 1996: 57). 
On 9 August 1990, at the Arab Summit convened in Cairo, the Iraqi delegation 
described the annexation of Kuwait as 'returning the branch to the root' and assured 
Saudi Arabia that this act did not pose any threat to Saudi Arabia. But Khaled argued 
that by seizing Kuwait, Saddam. had already undermined Saudi security, even if he did 
not invade Saudi Arabia (Khaled, 1995: 183). On the same day, King Fahd in turn 
described the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as 'the most horrible aggression the Arab nation 
has known in its modem history' (Khaled, 1995: 180). 
Furthermore, according to the Saudi Prince Khaled Bin Sultan, Riyadh was concerned 
that Iran would side with Iraq. In particular, Riyadh was concerned that Tehran would 
build up a substantial military power, as this would pose a huge potential threat to Saudi 
security (Khaled, 1995: 183). Only after Tehran had showed its neutral stance on the 
conflict, Riyadh began its rapprochement with Iran, as it realised that Riyadh needed 
Iran to counterbalance the threat from Iraq. 
6.1 The impact of the Kuwait crisis on Saudi Arabia 
For Saudi Arabia, the end of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait diminished the threat posed 
by Saddam. Hussein. In addition, Saudi Arabia preserved its territorial integrity. 
Despite emerging as a regional power after the liberation of Kuwait, Riyadh had still 
remained vulnerable, not only domestically but also to other strong powers in the 
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region, i. e. Iran and Iraq in particular. This was more so, as Egypt and Syria had failed 
to form an Arab peacekeeping force in the area (Amirahmadi, 1993: 151). 
Furthermore, the Kingdom and the regime had to bear the heavy cost of the war and 
were therefore weakened economically. According to Munro, from August 1990 to 
early 1991, oil prices increased, and the volume of the Saudi oil output increased by 50 
per cent to stablise the oil market and, at the same time, finance war with Iraq. These 
increases led to a rise in the value of the Kingdom's export revenues from $24 billion in 
1989 to $40 billion in 1991 (Munro, 1996: 201). 
This trend of the increasing oil revenue was, however, reversed in 1992, and Riyadh 
began to experience a serious liquidity problem. Saudi currency reserves were 
exhausted and the Kingdom was submerged in debt (Dune, 1995: 33). Saudi economic 
problems had started in 1983, when it began running up budget deficits. The problem 
was only compounded by the war, and in the fiscal year 1991 the Saudi Ministry of 
Finance did not even publish the annual budget report. By 1994, Saudi Arabia was 
experiencing a major payments crisis (Dune, 1995: 3 1). 
These deficits were caused by the $50 billion expenditures the Saudis incurred during 
the Second Gulf War. Saudi Arabia devoted a significant proportion of its budget to 
military expenditures on the coalition troops in the Kingdom to preserve its territorial 
integrity, and hence its own survival. To be able to meet the needs of the war, the 
Saudis followed strict rationalisation policies. For example, payment arrangements 
were extended to major military purchases. New purchases were, however, reduced. 
Furthermore, Riyadh started to consider privatising some state enterprises, such as the 
state airline, Saudia, and the Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Company [SABIC] (Dune, 
1995: 32). Because of its budget difficulty, Riyadh slashed subsidies. The price of 
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gasoline, electricity and other subsidised commodities increased sharply and in some 
cases nearly doubled (EIU Saudi Arabia Nol. 1995: 12-13). Dune argued that the 
economic change caused serious political dissent (Dune, 1995: 34). 
Political dissent was rising in the Kingdom because of the intensifying struggle between 
Islamists and advocates for modernisation/Westernisation. The presence of Western 
armies in Saudi Arabia created change in two ways. First, an Islamist opposition 
group emerged, who began to criticise the ruling family's secularism and alleged 
corruption. They called for the establishment of a more Islamic society and for putting 
an end to corrupt practices in the government and the royal family. In reaction to that, 
Western educated Saudis began to demand a reduction in the religious and 
governmental control of society and, in response, King Fahd established the 
Consultative Council on 1 March 1992. 
Considering the economic impact of the invasion of Kuwait on Saudi Arabia, the 
political situation bears far more consequences for the Saudi regime. Saudi's position 
in the regional system altered. The invasion acted as a double-edged sword for the 
Saudi regime; first, the threat of Saddam Hussein towards Saudi Arabia diminished 
because the West had greatly reduced the Iraqi military power. Therefore, Saudi 
Arabia emerged after the war as the most influential power in the Arab Gulf region. 
However, at the same time, the Saudi vulnerability was exposed for failing to defend 
itself even after so many years of a huge budget having been spent on purchasing the 
I 
most advanced weapons from the West. The invasion made Riyadh understand that it 
was essential to accommodate Iran into the regional affairs, which. would allow Iran to 
play a more important role in the Gulf region. 
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Another issue that affected the Saudi domestic situation developed soon after the 
Iraq-Kuwait battle. The Saudi regime was threatened by not just the fiscal crisis but 
also the political developments in Kuwait, such as the re-establishment of a parliament 
and moves towards democracy (however limited) which would have the potential 
domino effects on the Saudi society. The Saudi population could be urged to demand 
more say and participation in the formation of its domestic and foreign policy and this 
would threaten the absolute monarchical system. 
Saudi leadership of the Arab world (in the absence of Egypt post-Camp David and Iraq, 
post-Kuwait) was weakened by the evidence of its dependence on external forces for its 
security (including Egyptian and Syrian) and by the ineffectiveness of the Arab League 
in resolving the crisis itself. The regional system was not just penetrated but had 
collapsed, and the US held the Middle East much more firmly in its grasp than it had 
ever done before. 
7.0 The reaction of Iran 
For Iran, just recovering from the devastating eight-year war with Iraq, the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait was a great surprise but, at the same time, it was a chance to achieve 
vicarious revenge against its former adversaries - mainly, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the 
US. Tehran initiated a campaign to show that 'the Iraqi president was an aggressor by 
nature and that blame for the Iran-Iraq war fell squarely upon him and those who 
supported his war efforts, including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the US' (Amirahmadi, 
1993: 108). 
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Although Iran was interested in preventing Iraq from swallowing Kuwait, and was 
concerned about the presence of US forces in the region (MEI, 28 June 1991: 16-17), it 
did not want to be dragged into the conflict between Iraq and the US-led coalition. 
However, Tehran found itself walking on a tightrope. Tehran was in a very delicate 
position because at that time: 
1. A peace settlement with Iraq was yet to be formulated; 
2. Tens of thousands of prisoners of war were still not repatriated; and 
3. The dredging of the Shatt al-Arab was still to be completed (Daneshkhu, 1994: 300); 
Having stated that, Tehran also wanted to improve its relations with the West in order to 
secure economic aid (Pimlott, 1992: 47). Thus, Iran had three choices: 
1. Side with Iraq; 
2. Side with the US, the West and Saudi Arabia; 
3. Keep a neutral stance. 
Siding with Iraq: 
Iran's anti-US sentiments could have motivated Iran to side with Iraq. Iran was 
concerned that the US presence in the Gulf would turn out to be permanent even after 
the threat of Iraq had been removed. Iran was thus concerned that the US was using this 
chance as an excuse to assert its hegemony over the region. Furthermore, radicals in 
Iran pressured the government to support Iraq against the US-led coalition, underlining 
the imperialist designs of the US (MEI, 28 June 1991: 17). The situation was made 
more complicated for Tehran when, on 15 August 1990, Saddam Hussein made a major 
concession towards Iran, by announcing the acceptance of Iran's conditions for a full 
and final peace treaty between the two countries. Iraq was willing to accept the 1975 
Algiers Agreement, which recognised Iran's sovereignty over the eastern half of the 
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Shatt al-Arab waterway (Alaolmolki, 1991: 165). In exchange, Saddam Hussein hoped 
that Iran would side with him in his fight against the West, which he called the Islamic 
ihad' against the 'infidel' (Munro, 1996: 66). According to Pimlott, a more likely 
explanation for Saddam Hussein's willingness to give up the Shatt al-Arab was to 
induce Iran not to join the coalition and to release 'substantial military units from border 
security to engage in any conflict in or around Kuwait' (Pimlott, 1992: 47). Although 
this offer came as a surprise to Iran (Munro, 1996: 147), Tehran did not trust Saddarn 
Hussein after he had breached the 1975 Algiers Treaty. Tehran believed that if Iraq 
was successful in absorbing Kuwait, Iraq would become a maritime Gulf power that 
would challenge Iran later for the Shatt al-Arab (Daneshkhu, 1994: 299). 
Thus, Iran did not respond to Saddam's call for jiliad (MEI, 25 January 1991: 9). 
However, it accepted Baghdad's peace offer. According to Alaolmolki, Rafsanjani 
condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, as well as the return of the US forces into the 
Persian Gulf region. Rafsanjani argued that 'Peace with Iraq is a different issue and 
we hold to our view that Iraq must evacuate its forces from Kuwait so as to create the 
necessary conditions for the re-establishment of peace and tranquillity' (Alaolmolki, 
1991: 165). 
Siding with the US, the West and Saudi Arabia: 
This option entailed a huge risk for the Iranian Islamic regime. This is because Iran 
had just begun recovering from its war with Iraq, and the Iranians still had a vivid 
memory of the role of the US, the West and Saudi Arabia during the war against the 
Islamic regime. Therefore, even though Rafsanjani realised that Iran needed Western 
help for post-war economic recovery, he could not opt for a pro-US position. He 
followed a neutral policy, which proved to be beneficial for Iran. According to 
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Ehteshami, 'as Iran had not offered any military assistance to the anti-Iraq coalition and 
the Arab and Muslim forces stationed in the Persian Gulf, it could claim, in the spirit of 
'Islamic brotherhood', to act as the only effective peace broker between the warring 
Arab parties -a role which the United Nations also welcomed' (Ehteshami, 1995: 153). 
President Rafsanjani announced, in December 1990, that Iran would remain neutral in 
any conflict. Subsequently Tehran asked a senior Iraqi delegation for Iraqi withdrawal 
from Kuwait and the government made it clear that Iran would not support Iraq if it 
extended its attack to Israel as it had threatened (Munro, 1996: 149). 
In its foreign policy, Iran was driven by its strategic interests in the Persian Gulf: it 
believed that a strong Iraq constituted a security risk to Iran. However, Iran 
condemned Saudi Arabia for inviting US and Western forces into the Gulf, as t is 
would decrease Iran's role as a player in the region (MEI, 25 January 1991: 9). It has 
been argued that the main reason for Iran being against the coalition during and after the 
war was that Tehran feared that Iraq would become balkanised. This was against 
Tehran's own geopolitical interests (MIEI, 25 January 1991: 10), despite the likelihood 
that it could expect to inherit the Shi'ite areas of south of Iraq; but at the same time this 
would have raised the Kurdish issue within Iran's own territory. This is one of the 
reasons why Tehran firmly declared its commitment to Iraq's territorial integrity and 
that it opposed any geographical change in Iraq. 
Rafsanjani was able to balance these 'contradictory' goals by adopting a policy of strict 
neutrality. Thus, Iran adhered to the United Nations' sanctions against Iraq, while it 
condemned 'the long-term presence of foreign forces in the region'. By following 
such a policy, Iran gained considerable credit internationally. Its support for Kuwait's 
226 
Chapter Five: The Iraq factor 
sovereignty contributed to the improvement of its relations with Arab and Muslim 
countries (MEI, 28 June 1991: 17). 
Thus, while the Iraqi crisis posed a serious threat to regional stability, it led to the 
acceleration of Iran's move towards a more moderate foreign policy. Iran had already 
adopted a more accommodating policy towards its neighbours and the West to secure 
the required aid to recover from the economic devastation caused by eight years of war 
with Iraq. Furthermore, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait made Iran's neighbours 
appreciate more concretely Iran's regional role (Yetiv, 1997: 62). Thus, the invasion of 
Kuwait afforded Iran the opportunity to improve its relations with Gulf Arab states. 
Moreover, Iranian claims that the real threat to the Gulf had always come from Iraq 
were confirmed (Yetiv, 1997: 62). Saudi Arabia, took Iran's neutrality in the Kuwait 
crisis as a good omen and a sign of Iran's new moderation and its abandonment of 
adventures. 
7.1 The impact of the Kuwaiti crisis on Iran 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait offered Iran a number of immediate gains while incurring 
few losses. Iran re-emerged as one of the leading powers in the Persian Gulf, even 
though it was not involved in the conflict, as Iraq was weakened by the war. 
Although, Iran could not prevent a Western military presence in the region, the overall 
effect of the war was to Iran's advantage, as it gained Western sympathy because of the 
losses it had sustained during its war with Iraq. Thus, Iran requested compensation for 
war damages if Kuwait was to be compensated (Daneshkhu, 1994: 303). 
In Daneshkhu's view, Iranian gains from the Kuwait crisis were: 
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1. Iraq sought peace with Iran in order to secure Iranian neutrality in the war. 
2. Iran felt vindicated, as Western opinion changed favourably towards Iran. 
3. 'The Gulf war altered the strategic balance of power in the region and the Arab Gulf 
states moved closer to Iran as a way of counterbalancing Iraq's aggression' (Daneshkhu, 
1994: 296). 
However, Iran lost out in tenns of influence over Gulf security. According to Gary 
Sick, the US and the West's influence in the Gulf began from 1986 when Kuwait 
requested to re-flag its oil tanker under USA and Western protection, and gradually US 
and Western presence in the Gulf increased to reach its peak during the Kuwaiti crisis 
(Conference in May 2000, Oxford, UK). 
During the Iran-Iraq War, Iran attempted to persuade the UN and the Western world that 
Iraq was the aggressor, and it should be held responsible for the outbreak of the war. 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait afforded Tehran the opportunity to illustrate that Iran was 
the victim of a similar aggression in the 1980s. Moreover, Iran could also openly 
demonstrate to the West and the Gulf Arab states that they had been mistaken when they 
had supported Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war (Daneshkhu, 1994: 298). 
Iran was also vindicated by Saddarn Hussein's peace offer, which was made on terms 
that were favourable to Tehran; namely, to pull back Iraqi forces from Iranian territory 
by the next day; to release Iranian POWs; and to be bound by the terms of the 1975 
Algiers Agreement, which Saddam. Hussein had torn up at the start of the Iran-Iraq War. 
In particular, Tehran was triumphant because it regained the Shatt al-Arab without 
having to fight Iraq again for it. By this, Saddarn Hussein seemed to declare the war 
he had waged against Iran was fought in vain, and the immense suffering and material 
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loss it had inflicted on both countries was pointless (Khaled, 1995: 184). This was the 
biggest victory for Iran over Iraq and the Gulf states, which supported Iraq during the 
Iran-Iraq war (Quandt, 1991: 63). 
For Iran, a prolonged crisis, in the absence of war, was particularly advantageous as it 
enabled Iran to consolidate its short-term economic and political gains, which included 
higher oil prices (which increased Iran's 1990 oil revenue by around $4-5 billion) and 
gaining peace with Iraq (Amirahmadi, 1993: 111-116). In addition, Saudi Arabia and 
the Western coalition wanted Iran to side with them, or at least not to side with Iraq 
which, in turn, would enhance the importance of Iran in regional affairs. Iran's 
long-term security concerns were also served by the weakening of Iraq and other Gulf 
Arab countries (Amirahmadi, 1993: 111). 
By proclaiming a neutral stance, Iran managed to clean up its image and this accelerated 
its reintegration into the Western capitalist economy, which brought several large 
post-war reconstruction works. Iran established better relations with the West, the IMF 
and the World Bank. As a consequence, its trade relations with the West increased. 
For example, the trade. from Germany with Iran was increased by 29.4% to $273.9 
million (EIU Country Report Iran, No. 4 1990: 18). Italy and France also recorded an 
increase in imports from Iran (mainly crude oil and products) by more than 93 and 37% 
respectively in 1991 (EIU Country Report Iran, No. 3 1991: 20). Moreover, both the 
World Bank and the IMF promised Iran technical assistance and the World Bank 
approved a loan for $250 million in mid-March, 1991 (Amirahmadi, 1993: 116). 
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According to Amirahmadi, a quick defeat for Iraq also meant a major victory for Saudi 
Arabia and the US. Iran's total losses as a result of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait can be 
summarised as follows: 
1. OPEC's importance weakened due to the non-OPEC members making up the short 
fall. OPEC lost the ability to set the oil price and Iran's position within OPEC was 
marginalized further after it had attempted to increase its quota production. In 
comparison with Saudi Arabia, which increased its quota from 5.38 mbd to 8.03 
mbd (see table 3.7) soon after the invasion, Iran failed to increase its quota. 
Riyadh's main argument was that it needed to pay for the war effects, while none of 
any other OPEC states was able to gain any significant increase in their own quota. 
Iran had great difficulty in regaining its influence within OPEC following the 
domination of the organisation by Saudi Arabia. 
2. Islamic movements were demoralised, the Kuwaiti crisis showed the division within 
the Islamic world, and Iran realised that the common religious factor could not be 
mobilised to form a coalition in the region (Amirahmadi, 1993: 111). 
3. The invasion of Kuwait marked the beginning of a protracted US stay in the Gulf 
region and the consolidation of the US-Saudi alliance. This, in geo-strategic terms, 
means that Iran's role has been vastly diminished by the Western military 
intervention. The military presence of the US and the Western allies has seriously 
disrupted the regional balance of power. At the same time, the Western alliance, 
especially with Saudi Arabia, and the other Arab coalition partners such as Egypt 
and Syria, has added to the change in the regional power. Iran's position changed 
from that of being a credible rival to Iraq for Gulf supremacy to that of becoming a 
minor claimant at the end of the Second Gulf War (EIU Country Report Iran, No 2 
1991: 8). 
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4. The GCC plus Egypt and Syria security pact (The Damascus Declaration), which 
was suggested by the GCC states, was opposed by Iran as it disregarded its interests 
in the region. Iran advocated a defence arrangement in which it could play a role 
of regional importance. It also tried to use its close relations with some GCC states 
'to undennine US-sponsored Gulf defence plans which excluded Iran' (Abir, 
1994: 211). 
8.0 The impact of the invasion on Saudi-Iranian relations 
Iran's intense opposition to the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq had a positive impact on 
its relations with the Gulf Arab states, mainly Saudi Arabia. Bashir and Wright argue 
that when Iraq threatened Saudi territory in August 1990, Riyadh could not defend itself, 
I 
and so had to rely on 'other friendly states' (Bashir and Wright, 1992: 108) i. e. Syria, 
Egypt, the US and the West after the Gulf War. This led to a change in Riyadh's foreign 
I 
policy towards Iran as Riyadh recognised its needed to accommodate Tehran in regional 
affairs. According to Saudi Prince Khaled, during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia was concerned about Yemen, Jordan, Sudan and Iran. In particular, it feared 
that they would launch a surprise missile attack on Saudi Arabia, and as 'it might not be 
easy in the heat of battle to detect the source of such an attack', he recommended 
greater monitoring and surveillance of these countries (Khaled, 1995: 327). When 135 
Iraqi aircraft flew to Iran, Saudi Prince Khaled believed that Saddarn Hussein had made 
a deal with Tehran to provide a safe haven for Iraq's aircraft (Khaled, 1995: 358). At 
this stage Riyadh was still suspicious of Tehran's intentions. 
To ensure that Iran would side with Saudi Arabia, or at least take a neutral stand, the 
Jeddah-based Islamic Development Bank approved $6.5 million in project financing for 
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small industries in Iran, in August 1990 (Daneshkhu, 1994: 306), suggesting that 
because Riyadh feared, for its own security, it 'hastened' negotiations with Tehran. 
Furthermore, King Fahd attempted to appease Iran by suggesting that Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia had offered financial assistance to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war in order to 
defend Iraq and not to invade Iran. He noted that "he had personally tried to dissuade 
Saddam Hussein from invading Iran and referred to past events between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia as an 'aberration"' (Daneshkhu, 1994: 306, and MER, 31 January 1991). Of 
course, although it is very difficult to prove his words, it shows King Fahd's eagerness 
to appease Tehran in the post-Kuwait war period. 
Subsequently, Iran's 'prompt condemnation' of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait reassured 
Saudi Arabia, and contributed to the rapprochement between the two countries. This, 
however, was 'offset' by Iran's hostility to the arrival of US and other Western troops in 
the Gulf (Munro, 1996: 148). 
Eventually, Saudi Arabia perceived the end of the Gulf War as an opportunity to 
improve relations with Iran. Iran's declared neutrality in the conflict was regarded as a 
friendly gesture (Gause, 1993: 214). In addition, Saudi Arabia wanted to 'hold the 
door open to Iran and offset the activity which Iraq was undertaking in Tehran to seek 
the return of its military aircraft and persuade Iran not to change its neutral stand'. 
Thus, the Saudis took the initiative in restoring diplomatic relations with Iran. Prince 
Saud met Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati in Bonn in early February 1991 to discuss 
the re-establishment of their relations (Munro, 1996: 283), which they did in March 
1991. In other words, the Saudis benefited indirectly from the confrontation with Iraq 
as they were able to re-establish their relations with Iran. 
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However, in the post-Kuwait war period, Iran became concerned about its possible 
isolation from a new regional political order. Thus, Iran endeavoured to discourage 
Gulf states from developing a wider Arab defence arrangement or renewing security 
agreements with Western countries. This aroused Saudi suspicions about Iran's 
intentions and ambitions in the Gulf region, although Iranian military expenditure was 
far less than Saudi Arabia. Iran was trying to rapidly build its military power and 
develop its conventional and unconventional weapons industry. Furthermore, Riyadh 
still believed that Iran attempted to spread militant Islamic fundamentalism in the Arab 
countries and the Muslim world even after mending its relations with the Arab states 
(Abir, 1994: 210). 
Although Riyadh began to improve its relations with Tehran, it was still afraid of Iranian 
domination of the Gulf region. So if on the one hand, Riyadh began to re-establish its 
relations with Tehran, at the same time, it proceeded with its own cooperative security 
pact with other GCC states. The Gulf states plus Syria and Egypt met in Damascus on 
5 and 6 March 1991 and issued a statement of principles, known as the 'Damascus 
Declaration'. It dealt with security in the Gulf and the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the 
former, there was no mention of a role for Iran, and in the latter, it omitted to mention a 
role for the PLO. 
According to Munro, Iran was excluded from the arrangement because Saudi Arabia 
remained sceptical of Iran (Munro, 1996: 344). Consequently, this Declaration arose 
Tehran's anger, as the Iranians had insisted, since the start of the Gulf crisis, that they 
would have a major role in any plans for protecting the stability of the region in the 
future (Amirahmadi, 1993: 113). 
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But as Butt argues, as there were no diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran, it was unlikely that Tehran would be included in any regional security plan. At 
the same time, as Riyadh itself emerged in the Post-Kuwait war as the most important 
and influential player in the region, it would not wish to give up this role to Tehran. 
Additionally, most of the Gulf states remained sceptical of 'Tehran's long-term 
ambitions' (NIEL 22 March 199 1: 10). 
Although Iranian-Saudi relations had been restored by the end of March 1991, some 
significant issues remained unresolved; these included: 'the future leadership and 
security of the Persian Gulf and the traditional sources of tension between Arabs and 
Iranians' (Amirahmadi, 1993: 140). 
In an attempt to improve relations with Saudi Arabia, the Iranian foreign minister 
Velayati visited Jeddah in April 1991; the Saudi foreign minister Saud reciprocated his 
visit in June 1991 and discussed the Iranian pilgrims quota. He also assured Tchran 
that Riyadh did not intend to allow a permanent foreign military presence and that the 
Damascus Declaration was not aimed against Iran (Gause, 1993: 214). At the end of 
the visit, the two sides agreed on a framework for co-operation in the Gulf, on Islamic 
and economic issues, and for continuing the GCC-Iranian dialogue on security matters. 
Iran also scored a major diplomatic success on 18 June 1991, as Riyadh agreed to 
receive 115,000 Iranian pilgrims instead of the fixed quota of 45,000 decided after the 
1987 clashes. In addition, during the HaJ, Velayati, who was among the pilgrims, 
personally pledged to King Fahd that the demonstrators would stage an anti-US and 
anti-Israeli demonstration but would not proclaim anti-Saudi slogans. 
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For Riyadh this would demonstrate how far Rafsanjani could control his own people, 
and the result seemed to be in the Iranian president's favour (MEI, 28 June 1991: 7, and 
Abir, 1994: 211). Hence, in an interview following a GCC foreign ministers' meeting 
with Velayati in Kuwait, in October 1991, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud praised Iranian 
policy since the election of President Rafsanjani, indicating how it had positively 
contributed to Gulf stability and security (Amirahmadi, 1993: i57). 
As a part of its attempt to develop closer ties with the Gulf Arab states, particularly 
Kuwait, Iran co-operated with them within OPEC and expanded economic tics. Iran 
managed successfully to win a $100-million contract from Kuwait to help put out the 
flames of some thirty blazing oilfields (Amirahmadi, 1993: 152). 
9.0 Conclusion 
This chapter investigated how Iraq affected Saudi-Iranian relations through the Iran-Iraq 
war, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and, consequently, the war against Iraq in 
1991, which was led by the West but particularly by the US. 
At the start of the Iran-Iraq War, the balance of power in the Gulf region rested on Iran 
and Iraq as the major powers. Saudi Arabia was less important and could not 
challenge either of the regional players. Relations with Iran had been strained since 
the Islamic Revolution, but while Iraq represented a useful counter-balancing power 
Saudi remained concerned by its pro-Soviet orientation. Thus Saudi Arabia was also 
reliant on its own American sponsor for support. 
During the Iran-Iraq conflict, the balance of power shifted several times and was shaped 
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by the developments of war. At the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War (1980), Saudi 
Arabia attempted to maintain the situation as it had been by trying to appease both Iran 
and Iraq, and hoping that the war would end soon. However, it was soon clear that this 
was a vain aspiration. 
In its efforts to maintain its own security, Saudi Arabia led the establishment of GCC, 
which gave it greater authority in regional affairs as the major partner in a collective 
grouping. Furthennore, the closer US-Saudi relations enhanced Saudi Arabia's ability 
to act as a regional power, strengthened as it was by the supply of America's most 
advance weapons and AWACs aeroplanes. 
As the war progressed Saudi Arabia began to redefine its position. Although the Saudi 
regime used Islamic or Third World countries to mediate with Iran, and worked towards 
an United Nations intervention as an effort to end the war, these acts of negotiation were 
mainly motivated by the fear of an Iranian victory over Iraq, as the consequence of 
which there would undoubtedly have been a change in the balance of power in favour of 
Iran. Therefore, by the end of 1981, Saudi Arabia moved to take Iraq's side, becoming 
its primary financer. 
By July 1982, the battlefield situation had moved to favour Iran, which had succeeded 
in recovering all the territories it had initially lost to Iraq. Saudi Arabia was concerned 
about an Iranian advance into Iraqi territory, particularly as Iran had threatened to block 
the Straits of Hormuz. Both the Saudis and Kuwaitis feared an Iranian victory due to 
the adverse implications on the stability of their own regimes should Iran win. 
Therefore, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait aimed at gaining a ceasefire by offering financial 
compensation to Iran. Saudi Arabia was itself burdened by the war, as falling oil 
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prices affected their own financial situation. 
Between 1982 and 1984 one could argue that the regional balance of power was in thus 
in favour of Iran. Yet Iran was becoming more isolated in the international arena 
because of its consistent rejection of such a ceasefire, with the consequence being that 
the US was increasing its support of Saudi Arabia. The potential was there, then, for a 
shift in the balance of power to Saudi advantage. In 1984, when using the most 
advantageous AWACs surveillance airplanes which had been supplied by the US, the 
Saudi air force shot down an Iranian airplane, causing a major diplomatic dispute 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The event indicated that Saudi Arabia felt a new 
confidence in its own political power, such that it was strong enough to challenge the 
Iranian military domination of the region. 
With financial and other support from the international powers aiding Iraq, Iran began 
to lose its advantage in the war from 1985. At the same time, the religious factor 
intertwined with the political one, and the 1987 Mecca riot led Iran to become isolated 
not only from the West but also from most Muslim countries, with the consequence that 
Saudi Arabia improved its own position relative to Iran to the point where it felt 
sufficiently strong as to be able to cut off its diplomatic relations with Iran. The 
Iran-Iraq War changed the balance of power in the region, diminishing the military and 
political status of both Iran and Iraq and enabling Saudi Arabia to emerge as a strong 
contender in the region. 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait changed the balance of power in the region again. At the 
same time the international players managed to wholly penetrate the regional system 
(not least through the permanent stationing of Western troops in the Gulf region), 
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influencing the balance of power between Saudi Arabia and Iran to a great extent. 
Saudi Arabia had proved unable to alter the course of events. By the end of the crisis, 
Saudi Arabia had preserved its territorial integrity but at the same time its vulnerability 
to other regional powers had been exposed by Iraqi threats to Saudi territory. Riyadh 
could not defend itself, and had to rely on other friendly states such as Syria, Egypt, the 
West and particularly the US to defend itself. Thus despite having emerged as a 
regional power after the Iran-Iraq War, and despite still playing this role following the 
liberation of Kuwait, Riyadh was clearly only able to do so by virtue of its external 
allies and its oil revenues. On the other side of the Gulf, Iran had not been able to 
prevent the international powers from penetrating militarily the region, diminishing its 
ability to regain its former influence in regional affairs. The regional balance of power 
now rested on external 'regional' powers as much as on local regional powers. 
After the Kuwaiti crisis, security arrangements developed within the GCC, which 
essentially focused upon Saudi's assistance to its smaller neighbours. However, these 
arrangements clearly did not provide the capacity to protect Saudi Arabia from 
aggressive action by a major military power, such as Iraq or Iran. On the Saudi side, in 
spite of its efforts to improve relations with Tehran and the pragmatism of Rafsanjani's 
government, Riyadh became increasingly suspicious of Iran's endeavours to rapidly 
build up a substantial military power and develop its conventional and unconventional 
weapons industry. Riyadh had learned from the example of Iraq, that regional military 
powers could threaten the Saudi regime. A US-sponsored regional security 
arrangement (the 'six-plus-two' fon-nula) was implemented (although it was soon to 
dissolve into inactivity) which deliberately excluded Iran and Iraq, considered to be the 
main threats to regional security by both Saudi Arabia and the United States. Thus the 
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war with Iraq had not created a new alliance between Saudi Arabia and Iran: despite 
some warming in their relationship Saudi Arabia still viewed Iran as a threat rather than 
an ally in the regional balance of power. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE REGIONAL SECURITY FACTOR 
1.0 Introduction 
This chapter uses two case studies, Bahrain and the UAE, to examine how the 
relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia evolved throughout the period 1977-1997. It 
analyses how Saudi foreign policy towards Iran changed from the early stage of covertly 
backing the two newly independent Gulf states, Bahrain and the UAE, to the more overt 
confrontation over Iranian regional hegemonic ambitions in the 1990s. Through the case 
studies, one can distinguish that Bahrain and the UAE have played different roles in 
affecting the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
2.0 The Bahraini case 
2.1 Historical background of the establishment of Bahrain 
The history of the Gulf is the history of rivalry among powers of control of the region. As 
was mentioned in Chapter Two, the announcement of the British government withdrawal 
from the region and the establishment of Bahrain in 1968, caused great tension between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran. From the sixteenth century to the mid-twentieth century Iran had 
constantly claimed sovereignty over Bahrain. From the early nineteenth century the 
British government controlled the Omani coast, which included Bahrain. Although Iran 
was not willing to relinquish its claim on Bahrain, it was not able to challenge the British 
government until 1968, when the British government announced its intension to 
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withdraw from the region. This rekindled Iran's ambition to control Bahrain, the Shah 
having increased Iran's regional influence in line with its ambitions on the basis of 
growing economic and military strength. Only after the British government had launched 
the highly sensitive and secret diplomatic initiative to solve the issue of Bahrain, did the 
Shah relinquish his claim over Bahrain, resulting ultimately in Bahrain achieving 
independence in 1970. 
The Bahraini issue was then dormant for a decade until the Iranian revolution in 1979, 
when Iranian ulamas were intent on exporting their version of Islam. They had already 
singled out Bahrain as a place where ShPites were suffering from oppression under S111111i 
rule (Holden and Johns, 1981: 5 11). 
In September 1979, Iraniari Ayatollah Ruhani, a leading figure in the Iranian Islamic 
Revolution, proclaimed that he 'did not agree with the policies of the Shah's regime 
regarding Bahrain and that the Island still belonged to Iran' (Mojtahcd-Zadch, 1994a: 56). 
He also stated that he would 'lead a revolutionary movement for the annexation of 
Bahrain unless its rulers adopted an Islamic form of government similar to the one 
established in Iran' (Mojtahed-Zadeh, 1994a: 56). His view was quickly rejected by 
Iranian Foreign Minister Yazdi (Ramazani, 1988a: 20), who blamed Ruhani's 
4unauthorised' statement on the chaotic revolutionary conditions in Iran 
(Mojtahed-Zadeh, 1994a: 56). However, this careless announcement had incensed the 
Gulf rulers, and their peoples' criticisms of the Khomeini regime (Yorke, 1980: 5). 
2.2 1981-1990 period, minor events caused by the Iranian Revolution 
During this period, the Iranian revolutionary regime attempted to export its ideology into 
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the Gulf states and especially into Bahrain. The majority of Muslims in Bahrain are 
ShPite, yet in politics they are discriminated against by the Sunni minority. The 
consequent resentment of Bahraini ShPites towards the regime made a perfect target for 
the Iranian regime in its efforts to export its revolutionary brand of Islam. 
On 13 December 1981, Bahrain's security forces allegedly prevented a coup, arresting a 
group of terrorists capturing arms and radio equipment. Those arrested were said to have 
been members of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (Mojtahed-Zadeh, 
1994a: 54-55). The Bahraini Minister of the Interior stated that members of this group 
had been trained in Iran. 73 people were charged and sentenced to death on 23 May 1982. 
60 people were each sentenced to 15 years in prison and 10 were imprisoned for 7 years. 
The Iranian government strongly denied any involvement in the plot (Allocock ct al, 
1992: 365-6). 
The Foreign Ministry of Bahrain also made an official protest to the Iranian Charge 
d'Affaires, although the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs quickly denied any 
complicity. The Iranian media commentaries stated that this accusation was part of a 
concerted campaign to tarnish the character of the Iranian Revolution. The Bahraini 
regime was conscious of its inability to defend itself against the unrest within its own 
territories, thus the ruler of Bahrain, Isa Al-Khalifa, turned to Riyadh for help (Zahlan, 
1998: 152). 
Saudi Arabia was also prompt in accusing Iran of supporting and engineering the coup 
and was quick to turn the event to its own advantage. The Saudi Minister of the Interior, 
Prince Naycf, immediately visited Bahrain on 20 December 1981 and declared, without 
any hard evidence, that 'the sabotage plot was engineered by the Iranian government and 
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was directed against Saudi Arabia ....... On the same day Saudi Arabia signed bilateral 
mutual security pacts with Bahrain, thus bringing Bahrain one-stcp closer to Saudi 
domination (Mojtahed-Zadeh, 1994a: 55). 
Iran was accused of supplying Islamic militants when arms were discovered in Bahrain in 
1984 and of sponsoring an apparent attempted coup in June 1985. In Decembcr 1987, 
Iran was again accused of a plot to blow up a Bahraini refinery (Allocock et a], 1992: 366). 
In all of these cases, the Bahraini regime could never prove that Iran directly supported 
Bahraini opposition groups. Engaged as the region was in the prolonged Iran-Iraq 
conflict, this issue nonetheless achieved a relatively minor status in relations bctwcen 
Saudi Arabia and Iran (see Chapter Five). 
After the ceasefire between Iran and Iraq, relations between Iran and Bahrain improved, 
when an Iranian Charge d'Affaires was appointed to Bahrain in November 1988. Full 
diplomatic relations between the two states were later established in December 1990 
(Allocock et al, 1992: 366). However, the honeymoon between Iran and Bahrain lasted 
less than four years, until ShVite and Sunni Bahrainis together staged demonstrations 
against the government's mismanagement, corruption and inability to control 
unemployment. Again, the Bahraini regime blamed the unrest on Iran. In order to 
comprehend the cause of these unrests, which have been a recurrent feature of Bahraini 
domestic politics, one needs to understand the history of the Bahraini uprising against the 
regime. 
2.3 Post Iran-Iraq War, Bahraini domestic unrests 
Bahrain is the smallest state in the Gulf region, and its economy relies totally on oil 
243 
Chapter Six. The regional security factor 
income and the financial sector. Therefore, the economy is vulnerable to any change 
within the global economy. The Bahraini economy plunged into a recession after the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait led to a dramatic rise in the unemployment rate and inflation. 
Accordingly, demonstrations erupted demanding social, economic and political change. 
The Kuwaiti government's restoration of the National Assembly in 1992 catalysed the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (PFLB) and the National Liberation Front 
(NLF) to submit a petition signed by 350 prominent citizens asking the Amir to establish 
democracy in Bahrain (Fakhro, 1997: 180), i. e. restore the National Assembly. The 
opposition leaders met with the Amir; however the regime was not willing to give in to 
their demands. 
Saudi Arabia was closely watching events in Bahrain, as the protest movement could 
become a source of inspiration for similar protests its own lands. In the early days of the 
unrests, the Saudi Interior Minister, Nayef, announced that the security of Bahrain was 
inseparable from that of Saudi Arabia, thus reinforcing the view that weaknesses in any of 
the Gulf states would have a negative effect on the other regimes (Fakhro, 1997: 184). 
Demonstrations continued in June 1994, and again, in October 1994, a petition was 
signed by 23,000 citizens, (comprising both men and women from Sunni and ShPite 
sects), calling for reforms, such as the return to democracy, the end of corruption, a 
reduction of unemployment and a limitation on foreign labour. They cited the need to 
address socio-economic and political problems, such as unemployment, slackness in 
business, forced exile, restrictions on freedom of expression and subordination of the 
press by the government. The leading signatories requested p crmission to meet with the 
Amir to present the petition but their request was declined (Fakhro, 1997: 181). Both 
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Saudi Arabia and Iran were interested in Bahraini domestic developments as they were 
concerned about their own domestic situation. The Saudi regime has a significant 
geographical link with Bahrain, and the majority of Saudi ShPites are located in the 
Eastern Provinces of al Hasa and Qatif. Therefore whatever happened in the Bahraini 
domestic arena would have an immediate effort on Saudi's own ShPites. For Iran, 
although the Shah had relinquished the Iranian claim over Bahrain in 1970, there still 
remained an historical linkage, and some Iranians still regarded Bahrain as being part of 
Iran. 
2.4 The 1994 marathon event 
In November 1994, a minor clash between a group of runners (mixed foreigners and 
locals) and some ShVite protesters caused the most serious unrests in the history of 
Bahrain. On 25 November 1994, the Western runners, passing through some ShVite 
villages, encountered a group of Shi'ites demonstrating against the mixing of sexes and 
the 'indecent dress' (i. e. shorts worn by the runners); and these protests escalated into fist 
fights and stone throwing. On the same night, riot police arrested several people whom 
they accused of participating in the protest. Those arrests triggered further 
demonstrations by the ShPite community as a whole (Bahry, 1997: 48). 
However, things got worse when on 5 December 1994 the Bahraini authorities in 
Manama arrested Sheikh Ali Salman, a ShVite clergyman who had returned from Iran 
after completing his religious studies. Manama accused Sheikh Salman of initiating the 
whole incident (MEM, 19 December 1994: 18). Again, the Bahraini regime arrested 
another two leading ShVite clerics, Hamza al-Daid and Haidar al-Sitri, soon after the 
marathon event. The Bahraini regime's arrest of three of the most prominent religious 
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ShVite leaders led to even more turbulence within the Bahraini Shi'ite community, which 
held further demonstrations against the government. In December, there were many 
demonstrations in several ShPite villages, and when the Amir gave the order to arrest the 
demonstrators this, in turn, led to more disturbances. According to Fakhro, more than 30 
people were killed, a few hundred were injured and between 3,000 to 5,000 people were 
arrested. Among them, were nearly 30 women and 50 children, aged between 12 to 15 
years old. All of those arrested were ShVites (Fakhro, 1997: 18 1). 
At first, the Bahraini regime completely censored media news of the unrest. According to 
MEM reports, news agencies posted in Bahrain were prevented from reporting the events, 
even though, the incidents were repeated on a 'virtually daily basis'. A bid to secure 
Salman's release before being deported resulted in rioting and attacks on private and 
public property (MEM, 19 December 1994: 18). However, the Bahraini regime deported 
all three Shi'a clerics to Dubai on 15 January 1995 (MEI, 20 January 1995: 12). 
Because Salman had studied in Qom, in Iran, the Bahraini regime associated him with 
Iran and accused Iran of backing the whole incident. Manama went on to reiterate in a 
further hint to Iran 'that one neighbour state is broadcasting through its radio station news 
urging people to challenge the authorities and to persist in acts of violence' (MEM, 19 
December 1994: 19). At this stage, without official backing from the GCC states, the 
Bahraini regime only dared to hint that Iran was the mastermind behind the scene. 
Riyadh paid great attention to these developments in Bahrain. Concerned about the 
possibility of similar uprisings in its territory, Saudi Arabia led the GCC states in forming 
the Joint Security Agreement in November 1994. This Agreement contained sweeping 
provisions for media restrictions, extradition and cross-border pursuit of suspects and 
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allowed other GCC states' forces to move into other states to maintain security (MEI, 6 
January 1995: 13). 
The Bahraini unrest cast a shadow over the 15'h Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit, 
which opened in Bahrain on 19 December 1994. The 1994 GCC summit mainly 
discussed the internal security developments in the GCC states (MEM, 19 December 
1994: 20). The Bahraini regime played down the scope and scale of the unrest and hinted 
that it was an Irani an-inspired bid to disrupt the annual gathering of Gulf heads of state 
(MEM, 19 December 1994: 16). 
Although Tehran was certainly sympathetic towards the opposition in ShVite Bahrain, 
however, the Bahraini regime could never prove that Iran was directly behind the unrest. 
However, the Iranian regime supported the Bahraini ShPites against their own regime. 
The Tehran conservative daily, Jumhuri Eslami, identified democratic reform and jobs as 
the two key demands of Bahraini protesters, but asserted they were also demonstrating 
against discrimination against the Shi'ite majority by the ruling Sunni elite (MEM, 19 
December 1994: 19). 
The unrest continued from December 1994 until 1996, and a number of small bombs 
exploded at a prestigious target in Manama. On 17 January 1996, a homemade bomb 
went off in the Meriden hotel, followed by one outside the Diplomat Hotel on II February. 
A car transporting a bomb exploded in Isa town three days later (MET, I March 1996: 11). 
Now, this time with full backing from the GCC states, especially Saudi Arabia, Bahrain's 
regime strongly accused Iran of masterminding these unrests, even though they 
consistently failed to produce any evidence of Iranian involvement. With the GCC states 
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support, Bahrain expelled a junior Iranian diplomat in February 1996 (MET, 1 March 
1996: 11), and recalled its ambassador from Tehran in June. Tehran responded in kind but 
vehemently denied any allegations, saying they were due to 'foreign provocation', and 
even offered to send a delegation to investigate. However, this offer was rejected by 
Manama (MEI, 21 June 1996: 9). 
2.5 How the Bahraini issue has affected Saudi- Iranian relations 
Potential rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia for Gulf hegemony was submerged in the 
1960s and 1970s, according to Yorke, partly because of a shared interest in security and 
partly because of Saudi passivity in the face of the Shah's ambitions. Iranian 
expansionism had nevertheless always been feared among the Gulf rulers (Yorke, 1980: 5). 
The possibility that Iran was implicated in domestic Bahraini insurgency after 1979 
served to fuel these fears, coinciding with Saudi Arabia's own growing regional status 
and ability to confront Iran where necessary over its regional behaviour. The Bahraini 
issue showed that Saudi Arabia could also influence its smaller regional neighbours in 
their dealings with Iran, thereby pursuing its own Saudi agenda. 
Fakhro argues that Saudi Arabia has been able to influence Bahraini policy towards Iran 
because it enjoys leverage with Bahrain for the following reasons: 
Since the opening of the King Fahd causeway in 1986, the ties between Saudi 
Arabia and Bahrain have strengthened; especially as the business flow between 
both countries has grown rapidly. 
2. Saudi Arabia has provided Bahrain with a major oil pipeline that carries crude oil 
directly from the mainland into Bahrain's refinery for eventual exportation. In 
addition, Bahrain receives the revenues of a Saudi-managed oil field north of 
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Bahrain, (Abu Safa), equal to 100,000 barrels per day, on which it is almost 
entirely dependent. 
3. The general expectation is that oil may be fully depleted within the coming few 
years unless new fields are discovered. This would inevitably bring Bahrain 
closer to and make it more dependent upon Saudi Arabia, as its financial 
resources dwindle. Therefore, Bahrain is aware of its dependence on, and is 
eager to appease Saudi Arabia. 
4. Saudi Arabia provides Bahrain with assistance for joint venture and 
infrastructure project financing (Fakhro, 1997: 184). 
The fact that Saudi did so reflects its growing preoccupation with the regional balance of 
power. Developments on its doorstep which influences this balance in favour of regional 
competitors like Iran were necessarily of interest to Saudi Arabia. Moreover, for the 
Saudi regime, any change within Bahrain is likely to have an effect on its own society and 
politics due to the concerns of its own ShPite population, the common monarchical 
political system and the physical geographical linkage between Saudi Arabia and 
Bahrain. 
Although soon after the outbreak of the Kuwaiti crisis, the relations between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran became closer, the 1994 Bahraini unrest demonstrated that the Saudi 
regime was willing to confront Tehran because of its own anxiety concerning the stability 
of Bahrain. If it collapsed, it might well have a domino effect with the possibility of 
similar uprisings to occur in Saudi's own territory which may also change of balance of 
power in the region. Although Riyadh refrained from accusing Iran of the unrest, Saudi 
Arabia still utilized this event to form the Joint Security agreement within the GCC states 
and extended its sphere of influence further. 
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From the case-study of Bahrain, one could argue that Saudi Arabia's reaction towards 
Bahrain is a classic example that supports the neo-realist school of thought. Maintaining 
the balance of power in the region and regime survival are the most important goals for 
the Saudi regime. Therefore, Riyadh refused to relinquish its strong influence on Bahrain 
as it regards Bahrain as being under its own sphere of influence. Controlling Bahrain also 
strengthened the stability of its own regime. It did not allow any dramatic change in 
Bahrain for fear of any potential chain reaction within its ShVite dominated Eastern 
Provinces in al Hasa and Qatif. Therefore, whatever happens to Bahrain in the future, the 
Bahraini issue will always remain at the top of the Saudi regime's agenda and when it is 
involved with Iran regarding the Bahrain situation, the balance of power and the 
regime-survival strategy will always play a major role for both countries when 
conducting their foreign policy towards each other. 
3.0 The UAE islands' issue 
The UAE issue mainly focuses on Abu Musa, and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs dispute. 
The geographical location of Abu Musa and the Tunbs play a very important part in the 
relations between Saudi Arabia, Iran and the UAE. This section aims to show how Iran 
has been claiming ownership of these Islands, as a vital element in its security zone, and 
how in this case, Saudi Arabia has not taken any offensive policy against these claims. 
This shows how Saudi Arabia's foreign policy has been dictated rationally to serve its 
own political interests. According to the neo-realist theory, although balance of power 
plays an important part in the anarchical world system, for Saudi Arabia the UAE issue 
did not have the same importance as the Bahraini issue, because regime-survival strategy 
was the most important factor for Saudi Arabia. One could notice that Saudi Arabia is 
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very reluctant to get involved in the islands' dispute with Iran since the UAE did not play 
an important role in Saudi foreign policy. At the same time, in the economic sense the 
UAE was in opposition to Saudi Arabia, and both were competing in a similar market. 
The two interrelated factors for the tripartite relations, between Saudi Arabia, Iran and the 
UAE, were the Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs dispute, and the formation of 
the UAE. 
3.1. The location of the disputed islands 
For understanding the islands dispute one should first understand the strategic positions 
of Abu Musa, and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs in the Persian Gulf and the history of 
Iran's claim on these islands. 
The Persian/Arabian Gulf is connected to the open seas only through the narrow Strait of 
Hormuz. The Strait of Hormuz, and its shipping lanes, lies between Omani and Iranian 
waters, and about 40 percent of the Western world's oil imports pass through it (Yorke, 
1980: 6). In addition, security threats from the outside world via the sea route cannot be 
prevented without an effective control over this strait. Iran is in possession of a numbcr 
of islands situated at the entrance of the Strait of Hormuz, of which six islands of the 
so-called 'curved line' are of greatest significance. These are the islands of Hormuz, 
Larak, Qeshm, Hengam, Greater Tunb, and Abu Musa (Mojtahed-Zadeh, 1994b: 106), 
they lie at short distances from one another and the Iranian mainland, and form a strategic 
curved line close to the median line between Iran and the UAE. However, three of them, 
Abu Musa, the Greater and Lesser Tunbs have been the cause of dispute between Iran and 
the UAE- 
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Abu Musa is located 42 miles from the Iranian port of Bhndar Lengeh and 40 miles from 
Sharjah (one of the emirates of the UAE) (Mojtahed-Zadeh, 1996: 33). With 600 
permanent residents, it is the largest among the three islands, almost rectangular in shape 
and about 5 km across diagonally. It is particularly well known for its deposits of red iron 
oxide, and the oil field located in the nearby Mubarak oilrield (Mojtahed-Zadeh, 
1994b: 108), though the oil production is not so significant. 
The Greater Tunb is located 26 miles to Bandar Lengeh and 46 miles to Hamra Island of 
Ras al-Khaimah (another emirate of the UAE), and because it is relatively far from the 
entrance to the Persian/Arabian Gulf, its strategic value is less significant. The Lesser 
Tunb is situated 7 miles south west of the Greater Tunb, 24 miles to Bandar Lcngeh, and 
45 miles from Ras al-Khaimah (Mirfendereski, 1996: 118). The Lesser Tunb is an 
uninhabitable island with some significance as a connecting point secondary to the 
Greater Tunb (Mojtahed-Zadeh, 1999: 162). 
However, the value of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs to Iran has always 
been based on their strategic location. They are guarding the entrance to the Strait of 
Hormuz, and their control has traditionally seemed vital for Iranian national security. 
Since the 1930s when the Gulf region began its oil explorations, huge quantities of oil 
have passed via these islands, enhancing their importance. 
The sovereignty of these islands is therefore crucial although evidence for ownership 
before the mid-nineteenth century barely exists. 
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3.2 The impact of the Iranian Revolution 
The Iranian Revolution left Saudi Arabia as the sole guardian of the conservative regimes, 
and of Western interests, (following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), in the area. 
Since 1979, the UAE had been driven closer to Saudi Arabia by external circumstances. 
As stated earlier, the Iranian Islamic regime's wish to export its ideology into the Gulf 
region greatly alarmed the conservative UAE rulers. This forced the UAE to forge a much 
closer relationship with Riyadh. In the troubled situation in the Gulf, the UAE continued 
to rely on Saudi Arabia for policy guidance towards Iran and oil policy within OPEC 
(al-Alkim, 1989: 135). Saudi Arabia in turn struggled to preserve Gulf security and 
stability. 
The Iranian Revolution led the UAE and Saudi Arabia to speculate that the islands issue 
might well be revived. The announcement by Iran's new leaders that all agreements 
made by the Shah would be reviewed, and possibly abrogated, gave strong grounds for 
hope that Iran might give back the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Usser Tunbs 
to the UAE. However, in June 1979, the Iranian Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi, denied 
that Iran was ready to return the islands (al-Alkim, 1989: 159). 
The islands dispute in fact remained dormant until the eruption of the Iran-Iraq War in 
December 1980, which led the UAE delegation at the UN to raise their claim to their 
sovereignty over the islands (al-Alkim, 1989: 162). However, the issue became dormant 
soon after the UN session because the Iran-Iraq War came to occupy the full attention of 
world politics issues, and it was to be another decade before the dispute was able to 
re-emerge in April 1992. 
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3.3 Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser 11unbs' issue re-visited 
Iran's dispute with the UAE over the sovereignty of Abu Musa island, Greater and Lesser 
Tunbs was reactivated in 1992. Prior to these incidents, the UAE Defence Minister 
Rashid al-Maktum visited Rafsanjani, in February 1992. At the meeting al-Maktum still 
'praised Iran for its fundamental stands and role in strengthening peace and security in the 
Gulf region'. He declared his country's readiness to expand cooperation, particularly on 
oil, but made no mention of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs. In return, 
Rafsanjani stressed Iran's willingness to expand ties with all Muslim and neighbouring 
Arab countries (SWB, 11 February 1992). 
The dispute over Abu Musa was resurrected by Iran, which in April and August 1992 
prevented non-UAE nationals (employed by the UAE government) from working in the 
southern, Shaijah-administered part of the island. Furthermore, on 20 April 1992, Iranian 
authorities in Abu Musa prevented a ship loaded with more than hundred non-UAE's 
nationals, employed by the UAE government, from unloading in the harbour. At that 
time, the UAE government censored the whole incident, and prevented national 
newspapers from reporting the event. 
The UAE government immediately sent their Foreign Minister, Rashid al-Nu'aymi, to 
Iran. On 21 April 1992, al-Nu'aymi carried a message from the UAE President, Zayid Al 
Nahyan, concerning issues of 'bilateral interest' (SWB, 22 April 1992). Although the 
detail of this message is still unknown, it seems that at this stage the UAE Foreign 
Minister still wanted to prevent an impasse between both countries. 
The Iranians deported the expatriate Arab and Iranian workers who ran the island's basic 
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services, shutting down essential utilities and prompting many of the islanders of UAE 
nationality to leave for the mainland (MBI, I May 1992: 9). Iranian authorities in the 
island also seized its school, police station and desalination plant. The UAE complained 
to its GCC partners that its resident nationals had been expelled (MEI, I May 1992: 9). 
According to Middle East Intemational's report the UAE apparently asked its partners in 
the GCC not to react to the move, and there was a virtual news blackout in the Gulf press. 
The first mention of the issue made by the Saudi and Kuwaiti media was to report Iran's 
denials that anything was amiss. Presumably this was motivated by a desire not to upset 
relations just as the GCC countries were looking forward to a new era of 'moderation' in 
Iran (MEI, 1 May 1992: 9). 
Iran had played down the incident, denying that it had any intention of excluding the UAE 
islanders or any 'expansionist' ambitions in the Gulf, and claiming that the expatriates it 
removed had no right under the terms of the 1971 deal to be there without its permission. 
It also stressed that Abu Musa was an integral part of Iran, and that Tehran had plans to 
develop and populate it (MEL 1 May 1992: 9). 
Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati declared that: 'Iran is making great deal of efforts for 
development and reconstruction of the southern regions of the country, especially the 
islands of Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz and the Sea of Oman' (SWB, 24 April 1992). 
He emphasised that Iran had put a lot of effort into developing Abu Musa, including the 
upgrading of the administrative organisation in the island from a district to a governorate. 
He also denied that Iran intended to expel the Arab residents of Abu Musa. The Island 
issue would be debated between Iran and Sharjah (SWB, 24 April 1992). 
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Things went quiet until a second incident occurred, in August 1992, which caused a strain 
in Iranian - UAE relations. A passenger ship from Sharjah with 104 passengers aboard, 
was seized at Abu Musa. Iran claimed that the entry of passengers into its port in Abu 
Musa was unauthorised. The Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Morteza Sarmadi, 
said 'entry of foreign nationals into the Iranian island of Abu Musa must be consistent 
with normal procedure agreed upon between Iran and Sharjah'. In other words, 
foreigners were to obtain entry permits from Iranian port authorities (SWB, 27 August 
1992). However, the UAE Foreign Ministry protested by saying that 'the Iranian action 
was not in line with the relations binding the UAE and Iran, and reflected negatively on 
bilateral relations, at a time when the UAE wished to establish relations of 
good-neighbourliness and cooperation with Iran' (SWB, 5 September 1992). 
The dispute intensified in early September 1992, when Tehran began major construction 
works for new military installations on Abu Musa, including an airstrip for newly 
acquired Russian Mig-29 and Ilyushin aircraft, launch pads for North Korean Scud 
missiles, and advanced radar equipment. Accordingly, hundreds of Arabs, mostly from 
Sharjah, and some Iranians had to be transferred to other locations, including mainland 
Iran and the UAE. The evacuation scheme was perceived bý Arabs as a desire on the part 
of the Iranian regime to 'cleanse' the island of its Arab population, who enjoyed 
privileged rights in Abu Musa. Both sides had reasons to escalate the conflict; Arabs to 
"unify" their shattered ranks and consolidate a loose co-operation, and Iranians to divert 
public attention from a worsening political, social, and economic situation (MEI, 9 
October 1992: 5). 
Tehran justified its action which it called an internal security matter, by claiming that the 
1971 Iran-Sharjah MOU granted Iran control over security matters. At first, the UAE 
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demanded direct negotiations with Iran, and Tehran accepted. However, Egypt and some 
other Arab states announced that they were ready to defend the smaller Arab states 
against 'Persian expansionism'. Egypt used renewed fears of Iran to project it s position 
as a vital Gulf security partner. According to Milani, the UAE, encouraged by this 
support, suddenly demanded negotiations not only about Abu Musa but also about the 
two Tunb islands as well. Tehran rejected the proposal. Later on, the UAE insisted on 
taking this issue to the International Court of Justice for arbitration. Tehran rejected this 
suggestion saying that the islands issue was an internal conflict, and demanded bilateral 
negotiation only (Milani, 1996: 97). 
On 20 September 1992 in a press interview the UAE Foreign Minister Hamadan Al 
Nahyan stated, 'Iran's endeavour to give an impression that she desires to resolve the 
dispute through direct negotiations with the Sharjah Emirate, pointed out that Iran's real 
aim behind all this is to isolate the emirate from the union'. He added that 'Iran is trying 
to isolate the UAE from the [political] reality in the Gulf by making positive statements 
I 
towards the Gulf [countries]'. Concerning Iran's claims that its action on Abu Musa was 
legal under the agreement of the 1971 MOU, he asserted that such claims 'are a false 
interpretation of the clauses of the agreement with Sharjah', and 
'Iran is trying to be exclusively in charge of security [on the island], a 
matter which has no legal or political basis; it is only an expression of 
Iran's political determination to control the island. Iran's current actions 
on the island bespeak its intention to change the island's demographic 
composition and its legal status' (SWB, 21 September 1992). 
3.4 The negotiations between Iran and the UAE on the Abu Musa dispute 
On 26 September 1992, the Iranian Foreign Ministry's director-general of Persian Gulf 
Affairs, Mostafa Fumani-Ha'eri, visited Abu Dhabi to hold talks with UAE officials 
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about Abu Musa (SWB, 28 September 1992). The UAE was represented by the head of 
the department of Gulf Cooperation Council affairs, Sayf Saudi Sa'id Sa'id. Iran and the 
UAE began talks in Abu Musa on 27 September 1992. The UAE delegation had 
presented a memorandum to its Iranian counter-part containing the UAE's views on the 
dispute over the three islands, which amount to: 
1. Ending the military occupation of the islands of Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb. 
2. Emphasising Iran's commitment to the 1971 memorandum of understanding 
[MOU] on the island of Abu Musa. 
3. Refraining from interfering in any way and under any circumstances or pretexts in 
UAE's exercising its full sovereignty over its portion of the island of Abu Musa, 
in accordance with the memorandum of understanding. 
4. Cancelling all arrangements and measures imposed by Iran on the state organs on 
the island of Abu Musa, the state citizens and the non-UAE residents. 
5. Finding an appropriate framework to resolve the issue of sovereignty over the 
island of Abu Musa within a definite period of time (SWB, 30 September 1992). 
However, the talks only lasted for 15 minutes. When the UAE negotiators tried to discuss 
all three islands, the talks were suspended. According to a UAE off"icial, 'the Iranian 
delegation which had only been empowered to discuss Abu Musa, had asked for a break 
to consult Tehran' (SWB, 29 September 1992). 
After the talks had broken down, the UAE issued a statement proclaiming that Iran was 
solely 'responsible for not achieving any progress in the talks because of its insistence on 
refusing to discuss the issue of ending the Iranian occupation of the islands of Greater 
Tunb and Lesser Tlunb or to agree on referring the issue to the International Court of 
Justice' (SWB, 29 September 1992). 
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With the whole Arab League members' backing, and Iran's refusal to go to the 
International Court of Justice, the UAE felt there was no alternative but to approach the 
UN. Foreign Minister Rashid Abdullah brought the issue up at the General Assembly on 
30 September 1992 (MEI, 9 October 1992: 4). 
Facing mounting criticisms from Arab states, Rafsanjani defended Iran's position 
regarding these islands, and stated that according to the 1971 MOU, it was decided that a 
number of citizens of Sharjah could live in Abu Musa, in a part of the island where they 
operate a school and a hospital and they go around living as others do. Iranians would 
live on the other side. In February 1992, within the territorial waters of the island, Iran 
arrested a few suspect individuals, holding foreign identity cards. According to 
Rafsanjani, they were armed and had come to Abu Musa island on armed boats, and he 
referred the incident to the UAE (SWB, 21 September 1992). 
The UAE, without officially denying this serious breach of the 1971 MOU, accuscd Iran 
of preventing UAE nationals from entering Abu Musa, by demanding visas from them. 
The UAE also accused Iran of gradual encroachment in Abu Musa, by building roads and 
an airstrip, and of intending to expand its military presence on the island 
(Mojtahed-Zadeh, 1999: 293). 
Several reasons might explain the Iranian action: 
1. In the early spring of 1992, the Iranian President Rafsanjani paid a visit to Abu 
Musa. This is regarded as the first undertaken by an Iranian head of state since 
Iran moved its troops to this island in 1971. El-Issa argues that 'after this visit, 
Iranian authorities began to take a series of administrative measures by which 
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Iran sought to affirm its control and impose its hegemony over the entire island 
and its residents, in a move towards annexation by fait acconipli. ' (EI-Issa, 
1998: 242). 
2. The Iranian action of denying access to the southern, Shad ah-admini stered part 
of the island to non-UAE nationals was a local administrative blunder, a 
knee-jerk reaction to its exclusion from collective security arrangements for the 
Gulf or a calculated move designed to enhance its strategic position in the Lower 
Gulf (Schofield, 1997: 133-4). 
3. Iran wanted to send a message of warning that it was not prepared to forfeit any 
part of its territories (EI-Issa, 1998: 244-5). 
4. The economic crisis in Iran forced Tehran to pursue a course to defuse this crisis, 
even if it meant sparking an oil crisis with its neighbours, in a bid to increase oil 
revenues or its oil reserves. By imposing its control on Abu Musa and the Tunbs, 
it affirmed its ownership of these islands, and all oil wells and oil reserves within 
the territorial waters became its own (EI-Issa, 1998: 244-5). 
5. Iran was isolated internationally by the US and denied a say in regional security 
arrangements (the Damascus Declaration). This incident was a reminder to its 
Arab neighbours that Iran was still a force to be reckoned with in any security 
arrangements in the Gulf (Schofield, 1997: 133-4). 
After the Abu Musa incident, Iran held several large-scale exercises in Gulf water to show 
its military power to its Gulf neighbours and demonstrate that Iran was able to protect and 
control its coastal borders and to confront any operation quickly and decisively (SWB, 30 
April 1992). Again, in May 1992, Iran held another large-scale five-day military exercise 
in Shiraz, south of Iran. It included model armoured, infantry and air units of the ground 
force (SWB, 27 May 1992). Other land and sea military exercises were held in the Amir 
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Kabir dam region in September 1992 (SWB, 26 September 1992). 
Despite this show of strength, Iran attempted to cool down the whole situation. In 
September 1992, the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, Ali Besharati, stated that relations 
between Iran and the UAE would return to normal and those UAE citizens would 'be 
allowed access to Abu Musa island in a normal fashion without a visa' (SWB, 21 
September 1992). 
Milani has noted that current Iranian policy towards the islands is no different from that of 
the Shah. Khamenei, Rafsanjani, and Khatami have repeatedly reiterated that they will 
not abandon or compromise Iran's sovereignty over the islands. Tehran simply cannot 
relinquish Iran's historical claim over the islands, to do so would be political suicide 
because the majority of Iranians support the status quo in the three islands. (Milani, 
1996: 97-8). However, the leaders of the UAE, too, are under pressure from their own 
nationals and Pan-Arabists not to give in to Iranian demands. Their national pride and 
honour are also at stake (Milani, 1996: 98). 
3.5 How the UAE issue has affected Saudi -Iranian relations 
The strength of UAE-Saudi relations post the Iranian Revolution is found in the changing 
Saudi attitude towards the issue of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs. When 
Iran sent troops into these three islands on 30 November 1971, Saudi merely expressed 
sorrow, without condemning the Shah's action. In 1980, however Saudi Arabia declared 
its full support for the UAE in its demand for the recovery of the islands (al-Alkim, 
1989: 131-2). One can see that since the 1973 oil embargo, the UAE had cooperated fully 
with Saudi Arabia over the oil pricing. Without the UAE's full support, the oil embargo 
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might not have been so successful. In 1975 Abu Dhabi finally gave in to Saudi's demand 
and ceded its long-disputed territory to Saudi Arabia. This could explain why in 
December 1980, the UAE delegation to the UN raised their claim to sovereignty over the 
islands for the first time with the full backing from Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, after the 
GCC had been established in 198 1, a bilateral security agreement was signed between the 
UAE and Saudi Arabia in 1982 (al-Alkim, 1989: 132). 
one could argue that Saudi Arabia began to be more proactive in defence of the UAE in 
the 1980s because it was then in competition with the Iranian attempt to develop a 
complete hegemony over the Gulf, rather than being cowed by its military strengths as it 
had been in the 1960s and 1970s. With the backing of the US and the majority of Arab 
states on Saudi Arabia's side, the balance of power between Saudi Arabia and Iran had 
shifted in favour of Saudi Arabia. 
However, in spite of Saudi support for all GCC leaders, King Fahd never explicitly 
backed the UAE in its claims to Abu Musa, and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs. According 
to neo-realist theory, survival is the raison d'etre of the state, 'and states behaviour is 
characterised by self-help' (Quilliam, 1999: 9). Regarding geopolitical factors, since the 
UAE did not cause a security or religious problem to Saudi Arabia during the Abu Musa 
dispute, the Saudi reaction towards the whole islands' issue became lukewarm. 
This was demonstrated on 19 September 1992, when Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi 
Arabia received the Iranian Ambassador in Riyadh and described Iran as 'a very 
important country in the region and ...... called for the expansion of ties between Riyadh 
and Tehran' (SWB, 21 September 1992). At this meeting Prince Abdullah did not 
mention the Abu Musa issue. 
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After the Abu Musa incident the UAE President Sheikh Zayid toured the Gulf and Arab 
states to gain support. The first round of visits was to the GCC states and then Egypt, 
Syria, where he requested Syria to send another envoy to Tehran to resolve the dispute 
between Iran and the UAE. On 26 September 1992, Sheikh Zayid, visited King Fahd for 
the second time to ask for the support of Riyadh. 
However, Riyadh's stand on the Abu Musa dispute is confused. In his speech to the UN 
General Assembly, the Saudi Foreign Minister, Saud al-Faisal, declared that Riyadh 
supported a solution regarding the three islands dispute between Iran and the UAE. 
According to the French News Agency, this only appeared in the written text of Saud 
al-Faisal's speech which was distributed among those present at the UN General 
Assembly. However, this stand did not appear in the Minister's oral speech (SWB, 2 
October 1992). 
The written text stated that: 
We have heard with great concern the announcement made by the United 
Arab Emirates about the failure of the efforts it made with the Islamic 
Republic of Iran to reach a peaceful and amicable solution regarding a 
full recovery of its rights of sovereignty over the island of Abu Musa and 
the Greater and Lesser Tunb islands. We express our support for the 
United Arab Emirates in this context and its demands for the cancellation 
of the measures taken unilaterally by Iran and [the continuation on 
endeavours to solve this problem through negotiations and the recourse 
to the arbitration of international law and international legitimacy (SWB, 
2 October 1992). 
According to Iranian official Newspapers, IRNA report, the territorial claim on the three 
islands by the UAE against Iran and the support of that claim by Arab states and 
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Washington, led Saudis to think that the time was ripe for voicing historical claims. On 
the other hand, as the military machine of Iraq had been smashed, the Saudis were 
tempted to prove that they were the dominant power in the Persian Gulf, and on that basis, 
they decided to exploit the situation for attaining their goals on the basis of historical 
precedence (SWB, 6 October 1992). 
Tehran regarded Riyadh as the most important influential player affecting Arab world 
opinion in this dispute. The Iranian ambassador in Jeddah delivered a message from 
President Rafsanjani to King Fahd in October 1992 on 'the current problems and 
developments' in the Gulf. The message emphasised the ability of the countries of the 
region to solve problems through negotiations. King Fahd thanked the Iranian President 
and stressed the important role of Iran in maintaining peace in the Gulf region (SWB, 14 
October 1992). 
Thus, the Abu Musa issue emerges from time to time between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
Ying Fahd, in his message to the 1994 Hajj pilgrims, asked Iran to give back the islands of 
Abu Musa and Tunbs to the UAE (Mojtahed-Zadeh, 1998: 303). However, it has never 
become a major obstacle improving their relations in the 1990s. 
Again, in January 1996, Riyadh commented that if Iran had valid claims of its own to the 
islands, these ought to be adjudicated by a submission of the case to the International 
Court of Justice (Schofield, 1997: 155). However, because both countries had been on 
friendlier terms since 1995, with officials frequently exchanging visits, the Abu Musa 
issue receded into a minor disagreement between both countries. 
From the beginning was the of Abu Musa, the Greater and the Lesser Tunbs dispute in 
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1971, Saudi Arabia was not willing become involved in a dispute with Iran, because 
according to neo-realist theory, Saudi security had not been undermined by this dispute. 
Therefore, Riyadh kept a very low profile and allowed the British government and the 
Shah to wrestle over the independence issue and the UAE islands' dispute. At the same 
time, Riyadh itself had a border dispute with Abu Dhabi, which could explain the Saudi's 
lukewarm attitude towards the UAE. Soon after the Iranian revolution, the subsequent 
eight-year Iran-Iraq war, Iran was in weaker position, and the UAE, under the support of 
Saudi Arabia, raised their claim to sovereignty with the UN. 
Although, the issue of island sovereignty re-emerged in the 1990s, and the UAE 
attempted to gain support from Saudi Arabia, one can see because of the political 
situation with Iran Saudi Arabia was not willing to jeopardise its relations on both sides. 
4.0 Conclusion 
From these two case studies -Bahrain and the UAE, one can easily detect the different 
approaches of Saudi foreign policy towards Iran. 
For Bahrain, several reasons could explain its importance in influencing Saudi - Iranian 
relations. First, its strategic location close to the Eastern Provinces of Saudi Arabia, Hasa 
and Qatif, and the increasing interactions between them after the linkage of the two 
countries by a causeway. Any political change in Manama will affect Riyadh dearly. 
Second, from the religious point of view, Bahrain being mainly ShPite - if the Manama 
regime changed to an Iranian style Islamic Republic, this would encourage Saudi's own 
ShPite minority to request fairer treatment from Riyadh. 
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Throughout different periods, Saudi Arabia has adopted different approaches towards 
Bahrain. In the early nineteenth century Saudi Arabia itself had ambitions towards 
Bahrain but it was only when it realized that it could not gain control of Bahrain that 
Saudi Arabia was forced to change its tactics to ensure the Bahraini government should 
always consider Riyadh's position. 
The Saudi reaction to the unrest in Bahrain illustrated that the Saudi regime will not allow 
any dramatic regime change in Bahrain to occur, due to its own security concerns. 
Therefore, Riyadh is willing to confront Tehran to guard stability in Bahrain, and this 
situation is certain to continue in the foreseeable future. In effect, the Bahraini issue will 
always be a cause of friction between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
In contrast to Bahrain, Saudi foreign policy towards Iran regarding the UAE was 
remarkably different. First, although, Abu Musa, the Greater and Lesser Tunbs are very 
important for the Saudi oil shipments through the Gulf, they will not threaten Saudi's 
security and domestic situation. At the same time, the Saudi regime learned that during 
the 'Tanker War' the superpowers, especially the US, were very eager to protect the oil 
shipments moving through the Strait of Hormuz, preventing the Iranian government's 
aim of sabotaging the world economy. Therefore, the Saudi regime believed that the 
international community would not allow Iran to utilise these islands to pose any threat to 
the oil shipments. Second, Riyadh regards the UAE as an opposition in competing for 
regional and international markets, and domination within the GCC. Therefore, Saudi 
Arabia's reaction towards the islands dispute remained lukewarm. Only when the UAE 
requested that Saudi Arabia should raise the islands' issue, or when Riyadh needed to 
show its influence and importance within the GCC, would it raise the 'ownership' issue of 
these islands in the media, or in the international arena. 
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In conclusion, Saudi foreign policy can be seen to be driven by neo-realist thinking. The 
state is a rational actor; and security concerns are fundamental in determining Saudi 
foreign policy, whereas economic issues play a secondary role. In conducting relations 
with its neighbours, Saudi Arabia acted according to its own national interests. Security 
concerns dictated its confrontational policy with Iran when regarding the issue of Bahrain. 
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia took a neutral stance towards the UAE issue, because the 
UAE does not represent a direct challenge to Saudi's interests. Therefore, Saudi Arabia 
did not wish to aggravate Iran, over this issue. 
267 
Chapter Seven: The superpowers factor 
CHAPTERSEVEN 
THE SUPERPOWER FACTOR 
1.0 Introduction 
This chapter analyses how the superpowers (i. e. the Soviet Union/Russia and the US) 
influenced relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran from 1977 to 1997 by highlighting 
each superpower's own concerns in the region, their individual policies towards Saudi 
Arabia and Iran, the responses of those states and how these responses affected their 
bilateral relations. The researcher of this project has argued for a neo-realist approach 
to understand international and regional systems. In the context of the Saudi-Iranian 
relations, therefore, the research offers evidence to suggest that the US and the Soviet 
Union's penetration of the Middle East [necessarily] had a consequent impact on the 
policies of the regional players, who had to respond to the changes that were introduced 
by both superpower actors. Therefore, this chapter looks at the superpower policies 
towards Saudi Arabia, Iran and the region, and accesses how Saudi Arabia and Iran 
responded and how those responses affected the relations between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran. In this chapter, the researcher identifies four general variables that help to 
understand the foreign policies of the superpowers towards the region and specifically 
their impact upon the Saudi-Iranian relations. These variables are security (border, 
water, and military presence), ideology (communism vs. capitalism), economic factors 
(oil, arms, aid, trade), and regional conflicts (i. e. the Arab-Israeli conflict, Yemen, the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait). 
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This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section highlights both 
superpowers' interests in the Middle East post-WWII; the second section examines how 
the relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia has been influenced by the superpowers' 
interests and by their need to respond to these policies. 
2.0 Superpowers' interests in the Middle East 
The importance of the Middle East for both superpowers had evolved from the early 
twentieth century from being of minor importance into being one of the arenas for 
competition between the US and the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s. This was 
due to the superpowers' struggle to gain power and influence throughout the world 
vis-a-vis one another. This 'Cold War' (1945-1990) was based on maintaining a strict 
but flexible hierarchy between the superpowers and their allies, as well as between the 
nuclear states and the non-nuclear states. Griffiths and O'Callaghan argue that 
powerful domestic interests on both superpower sides, helped to sustain the Cold War. 
Within the US, the arms race strengthened sectors of the military-industrial complex, 
justified their intervention in conflicts abroad, facilitated the establishment of the 
national security state, and made the President become prominent over other institutions 
of the US federal government. For the Soviet Union, the Cold War justified domestic 
repression, subordinated the civilian to the military sectors of society, and maintained 
an authoritarian government (Griffiths and O'Callaghan, 2002: 36-37). 
The Cold War began as a result of Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe and the 
imposition of Communist regimes in the countries of that region. However, the 
competition between both superpowers in Europe spread into the Middle East when the 
Soviet Union refused to withdraw from Azerbaijani areas of Iran in 1946. Throughout 
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the 1950s and 1960s superpower rivalry manifested itself in American and Soviet 
support for conservative and revolutionary movements and regimes respectively, with 
the emphasis being on maintaining a geo-strategic and territorially based balance of 
power. In the 1970s Arab oil played an increasingly significant role, with the 
domination of the West upon the oil industry in the region posing a major threat to 
Soviet security. Oil created a new inter-dependency between the superpowers and the 
region, enhancing the territorial and ideological aspects of cold war competition. 
By the 1990's, however, the Soviet Union proved unable to sustain its competition (in 
the arms race) with the US as it faced internal economic and political turmoil. With an 
economy that was less than half the value of the US, the Soviet economy, being largely 
unreformed since Stalin's day, had declined since the 1960s due to the cumbersome and 
inefficient central planning system. It was therefore unable to incorporate the 
technological advances that were revolutionizing the economies of the US (Kort, 
1998: 82-85). The Cold War finally ended when the Soviet Union became 
economically exhausted by the burdens of trying to keep up with the far more 
developed, financially richer, and technologically more efficient US and its allies. One 
of the consequences was that the US was able to dominate the international system 
(Griffiths and O'Callaghan, 2002: 36). 
The period covered in this thesis, (1977-1997) thus witnessed a fundamental alteration 
in the impact of superpower penetration of the region, from Cold War to post-Cold War, 
from bi-polar to unipolar intemational systems. 
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In order to understand how this changing superpower involvement in the region 
influenced the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, we need to analyse the 
framework within which their main policies towards the area were designed. 
The Soviet Union and the US had similar interests in the Middle East region. The 
author attempts here to define their interests in terms of the different issues. In 
contrast, although, the US had the similar concerns regarding regional affairs, they got 
involved soon after WWII, when American policies were formulated with regards to the 
Soviet threats. Each American President issued a so-called 'doctrine' to 
counterbalance the threats from the Soviet Union. Therefore, the best way to 
understand the evolution of US foreign policy in the region would be to assess the 
various doctrines implemented in each period. 
2.1 Soviet interests in the Middle East 
Soviet interests in the Middle East region were shaped by four factors that dominated 
Soviet policy thinking in the twentieth century: security, ideology, economics and 
regional politics. 
In tenns of security, basic geopolitical factors were crucial to Russian policies. Middle 
Eastern countries, notably Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, near or adjacent to the Soviet 
borders, fonned a buffer zone to protect Russia's southern border (Joshua, 1970: 1). 
Critically these countries held predominantly Muslim populations who held much in 
common with the populations of the Central Asian Republics of the Soviet Union. 
Thus their internal politics were of great concern to the Soviet Union as well as their 
geo-strategic alignment. 
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In the wake of WW II, strategic concerns were increasingly matched by ideological 
considerations (the spread of communism and the struggle against Western imperialism) 
and economic concerns. The withdrawal of British and French military forces from 
the region created a power vacuum in the Middle East that provided tempting 
opportunities for the extension of Soviet influence for these accumulating reasons 
(Pinchuk, 1973: 65). 
With the oil crisis in 1973, Moscow learrit that oil not only represented an economic 
asset to which it needed access, but also that economics could be a very effective 
weapon to use against the West's interests. Moscow had an interest in gaining (indirect) 
control over this strategic resource, at least to the extent of being able to threaten the 
regular flow of vital oil supplies to the West (Golan, 1990: 17). This increased Soviet 
interest in the Persian Gulf region, moving Soviet influence beyond conventional 
support for Arab nationalist regimes as in Syria and Egypt or efforts to infiltrate the 
regimes of regional neighbours like Turkey and Iran. Following the announcement of 
the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, the Soviet Union immediately expanded 
its naval presence in the Indian Ocean. They signed treaties with Iran in 1968,1972 
and 1976, and also with India in 1971 and Iraq in 1972. This allowed the Soviet navy 
to have access to the port of Umm Qasr at the northern end of the Persian Gulf, and 
develop close ties with the Marxist regime in South Yemen (PDRY). By 1978, the 
Soviet Union was influential in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Libya and the South Yernen. At 
the same time it had signed friendship treaties with Iraq, Syria and Algeria and had 
established full diplomatic relations with Kuwait, Iran and Jordan. 
The Iranian Revolution in 1979 changed the Cold War game in the region. For 
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Moscow, Iran was regarded as critical for Soviet foreign policy, in the light of the 
historical Soviet preoccupation with border security and its own ethnic Muslim 
minorities that were linked with Iran by their common religion. The strategic value of 
the Soviet relations with Iran lay, to a large extent, in Iran's location in the Persian Gulf 
water and its oil production and export capacity (Varasteh, 1991: 46). The revolution in 
Iran, and Iran's immediate rejection of the previous American influence, represented a 
net gain to the Soviet Union, despite the subsequent alignment of Iran with 'neither East 
nor West'. Despite the ideological differences between the secular Soviet Union and 
the Islamic Republic, the Soviet Union sought to capitalize on its fortune by developing 
relations with the Islamic state. 
1979 also saw the Soviet Union attempting to improve its strategic position by its 
invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. While this, combined with the loss of Iran for 
the US, initially improved its Cold War position, the occupation was soon to become a 
military liability for the Soviet Union, and drew it into ideological conflict with Arab 
Gulf regimes (and eventually fighters), who were forced closer to the United States 
security umbrella by the aggressive policies of the Soviet Union. 
Up until its 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union seemed to be having some 
success in a policy of penetrating the Middle East but, within the Persian Gulf, it had 
only managed to establish a client relationship with Iraq and diplomatic relations with 
Kuwait. In the early 1980s, the Soviet Union tried to capiatlise on the opportunities 
offered by the Iran-Iraq War which provided an ideal opportunity for Moscow to play an 
important role in the region, by providing weapons to both of the warring states. 
However, the Soviet economy could no longer sustain the costly arms race in direct 
competition with the US and, as it underwent its own internal traumas, its actual 
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influence within the Middle East ultimately dwindled somewhat. It failed to establish 
itself as a major actor in the Persian Gulf. Only during the Second Gulf War in 1991 
and in its immediate aftermath, did Russia begin to reassert itself in the region. 
However, post-Soviet and USSR status meant that the new Russian policy changed its 
orientation, to what can be best described as being a 'constructive engagement'. The 
policy was not just limited to arms sales, but also concentrated on economic 
development issues, particularly in the area of energy (e. g. pipelines) as well as making 
a revitalised contribution in international for a such as the United Nations. 
2.2 US policies towards the Middle East 
The US had the same concerns as the Soviet Union in regional affairs, namely security, 
ideology, economics, and regional political factors, though they used them at various 
different levels during each period which affected the US perceptions of directing their 
own policies in the region. 
After WWII, the US was concerned about Soviet encroachment into the Middle East 
region. This imminent threat was accelerated by Britain's gradual departure from the 
Middle East in the aftermath of the war. In the post-war era, US involvement in the 
Middle East region was shaped by a series of American presidential pronouncements, or 
doctrines which represented responses to the superpower competition for power at the 
global level, as well as with specific reference to the Middle East. The early Truman 
and Eisenhower doctrines essentially sought to provide US military support to regional 
regimes fighting communist insurgencies, while the 1969, Nixon doctrine (also known 
as the 'Twin Pillars' strategy) ramped up the US interest in the Middle East by 
providing economic and military support to regional 'policemen' nominated by itself. 
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The US still relied on regional states to assume the primary responsibility for their own 
defence but sought to ensure stability in the Gulf through promoting co-operation with, 
and between, Iran and Saudi Arabia (Kuniholm, 19S7: 16). 
The policy sought to keep Iran as the supreme power, but enabled Saudi Arabia to 
remain sufficiently strong (both qualitatively and quantitatively) to provide a major 
supporting role. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 undermined the premise of the 
'Nixon Doctrine'. With the hostage crisis in Iran, the burning of the American 
embassy in Pakistan, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and Turkey's domestic turmoil, 
together with problems in the Horn of Africa and also in Saudi Arabia, the whole area 
subsequently became known as the 'Arc of Crisis'. It was clear that the 'Twin-Pillar' 
policy was in ruins and US policy along the Northern Tier was in disarray (Kuniholm, 
1987: 17). 
The Iranian Revolution in February 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
December 1979 were both perceived to threaten US vital interests in the Gulf region - 
i. e. access to oil and strategic advantage. The 'Carter Doctrine' that was subsequently 
introduced in 1980 committed the US to the military defence of the Gulf from any 
external threats - and was directed specifically at the Soviet Union (Evans and 
Newnham, 1998: 61-62). 
The Reagan administration consolidated the security framework that had been initiated 
by President Carter. The essence of the 'Reagan Doctrine' was the active 
destabilisation of selected target states that embraced Marxist/Uninist and pro-Soviet 
ideologies and policies (Kuniholm, 1987: 17) as well as the consolidation and expansion 
of the Rapid Deployment Forces established by Carter, with base facilities being 
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procured within the 'Arc of Crisis'. 
The Reagan administration had been determined to halt the expansion of Soviet power. 
Their main targets in the Middle East were Afghanistan and Iran. Furthermore, the 
administration emphasised the idea of 'regional influence' and as a result of this, Turkey 
and Pakistan were beneficiaries of improved assistance packages, and the US continued 
to develop a close relationship with Saudi Arabia (Kuniholm, 1987: 17). Saudi Arabia, 
while willing to receive diplomatic support from the United States, and the develop 
economic ties, proved reluctant to make the mistakes of the Iranian Shah and refused to 
allow the US the desired permanent military base facilities within Saudi soil, offering 
instead what was effectively only 'storage' space at Dhahran. 
The Iran-Iraq War offered the US new opportunities to expand its influence on Arab 
regimes in the Persian Gulf, although it also offered threats in terms of a potential 
Iranian victory or Soviet co-operation with either warring party. However, with the 
Soviets largely pre-occupied with their internal troubles and with the war in Afghanistan, 
the latter threat remained largely at the non-military level (the exception being arms 
sales). 
The end of the Iran-Iraq War in July 1988, and the withdrawal of the Soviet army from 
Afghanistan, marked a new beginning in the history of the Middle East. Furthermore, 
the political and ideological map of international relations was altered in 1990. The 
end of the Cold War and the inappropriateness of the Soviet system as being a model for 
Third World states, terminated the bipolar system and the US then became the unilateral 
superpower of the world. 
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The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and the subsequent war in the Gulf 
brought the issue of security in the Middle East to the top of the international political 
agenda. The Second Gulf War in 1991, which was led by the US for the restoration of 
the Kuwaiti government, saw American hegemony ensured. Although the coalition 
has been sanctioned by the United Nations, and had included fighting forces from many 
countries, the US was largely credited with having reduced the threat from Iraq towards 
Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states (Hudson, Johns, 1996: 340) and subsequently 
became their major security partner. 
In return for the protection it offered, the US gained a new level of access to the energy 
resources in the region (Hader, 1993: 42). Riyadh showed its gratitude by agreeing to 
continue supporting the stabilisation of the oil market, accepting a more visible 
American military presence in the Gulf, and playing a more active diplomatic role in 
regional Arab politics, including its backing of the US-led peace process (Hader, 
1993: 42). 
As the Clinton administration came into office in 1993, it faced the challenge of 
ensuring Gulf stability in a new international and regional environment. The 
disappearance of the Soviet Union gave the US unprecedented freedom of action, while 
the Madrid Conference, which had been sponsored by the Bush administration, 
inaugurated a fundamental new phase for the Middle East peace process, offering hope 
that the Arab-Israeli conflict might eventually prove resolvable (Brzezinski et al, 
1997b: 22). 
Clinton was concerned that the American economic base was no longer able to support 
an over-extended military presence abroad. The Clinton Doctrine rested on three main 
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pillars: the preservation of global military predominance; the quest for continued 
economic prosperity; and promotion of a free market democracy abroad. However, the 
Clinton Doctrine differed from previous doctrines, in that there was no open-ended 
commitment to military intervention, nor was there any promise to bear the costs of 
world conflicts (Evans, Newnham, 1998: 68). 
The Clinton administration's strategy for achieving this goal, during the president's first 
term, was its attempted 'Dual Containment' of Iraq and Iran, which was first proposed 
in 1994. This policy was predicated on the assumption that America could restrict 
both Iranian and Iraqi military expansion, and could therefore, bring stability to the 
Persian Gulf. This policy was intended to topple Saddarn Hussein's regime in Iraq and 
also reform the regime in Iran. 
However, it can be argued that this policy was largely ineffective because there was no 
regime change in Iraq and, added to that, Iran continued to support extremist groups 
such as Hizbullah in Lebanon. There was also a lack of support from all other actors 
including the EU, Russia, China and Japan for maintaining sanctions on Iran due to 
their own separate econonge interests in Iran (Brzezinski et al, 1997b: 20). They all 
seemed to desire lifting the sanctions and gaining the chance of receiving contracts for 
their own companies to work on the reconstruction of the country. 
The first Gulf War and the subsequent Clinton strategy of 'Dual Containment' saw 
Iran's reduction from regional power following its break with the United States in 1979 
largely completed. Moreover, the US sought to isolate Iran and to promote its Saudi 
ally to a new level of regional power. However, the failure to truly isolate Iran (given 
European, Asian and Russian connections with that state) and Gulf Arab 
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acknowledgement that Iran remained a significant regional force, meant that Iran never 
truly slipped from its regional status. This chapter, while now moving on to examine 
how Iranian-Saudi relations were affected by this alteration in superpower politics, 
argues that ironically, the end of superpower rivalry, the hegemony of the US and the 
latter's efforts to promote one while demoting the other, did not serve to influence the 
Saudi-Iranian relationship to a greater extent that had the previous superpower rivalry. 
3.0 The impact of superpowers involvement on Saudi-Iranian relations 
In order to fully assess and analyse the impact of superpower involvement in the region 
on Saudi-Iranian relations during 1977-1997, one should first understand how both 
Saudi Arabia and Iran reacted to the superpowers' penetration into the region and how 
this ultimately affected the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia and Iran towards each other. 
Therefore, in this section the research attempts to highlight both Saudi Arabia and Iran's 
foreign policy orientation during the Cold War and soon after the collapse of the Cold 
War, when the US became the unassailable hegemon in the world. It will be possible 
to use the events that occurred between the 1977 and 1997 period as a signpost to 
discuss the impact of the superpowers' influence on the relations between Saudi Arabia 
and Iran. 
3.1 The foreign policy of Saudi Arabia in response to the superpowers involvement 
in the region 
The key to understand the Saudi Arabia's foreign policy would be to examine the 
strength and weakness of Saudi Arabia in the world political arena. Saudi Arabia is an 
unconventional power. It is militarily weak compared to its regional neighbours (see 
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table 2.4,5.6 and 7.1). Its size of population is dwarfed by that of Egypt, Turkey or 
Iran. Yet, it is the world's largest producer and largest exporter of oil, and its oil 
reserve amounts to more than 25% of the entire world (Ahrari, 1987: 70). It is also 
home to the two Holy Cities, Mecca and Medina, which has enabled Saudi Arabia to 
claim a special leadership role in the Muslim world. 
Table 7.1 Evolution of the Principal Gulf Powers, 1970-1980 
1970 1980 
Iran Iraq Saudi Iran Iraq Saudi 
Arabia Arabia 
Manpower 161 95.5 60 240 242 67 
(1,000) 1 1 
Tanks >750 685 90 1,7351 2,7501 380 
APCs >750 >200 -- >825 2,500 >350 
Strike 32 124 24 265 217 -- 
Aircraft 
Interceptor 138 105 51 166 11 136 
Aircraft 
Major Naval 11 -- -- 11 -- 
Ships 
Source: Harneed, M. A., (1986), Saudi Arabia, the West and the Security of the Gulf, (Iondon: Croom Helm) p. 4. 
Therefore, Saudi Arabia's foreign policy is best understood by its fundamental goals of 
regimelstate survival which was of utmost importance in the policy-thinking of the Al 
Saud regime: to protect the country from foreign domination and/or invasion and to 
safeguard the domestic stability of the Al Saud regime. According to Gause, Saudi 
foreign policy is one tool among many used to secure the ruling of the Al Saud regime 
and build a secure Saudi state. However, the pursuit of these goals has rarely been 
direct and clear-cut, because Saudi foreign policy must operate on three levels: first, on 
the international level, dominated by the Saudi Arabia strategic alliance with the US and 
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the Saudi role as an oil power; second, on the Middle East regional level, where Saudi 
Arabia plays a balancing game among larger and more powerful neighbours, such as 
Iran and Iraq; and third, on the Arabian Peninsula level, where Saudi Arabia asserts 
itself as a hegemon over its smaller monarchical Gulf neighbours (Gause, 2002: 193). 
Due to the complexity of the international politics which affects Saudi Arabia's foreign 
policy so immensely means that some policies may seem beneficial for Saudi Arabia on 
one level, but can present serious problems on another level. Saudi's alliance with the 
US has been of great benefit both militarily and economically, but has also exposed the 
Saudi regime to regional attack and domestic criticism. Their leading role in the 
world's oil market has brought them wealth and international status, but also subjected 
them to both intense international and regional pressure. The leadership in the Muslim 
world has brought them the domestic legitimacy and regional stance, but has also 
opened up the competition with Egypt's Pan-Arabism and Iran's challenge against its 
role in the Muslim world (Gause, 2002: 193-194). Therefore, all these factors shaped 
the Saudi foreign policy in the twentieth century. 
3.2 The foreign policy of Iran in response to the superpowers penetration in the 
region 
For understanding the Iran's foreign policy in response to the superpowers involvement 
in the region, one should look into the role and position of Iran in the region/world 
which plays an important role in shaping Iran's foreign policy towards international and 
regional players. Geography has played a key part in forming Iran's foreign policy for 
centuries. However, in the twentieth century due to the superpowers' Cold War game, 
this directly affected the Iran's relations with the superpowers and the regional Gulf 
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states. Geography acted as a single force in shaping Iran's foreign policy in the early 
stage of the Cold War. Historically, fears and perceptions of foreign 
interference/invasion formed the basis of Iran's foreign policy. However, at the same 
time, this contributed to Iran's forceful struggle for both political and economic 
independence from foreign powers. According to Ehteshami, during the twentieth 
century, a combination of factors - geography; the need to secure the country's 
territorial integrity; adverse historical experiences; competition with regional players; 
external meddling with Iran's internal affairs by the Soviet Union, Britain and the US; 
and the oil resource - have all come together to give geopolitics an acute factor in the 
weight of history, as it holds a special place in having determined Iranian foreign policy 
(Ehteshami, 2002: 285). 
For Iran, both in pre- and post- revolution, their economic power and independence of 
action in economic terms have all been seen as the predecessors to gain their political 
independence and establish a regional influence. Therefore, developing the Iranian 
economy was always at the heart of the regime. This has been witnessed during the 
Shah's period of rule and the clerical regime from 1979, all with an attempt to expand 
the Iranian domestic economy and broaden the country's industrial and manufacturing 
base. 
As discussed in Chapter Three, oil has acted as a double-edged sword for the Iranian 
economy. Since the late 1960s, the economics and politics of oil began to influence 
Iranian foreign policy and their national-security strategy. However, this heavy 
reliance on oil wealth, as the main pillar of Iran's development strategy, increased its 
vulnerability to the outside powers and international economic pressures. Although, 
since the revolution, the clerical regime attempted to divert its heavy reliance on an 
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oil-economy strategy, the war with Iraq destroyed the chance for Iran to transfer its 
oil-based economy into having a broader agricultural, manufacturing and industrialised 
base, which limited Iran's ambitions to become the dominant power in the region 
(Ehteshami, 2002: 285,288-291). 
After the end of Iran-Iraq War and soon after that the end of the Cold War, this allowed 
Iran to readdress its economic problem. In the absence of foreign investment and other 
immediately available and accessible resources during the Iran-Iraq War, this forced the 
Iranian clerical regime to 'face the music' and change its foreign policy towards the 
West in general, and the Arab states in particular. 
Due to global dependence on oil as the main source to generate the world's economic 
growth, oil has enhanced Iran's capabilities and its potential to influence the balance of 
power in the region. However, this very point has, caused the intense 
competition/rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. During the Shah's reign, due to 
the oil factor, the Shah forged a very close alliance with the US and this enabled Iran to 
build a substantial military capability in the 1970s and pursue Iran's ambitious political 
objectives in the Middle East. But, soon after the 1979 revolution, oil acted as one of 
the main factors to cause serious frictions with the outside players. 
The ambition towards regional supremacy has long been a feature of Iranian foreign 
policy which could be derived from Iran's long history and its geographic location. 
Iran sees itself as being unique to play an important role in the region. Throughout the 
Shah's period, it can be seen that Iran tried to become the Gulf region's primary military 
power and finally became the main pillar of the Western security system in the Middle 
East. However, since the Iranian Revolution, the clerical regime based its legitimacy 
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on religion, therefore, religion has also emerged as being an important factor to affect 
Iran's foreign policy towards its neighbours. In the early 1980s the Iranian policy of 
exporting the revolution caused huge tension in its relations with Saudi Arabia and other 
influential Islamic actors in the Muslim world, which ultimately led both superpowers 
to change their policies towards Iran. Since the end of the Cold War, and despite its 
more integrationist and non-ideological foreign policy, Iran has still tried to keep pace 
with the politicized Islamic groups in the Arab world and has actively supported their 
activities (Ehteshami, 2002: 286-288). 
For understanding the impact of the superpowers' involvement in the Middle East and 
the response by both Saudi Arabia and Iran, including whether there was any change of 
the balance of power between them, the research attempts to highlight the events that 
occurred during the time scale of 1977-1997. This section will be broken down into 
three main time periods. These periods are, 1977-1979, and the dramatic changes in 
the region caused by the 1979 Iranian Revolution; then 1980-1988; during this period a 
change in the balance of power between Saudi Arabia and Iran occurred because of the 
deterioration in the relations between Iran and the superpowers which was caused by the 
eight-year Iran-Iraq War; and finally, 1990-1997, as this period witnessed the decline of 
the Soviet influence in the region which led to the US emerging as the unipolar power. 
3.3 1977-1979: The dramatic changes in the region 
Between 1977 and the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the region witnessed competition 
between the superpowers, the result being damaging for the regional stability. As this 
chapter has shown, prior to the Iranian Revolution the Shah had proven to be an 
important ally for the US. The Shah had helped restore US-Egyptian relations, helped 
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lure North Yemen and Somalia away from the Soviet camp, and had defeated the 
Communist revolt in Dhofar, Oman, as well as maintaining a monitoring role on Iraq 
and South Yemen. The Shah had utilized the Cold War game between the superpowers, 
gaining American support by threatening to strike up closer relations with the Soviet 
Union. To counter-balance US influence on Iran, Moscow had, during the decades 
prior to the Iranian Revolution, cultivated Iranian trade and joint ventures (such as 
increasing its assistance for expanding the Esfahan Steel Mill). However, 
Soviet-Iranian relations became more limited as Iran increased its ideological and 
political proximity to match US interests in the region. 
Closer proximity to the US carried its own costs. Initially, the opposition in Iran to the 
Shah came from the leftists who were led by the Tudeh (Communist) party, some 
theology students and several members of the bazaar merchants (who believed that their 
economic position was being threatened by the economic changes). When the 
revolutionary movement in Iran began to escalate during the autumn of 1978, there 
arose the possibility of some intervention by Washington, which led the Soviet leader, 
Leonid Brezhnev, to warn the US against interfering with Iran's domestic affairs. The 
Soviets were impressed by the anti-imperialist and anti-Western rhetoric that was being 
openly expressed during the revolution. This, and the inclusion of leftist forces in the 
coalition, all combined to the Soviet's advantage; the Soviet media also started to attack 
the Shah, denouncing him as a 4corrupt and brutal dictator' who oppressed the Iranian 
people. Evidently, the increasingly obvious instability of the Shah's regime presented 
the Soviet Union with the possibility of turning Iran into the Soviet camp which could 
be used to undermine the American influence and their prestige in the region (Varasteh, 
1991: 47). For these reasons, it can be argued that, this is why they prevented any US 
involvement in Iran. Article Five of the Iranian-Russian Treaty, signed in 1921, 
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allowed both countries to prevent the presence of forces of a third party into both 
countries. The treaty also entitled Moscow to move its troops into Iran if it felt 
threatened by any armed intervention by a third party interfering with Iran. To counter 
their position as being the 'third party' the American Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, 
stated publicly in 1978 that Washington had no intention of becoming involved in Iran's 
internal affairs (Hiro, 1996: 127). 
Therefore, one could argue that because of the competition of both superpowers the 
Soviets did not allow the Americans to interfere in Iran's domestic problems, which 
ultimately resulted in the downfall of the Shah. 
3.3.1 The Iranian Revolution 
The Iranian Revolution in February 1979 changed the balance of superpower influence 
over Iran. For Moscow, it initially signified a golden opportunity for improving its 
relations with Iran, because the bond between Iran and the US was broken. Therefore, 
the Soviet Union intensified its attention towards Iran by providing support through the 
Tudeh party. Moscow regarded the revolution as having provided it with the 
opportunity of once more moving into the centre of the political stage. For the Soviet 
Union it represented an effective and efficient way of combining ideological preference 
with political necessity (Varasteh, 1991: 48). Nonetheless, this optimism did not last 
long, because soon after the revolution, Tehran asked Moscow to abandon the 1921 
Iranian-Russian Treaty (Golan, 1990: 29), as it wanted to function free from foreign 
intervention under its new 'neither East nor West' foreign policy; a request which 
Moscow refused to comply with. 
286 
Chapter Seven: The superpowers factor 
Tensions were exacerbated between Iran and the Soviet Union over the Kurdish 
problem. Tehran accused the Soviet Union of stirring up trouble among the Kurds on 
its northern borders and of sending arms and back-up support to the Kurdish 
Democratic Party (KDP). Moscow denied this accusation (Varasteh, 1991: 48-49). 
At that time, Moscow still attempted to keep friendly relations with Tehran. 
The Arab Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, were horrified by both the revolution 
itself and the fact that the US had offered no assistance to support the Shah. This made 
Riyadh doubt any genuine US commitment towards Saudi Arabia. However, despite 
its reservations regarding the reliability of its American ally, anew degree of Saudi 
co-operation with the West was manifested in the 1979 oil crisis (see Chapter Three). 
The Iranian Revolution caused a panic reaction in the world's oil market and therefore 
in order to stabilise the oil price, the US requested Saudi Arabia to act as a swing 
producer. By actively becoming an oil swing producer during the oil crisis, Riyadh 
hoped that it had bought itself guaranteed US protection. During the Iran-Iraq War, for 
its own regime survival, Saudi Arabia was forced to align itself closely to the US, 
feeling threatened by the possibility of Iran potentially winning the war, and the 
potential for a domino effect eventually hitting Saudi Arabia. The Saudi regime was 
fully aware of its vulnerability and therefore, the necessity to rely on the US for their 
protection. 
Thus, the Iranian Revolution drew the US and Saudi Arabia close together despite Arab 
concerns over the extent of US support for the regimes themselves. The anti-American 
and anti-Saudi stand that was taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran, became a unifying 
factor between the US and Saudi Arabia (Amirahmadi, 1993a: 148-149). Soon after 
the revolution, the Iranian clergy claimed that the Gulf regimes were corrupt, and 
287 
Chapter Seven: The superpowers factor 
un-Islamic, so they wished to export their Islamic ideology throughout the Gulf region, 
and further (Sankari, 1982: 190). The new Iranian regime threatened the legitimacy of 
the Arab Gulf regimes, which led them to request help from the US, in order to prevent 
any Iranian intrusion. The US provided Saudi Arabia with weapons in order to 
enhance their defence system and this US involvement in Riyadh's military build-up 
enhanced Saudi Arabia's position to confront any Iranian threats provided thereafter. 
3.3.2 The American hostage crisis 
In 1979, when the Shah fled Iran after a year of growing public unrest, President Carter 
allowed the ailing Shah to enter the US for medical treatment on 22 October. On 4 
November 1979 an angry mob of young Islamic revolutionaries seized the American 
embassy in Tehran, taking more than sixty Americans in hostage, in what was called the 
'American hostage crisis'. It lasted for 444 days and ended just minutes after 
President Reagan took office. The whole event led to a steady deterioration in the 
US-Iran relations. 
The hostage saga exposed the fact that the Americans had underestimated the new 
Iranian clerical regime, and the Carter administration was slow to understand the 
realities of the Iranian Revolution (Kort, 1998: 73). Kort argues that Carter allowed 
himself and his administration to become 'hostage to the hostage crisis'. Carter 
commented that he felt the same helplessness that a powerful person would feel if their 
child was kidnapped. He made the mistake of allowing those feelings to be known 
publicly. While Carter visibly agonized over the fate of the hostages, the US looked 
like a weak and helpless giant as the Iranians mistreated the hostages and taunted the 
president. A humiliating failed rescue attempt in April 1980 only made the US and its 
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president look even worse, and the saga left Carter's presidency in ruins (Kort, 
1998: 73-74). 
The American hostage crisis in Iran led to a dramatic change in the US policy towards 
both Iran and Saudi Arabia. The hostage crisis caused a deterioration in the relations 
between the US and Iran and, at the same time, reinforced the US commitment towards 
Riyadh for safeguarding the stability of Saudi Arabia. This issue changed the balance 
of power between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and for the first time Riyadh began to compete 
with Iran to have a major influence within the region. 
3.3.3 Invasion of Afghanistan 
The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union on 25 December 1979 is regarded, by 
many, as an unprovoked invasion of one sovereign country by another. It caused a 
significant tensions between the Soviet Union, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, due to their very 
different ideological and strategic perspectives (Rabins, 1989.91). 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, (1979-89), became a conflict between 
anti-Communist Afghan guerrillas, the Afghan government and the Soviet forces. A 
year earlier, in April 1978, a successful coup had installed a new Communist 
government in Afghanistan under Nur Mohammad Taraki. However, this new Afghan 
regime was unpopular from the start in that conservative and Islamic country and by 
1979 it was on the verge of totally collapsing (Kort, 1998: 75). In 1979, another coup 
brought in Hafizullah Amin, whose actions Moscow had been increasingly unable to 
control, so Moscow desired to topple this new regime (Smolansky and Smolansky, 
1991: 216). Soviet troops invaded, and installed a new Communist leadership through 
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Babrak Kan-nal, as the new president. Moscow had calculated that Karmal would be 
more effective under its own direct influence (Girardet, 1985: 35-37). 
The Soviet Union considered this invasion to be a defensive action. Moscow 
calculated that they were saving a friendly Marxist regime threatened by both American 
and Chinese subversion. Furthermore, the Soviets feared that Islamic fundamentalism, 
which already had led to the overthrow of the Shah in Iran, would spread via 
Afghanistan to millions of Muslims living in the Soviet Union. In addition, this 
invasion actively affinned the Soviet Union policy thinking of the Cold War era, where 
the Soviet Union intervened in conflicts outside its own borders in order to prevent the 
fall of Communist regimes (Kort, 1998: 75-76). The whole invasion could be regarded 
as being based on the Soviets' ambition to use Afghanistan as a springboard for further 
Soviet advances towards the Persian Gulf in general (Quandt, 2001: 68). 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan once again led Arab states to question the credibility 
of the US as an ally and a defence against the spread of communism. The invasion 
had led to fears in Washington of a possible Soviet move into the Persian Gulf (Al 
Rasheed, 2002: 160) and it was increasingly important to allay these fears and 
demonstrate the extent of America's commitment to the region. Thus the 'Carter 
Doctrine' came into being whereby the Carter administration ordered the formation of a 
Joint Task Force of fifty thousand men, in order to bolster the US Fifth Fleet in the 
Indian Ocean and to safeguard Gulf oil shipments. The so-called 'Rapid Deployment 
Joint Task Force' was a form of the military fire brigade, which was available to race 
into trouble spots around the world, and particularly in the Persian Gulf region. Its 
main purpose was to aid friendly countries in the region (Alnasrawi, 1989: 77). At the 
same time, it also involved renewed US efforts to establish rights to secure bases from 
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which such a task force could be deployed (Evans and Newnham, 1998: 62). In this 
context, Saudi Arabia was viewed as a key ally. Saudi, conscious of the spreading 
enthusiasm for the Islamic revolution on its back doorstep, proved reluctant to comply 
with American requests for base facilities, unwilling to host American troops on Saudi 
soil despite its reliance on its ally for strategic support. 
Iran's stand vis-A-vis the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Moscow's treatment of its 
own Muslim population had added a new religious dimension to the Cold War- based 
Iranian-Soviet relations (Ehteshami, 2002: 287). For Iran, which until 1991 bordered 
both the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, the invasion caused considerable alarm, 
creating the possibility of a similar Soviet attack on Iran. The Iranian clerical regime 
was well aware of the Soviet desire for access to wann-water naval facilities as well as 
the strategic gains that could be made from control over the Strait of Hormuz (Varasteh, 
1991: 49) which traditionally has been under the sphere of Iran. 
However, parallel to its fears, came the opportunity for Iran to unite itself with the 
Afghanistan resistance and establish itself as the leader of the Pan-Islamic movement 
(Varasteh, 1991: 49). It could be argued that this acted as a prelude of the competition 
for the leadership in the Muslim world between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Despite the 
knowledge that there was little that Iran could really do to save Afghanistan from 
occupation, Tehran became more vocal in its anti-Soviet sentiments. As the 
Iranian-Soviet differences escalated, Iran closed its Consulate in Leningrad (St. 
Petersburg) and the Soviets retaliated by closing its Consulate in Rasht (northern Iran). 
Furthermore, Iran also boycotted the Olympic Games that were held in Moscow in 1980 
as a direct protest against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Varasteh, 1991: 49-50). 
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For Saudi Arabia, due to its self-proclaimed leadership of the Muslim world, then, when 
the invasion had occurred, although Riyadh could not prevent or change the outcome, 
the Saudi regime were fully aware that if Riyadh did nothing to show its concern about 
other Muslim states and to assist the Afghan mujahidin (guerrilla fighter) then taking no 
action would ultimately undermine the Saudi regime's credibility among the Muslim 
world. Therefore, following the invasion, Riyadh began to support the Afghan 
mujahidin through funds, anns and its volunteers to oust the Soviet invaders (Eilts, 
2001: 241), although their support efforts had little success. 
The conflict soon became a stalemate. The Muslims were supported by aid from the 
US, China, and Saudi Arabia. This whole episode drew Iran and Saudi Arabia closer 
together as they both condemned the invasion, both provided funds and arms and both 
stood against the atheist Soviet Union. 
One could argue that the competition between the Soviet Union and the US contributed 
to the downfall of the Shah and the collapse of the Win Pillar policy. Ironically, 
however, while Iran and Saudi Arabia were no longer the twin allies of one superpower, 
and while America was increasingly reliant on promoting Saudi Arabia as its regional 
front-man, Riyadh had begun to doubt the American commitment towards itself (or at 
least the Saudi regime). Moreover, Saudi Arabia was unwilling to comply with some 
aspects of the new American military doctrine (notably forward bases). Furthermore 
the invasion of Afghanistan had created common religious concerns between Iran and 
Saudi Arabia. 
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3.4 1980-1988: Iran-Iraq War 
3.4.1 The establishment of the GCC 
Soon after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, Saudi security began to come under threat 
from Iran, and Riyadh immediately asked for emergency US military support. Saudi 
Arabia had always wanted the American military protection; however, as discussed in 
the Saudi Arabia's foreign policy section, the Saudi regime tends to walk on the 
tight-rope in this situation, as it always wants to keep a fine balance between its security 
needs and its domestic situation. Saudi's alliance with the US has been of great benefit 
both militarily and economically, but has also exposed the Saudi regime to some 
regional attack and domestic criticism. When the US offered the military protection 
for Saudi Arabia in the early 1980s, Saudi Arabia still refused to permit American 
combat forces into their territory. 
Soon after the Iranian Revolution, and then the dramatic American hostage crisis and 
finally, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia tested the merit of its liaison 
with the US by pushing for more arms sales. At the same time, it diversified its policy 
thinking by establishing a regional collective power (the GCQ to prevent any possible 
Iranian attack. 
Chapter five discussed the formation of the GCC in 198 1, and the information provided 
suggests that one could argue that with the support of the US, Saudi Arabia emerged as 
an important regional player and during the Iran-Iraq War it utilised this support to 
challenge Iranian superiority in the region for the first time. The establishment of the 
GCC began to change the balance of power between Saudi Arabia and Iran in regional 
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affairs, as one could argue that the GCC allowed Saudi Arabia to balance its reliance in 
the US for military support with a regional collective 'power base'. 
However, the formation of the GCC seemed to backfire somewhat on Riyadh's relations 
with Iran. Iran began to attack Riyadh for its hostility towards Iran concerning its 
support of Iraq, and its role in lowering oil prices in the international markets, and also 
in having welcomed a US military presence in the Gulf (Menashri, 1990: 293). This 
confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran emerged as a regular feature during the 
Iran-Iraq War. 
The Iran-Iraq War exposed the vulnerability of Saudi Arabia because, for the 
regime/state survival, this led the Saudi regime to attempt to forge close relations with 
the US. In response to the threats from Iran, King Fahd, more than any other Saudi 
leader, pursued a special relationship with the US. Long argues that King Fahd was 
the driving force for closer military, political and economic relations (Long, 1985: 119). 
According to Al Rasheed, throughout the 1980s Saudi Arabia had no option but to adopt 
a policy based on 'a balance of dangers' and chose the least dangerous path. Saudi 
Arabia sought important military assistance from the US, but continued to promote 
itself as a non-aligned Islamic country, resisting all US efforts to establish any military 
airbase facilities on its soil (Al Rasheed, 2002: 161). Saudi Arabia was under the 
illusion that this resistance would conceal the intimate relations with the US for fear of 
regional Pan-Arabist attack and domestic fundamentalist criticism. 
3.4.2 The superpowers' initial ambivalence towards the warring parties 
The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War on 22 September 1980, and the engagement of the 
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superpowers with that conflict, had a profound influence on the relationship between 
Iran and Saudi Arabia. In the beginning of the war both superpowers tried to avoid 
any involvement, but both were inevitably drawn into the conflict. 
At the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War, the US insisted on their neutrality, but found itself 
drawn into planning security strategies for the Gulf region. Soon after the outbreak of 
the Iran-Iraq War, Saudi security became under threat from Iran, and Riyadh 
immediately asked for emergency aid from a US military support, which included 
deployment of American AWACs, enhanced air defence, and greater intelligence 
support. The Saudi's request was driven by fear of potential Iranian air strikes 
(Acharya, 1989: 128). Washington's response to Riyadh's request took the form of 
anns transfers which were designed to bolster the Saudi capability against Iran, and they 
also provided an economic and political backing of Iraq in order to prevent an Iranian 
victory in the war (Acharya, 1989: 126). 
The war also presented a series of severe dilemmas for the Soviet Union. Having 
cultivated both Iran and Iraq as assets in the region, it was far to side with either party. 
While the Soviet Union was far from being happy at the prospect of a victorious Islamic 
state on its southern borders, which could incite its own Muslim minorities to rebel, it 
was still less enthusiastic to see an increasingly Western-backed Iraqi victory. 
Therefore, Moscow expressed its own neutrality in the war (Varasteh, 1991: 50), trying 
to maintain good but uncommitted relations with both sides. 
The war nonetheless created difficulties for Moscow's relations with both Baghdad and 
Tehran. The Soviet Union was tied to Iraq by their treaty of friendship and by close 
military and economic co-operation and, in the case of Iran, Moscow still attempted to 
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maintain the economic and strategic interdependence network which connected both 
countries (Vassiliev, 1993: 323). However, once the US began to decisively tilt towards 
Iraq and as the war began to have an impact on oil markets, the Soviet Union was forced 
to engage more closely with events. 
According to Golan, there were signs that the Soviet Union tried to prevent an 
escalation of the Iran-Iraq War (Golan, 1990: 282), and restricted its own military 
supplies to Iraq in the first two years of the war (Vassiliev, 1993: 323), for fears that the 
US would benefit greatly from the hostilities. From 1982, the Soviet Union also 
started favouring its client regime in Iraq. The main reason for this was that the Soviet 
Union realised that Iran's anti-Western rhetoric was matched by its anti-Soviet rhetoric. 
They were also concerned that the Islamic Revolution could spread into the Soviet 
southern Muslim areas. After the Iranian military had pushed back the Iraqi forces out 
of its territory and had invaded the southern part of Iraq, Moscow supplied Iraq with 
surface-to-surface missiles (Golan, 1990: 282), partly as the Soviet Union grew alarmed 
at the possibility of a loss of its own oil supplies from Iraq (Varasteh, 1991: 52). 
As far as US alignment was concerned, although the 'Carter Doctrine' of the Rapid 
Deployment Joint Task Force was put into place in Saudi Arabia in 1980, the most 
important development was the coming to power of the Reagan administration. This 
saw an increased commitment to Saudi security and a strengthening of US-Saudi 
military co-operation. An agreement was reached with the Saudi government, for the 
sale of an integrated package of highly sophisticated weaponry. In total, Saudi Arabia 
bought 60 F-15 aircrafts and 5 AWACs airplanes to protect its territory, and enhance its 
defence system (Vassiliev, 2000: 398). The AWACs sale became a symbol of growing 
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US concern over the potentially destabilising consequences of the Iran-Iraq War 
(Acharya, 1989: 130). 
3.4.3 The AWACs deal 
Soon after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, Riyadh immediately requested the US to 
dispatch four AWACs aircraft in September 1980 to help direct Saudi air defense against 
possible Iranian attacks. Al Rasheed argues that the sale of the AWACs to Saudi 
Arabia in 1982 was an attempt to restore both US credibility as a reliable security 
partner and Saudi faith in US commitment to regional Gulf security (Al Rasheed, 
2002: 160-161). 
In the 1980s Saudi Arabia increasingly became a partner of the US, upon whom it 
depended for huge quantities of arms, economic development and security. The 
AWACs package was considered vital for protecting Saudi security (mainly the oil 
fields) against Iran and countries in which the Soviet Union had military presence (i. e. 
South Yemen) (Al Rasheed, 2002: 161). 
The AWACs package deal between the US and Saudi Arabia was significant for two 
reasons. First, it was meant to enhance Saudi Arabia's capabilities against Iranian air 
attacks. Since most of Saudi's oil fields, export facilities and military installations are 
on the coast of the Eastern Province, the early warning ground radar could not be placed 
in locations forward enough to provide a sufficient warning time in order to intercept 
any attacking aircraft. Second, the important aspect of the AWACs deal was its 
contribution to the US capability for direct intervention in the Gulf. With the AWACs 
and the F-15 enhancements, the US provided 'an extensive logistics base and support 
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infrastructure, including spare parts, facilities, trained personnel, and specialized test 
and maintenance equipment' (Acharya, 1989: 140-1). 
With neither of the two superpowers supporting Iran, Riyadh realised it could confront 
the isolated Iran without fear of any reprisal. For example, the Saudi Air Force used 
the AWACs provided by the US to shoot down an Iranian F-4 Phantom, which they 
claimed was in their airspace on 5 June 1984 (SWB, 6 June 1984). Iran delivered 'a 
strongly worded memorandum to Riyadh protesting vigorously against the Saudi attack 
on aircraft' (Simons, 1998: 260), and this event nearly caused a war between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran. 
3.4.4 Banning the llbdeh party in Iran 
The revolution in Iran had represented an opportunity for the previously banned Tudeh 
party (which was linked to the Soviet Union) to become actively involved in the politics 
of government in Iran. The Tudeh party had been banned by the Shah in the 1950s, 
but soon after the revolution the exiled Tudeh party leaders returned to Iran from abroad 
and opened several offices. During the period of uprising against the Shah, members 
of the Tudeh party in Iran supported Khomeini's anti-imperialist stand, and fon-ned a 
coalition of anti-Shah forces with radical students and the bazaar merchants which was 
the main driving force to overthrow the Shah. Soon after the revolution the Tudeh 
party built up their influence and began to infiltrate the different government 
organizations (Varasteh, 1991: 52). 
When the Soviet Vice Consul in Tehran defected to Britain in 1982, he took with him 
documents regarding the activities of the Soviet intelligence community in Tehran 
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which also included the names of members of the Tudeh party. The British 
government handed these documents over to Tehran who promptly began to arrest more 
than 5,000 members of the Tudeh party, branding them as 'Soviet agents' and declared 
the Tudeh party as being outlawed (www. iranchamber. com). This event closed the 
lines of Soviet influence in Iran. Those documents and the later arrests of the Tudeh 
party members exposed the Soviet-supported Tudeh activities and Soviet political 
intervention in Iranian domestic affairs (Varasteh, 1991: 52-53) 
Moscow's supply of weapons to Iraq, plus the 'espionage' saga of the Tudeh party, led 
Tehran to expel 18 Soviet diplomats in 1983, and to launch a campaign on behalf of the 
'oppressed Muslims in the Soviet Union' (Golan, 1990: 282). The Soviet Union 
retaliated against Iran's hostile action by expelling three Iranian diplomats from 
Moscow (Freedman, 1991: 161), and criticized/blamed Iran for the continuation of the 
Iran-Iraq War, warning the Iranian regime to stop the 'filthy campaign of slander' 
against the Soviet Union (Freedman, 1991: 192). This event raised the political 
tensions and strains between the Soviet Union and Iran, and the outcome was that 
Tehran lost the Soviet political neutrality towards the war with Iraq. Furthermore, the 
Soviet Union began to openly support the exiled Tudeh party which was based in Baku 
(which was then within Soviet territory), through radio broadcasts via 'The National 
Voice of Iran' which demanded the overthrow of the Islamic regime (Varasteh, 1991: 54). 
Nonetheless, it was still in Moscow's interests to preserve some ties with Iran 
(Freedman, 1991: 161), therefore, although in the political arena the relations between 
the Soviet Union and Iran were at a low point, both states still tried to maintain 
economic contacts through several agreements, which included Soviet assistance in 
developing Iranian Steel Mill in Esfahan, in return for which Iran supplied the natural 
gas to the Soviet Union. 
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3.4.5 The effect of the Iran-Contra Affair 
In March 1984, the pro-Iranian Lebanese Hizbullah had captured William Buckley, the 
US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) station chief in Beirut, and later captured four 
more Americans. At the same time, one Saudi diplomat based in Beirut was also 
kidnapped. Hizbullah demanded that 17 ShVites who had been convicted in Kuwait on 
charges of bombing the US embassy should be freed and they also called on the US to 
end its arms embargo against Iran. 
Some of the top ranking officials within the National Security Council of the US and the 
CIA believed that the isolation of Iran would be potentially harmful to the long-term 
American interests in the Middle East. They continued to view Iran ýs strategically 
important to the region, on account of its proximity to both the oil-rich Persian Gulf 
states and to the Soviet Union. Due to the criticism presented by Iran concerning the 
issues of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the expulsion of the Soviet diplomats 
from Iran, they believed that Iran was naturally anti-Soviet. Therefore, they wanted 
the US to position itself in a way that Washington would benefit from the new political 
climate (Hooglund, 1991: 39-40). 
The National Security Council initiated a clandestine policy that had the objective of 
seeking a rapprochement with Iran. The main feature of this secretive initiative was a 
US willingness to sell Tehran weapons, ostensibly for defensive use only, in return for 
Iran's assistance in getting the release of American citizens being held as hostage in 
Lebanon (Hooglund, 1991: 40, Hiro, 1996: 126). To achieve this aim the National 
Security Council used Iran's influence over the pro-Iranian Lebanese Hizbullah. At 
the same time, the officials from the National Security Council believed that by selling 
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desperately needed weapons to Iran, it might improve the relations between the US and 
Iran in the long run. As the events developed and unfolded, relations between the US 
and Iran directly affected Saudi-Iranian relations. 
After 1983, the Saudi authorities were borrowing money from local banks as the 
economic situation had worsened due to the burden of war. This led, in 1985, to 
increased diplomatic efforts by Riyadh to bring the war to an end and make peace with 
Iran. At the same time, under US request, Saudi Arabia began to supply weapons to 
Iran (Abir, 1994: 131) and, for the first time since Iranian Revolution, each country's 
foreign minister made an official visit to his counterpart's capital. Soon after Israel 
had, with US approval, shipped the US-made missiles to Iran, one American hostage 
was released in September 1985 (Hiro, 1996: 127). Tehran showed goodwill towards 
Riyadh by intervening with the Lebanese Hizbullah to free the Saudi diplomat who had 
been abducted in Beirut (Abir, 1994: 131). However, the secret US arms-for-hostages 
deal, the so-called 'Irangate Affair', was exposed in November 1986, as was King 
Fahd's personal involvement in the secret deals (Walsh, 1997: 19-20). Public 
knowledge of this information had a devastating impact on the rapprochement between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, because King Fahd had felt that, although he had good intentions 
towards Tehran, the Iranian clerical regime had betrayed him by disclosing the whole 
secret arrangement to the media. This had undermined his credibility throughout the 
Muslim world. Soon after this saga, one could notice that King Fahd took a very 
strong stand towards Iran in the later stage of the Iran-Iraq War. 
The revelations of the Iran-Contra Affair also had a side effect on the relations between 
Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union found out about the secret 
arms deal between the US and Iran, this alarmed Moscow that it might lose its influence 
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in the Middle East. Therefore, Moscow intensified its efforts to forge closer relations 
with the Gulf states, which paid off in 1987 when Oman and the UAE established 
diplomatic relations with Moscow. 
Since the start of the Cold War, Moscow had attempted to forge close relations with 
Riyadh but without any success, due to the US holding a very strong link with Saudi 
Arabia. However, the oil issue changed Saudi Arabia's attitude towards the Soviet 
Union. Riyadh sought after the cooperation with Moscow in 1987 to stabilize the oil 
price by conducting its first oil minister visit to the Soviet Union in January 1987. At 
the end of this visit, Moscow agreed to cut back its oil production by 7% to boost the oil 
price. Given the fact that the Soviet Union had long wanted diplomatic relations with 
Saudi Arabia, and at the same time could raise its own revenues from the sale of oil and 
natural gas which was 60% of the Soviet hard currency earnings, it is no doubt that 
Moscow would be willing to cooperate with Riyadh (Freedman, 1991: 251-252). 
However, it could also be argued that this visit paved the way for the Soviet Union and 
Saudi Arabia to establish their diplomatic relations in the 1990s. 
6 
The outcome of the Iran-Contra Affair was totally different for both countries. Iran, 
due to its continued effort to fight with Iraq, meant that Tehran was willing to conduct 
an arms deal with the superpower it had always regarded as the 'Great Satan' (i. e. the 
US). However, the revelations of the whole issue, led the US administration to 
withdraw its attempt at rapprochement with Iran, and tilt towards Iraq. For Saudi 
Arabia, although King Fahd was personally involved with the arms sale deal, Saudi 
Arabia mainly wished to show Washington Riyadh's willingness to keep its good 
relations with the US. Soon after the Iran-Contra affair became public, Riyadh 
explored the opportunity to forge its relations (although only focus on the economic side 
302 
Chapter Seven: The superpowers factor 
at this stage) with Moscow. Iran became isolated from both superpowers and the result 
was that both superpowers tilted towards Saudi Arabia in regional affairs, which meant 
that the balance of power in the region changed to favour Saudi Arabia. 
3.4.6 The 'Tanker War' 
The 'Tanker War' began in 1984 when, once again, Iran refused to accept the Iraqi 
ceasefire offer. In response to this Iraq attempted to reduce Iran's oil incomes, in the 
hope that the economic strains would force Iran to accept the ceasefire. To achieve 
this Iraq attacked Iranian oil tankers and the Iranian oil terminal on Kharg Island. As 
Iran could not damage Iraqi tankers or their oil terminals very easily, they retaliated by 
attacking Saudi and Kuwaiti tankers in the Gulf waters which were targeted due to their 
support of Iraq. The attacks occurred in May and July 1984 and again, in February 
1985 (for detail offensive and counter-offensive attacks between Iran and Iraq during 
this period please see Chapter Five). Saudi Arabia feared that if it asked the US to 
protect its sea-lanes this would provoke Iran and would cause internal dissent (Hiro, 
1987: 343). Thus, Saudi Arabia only requested the US to maintain a strong presence 
'over the horizon, in the Arabian Sea and did not request the US to provide any direct 
military protection. 
Iran's relations with both superpowers deteriorated sharply in the mid-1980s. 
Concerning the Soviet Union, the main reasons included the banning of the Tudeh party 
and the expulsion of Soviet diplomats from Tehran. Concerning the US, the 
rapprochement was put on hold by the 'Irangate Affairs', and the consequence of this 
pushed Washington towards promoting the policy of the containment of Iran. 
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The progression of the war played an important role in shaping the relations between 
the Soviet Union and Iran. In 1983, the diplomatic dispute between Moscow and 
Tehran had caused serious problems between them. The outbreak of the 'Tanker War' 
between Iran and Iraq caused Iran to partially change its policy towards the Soviet 
Union, and it initiated the first major positive diplomatic gesture to Moscow by sending 
its director general of the foreign ministry to visit Moscow in June 1984. For Moscow, 
due to its attempt to build upon its economic relationship with Tehran, in the hope that 
this might be the foundation for improved political relations with Iran in the future 
(Freedman, 1991: 193), this meant that the dialogue between both countries still 
continued. 
In early 1986, Iran invaded the Fao Peninsula in Iraq, suggesting the possibility of an 
Iranian complete victory over Iraq. However, as the consequence of this would change 
the balance of power in the region and was something that neither the US nor the Soviet 
Union were willing to face, both superpowers changed their view on the war and 
became much further tilted towards Iraq. 
On the regional level, for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the invasion of the Fao Peninsula 
meant that Iran threatened their very regime survival, and this threat had literally 
reached their doorsteps. Added to that, at the beginning of the Fao offensive, Iran had 
threatened Kuwait not to allow Iraqi troops to use the Kuwaiti strategic Bubiyan Island 
for them to push back the advancing Iranian troops. However, when Iraq had regained 
its territory later in 1986, Iran intensified its attacks on both Kuwaiti and Saudi tankers. 
For Kuwait alone, during this period, Iran attacked 14 ships, bound to and from Kuwait, 
and also seized some Kuwaiti cargoes. Kuwait sought protection from both 
superpowers. 
304 
Chapter Seven: The superpowers factor 
When Kuwait first requested protection from the US in the Autumn of 1986, 
Washington's initial reaction towards 're-flagging' the tankers was unenthusiastic. The 
US believed that there was no evidence that Kuwaiti ships were being singled out for 
such attacks, at any greater rate than those of other Arab states. The US offered 
support only when the news of the Soviet Union had agreed to assist Kuwait, and both 
Oman and the UAE had established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. This 
led to the American perception that Moscow was on the verge of significantly 
increasing its presence and influence in the Persian Gulf. All the above-mentioned 
reasons led Washington to change its mind (Hooglund, 1991: 42-43). Another reason 
was the revelation of the 'Iran-Contra' Affair which pushed the US involvement into the 
conflict even further. 
The revelations about the clandestine US-Iran contact and arms sale deals came at a 
critical time. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were trying to persuade Washington to 
intervene more forcefully in order to protect freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf. 
Therefore, the revelations of the 'Irangate' issue embarrassed Washington among the 
Arab states which later on forced the US to attempt to mend their relations with the 
Arab Gulf states, by offering its naval protection, albeit with reluctance. 
According to Hooglund, initially, Washington did not regard the 're-flagging' of tankers 
to be considered as a major military intervention in the Persian Gulf or any 
confrontation with Iran. The policy was perceived to be an effective means of 
countering the Soviet Union, and redeeming the American tarnished reputation among 
its Arab allies. It was also used to generally divert attention away from the revelation 
of their covert relations with Iran, as that issue which was still causing domestic and 
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international embarrassment (Hooglund, 1991: 42-43). 
The expulsion of the Soviet diplomats from Iran marked the lowest point in their 
diplomatic relations. However, Moscow still tried to maintain its relations with Iran at 
the level of economic engagement, so both countries conducted several official visits to 
their counterpart's capitals. The Soviet leadership changed in 1985 with the election of 
Mikhail Gorbachev who began to separate political and economic issues. In 1986, 
Moscow attempted to improve its relations with Tehran, and thereby broaden Soviet 
options to a variety of states, regardless of any ideological considerations (Golan, 
1990: 282-84). With the initiative coming from Moscow to mend its relationship, 
Tehran reacted prudently. As Golan argues that in the period prior to the Tanker War, 
Moscow's policy had clearly tilted towards supporting Iran in the context of the war. 
Tehran also realised it could benefit from an economic agreement with Moscow, and in 
December 1986 both countries signed an agreement that allowed for the reopening of 
the gas pipeline from Iran to the Soviet Union (Golan, 1990: 285). 
For the Iran-Iraq War, the primary dilemma for the Soviet Union had been the choice 
between its desire to develop friendly relations with Iran, to maintain its relations with 
Iraq, and its need to contain the war so as to limit the opportunities for the expansion of 
any American influence in the region. They also wished to minimize the tension 
between the US and Soviet interests in the Middle East for the sake of gaining a general 
defrosting in relations with the US (Varasteh, 1991: 56). 
However, the Cold War game between the superpowers still played an important role in 
affecting the Soviet involvement in the region. Since the revelations of the Iran-Contra 
Affair, Moscow had been concerned at the possibilities of a reconciliation between Iran 
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and the US (Freedman, 1991: 248) which would affect the Soviet position in the region. 
Therefore, when Kuwait first made the 're-flagging' request to Moscow, Moscow was 
happy to extend its influence/role even deeper into the regional affairs. 
Moscow nonetheless viewed with deep concern the continuation of the war as it was 
threatening the international sea-lanes and vessels that did not belong to either of the 
belligerents, and the disrupted oil supply also affected the Soviet's own economy. 
Therefore, Moscow immediately offered help to Kuwait. However, in doing this, such 
a decision brought conflict between the Soviet Union and Iran. The seizure of a Soviet 
cargo vessel in the Gulf by the Iranian Navy in September 1986 did little to improve 
their relations (Varasteh, 1991: 55). 
As stated earlier, one could notice that, under Gorbachev, the Soviet policy towards Iran 
clearly divided into political and economical considerations. In the political arena, by 
1987 the Soviet Union was reversing its policy towards the Iran-Iraq War. In July 
1987 the Soviet Union began to support the American attempt to secure an immediate 
ceasefire between both countries. From the economic perspective, Moscow still 
attempted to maintain its economic activity with Iran and Iraq. 
One could conclude that the Tanker War drew both superpowers deeper into the regional 
conflict. The US began to have direct involvement in the Persian Gulf, although at the 
beginning of the war it attempted to avoid any military involvement. The Soviet 
Union also had engaged in direct military involvement, although it was more reactive 
than initiatory, due to the competition with the US during the Cold War. However, 
superpowers engagement in the Tanker War also directly affected the equilibrium 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran alienated itself from both superpowers which 
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made the Soviet Union tilt politically towards Iraq. The relations between the US and 
Saudi Arabia were enhanced further which eventually fonned a strong interdependence 
relationship. With the support of the US, Saudi Arabia emerged as [one of] the most 
important regional powers, while the war had exhausted the Iranian military and 
political resources further, and made Iran weaker to resist the superpowers' influence in 
the region. The balance of power in 1987 was already on the side of Saudi Arabia, so, 
when the riot in Mecca occurred in that year, one could notice that the Saudi regime 
dared to have an open confrontation with Tehran. 
3.4.7 The Mecca riot 
From the beginning of the Iranian Revolution and later during the war against Iraq, Iran 
felt that it had been treated badly by the superpowers, especially the US, because of the 
US support for Iraq. Therefore, during the annual Hajj in Mecca, Iranian pilgrims held 
anti-American and anti-imperialist political demonstrations in the name of liberating 
Mecca from the Western infidels. There were also demonstrations and protests held 
against the Saudi regime (MEI, 8 August 1987: 3). These demonstrations became an 
annual event during the Hajj and was one of the main reasons that caused fierce 
frictions between Saudi Arabia and Iran (see chapter three, section 5.2). As the war 
against Iraq progressed, Iranians became particularly enraged by the US decision to 
protect Kuwaiti and Saudi tankers from Iranian attacks. However, the implications of 
the Tanker War meant that both superpowers wished to end the war as soon as possible 
for their own benefit. Therefore, the US and Soviet Union put huge political pressure 
on Iran to force them to accept the ceasefire (see Tanker War section). 
The American UN delegations took the initiative in rewriting a draft resolution that won 
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unanimous Security Council support on 20 July 1987. Resolution 598 called upon 
both Iran and Iraq to follow a step-by-step peace process beginning with ceasefire and 
the withdrawal of their forces back to within their separate international borders (Hiro, 
1991: 309-310). According to Hooglund, Resolution 598 also provided a mechanism 
for the Security Council to impose sanctions on whichever country refused to comply. 
Both Washington and Baghdad assumed Tehran would reject Resolution 598 because 
Iran, which still occupied Iraqi territory, had strongly opposed any consideration of 
withdrawing their troops during several unsuccessful earlier efforts by third parties to 
try and mediate for a ceasefire (Hooglund, 1991: 43-44). 
The Iranian regime felt that the international pressure to force Them to accept the 
ceasefire without punishing Iraq, the aggressor, had come mainly from the US. 
Therefore, prior to the 1987 Hajj, Khomeini had 'called upon Iranian pilgrims to 
demonstrate against the US presence in the Gulf' (MEI, 8 August 1987: 3). AsthelIajj 
incident unfolded, the Iranian pilgrim demonstrations in Mecca caused the relations 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran to reach a nadir on 31 July 1987, when pilgrims shouted 
slogans against the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia. The Saudi authorities crushed the 
demonstration causing more than 400 deaths. Soon after the incident, Rafsanjani 
issued a strong protest against the Saudi regime (SWB, 4 August 1987, ME/8637/A/5). 
Furthermore, crowds in Tehran surrounded the Saudi embassy (SWB, 4 August 1987, 
N4E/8636/i) and one Saudi diplomat was killed. Khomeini blamed the US for the 
incident and also proclaimed that Saudi Arabia was Iran's main enemy (SWB, 4 August 
1987, ME/8637/A/i). As Iran still battled in war against Iraq, Tehran opened up 
another battlefield on the religious front. 
Thus, following these events, Iran became increasingly isolated in world politics, 
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although the Soviet Union had attempted to mend its relations with Iran by having 
reported the Mecca riot in a neutral manner (Freedman, 1991: 272). At the start of 
1987 Moscow began its charm-offensive policy with Riyadh and attempted to forge 
diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia (Freedman, 1991: 251-252). Therefore, 
Moscow did not wish to offend Riyadh due to its own political gains. Furthennore, 
due to the decline of the Soviet economic situation, this began to show that it was losing 
the Cold War battle with the US so, therefore, its influence in world politics also 
dwindled. 
In the Islamic world, most of the Muslim countries accepted the Saudi account of the 
event as it was seen as having been deliberate provocation by the Iranians for political 
purposes. Also, even the most anti-American Arabs had dismissed Iranian charges that 
the US had orchestrated the tragedy in Mecca as being 'pure nonsense' (MEI, 8 August 
1987: 3). Therefore, all the Arab leaders, apart from the Syrian and Algerian Presidents, 
condemned the Iranian pilgrims' action (MEI, 8 August 1987: 3). Due to the Mecca 
riot, Saudi Arabia not only gained support from the majority of the Muslim world, but 
also enhanced its links with the US. The US naval presence in the Persian Gulf further 
weakened Iran's position in the region. On 18-20 April 1988, the US Navy attacked 
Iran's naval vessels and oil platforms (MEI, 14 May, 1988: 13). Riyadh seized this 
chance of having US support to confront Iran in regional affairs, and severed its 
diplomatic relations with Iran on 26 April 1988. This sent their interactive relations 
into the lowest point their link had reached in the twentieth century. 
Thus, one could conclude that superpower support for Saudi Arabia could explain why 
Riyadh had, from 1986, dared to confront Iran on all fronts, and why they competed 
with Iran for influence in the region. At the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War, Saudi 
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Arabia fought with Iran for its own regime/state survival, but clearly at the end of the 
Iran-Iraq War, Saudi Arabia, used the Cold War game as a strategy to determine its own 
foreign policy. Essentially it used both superpowers for its own advantages to gain the 
upper hand in its position in the region and took this route in order to emerge as one of 
the dominant regional powers. However, in contrast to this, Iran, due to its ideological 
and political stand and the exhaustion of its economy by fighting the costly eight-year 
war with Iraq, had antagonised both the Muslim states and rest of the world. The 
result of this was that Iran became weakened in both the political and economic arenas 
and gradually lost its competition against Saudi Arabia gaining dominance in the Gulf. 
The end of Iran-Iraq War and soon afterwards, the end of the Cold War changed the 
international political situation and saw the US emerge as the unassailable unipowcr in 
the world. This development and dramatic change also played the definitive role to 
shape the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the 1990s. 
3.5 1990-1997: The decline of Soviet influence in the region and US emergence as 
the unipolar power 
3.5.1 How the end of the Cold War affected the regional balance of power 
With the end of the Cold War, the distribution of capabilities and the legitimating myths 
of the superpowers no longer structured international politics. The consequence was 
that the superpowers were much less interested in containing their old allies' domestic 
turmoil, for fear of losing them to the other camps. The Cold War had significantly 
affected economic and political developments in the Middle East due to both 
superpowers having each cultivated their own allies in the region. For example, the 
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control and price of oil was the result of political more than economic considerations. 
The US tolerated not only the nationalization of the holding of the international oil 
companies in the Middle East states, but also major and discontinuous increases in the 
price of oil. Krasner argued that this development could have been avoided if it had 
not been due to the geo-strategic calculations involved (Krasner, 1997: 201-202). 
Following the end of the Cold War, conflict among oil producing states in the Persian 
Gulf became one of the most dominant factors which caused regional frictions. The 
superpowers were no longer in a position to constrain their allies, which was something 
that they were motivated to do during the Cold War because of their fear that they could 
be drawn into a mutually undesired conflict (Krasner, 1997: 202). 
With the end of the Communist threat and the relative decline in American economic 
power, the US shifted its ideological and political considerations of policy into 
economic policy. For this reason, the US has tried to maintain close economic ties 
with the Gulf states through the activities of its multinational corporations, military 
sales and oil. Soon after the end of the Cold War, the US became - and still is - the 
external balancer against any effort by a Middle Eastern state, such as Iran and Iraq, to 
exercise hegemony over the Persian Gulf which could lead to steep oil price increases 
(Krasner, 1997: 206). 
The balance of power between Saudi Arabia and Iran became problematic, because 
there were huge incompatibilities between economic wealth and military capability. 
For example, Saudi Arabia controls large oil reserves and has a small population. 
Their military resources are limited when compared to those of Iran and Iraq whose oil 
revenues have always been absorbed by the demands of their much larger populations. 
Any country that is incapable of defending itself from outside powers, will always be a 
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target for the militarily stronger neighbours. 
Although the US emerged as the unipower in the world soon after the end of the Cold 
War, there was still an inherent problem for the US in trying to establish the credibility 
of the American commitment to defend the weaker oil-exporting states of the Arab 
world. The Arab world still had in their memory how the US had abandoned the Shah 
at a critical time. At the same time, there will always be an incompatibility between 
the interests of the US and its military commitments and power. 
With the end of the Cold War, the necessity of giving priority to global stability in 
international relations with respect to regional circles began to fade away. Tendencies 
towards regionalism are presently increasing, both economically and politically 
(Aliboni, 1997: 216). For this reason, states in the Persian Gulf are reacquiring a 
degree of freedom in conducting their foreign policy. One could notice that soon after 
the end of the Cold War, both Saudi Arabia and Iran attempted to conduct their own 
foreign policy towards each other, and their relations could be best described as 
rapprochement. Nevertheless, according to the neo-realist framework, both states still 
tried to dominate the Gulf regional affairs and become the dominant players in the game 
of the balance of power in the Persian Gulf. 
3.5.2 The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait came as a surprise to the whole world, especially since 
Saddarn Hussein's delegates had just begun negotiating with the Kuwaitis in Jeddah on 
the previous day (Abir, 1994: 173). The invasion and the subsequent collapse of the 
Soviet Union in December 1991, brought a new horizon throughout the region. The 
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dissolution of the Soviet Union led to the formation of the Russian Federation led by 
Boris Yeltsin. The relinquishment of territory in Transcaucasia and Central Asia 
ended three hundred years of imperial expansion, and meant that Russia was one-step 
removed from being able to directly influence the Middle East (Rubinstein, 2001: 75). 
When Russia lost 24 per cent of its territory in December 1991, it also lost some of the 
major oil-producing areas of the state, and became dependent on the oil in the Middle 
East (Rubinstein, 2001: 89). Russia's influence dwindled to such an extent in the 
region that it is unlikely to ever be able to equally compete with the US in regional 
affairs again. 
Saddarn Hussein's seizure of Kuwait constituted 'an immediate threat' to Saudi Arabia 
as well as threatening the oil and strategic interests of the US (Khaled, 1995: 168). 
Soon after that, President George Bush Snr. offered military protection for Saudi Arabia, 
and promised to withdraw US forces from Saudi territory at the end of the war. King 
Fahd accepted the US protection on 6 August 1990, and the Americans moved into 
Saudi Arabia. This caused a very strong reaction from Tehran, due to its own 
ambitions, as Iran did not wish any foreign power, especially US forces, to be present in 
the region. 
By proclaiming a neutral stand by refusing to support either Iraq or the US coalition, 
Iran managed to clean up its image and establish much better relations not only with the 
West, the IMF and the World Bank, but also with its Arab neighbours. Through this 
neutral stance, Iran accelerated its reintegration into the Western capitalist economy and 
encouraged Riyadh to begin its rapprochement with Iran because it needed Iran to 
counterbalance the threat from Iraq. The US however, was to be the biggest obstacle 
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for Tehran's reconciliation with Saudi Arabia. 
As Muir argues, the main reason for Iran being against the US-Saudi coalition during 
and after the war was because Tehran feared Iraq would become another state of 
Balkanisation and this was against Tehran's own geopolitical interests (MEI, 25 January 
1991: 10). Although Iran could expect to inherit the ShPite areas of southern Iraq, this 
would raise the Kurdish issue within Iran's own territory. Tehran, therefore, firmly 
declared its commitment to Iraq's territorial integrity. 
Iran was also interested in preventing Iraq from swallowing Kuwait, but it was more 
concerned about the presence of US forces (MEI, 28 June 1991: 16-17), which 
challenged the Iranian main ambition for gaining greater influence in the region. This 
could explain why Tehran resisted the presence of foreign powers in the region, and 
especially the US. 
Rapprochement between the Gulf states and Tehran was met with disdain from 
Washington. Tehran advocated organising a regional defence pact among the Persian 
Gulf states which would give Iran the dominant position. With Washington's backing, 
Riyadh allied itself with other Gulf states, plus Syria and Egypt, to from its own defence 
pact, the so-called 'Damascus Declaration' in 1991, and this excluded Iran. This 
declaration totally alienated Iran, and caused resentment from Tehran. 
3.5.3 The regional defence pact: 'six plus two9 
Soon after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, there was much enthusiasm to create a viable 
regional security arrangement. The Secretary of State, James Baker, even mentioned 
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the possibility of Iran participating in such an arrangement. However, President 
Clinton was against any Iranian participation in the Gulf security pact because of firrn 
belief that Iran supported Islamic terrorist groups in several countries (Milani, 1996: 95). 
At that time, Iran claimed that there was a power vacuum in the region created by the 
lack of an all-embracing and all-round security system. This, Tehran believed, 
constituted a threat for regional security and stability. Iran wanted regional security 
and non-security problems to be resolved within the framework of a fruitful and useful 
system for everyone, on the basis of collective interests, and through friendly 
negotiations (SWB, 6 October 1992). Therefore, Iran believed the GCC's philosophy 
must expand and undergo reform in order to admit Iran. 
With the US strongly opposed to allowing Iran to join any regional security pact, and 
with Clinton's support, King Fahd refused to allow Iran to join the Gulf security pact. 
This meant that Riyadh was not willing, in any way, to allow Tehran to share its 
dominate position in the region, or to play an important role in the regional affairs. For 
these reasons, during the last stages of the war against Iraq, it was agreed between 
Egypt, Syria and the GCC countries to form a regional defence pact, the so-called 
'Damascus Declaration', (i. e. six plus two), on 6 March 1991. The main propose for 
this was to maintain a strong 'Arab army' to protect the Gulf states. This declaration 
represented an Arab solution to the Gulf security predicament which totally excluded 
Iran from playing any significant role in regional affairs (Gargash, 1996: 142-43) 
Meanwhile, Iran continued to pursue its traditional strategy of excluding any foreign 
presence from the Gulf, insisting that Gulf security was the responsibility of the Gulf 
regimes themselves. Iran realised that, although a Western presence would not 
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threaten the position of the region's smaller states, it would challenge Iran's role as the 
major regional power (Gargash, 1996: 143). However, although Saudi Arabia, the 
driving force behind the GCC, and the US recognised that a viable regional security 
apparatus must include Iran, neither state was prepared to officially accept this notion 
(Milani, 1996: 95). 
Nevertheless, Riyadh recognised that it needed to accommodate Tehran in regional 
affairs. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait forced Riyadh to realise that buying the most 
advanced weapons could not prevent external threats, and that it had to rely on 'other 
friendly states' (Bashir and Wright, 1992: 108) i. e. Syria, Egypt, the US and the West. 
Therefore, Saudi Arabia re-established its diplomatic relations with Iran in March 1991, 
relaxed Iran's pilgrim quota, and even allowed the Iranian pilgrims to demonstrate 
against America and Israel in the 1991 Haj season (Abir, 1994: 210-211). Ironically, 
these kind of demonstrations that were held by the Iranian pilgrims in Mecca had been 
the main reason that had caused Saudi Arabia to have broken their diplomatic relations 
with Iran in 1988. The whole event in 1991 demonstrated tha, t since the end of the 
Cold War, Saudi Arabia had obtained a degree of freedom in conducting its own foreign 
policy towards Iran, and utilized the support of the US for its own advantage when 
dealing with Iran. However, at the same time, Riyadh was not willing to relinquish its 
dominance of power and influence in the region, and understood that with US support, 
Iran could not match Saudi Arabia's influence in regional affairs. 
3.5.4 The 'Dual Containment' 
Relations between the US and Iran affected Saudi-Iranian relations. in part because 
Tehran hosted an anti-Madrid conference in February 1993, Washington imposed the 
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'Dual Containment' policy and economic sanctions on Iraq and Iran in May of that year. 
The Clinton administration argued this would protect Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf 
monarchies and enable Israel and the moderate Arab states to move towards peace 
(Brzezinski et al, 1997b: 22). 
The issue of the renewal of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in early 1995, further 
underlined fundamental differences between Iran and the US. Tehran refused to renew 
the treaty, as long as Israel had not signed. Israel and the US claimed that Iran 'was 
close to developing a nuclear weapon, although the International Atomic Energy 
Agency failed to find sufficient evidence to prove the claim and Iran also denied the 
accusation (EIU Iran Country Profile, 1995: 9). 
3.5.5 The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Act 
In January 1995, the US Senator, Alfonso D'Amato: 
'proposed a bill that would prohibit any US-owned subsidiary overseas from 
conducting business with Iran or any enterprise owned by an Iranian citizen. 
This bill became the 1995 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Act, which also 
prohibited US oil companies from purchasing any Iranian oil for resale on the 
spot market. In February 1995, Clinton issued an order to prevent the 
US-based oil company, Conoco, from carrying out a deal to develop Iranian 
oilfields, and from June 1995 a further executive order came into force banning 
all American exports to Iran and all investment in Iran by US companies and 
their subsidiaries' (EIU Iran Country Profile, 1995: 9). 
Although the Iranian President Rafsanjani admitted in 1995, that his administration 
sought to form better ties with the US, he criticised the Clinton administration for 
misinterpreting Iran's intentions innegotiating a deal with the US oil company Conoco. 
Rafsanjani asserted that in forcing Conoco to abandon its deal with Iran, the US had 
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missed an opportunity to improve its relations with Iran (EIU Iran Country Report No. 3 
1995: 9). 
Although this illustrated Iran's willingness to forge better relations with the US, the US 
senator Alfonso D'Amato passed a new bill, in December 1995, which extended US 
sanctions 'to cover third countries and non-US companies dealing with Iran' (EIU Iran 
Country Report No. 1 1996: 8). The new bill was intended to intensify pressure on Iran 
by discouraging foreign companies from dealing with the Iranian oil industry, as 
Washington believed that oil was the main source of revenue for Iran, and was the 
source of funds with which Iran sponsored international terrorism (EIU Iran Country 
Report No. 11996: 8-9). 
The Clinton administration argued that the sanctions had been implemented due to 
Iranian sponsorship of terrorist activities within and outside the region; its continued 
efforts to subvert friendly governments through the export of the Islamic revolution; its 
opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process; its relentless pursuit of the material and 
technology needed to build weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear arms; and 
finally, its dismal human rights record. The most important point, as Ben-Meir argues, 
was that Clinton insisted that 'Iran continues systematically to undermine US interests 
and shows no inclination to change its ways' (Ben-Meir, 1996: 59). 
3.5.6 Saudi domestic problems 
However, despite tensions in the US-Iranian relations, since the Kuwaiti crisis Riyadh 
had pursued its own agenda towards Tehran. Evidently, the Saudi regime was serious 
about establishing a firm reconciliation. The rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and 
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Iran faced yet another test when, on 13 November 1995, a car bomb exploded at the 
Office of Programme Management of the Saudi Arabian National Guard in Central 
Riyadh. This office was the signals and communications headquarters of the military 
force, whose primary function was internal control, and was partly-staffed by US 
military advisers (Esposito, 1997: 63). However, the threat at that time seemed to draw 
little attention. The Saudi authorities refused to comment on the possible perpetrators, 
although some critics were quick to blame external sources, implicating external 
support from either Iraq or Iran. (The Financial Times, 20 November 1995). 
Another 'wake-up call' came to shake Saudi society just six months after the Riyadh 
bombing. On 25 June 1996, the explosion at a military housing complex (al-Khobar 
Towers) in Dhahran resulted in 19 Americans being killed and 264 casualties (The 
Guardian, 26 June 1996: 1). The bombing was preceded by several warnings to the US 
and British embassies, threatening attacks on Western forces in Saudi Arabia. 
Following Iraq's defeat in February 1991, most of the foreign troops had departed from 
Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, Riyadh was concerned about possible external threats still 
remaining, such as from either Iraq or Iran. It feared that Iraq, though momentarily 
defeated, might at some point in the future seek to renew its aggressive actions towards 
Saudi Arabia since Riyadh supported the war against Iraq. A very good example to 
support this fear would be the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait after Kuwait had supported Iraq 
during the Iran-Iraq War. Concerning Iran, Riyadh still considered it as potentially 
hostile. Hence, in response to a US proposal, Saudi Arabia reluctantly agreed that 
5,000 American military personnel could remain in its territory (Eilts, 2001: 238). 
Nevertheless, this stationing of US troops in Saudi Arabia caused the resentment within 
Saudi by the conservatives and militant fundamentalists. 
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As soon as the bombing in Dhahran took place, the United States Defence Secretary, 
William Perry, vowed retaliation if the bombing turned out to be 'a case of 
state-sponsored terrorism', and he indicated that the external sponsor might be Iran (The 
Guardian, I July 1996: 10). According to the American newspaper 'USA Today', 
which had obtained official documents, the Clinton administration was convinced that 
the terrorists who bombed the US military compounds in Saudi Arabia in both attacks 
of November 1995 and June 1996, had been trained in Iran (The Guardian, 3 August 
1996: 13). Clinton wished to punish Iran for its part in the bombing incidents, but it 
was never proven whether Iran had direct or indirect involvement in these two incidents. 
Again, on 2 August 1996, the American Defence Secretary, William Perry, hinted that 
Washington would retaliate against Iran if a Saudi investigation into the bombing of the 
US barracks implicated Tehran. He stated that: 'if we have compelling evidence of 
international sponsorship of that bombing, we will take strong action' (The Guardian, 3 
August 1996: 13). He also went further, declaring that he expected Saudi Arabia to 
conclude that there was 'an international connection' to the bombing in which the 
terrorists were trained or sponsored by a third country (The Observer, 4 August 
1996: 25), which would strongly indicate that Iran was behind the scene. 
However, despite such immense pressure, the Saudi investigation still pointed out that 
hard-line Saudi Sunni Islamists were responsible. One Saudi, Hani Abdel Rahim al- 
Sayegh, was arrested in Canada in March 1997, on suspicion of being involved in the 
bombing of Dhahran. Saudi and US sources indicated that al-Sayegh co-ordinated the 
travel arrangements of the Saudi dissidents who had been recruited by an Iranian 
intelligence officer in Damascus, and then sent to Iran for religious indoctrination and 
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finally to Lebanon for guerrilla training (The Guardian, 28 March 1997: 17). Again, 
Riyadh had no hard evidence to prove Iran was really the mastennind behind the 
Dhahran bombing, and tensions between the US and Saudi Arabia increased when 
Riyadh refused to hand over the suspects to the CIA, even following several requests to 
do this from Washington. 
One could argue that with the backing of the US, Saudi Arabia could easily blame its 
domestic turmoil on Iran. Charging the Iranians with masterminding the bombings 
instead of admitting to having dissidents of its own would certainly have been easier for 
the Saudi regime. However, in May 1997, the Saudi Minister of the Interior 
announced publicly that the government had concluded that there was no foreign 
involvement in the bombing and that all the actors were Saudis. The Saudi 
government notably refrained from issuing charges against any specific individuals or 
groups, including those in custody, despite the deep frustration of the US in its inability 
to proceed with any prosecution of the case (Fuller, 1999: 192). 
In sum, the US wanted to use the bombing incidents in order to punish Iran, and 
pressurised Riyadh to allow the bombing suspects to be interviewed by the CIA. 
However, Riyadh was on the road towards full rapprochement with Tehran post the 
Kuwaiti crisis, and this could be the reason to explain Riyadh's behaviour. 
The subsequent improvement in the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran started 
with the election of Iran's President Khatami in 1997, who expressed a strong desire to 
start relations afresh. Saudi Arabia, who once felt threatened by the religious 
revolutionary dimensions of Iran's Islamic Republic, now felt more comfortable dealing 
with a state driven more purely by political self-interest rather than by religious 
322 
Chapter Seven: The superpowers factor 
ideological fever. Relations between the Arab countries and Iran, which had already 
begun to improve in the early 1990s, showed dramatic progress after the election of 
Khatami, especially between Saudi Arabia and Iran (Fuller, 1999: 79). 
In the 1990s, one could argue that trends in the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran 
were only affected by the last remaining superpower; the US. However, at the same 
time, the Saudi regime depended on the US for military protection from both internal 
and external threats, while the US needed oil from Saudi Arabia for its own domestic 
needs. Although Saudi Arabia had utilised the US support to deter Iran from joining 
the 'Damascus Declaration', the Saudi regime also understood that it needed Iran to 
ensure its regional security. Therefore, Saudi foreign policy towards Iran evolved 
around its own self-interest. Accordingly, when the bombing incidents happened 
within Saudi territory, Saudi Arabia resisted the immense pressure from the US to 
accuse Iran which, in having not passed on the blame, managed to pave the way for 
rapid rapprochement between the two countries. 
However, the author predicts that the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran will 
always involve the role of the US in regional affairs. Saudi Arabia will be shrewd 
enough to utilise the US for its own policy towards Iran, but will not be totally under the 
US command to antagonise Iran. In other words, the Saudi regime will use the US as 
its bargain chip in its relations with Iran. 
4.0 Conclusion 
This chapter has developed around the neo-realist assertion that states behave in 
response to the nature of, and play within, both international and regional systems. 
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Iran and Saudi Arabia developed their relations vis-A-vis one another within the context 
of superpower relations and penetration of the Middle East region. The period until 
1990 was characterised by superpower rivalries, with both superpowers having defined 
interests in the region and instituting polices in pursuit of those interests. Saudi Arabia 
and Iran were both the targets of those policies, and players who responded to the 
policies at the same time as responding to regional power play by each other (and other 
states such as Iraq). At all times, regimes sought their own survival and to maintain a 
balance of power favourable to their own interests. 
Superpower rivalries and policies impacted upon *the domestic politics of both Iran and 
Saudi Arabia. The Iranian Revolution can be traced to some extent to the close 
relationship between the US and the Shah of Iran, and the latter's vigorous 
modernisation policies which had American backing. Saudi Arabia has had similar 
problems in maintaining its own regime legitimacy while depending on America for 
strategic and military support. 
To prevent the Communist threat to spread into the region, in the late 1960s, both Saudi 
Arabia and Iran became the policemen of the region, and the US provided huge 
quantities of weapons to them both. However, despite the attempt from the US to raise 
the power of both Saudi Arabia and Iran in the region, the balance of power still 
favoured Iran due to its huge human resources and extensive military capacity. Thus, 
Iran still remained as the unassailable power in the region during the late 1960s. 
Nonetheless, in the 1970s, when the oil embargo raised the profile of Saudi Arabia, both 
superpowers began to focus on Saudi Arabia's potential importance in the regional and 
world arena. The Iranian Revolution changed the balance of power even further. The 
new Iranian clerical regime alienated itself from both superpowers: from the US, due to 
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the hostage crisis, and from the Soviet Union due to the invasion of Afghanistan. 
Soon after the Iranian Revolution and the American hostage crisis, plus the hostility of 
the new Iranian clerical regime towards the US, the US changed its policy towards Iran. 
Consequently, this change enhanced Saudi's influence in the region, enabling Riyadh to 
overtly confront Iran for the first time in the history of their relationship. Needless to 
say, this would not have been possible without the support of the US. From the history 
of events in the period of the Iran-Iraq War, one can notice that the superpowers affected 
the balance of power and relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran quite immensely. 
For Saudi Arabia, during the Iran-Iraq War, due to its own regime/state survival, Riyadh 
attempted to forge a close relationship with the US. The US also needed the oil 
resource from Saudi Arabia so, as a result, both states forged an interdependcnce 
relationship. With strong support from the US, this enhanced Saudi Arabia's position 
in the region which increased its bargaining power to deal with outside threats. For 
Iran, due to its ideology, the clerical regime changed its foreign policy orientation to 
'neither East nor West' and alienated itself from both superpowers, finally becoming 
largely isolated in the world political arena. The outcome of this was that the balance 
of power between Saudi Arabia and Iran shifted from being in favour of Iran in the 
1970s towards Saudi Arabia in the 1980s. 
The end of the Cold War had a fundamental impact on the world in general, and Saudi 
Arabia and Iran in particular. The disappearance of the SovietlRussian influence in the 
region meant that the US became the hegemon in the world political arena. However, 
the US only acts as the external balancer against any regional state attempts to become 
the hegemon. The former superpowers are no longer in any position to constrain their 
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allies, and this has allowed both Saudi Arabia and Iran to have some freedom to conduct 
their own foreign policy towards each other. 
After the Kuwaiti crisis although the Saudi and US policies were interlinked, Riyadh 
also realised the need to accommodate Iran within regional affairs for counter-balancing 
the threat from Iraq. The regime survival still played an important role in shaping 
Riyadh's foreign policy towards Tehran. Nevertheless, since the end of Iran-Iraq War, 
the balance of power was in favour of Saudi Arabia of which Riyadh was not willing to 
abandon its new-found dominant position in the region. Saudi Arabia prudently 
utilised the support of the US when dealing with Iran. Riyadh sometimes used US 
support to exclude Iran from the regional defence pact, and at other times, resisted 
against any US pressure for them to antagonise Iran. The fact that both countries still 
attempted to gain the upper-handed position in the regional affairs for their own 
regime/state survival and at the same time, keep the balance of power in the region, 
demonstrates the neo-realist theory that balance of power plays an important part in the 
anarchical world system. 
In case of Russian or US involvement in the future relations between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran, one could predict that, due to the utter importance of oil in the world economy, 
both countries, due to their own geopolitical ambitions in the region, will always have 
strong interests in the regional affairs for their own economic benefit. Therefore, they 
will not abandon their influence towards Saudi Arabia and Iran. One could argue that 
the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran will always be affected by any superpower 
or superpowers, in the future. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
1.0 Introduction 
This chapter is comprised of three parts. The first section briefly reviews the 
preceding chapters, while the second part highlights how each factor affected the 
relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, assessing the impact of each factor, and how 
they intertwined. Finally, the concluding comment suggests that neo-realist theory 
provides a suitable framework to use in order to explain the relationship between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran but that certain qualifications to this assertion are appropriate. 
2.0 Thesis revisited 
From the discussion throughout the chapters, the thesis set out to understand the roles of 
oil, religion, Iraq, Bahrain, the UAE, and the superpowers in shaping the relations 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The researcher has argued that neo-realist theory can 
explain the behaviour of the two countries and their foreign policy towards each other, 
although with certain qualifications. The core elements of neo-realism include the 
notion that the state can be seen 'as a rational actor and that, although economics and the 
search for power both affect the state's foreign policy, power is more important than 
economics when external situations threaten regime survival. Maintaining the balance 
of power in a state's own favour plays a critical role in foreign policy thinking. This 
was discussed in Chapter One, where neo-realist theory was contrasted with other 
theoretical models. 
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Chapter Two established the context for the main analysis by setting the historical 
background. Saudi-Iranian relations were examined through the pre-WWII period, 
through the periods of state formation and consolidation, Arab nationalism, the growth 
of the oil wealth, until 1977. The historical investigation illustrates that in differcrits 
periods, relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran were shaped by a number of factors 
including oil, religious competition, response to the regional role of Iraq, regional 
disputes over Bahrain and the UAE, and the role and policies of the superpowers in the 
regional system. The subsequent chapters developed the impact of these factors further 
for the period 1977-1997. 
Chapter Three analysed how oil affected their relations as each state devised policies 
based on their own oil resources. The chapter argues that despite the importance of oil 
for both states' economic development policies, they have used oil principally as a tool 
for asserting their regional and international power. The 1973 oil embargo 
fundamentally changed the balance of power between Saudi Arabia and Iran as Saudi 
Arabia was able to enhance its own position as a major player both regionally and 
specifically relative to Iran. Nonetheless oil acts as a double-edged sword for both 
states, Saudi more than Iran, given the rentier nature of their economies and their 
dependence on oil revenues for their economic growth. To this extent, the 
determinism of neo-realist theory has to be moderated with acknowledgement of the 
importance of domestic economic considerations. 
Chapter Four examined how religion helped to reinforce the competition between the 
two countries soon after the Iranian Revolution in 1979. It highlighted how religion 
has been used as a tool to gain legitimacy for both Saudi and Iranian regimes; and how 
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both regimes have fought to control and influence the Muslim world through their own 
interpretations of Islam, using this influence to improve their positions relative to one 
another via international Islamic organisations and the 11qjj. 
Chapter Five assessed the role of Iraq, which was seen to be a country which evolved 
from being a regional player into an international villain, by invading both Iran in the 
1980s and Kuwait in 1990. Iraq's own actions in pursuit of its regional ambitions have 
threatened Saudi Arabia but also enabled it to consolidate its relationship with the 
United States and thereby increase its own regional power. The Iraqi invasion of Iran 
significantly weakened Iran militarily and brought an American military presence to the 
region which was aligned against the Islamic Republic. However, Iraq's invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990 and the 1991 Coalition war against Iraq reduced Iraq's own regional 
power significantly and opened the way for Iran and Saudi Arabia to embark on their 
own rapprochement. 
The penultimate chapter focused on regional disputes between Iran and two regional 
countries, Bahrain and the UAE. The chapter shows how Iran has sought to enhance 
its regional power through its pursuit of these disputes and how Saudi Arabia has 
exhibited differing responses as each dispute has offered different dilemmas and 
possibilities for Saudi itself. The chapter highlights the regional systemic constraints 
which help determine Saudi-Iranian relations. 
The final chapter analysed the superpowers' involvement in the region working on the 
premise that Iran and Saudi Arabia are regional powers within a penetrated regional 
system and that the superpowers have played a fundamental role in shaping that system. 
The chapter argued that during the Cold War, relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran 
329 
Chapter Eight. Conclusion 
were largely shaped by the playing out of superpower rivalries and the responses of the 
two states to those superpower policies. Since the end of the Cold War, however, and 
despite the extent of American hegemony in the region (which has seen a significant 
diminishment of Iran's regional power), Iran and Saudi Arabia have had a greater 
degree of power in determining their own bilateral relationship. 
3.0 The role of factors in Saudi-Iranian relations 
Both Saudi Arabia and Iran originally emerged as independent countries lacking 
prominence in world politics. Their foreign policy mainly reacted to the demands of 
external situations which determined their place in the regional balance of power or 
which threatened the legitimacy or survival of their ruling regimes. Prior to WWII, 
both Saudi Arabia and Iran were minor players in the international political scene, and 
made little impact on regional politics. At the same time, because Saudi Arabia and 
Iran did not have frequent contact with one another, their relations with each other did 
not show fluctuation to any great degree. However, the superpowers and regional 
events thereafter affected their relations in-different ways. From the beginning of the 
Cold War in 1945, Western interests were mainly concerned with preventing the spread 
of Communism, which resulted in the West and the US supporting both Iran and Saudi 
Arabia, although the former to a greater degree than the latter. This, together with the 
greater resource base of Iran, enabled the Shah to successfully aspire to Iranian regional 
dominance in the late 1950s and early 1960s. During this period Saudi-Iranian 
relations were shaped by superpower involvement in the region rather than by regional 
(Gulf) disputes, religious, Iraqi or oil-related factors. 
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From the 1960s, the importance of oil in the world transformed both countries from 
being minor players in the international arena into regional powers. Both Saudi Arabia 
and Iran utilised their oil wealth to consolidate their influence in the region. However, 
the Saudi regime was still unable to challenge the Shah's military power. Thus when 
the British announced their withdrawal from the region and the conflicts over Bahraini 
independence, Abu Musa, and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs emerged, Saudi proved 
more concerned with the Bahraini dispute (which threatened its own regime survival) 
than with confronting Iran over its regional ambitions regarding the other disputes. 
Iraq and regional conflicts only served as a minor cause of friction between the two 
states, but religious disputes became more notable after the Iraqi regime began to exile 
its ShVite leaders into Iran in 1968. 
The 1973 oil embargo altered this situation as Saudi Arabia's international status 
rapidly increased. Saudi Arabia not only gained wealth and confidence, but also 
joined Iran as one of the twin pillars of American regional policy. Its role within 
OPEC gave it new status and leverage, and offered a non-military arena in which it 
could challenge Iran's own regional dominance. The two states remained linked, 
however, by their monarchical regime interests, their alliance with the US, and their 
resistance to Communist infiltration of the region. Oil thus brought a change in the 
balance of power which favoured Saudi, although not sufficiently to allow it to 
challenge Iran, and which allowed it to give voice to grievances over regional disputes 
and differing regional interests. This caused concern in Riyadh that the shift of the 
ShPite centre from Iraq into Iran would enhance Iran's importance in the Muslim world. 
Prior to 1977 this religious factor did not significantly affect their relations in tangible 
terms, but signs were certainly there of the inevitable confrontations that were to come, 
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soon after the Iranian Revolution. The revolution brought a new regime to power 
which challenged Saudi Arabia in terms of ideology, aspirations to religious leadership 
of the Muslim world and its rejection of alignment with the United States. The 
revolution altered the superpower balance of power in the region, representing a net loss 
for the United States and a gain for the USSR. The latter proved short-lived as Iran 
rejected the Soviet Union's ideological and political interference and declared itself in 
favour of 'neither east nor west'. 
The Iran-Iraq War enabled Saudi Arabia to capitalise on new opportunities to increase 
its oil wealth and develop the relationship with America, despite its reservations 
regarding the credibility of American support for the regime itself given the failure to 
defend the Shah. Iran, in contrast, found itself under a military threat which was 
supported by America and the Gulf Arab states. Having rejected alliance with the 
Soviet Union, it was increasingly isolated and unable to counter the rising star of Saudi 
Arabia. The two states came into continual conflict over oil policies, religious issues 
which affected domestic regime legitimacy as much as external power projection, and 
the superpowers' military presence in the region. 
The end of the Iran-Iraq War was closely followed by the end of the Cold War and the 
retreat of the Soviet Union from regional power play against the United States. 
Although this left Saudi's ally and Iran's nemesis, the United States, as the regional 
hegemon, it also allowed Saudi Arabia and Iran to pursue bilateral relations without the 
constraint of superpower rivalry. This era has seen a tentative rapprochement between 
the two states, with Saudi Arabia making concessions to Iran on oil policy, the repairing 
of relations over the Hajj, and some reduction in tensions over regional disputes. 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait served to illustrate Saudi military weakness and reliance on 
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American security structures (and also Iran's isolation from these structures) but it also 
removed a potential threat from the horizon of both Iran and Saudi Arabia in the 
short-to medium term. 
This chronological summary illustrates the importance of the factors identified in 
Chapter Two for Saudi-Iranian relations. Chapter Three showed how oil has been a 
foreign policy tool. The Saudi strategy throughout the period studied has been to 
maximise oil revenues by maintaining production at a high level. At the same time it 
has been unwilling to press for any dramatic rises in the price of oil. In contrast, Iran's 
oil policy reflected its situation at different stages. During the last period of the Shah, 
Iran still attempted to maximise its oil income in order to support its transformation 
from being an oil based economy into an industrial based one. The Iranian Revolution 
changed the regime's policy towards conserving the oil resource for its long-term 
economic goal. However, the outbreak of the eight-year Iran-Iraq War forced Iran into 
taking the short-tenn view on utilising its oil resources. This intensified its 
competition with Saudi Arabia over oil policy. 
However, since the 1970s oil embargo, Saudi Arabia has seized the chance to become 
the unassailable player within OPEC. In the main analysis, the thesis concludes that 
although oil played an important role in shaping their relations, political consideration 
also affected the two countries' oil policy towards each other. The thesis showed that 
the oil factor has changed the balance of power between Saudi Arabia and Iran since the 
1970s, and the competition intensified in the 1980s due to the Iran-Iraq War. This 
period witnessed open confrontation between the two countries over the issue of oil 
quotas within OPEC and beyond. Because of the war, Iran lost its political, economic 
and military superiority in the region and Saudi Arabia seized the chance to suppress 
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Iran's influence within OPEC, and dared to use oil to force Iran to accept specific tenns 
and conditions. 
However, one can see that politics played a very important role in dictating their 
relations. Only after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 did Riyadh change its 
foreign policy towards Iran because it needed Iran's co-operation in regional affairs, to 
counterbalance the threat from Iraq. In this period, although both countries fought for 
domination within OPEC, they still attempted to keep good working relations. In the 
1990s the oil factor faded into the background again, and only served as a political too]. 
Although oil still played an important role in forming relations between Saudi Arabia 
and Iran, as neo-realist theory indicates, political considerations carried more weight 
than economic ones. 
From analysing the oil policy, one could argue that the oil issue will always be a source 
of disagreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which cannot be separated from the 
political situation in the region and the world. The oil issue will affect their 
relationship in the future but the political environment will also play the most important 
role when the two countries deal with oil resources. 
Chapter Four assessed the religious factor by identifying Islam as an effective force in 
providing or reinforcing national identity and political legitimacy to both Saudi Arabia 
and Iran. Religion has been manipulated by both governments to serve as a source of 
mass mobilisation, and to gain their legitimacy. Islam was founded in the seventh 
century in the Arabian Peninsula as the legitimate religion, and the sectarian division 
between Sunni and Shi'a forms of Islam also derived from that time onwards. 
Nonetheless, the division of Islam did not really cause any problem prior to the Iranian 
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Islamic Revolution. 
Soon after the Iranian Revolution, Iran promoted itself as the model of a true Islamic 
state with its ShPite doctrine that emphasised the link between religion and politics. 
The Iranian clerical regime wanted to export their vision of Islam into the entire Muslim 
world, but especially the Arab Gulf states, and this caused panic reactions from those 
regimes. Furthermore, the Iranian regime began to challenge the House of Saud and 
inevitably a strong confrontation followed. The clash between Saudi Arabia and Iran 
was played out on two interlinked fronts, the annual Ilajj and the competition within the 
Islamic organisations. 
Tehran utilised the annual HaJ as a platform for protesting against the injustice of the 
West, and also against the Arab states for supporting the Iraqi war effort which had 
caused religious friction between Saudi Arabia and Iran. This acted as main cause for 
Riyadh to sever its diplomatic relations with Iran which sent their relations into a nadir. 
Although both Saudi Arabia and Iran were the founding states for the Islamic 
organisations of the Muslim League and the OIC, from the discussion of this topic in 
chapter four it was clearly shown that Riyadh had utilised the Islamic organisations to 
be its voice. In contrast, Iran under the Shah had not paid any attention to the role 
these Islamic organisations held. The Shah only used the organisations as a tool to 
show his influence in regional affairs. 
Saudi Arabia seized the chance to become the most dominant player in the Islamic 
organisations in the 1980s. However, as mentioned earlier, in the 1990s because 
Riyadh realised its need to accommodate Tehran in the regional affairs in order to 
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counterbalance the threat from Iraq, Saudi Arabia began its rapprochement with Iran, 
and Tehran at the same time seized the chance to mend its relations with Riyadh. it 
regained the pilgrim quota and participated in the OIC conferences. The main triumph 
for Tehran was that it was the host for the OIC summit in 1997. From the discussion 
in Chapter Four, one could see that religion played an important role in shaping the two 
countries relations, although, political considerations still dominated their relations. 
Chapter Five investigated how the factor of Iraq had affected the relations between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran. Although the importance of Iraq emerged only after the Iranian 
Revolution, the impact on the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran was immense. 
The Iran-Iraq War was the most important factor which changed the relations between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran. Riyadh supported Iraq in the war against Iran, for fear that an 
Iranian victory would change the balance of power in the region. Consequently their 
relations deteriorated sharply and for the reason of Saudi having supported Iraq during 
the war Iranians protested this injustice during the annual Hajj. The religious and Iraqi 
factors intertwined with each other and greatly affected the relations of Saudi Arabia 
and Iran. However, in the 1990s the opposite occurred, as Iraq was the main reason 
behind the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Saudi Arabia initiated 
friendlier relations with Tchran and soon after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the two 
countries re-established the diplomatic relations. However, because of Iraq's 
geopolitical and economic, importance in the region, it will always act as a vital factor 
that will affect the balance of power in the region in general, and the Saudi-Iranian 
relations in particular, in the future. 
Chapter Six discussed Bahrain and the UAE, and assessed how these two regional 
factors affected the Saudi-Iranian relations. It showed that their affects on the relations 
336 
Chapter Eight Conclusion 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran was different. Riyadh reacted strongly over the 
Bahraini issue because of the ShVite connection. In contrast, their reaction to the Abu 
Musa, and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs issue was lukewarm when the UAE requested 
support. Although Riyadh showed its support for the UAE, they were reluctant to 
damage their own relations with Tehran, which is strong evidence of the neo-realist 
thinking in how a state conducts its foreign policy. 
Chapter Seven discussed the superpowers involvement in the region and their effects on 
the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. From the discussion in the chapter, one 
can notice that the influence of both superpowers on relations between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran often changed, depending on their own perceptions and needs. Also, both Saudi 
Arabia and Iran reacted to the situations imposed by the superpowers, and were seen to 
act as pawns in the Cold War game. However, the Iranian Revolution had a 
devastating impact on Irani an-American relations which, in turn, affected Saudi-Iranian 
relations. The superpowers acted in regional affairs purely according to their own 
political and economic needs, and by doing this, their policy greatly affected the 
relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, especially during the eight-year Iran-Iraq War. 
One can notice that the switch from a US policy of supporting Iran altered in 1979 had 
the effect of enhancing Saudi's influence in the region. For the first time in the history 
of Saudi-Iranian relations, this support allowed Saudi to overtly confront Iran on all 
fronts. 
For the Soviet Union, its influence over Saudi Arabia and Iran deteriorated sharply 
because of its own economic problem. The US supplied weapons to Saudi Arabia, 
which reduced the importance of the Soviet Union in Saudi Arabia. In the case of Iran, 
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the Soviet Union attempted to keep its relations linked with Iraq, and therefore, did not 
help Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. At the same time, the Iranian clerical regime 
changed its foreign policy as choosing 'neither East nor West' and distancing itself from 
both superpowers. 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait had a very important impact on the Saudi-Iranian relations. 
Also, during the gradual disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia lost its 
influence over Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the US became the unipower in the region. 
Although Saudi Arabia and the US formed interdependent relations immediately after 
and since the Iran-Iraq War, Riyadh still needed to accommodate Iran in regional affairs. 
From the events in the 1990s one can conclude that Riyadh utilised the support of the 
US to deal with Tehran. As the American administration regarded Iran as being a 
pariah state, and also being the main obstacle for any US domination in the region, the 
US utilised its political influence in the region to confine Iran's influence in regional 
affairs. This can be seen in action during the Iran-Iraq War, when the US sided with 
Iraq. Soon after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the US still attempted to exclude Iran 
from joining the regional security pact. Saudi Arabia prudently used American support 
to also exclude Iran from regional affairs. 
Soon after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait Riyadh realised that Iran could act as a 
counterbalance to the threat from Iraq. Therefore, although in the 1990s Saudi Arabia 
was under huge pressure from Washington to accuse Tehran of the bombings within the 
country, interestingly, Riyadh refrained from doing so. This indicates that Riyadh 
began to conduct its foreign policy considering its own interests in the region. 
However, since the US has been the hegernon in the region since the 1990s, 
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Saudi-Iranian relations are likely to be directly affected to some extent by US policies in 
the future. 
4.0 The limits of neo-realist theory applied to Saudi-Iranian relations 
The researcher chose the neo-realist theory as a framework for examining Saudi-Iranian 
relations because it best explains the formulation of Saudi and Iranian foreign policy 
and hence their relations in the time scale (1977-97) under study. Neo-realism 
attributes a state's foreign policy to external rather than internal factors and this suits 
and explains the two countries' foreign policy behaviour. As shown in this research, 
the two countries' foreign policy has been largely determined by external factors, rather 
than internal ones. The state has been the principal actor in determining the course of 
Saudi-Iranian relations. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia and Iran conducted their foreign 
policy based on rational criteria. Although economic, military and religious 
capabilities are important factors, political considerations, notably regime survival and 
balance of power, are the final determinants of their foreign policy behaviour. 
From the case study of the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran one can, however, 
notice the limitations to the usefulness of this theory of international relations. This 
comprehensive study of the empirical aspects of the relations between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran shows that the theoretical framework can be used as a guideline to understand how 
states conduct their foreign policy towards each other. However, at the same time, it 
still exposes the limits of the explanatory power of the theory for every aspect of their 
inter-state relations. 
For example, in the oil chapter, the nature of rentierism, and its role in determining the 
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foreign-policy of states, cannot be properly explained by the neo-realist school of 
thought. Also, the neo-realist school of thought, could not explained why since the 
Iranian Revolution, ideology/religion temporarily superceded regime survival as a 
contributor to Iranian policy towards Saudi Arabia, and the role played by ulenza and 
officials which showed the neo-realists school entirely ignore the domestic composition 
of political elites which lead to question and challenge the definition of state by the 
neo-realism. In additions, the neo-realist school could not explain that during the 
Tanker War, the Iranian regime acted as an irrational actor in the action against both 
superpowers and opened another battlefield which Iran itself could never win. 
Furthermore, non-state actors such as OPEC, OAPEC and ulenia, have played a 
significant role in determining the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the evidence 
of the internal/domestic factors can also influence the outcome of state foreign policy. 
However, the researcher believes that due to the nature of Saudi Arabia and Iran, the 
actions of these non-state actors have been of minor importance. This has been shown 
throughout this thesis by highlighting the factors that have shaped the relationship. In 
other words, neo-realism provides, in this case, a framework for interpreting the 
relationship, and not a complete explanatory theory. 
Relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia are likely to remain competitive; however, 
both countries are also interested in maintaining some level of co-operation. to protect 
their own national interests. Competition mainly emanates from rivalry, when over 
expanding their influence in the Muslim world, and extending their control in oil 
production and pricing. Any regional conflict will affect the equilibrium in the region, 
and therefore, both Saudi Arabia and Iran need to maintain good relations in order to 
secure the stability of the region, and keep the balance of power in the region. 
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In the future, the oil factor will still play an important role to affect the relations 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran due to their rentier economy basis. This will only 
occur until the end of the oil era or the emergence of a new energy, such as natural gas 
or wind power, which will shift the importance of the region in the world economy, and 
may well diminish the importance of oil and change the fortune of both countries. 
Should a new source of energy be used, this will witness the importance of the Middle 
East region in general, and Saudi Arabia and Iran in particular, to dramatically decline. 
Due to the foundation of both countries, the religious factor is in the heart of both 
regimes, and acts as the legitimacy for both Saudi and Iran's regimes. Only a dramatic 
change of both regimes (of which, in the foreseeable future, the chance of this to happen 
is still extremely slim) and for both or either to become secular state, then the religious 
factor will always affect the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran on the issue of the 
leadership in the Muslim world. 
Both Saudi Arabia and Iran attempt to evolve themselves as being an important player 
in world politics, and therefore, they will still play an active role in the regional affairs. 
Also, the regional factors such as Iraq, Bahrain, and the islands issues will still play an 
important role in shaping the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, because any 
change will affect the balance of power in the region which will have a potential 
domino effect on their relations. In the foreseeable future, all these regional security 
factors will still play a very important role, and will affect their relations. 
For the superpowers, as long as oil still remains as the main energy source to generate 
the world economy growth, they will still keep very close attention on the relations 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and at the same time, they will still actively attempt to 
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influence/control both countries relations in order to suit their own political and 
economic needs. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran, as the regional players, cannot avoid - or 
escape - the will of a superpower, and this, in the long run, will always effect their 
relations. In short, in the foreseeable future, both Saudi Arabia and Iran will continue 
to act towards each other within the established framework of the neo-realism theory. 
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